



*Routledge Advances in Translation and Interpreting Studies*

# TRANSLATION AND HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

**A TRANSFORMATIVE, SOCIO-NARRATIVE APPROACH  
TO A.V. MILLER'S COLD-WAR RETRANSLATIONS**

David Charlston



# Translation and Hegel's Philosophy

This volume engages with translations of philosophy as complex, socially structured narratives bound by emotional, political and philosophical connections, exploring these dynamics at work in A.V. Miller's Hegel translations and retranslations published between 1969 and 1986. The book contextualises Miller's lifelong commitment to Hegel and builds on this narrative to lay the foundations for its socio-narrative, Bourdieusian and feminist theoretical frameworks, applied to the texts and paratexts of Miller's six retranslations. The volume's plurifocal sociological approach both illuminates the role of translators and publishers of philosophy in the "great transformation" of political liberalism and subsequently seeks to transform understanding about the ethical responsibilities of translators of philosophy in communicating values of diversity and change in political thinking. In highlighting the value of sociologically-grounded analyses of translations of philosophical works, this book is key reading for students and scholars in translation studies, German studies, continental and feminist-informed philosophies.

**David Charlston** has been working as a freelance translator for over twenty years. He recently completed his PhD in Translation Studies at the University of Manchester, UK.

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# Translation and Hegel's Philosophy

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Approach to A.V. Miller's Cold-War  
Retranslations

David Charlston



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To the

'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I'

(Hegel and Miller 1977: 110)



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# Preface

I recently remarked to David that the series of coincidences which had made us aware of each other's existence and which eventually resulted in his book, was a tale worth the telling and he invited me to write a preface. This is it; the context in which David's book sits. The human back story that makes sense of the whole.

In 1991 Arnold Miller died and thus ended his life's work as Hegelian philosopher, translator and passionate believer in the maturing consciousness of the Earth as an organic whole within which individuals, nations and empires shaped their social and political mores and values.

In 1991 David Charlston began his career as a professional translator of German into English and had already developed a specific interest and passion for Hegelian translations and the role of the translator in potentially contributing to the ethics of political and social development. He soon became aware of Arnold Miller and his strategic role in bringing Hegel to the English-speaking world and resolved to put him at the centre of his postgraduate studies.

Something else happened in 1991 that would eventually bring the parallel lines of our individual journeys into paths that crossed and which connected Arnold, David and me. A few days after Arnold died, I found myself writing what I felt was a personal and private tribute to my father. It seemed to develop a life of its own and became a published obituary. With publication I realised that I was hoping for a torch bearer to step on to the stage and continue Arnold's work. Alas, it was not to be. Twenty-three years elapsed and I began to think: "Not in my lifetime."

David travelled extensively to gather primary source material about Arnold. Ludlow, Essex, Miserden, Whiteway Colony . . . (Only six miles away now. So near and yet so far) and finally Stroud. Each strand played its part and each strand seemed to have a life of its own, its presence repeatedly and unaccountably withheld by an invisibly orchestrated timetable. And David and I still did not know that there were strands and timetables, visible or invisible, and neither did we know that the other existed.

In 2010 David was driving with his wife, Lin, and her artist friend Liza from Ludlow to Presteigne. Liza, who did not know David, later

told me that she made polite conversation by asking David what was his line of work? When he replied that he was a translator with a focus on the translation of Hegelian philosophy from German into English, Liza dropped her bombshell. "That would be Arnold Miller then," she stated. I like to think that David at least swerved in shock! Liza explained that she and I (then Mary Miller) had been best friends in the 60s and early 70s but had lost touch some 40 years before. Search engines to find me drew a blank. And I had independently looked online for Liza but to no avail. David continued to gather as much information about Arnold as he could.

In late August 2014 I opened my university mailbox to find an e-mail, from a Dr Robert Hartley of the Old Camdenians, (formerly Hilldrop Road Secondary School, Islington, London) asking for information about Arnold to list in the record of Old Camdenians' achievements. I found it ironic that he was asking which university Arnold had been to! As an aside he mentioned a Dr David Charlston who had made Arnold Miller and Hegel translations central to his PhD studies and I noticed that he had copied David into the e-mail. I replied enthusiastically to Dr Hartley, offering any further information he might want and including my contact details. With some trepidation I copied David into the reply. Privately I dared to let the whisper of a question enter my mind. Could this possibly herald the advent of the long-awaited torch bearer?

I did not have to hold my breath for long. The next morning the phone rang and a hesitant David Charlston introduced himself. Nearly three hours later we were firm A.V. Miller and Hegel friends. "And you have answered my entire list of questions without me asking a single one of them," said David delightedly.

As I hung up, I realised that the date was 2nd September. My parents' wedding anniversary. The gods had relented. The parallel lines had met, not at infinity, but by curving into the full circle which has now, five years later, given birth to David's book.

Within weeks David, Lin and I had met at Liza's. There was so much catching up to do over a delicious meal, with inspiring and illuminating conversation which set the scene for the years to come. Despite David's best efforts he had been unable to obtain a copy of the obituary and only got to read it, my copy, when we first met at Liza's. David and Lin visited me in Stroud and I was able to arrange a visit with them to "Rivendell," my parents' (and later my) old home at Whiteway Colony.

Since then David has been a regular visitor to Stroud and over the fish (but no chips!) which he brings with him up the long hill to my home, we talk and talk focussing on Arnold and Hegel in the context of history and social mores, with lively debates about patriarchal philosophy and the role of women, the relationship between intellect and emotional literacy in philosophy, the ethics of translation – interpretative or prescriptive? and never enough time to say it all before the next train home to Ludlow.

The strands and coincidences continue to hallmark the process. When clarification has been needed to justify or confound an interpretation, I have been immediately led to a primary source hidden within a pile of documents where the requisite evidence emerges into plain sight. This journey with David has been for me, a joyous dialogue of friendship. I have so valued his knowledge and scholarship, his open mindedness, his passionate commitment to Hegel and Arnold, the ethics of the translator's role, why translation matters and the laughter we have shared along the way.

He has asked me to include the German inscription which Arnold wrote to me in my volume of the *Logic*, signed and dated March 1969. We have added a translation for readers unfamiliar with German.

Ein noch gesundes Herz hat noch den Mut, Wahrheit zu verlangen  
. . . . Der Mut der Wahrheit, Glauben an die Macht des Geistes, ist  
die erste Bedingung des philosophischen Studiums. Hegel.

(Inaugural Address, Delivered at the  
University of Berlin, 22 October 1818)

A heart which is still in good health still has the *courage* to demand  
truth . . . *The courage of truth and faith in the power of the spirit* is  
the primary condition of *philosophical study*.

(*Hegel's Political Writings*, translated by  
H.B. Nisbet, edited by Lawrence Dickey and  
H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press,  
Cambridge, 1999: 184)

But what of the first torch bearer, Francis Sedlák? Sedlák who translated the *Logic* and then burned the beautifully handwritten manuscript in anger and despair after repeated and relentless rejections by every publisher? I have always felt this was a tragedy not only for Sedlák but also for Hegel's *Logic* and that the fire was unequivocally destructive. Lately I find I have opened up to other possibilities. Fire is transformative and is a worthy symbol of renewal. The flames that destroyed Sedlák's manuscript also lit the torch of the next torch bearer, Arnold Miller. Now David has taken on the role. He carries that same belief in the power of the fiery spirit that seeks to serve the voice of truth.

Mary Lettington  
November 2019

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The idea for this book took shape only after a series of coincidences which led to my meeting with Mary Lettington. Her willingness to share her profound understanding and insightful critique of her father's work through letters, e-mails and conversations has inspired and sustained me. I am especially grateful for Mary's permission to use the obituary, family photographs and materials from her father's library and notes in the present monograph. In view of the book's focus on her father, direct contact with Mary has added a vital personal dimension which could not have been achieved through analysis of texts and archives alone. This is not said to diminish the importance of these valuable resources but only to underline my gratitude to Mary for the energy, inspiration and constructive criticism she has generously given. Although the book is described as a monograph, the intellectual and emotional effort of writing it has been collaborative almost from the beginning. Conversations and correspondence elaborating on details given in the obituary which Mary authored, have shaped the open, participatory and dialogic character of the three biographical chapters in Part Two and contributed significantly to the entire book. Mary has shared her experiences of life on Whiteway Colony; she grew up with the many stories about Sedlák, Nellie Shaw, the wars and, of course, Hegel. Her narratives are interwoven throughout this book as a welcome gift to translation-studies research.

Other friends and colleagues have also contributed to the writing of this book at different times and to a different extent. I am grateful to colleagues I have met at conferences, seminars and other events organised by the Centre of Translation and Intercultural Studies (CTIS) at the University of Manchester, where I was kindly granted the status of Honorary Research Fellow; and to members of the Genealogies of Knowledge project team and the International Association for Translation and Interpreting Studies (IATIS) for keeping me in touch with developments in translation studies. This applies especially to my colleagues on the editorial team of the IATIS online journal, *New Voices in Translation Studies*. Without the many gestures of interest, support and encouragement I have



received through my membership of the Hegel Society of Great Britain and the Hegel Society of America I would have felt a complete outsider to the world of Hegelian philosophy.

Although too many friends and colleagues have contributed for me to name everyone individually, I would like to express personal thanks to Ruth Abou Rached, Mona Baker, Owen Barfield, Andrew Brown, Yvonne Browne, Lin Charlston, William Charlston, Jim Devin, Lisa Foran, Ann Hardie, Terry Hardie, Liza Harding, Stephen Houlgate, Michael Grendon, Kirsten Malmkjaer, Maeve Olohan, Terry Pinkard, Stella Sandford, Robert Stern and Nicholas Walker, all of whom have helped me with this book in practical ways as well as offering encouragement, affirmative critique and moral support.

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Part One

# Unfolding a Democratically Responsive Theoretical Approach



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# 1 Hegel, Miller and the “Cold-War” Transformation of Liberal Thought

## Introduction

Mary Lettington, one of Arnold Miller’s two daughters, had arranged this first visit to the translator’s former home and driven us up to the Whiteway Colony. After brief introductions, Mary took my wife Lin and me over to the window. The desk was piled high with Yvonne’s books: philosophy, literature and art. “This is where Arnold sat when he translated Hegel. He used to ‘stretch his eyes,’ looking out at that tree.” The house, originally a “self-build,” the garden and the tree are in Whiteway, still described as a “Tolstoyan anarchist colony” in Gloucestershire, where the Millers lived when Mary’s father, Arnold, completed the Hegel translations. Yvonne, a retired English teacher who was working on her PhD, had moved into “Rivendell” 15 years before and kindly invited Mary to show us around.<sup>1</sup> I had just finished my PhD. Translation Studies. Hegel in translation. Lin was about to begin hers at Manchester School of Art. When Mary showed us the view from what used to be Miller’s workplace, I couldn’t help thinking about the tree in Hegel’s *Phenomenology*.

I, *this* ‘I’, assert then the ‘Here’ as a tree, and do not turn round so that the Here would become for me *not* a tree; also, I take no notice of the fact that another ‘I’ sees the Here as *not* a tree, or that I myself at another time take the Here as not-tree, the Now is not-day. On the contrary, I am a pure [act of] intuiting; I, for my part, stick to the fact that the Now is day, or that the Here is a tree; also I do not compare Here and Now themselves with one another, but stick firmly to *one* immediate relation: the Now is day.<sup>2</sup>

(Hegel and Miller 1977: 62–63)

I wondered if Miller had written these words while looking at the tree in his own garden. They *are* Miller’s words, Miller’s sentences, Miller’s square brackets, italics and single quotes, characterisation and narrative framing. The firmly asserted “I” was Miller. The “Here” was the view of Miller’s tree. In a sense, the English text is “not-Hegel”; it is a translation,

#### 4 A Democratically Theoretical Approach

a shared piece of writing, a performative act. It is an inseparable part of Miller's story. This surprising claim, which has significant socio-political and philosophical implications, can be formulated more precisely by suggesting that the language and narrative features of Miller's translations are inextricably embedded in the many intersecting and sometimes contradictory narratives surrounding and forming the translator's life. The present volume investigates the dynamic relationship between a translator of philosophy, his/her work and its reception using a theoretical framework designed to provide transferable information. The book is intended specifically for translation-studies researchers interested in social contextualisation, gender-related performativity and the retranslation of philosophy. A further objective is to suggest new, more attentive, participatory and transformative ways of reading and enjoying Miller's and Hegel's work.

My own interest in Hegel intersects with Robert Schumann. I wrote my MMus dissertation on Schumann's piano music and read many of his and his wife's letters and diaries. Schumann's student roommate, Flechsig, attended Hegel's lectures around 1828–1830, and Flechsig and Schumann had terrible rows about Hegel. So, I became interested in Hegel.

When I first approached Arnold Miller's translation of the *Phenomenology*, I loved reading it but found it difficult to understand, in some ways more difficult than the German. But that's because I've spent so many hours reading and translating German. Miller's address at "Rivendell, Whiteway, near Stroud," intrigued me. I had been a translator myself for about 20 years at this time, and the address suggested to me that A.V. Miller was a real person with a hidden identity. I started looking for little clues in the writing. The most evocative single word I remember was "sunburst" (as a translation of *Blitz* – it's the flash of new life when a baby is born (Hegel and Miller 1977: 7)). The word "sunburst" prompted me with thoughts of 1930's English interior design rather than 1807 Germany. A popular symbol of the Art Deco Movement. I found that amusing. Culturally incongruous. Possibly deliberate. A beautifully compressed, cryptic message, a translatorial re-membering (Flotow 2011a). I wondered, had Miller or Hegel ever seen or held a newborn baby?

When I found out much later that Arnold was an outsider to academic philosophy – i.e. not a university professor – that made me even more intrigued. I've since come to think of the translations as somehow performative. In addition to translating Hegel, Miller was showing me something about himself, his hidden, gender-specific and age-related sense of identity. I thought about the millions of words I had translated, and that, as a translator, my life had not been "measured out in coffee spoons" but somehow encrypted in or grafted onto other people's words.

The approach throughout the book is based on the following assumptions. Miller's translations and retranslations were made in a historically situated social space formed by intersecting narratives, the many stories circulating in the discourse around the translated books. They continue

to contribute to the ongoing transformation of that social space. But the social space was and still is differentiated by the distribution of power between groups and individuals. Narratives influence how power is distributed and how individuals and groups think of themselves, construct, negotiate and perform their various identities. The shared products, processes and participants of translation are fundamental to this analysis because translation re-narrates the transfer of information, the accumulation and distribution of power as well as the formation, transformation and performance of individual and group identities.

The Miller translations are woven into this tapestry in a unique manner. Hegel’s books, which were written in German, form part of academic discourse. They can be described as canonical texts with a relatively small, highly educated readership. As such, they are entwined with an important dimension of institutionalised power. As philosophical texts, Hegel’s books are concerned with investigating and determining “intelligent, clear-headed” or “rigorous and disciplined” ways of conceiving the basic categories of thought (Houlgate 2006: 11) or finding ways of thinking which are reliable in practice. But from a broader sociological perspective, there is a circularity and a self-fulfilling prophecy associated with this hegemonic discourse. Only those with power in the form of education have access to the discourse which accordingly becomes a self-determining feature and source of power. For most people, philosophical discourse remains inaccessible, irrelevant, esoteric. Crucially, however, regulating access to philosophical discourse through publishing, censorship and translation can change the distribution of power. Think of Karl Marx.

Between 1969 and 1986, Arnold Vincent Miller (1899–1991) published six English retranslations of Hegel’s works from German. The published books cover around 2,700 pages, including forewords, prefaces, introductions, contents pages, a small proportion of which had been written by editors. Given the notorious difficulty of Hegel’s texts, translating these books and taking them through to publication represents an immense personal commitment and a considerable volume of intense intellectual work for a retired civil servant from London. The first of the translations, Hegel’s *Science of Logic* (Hegel and Miller 1969) was published when Miller was 70 years old; the last, *The Philosophical Propaedeutic* (Hegel and Miller 1986), when he was 87. Analysing motivational factors in terms of “multiple causation” (Hanna 2016) and the sense of “performativity” (Butler 1988; Flotow 2011; Parker and Sedgwick 1995a: 2–3) behind Miller’s translations of Hegel can help us to comprehend the translations and their receptions more fully and to evaluate the troubling sense that the Cold-War Hegel revival, of which these translations form a significant part, might have inadvertently contributed to social, political and philosophical outcomes diametrically opposite to its instigators’ intentions. While the Hegelians sought to defend Hegel against accusations of totalitarianism and to restore belief in a rational, philosophical



and spiritual basis for personal and political freedom, their efforts were overcome by the growth of “neoliberalism” (Brown 2015; Davies 2017; Harvey 2005), a new socio-economic world order in which even philosophical discourse is subservient to the freedom of market forces. Against this background, the analysis suggests the need for tentative rethinkings of the “narrative coherence” (Baker 2006/2018: 143–152) and practical implications of Miller’s re-narration of Hegel’s philosophy of freedom, from our own very different, contemporary perspectives, as it were, from this “dispirited” side of “the great transformation” (Polanyi 1944).

## **Aims and Theoretical Considerations**

A preliminary aim of the book is to examine the personal background to Miller’s work, analysing and reformulating some of the narratives surrounding his intimate commitment to Hegel’s philosophy to piece together how and why Miller came to translate these books. In a sense which will be explained in greater detail in Chapter 2, these “personal” or “ontological” narratives shape or “frame” the language of the translations themselves. However, the significance of translation is never limited to the narrowly linguistic (Cronin 2003: 2–3). This is especially true of the translation of philosophy, and the relevance of Miller’s work spreads outwards beyond that of a personal, academic achievement limited within one discipline. As already suggested, complex political motives and far-reaching cultural consequences are associated with the late twentieth-century Hegel revival in which the publication of Miller’s translations played a key role. Socio-narrative theory encourages engagement with a broad range of narratives, academic as well as anti-academic, used strategically by people in different situations to renegotiate terms and conditions which are relevant to their lives, “informing and forming” (Shread 2011) the world in which we and they live. The investigation does not shun the unphilosophical.

The overarching theoretical aim of this case study is therefore to investigate intersecting layers and strands of narrativity (Bal 1997) loosely connecting the translator, the translations and their dynamic social and political environments. Building on developments in socio-narrative theory (Baker 2005, 2006/2018; Harding 2012), Bourdieusian approaches to translation and intercultural studies (Charlston 2012, 2013; Hanna 2016; Inghilleri 2005) and aspects of feminist translation studies (Flotow 2011; Flotow 2014; Shread 2011), the book investigates six primary texts,<sup>3</sup> the Miller translations and retranslations, probing, in this chapter, for example, how these texts have contributed to the ongoing metanarrative of re-conceptualisation and re-narration of liberal and neoliberal political theory (Bird 2006; Blackburn 2001; Brown 2015; Harvey 2005).

With reference to different types of narrative, including the “personal” as well as the “public” narratives, “disciplinary” narratives and “metanarratives,” in which Miller’s Hegel translations are embedded, the

analysis probes the continuing translation-assisted transformation of concepts of “freedom,” “universality,” “social (in)equality” and “the organic state” from their roles in post-war liberal political theory (Berlin 1969; Findlay 1958; MacIntyre 1972; Mure 1949; Nozick 1975; Popper 2003; Rawls 1971; Rawls 2000) through to their functions in very different types of narrative encountered in and beyond the precarious, hierarchical re-structurings of contemporary globalisation and neoliberalism (Brooks 2012; Brown 2015; Butterwegge 2007; Honderich 1994; Maeckelbergh 2009; Stone 2012).

Regarding the translated texts, the analysis draws on insights from theories of “lexical priming” (Hoey 2004, 2005), “paratexts” (Batchelor 2018; Genette 1997) and textual-analysis techniques associated with corpus linguistics in translation studies (Jones 2019; Olohan 2004). The analysis sets out to show how linguistic and textual features of such texts, including characterisation, emphasis markers, metaphor, re-focalisation, genericness, selective appropriation and social register, function with reference to “narrative coherence” and the “logic of good reasons” (Baker 2006/2018: 141–164; Fisher 1984).

Against this theoretical background, Miller’s translations are construed as “primary narrative texts” (Bal 1997: 57; Harding 2012: 45) located in an Anglo-American social space during the so-called Cold-War period, at a time when Hegel’s philosophy was highly controversial. The publication of the translations fuelled a revival of interest in Hegel as a philosophical champion of liberal and conservative politics (Findlay 1958; Houlgate 2008; Rawls 2000; Singer 2001; White 1975). But the translations were also associated with a reformation of Christian and Judeo-Christian religious philosophy (Fackenheim 1968; Kelly 1992; Pinkard 2007; Roth 1988). Moreover, through indirect association with Marxism, the translations contributed to the growth of activist movements in France and Italy (Debord 1994; Lonzi 1977). Politically engaged intellectuals and activists had long claimed Hegel as their ally or enemy (Beauvoir 1953; Beauvoir 1997; Lukács 1985; Mussolini 1938).

To single out one narrative strand, Miller’s translations contributed explicitly to a much publicised disciplinary narrative defending Hegel against accusations, especially from Karl Popper, that Hegel’s absolute idealism and particularly his idea of a hierarchically structured “organic state” were ultimately “essentialist,” “totalitarian” and therefore irrevocably associated with Nazism and Soviet Communism (Findlay 1958; MacIntyre 1972; Mure 1949; Popper 2003; Stewart 1996). Within a dynamic political “field,” the translations themselves constituted a valuable and contested “form of capital” for participants on each side. The translation of Hegel’s philosophy was not only inextricably interwoven with the politics of the day; it was a collectively orchestrated performative act in concomitant processes of secularisation, Americanisation and commodification of ideas (Bourdieu 1988, 1993; Gouanvic 2005;

Sapiro 2008). Studying Miller and his work with reference to this dynamic background of emerging metanarratives therefore contributes to our appreciation of the pivotal role his translations played in the complex transformation of classical liberal notions of freedom: from the idealist's self-determination and freedom of the spirit to the neoliberal materialist's freedom to buy and sell; from a fixed category of personal and collective onto-epistemology (Barad 2007) into a descriptor for asymmetrically competitive neoliberal market practices and their impact through economic globalisation or "economisation" on people and cultures throughout the world (Brown 2015; Davies 2017; Harvey 2005).

### **Fragmentary Narrative Strands, Cues and Pointers in and Around the Translations**

Miller begins the *Translator's Preface* to his translation of Hegel's *Science of Logic* (Hegel and Miller 1969) with a reference to "the current revival of interest in Hegel both in this country and across the Atlantic." He thus frames the translation with reference to the contemporary social and political context but does not give much further detail. He merely suggests that, 40 years after the publication of the first English translation (Hegel and Johnston 1929), the time is now ripe for a new translation, especially because of the ongoing Hegel revival. Like all narratives, therefore, Miller's account here is selective. It brings some ideas forward and elides or erases others. However, it is not difficult to pick up the threads of this particular disciplinary narrative – well known to teachers and students of philosophy. A fragment of this story, which is re-assembled here from clues found in and around the translations, introduces some of the characters, themes and terminology discussed in detail later the book.

In 1945, Karl Popper published *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (2003). The book was presumably intended to be optimistic, constructive, forward looking, as well as admonitory. It identifies the eponymous "Open Society" with western liberal democracy as it is to be developed in the aftermath of the holocaust; the "Enemies" are philosophers whose totalising metanarratives can be blamed for the two forms of totalitarianism closest and most haunting to the Open Society in space and time: Hitler's Third Reich and the contemporary, widely narrated "threat of Communism." The specific targets of Popper's attack are Plato, Hegel and Marx, all long dead, but their already culpable words and ideas live on perniciously, in translation, potentially contaminating the minds of present and future generations. In the relatively short section dedicated to Hegel (two of 25 chapters), Popper clothes his polemic in the devices of alliteration, assonance and metaphor, "In our own time, Hegel's hysterical historicism is still the fertilizer to which modern totalitarianism owes its rapid growth . . ." (Popper 2003: 63). One menacing implication of this extended metaphor is presumably that (totalitarian) philosophers must

be eradicated, rooted out or more reasonably perhaps, that their books should be left unopened and certainly not retranslated.

Popper was not alone in his suspicion of historical (or hysterical) philosophers; Bertrand Russell expressed similar views in his *History of Western Philosophy* (1946: 709–712). From a very different perspective, Carla Lonzi’s radical feminist attack “Let’s spit on Hegel” circulates and reinforces a similar anti-Hegelian, public narrative (Lonzi 1977). Hegel is portrayed as dangerous because his philosophy seems to threaten something people value, our security, our capital, our freedom. Popper’s colleagues in the Mont Pelerin Society, which he co-founded with Friedrich August von Hayek and others in 1947, were particularly worried by the threat posed to free-market capitalism by communism, socialism and some of the more humane but expensive social-welfare policies associated with the then current “embedded liberalism.” This early think-tank is strongly associated with the origins and the founders of modern “neoliberalism” (Harvey 2005: 11–12, 20–22). For Popper and his group, Hegel’s philosophy was synonymous with oppression, not freedom, at least not the kind of political and economic freedom they wished to see.

The philosophers Miller specifically acknowledges or mentions in his *Translator’s Preface* had all staunchly rejected Popper’s view which they considered to be based on gross misunderstandings of Hegel’s philosophy (Findlay 1958; Kaufmann 1972; Mure 1949). Their defence of Hegel was doubtless a contributing motivation behind the translation project and constitutes a further public narrative which, as we shall see, spilled out beyond its strictly intra-disciplinary, purely philosophical bounds. However, it is also evident from the language Miller uses in the remainder of the *Translator’s Preface* that Miller’s real motives for translating Hegel relate to a completely different set of more personal, ontological narratives dating back to a much earlier identity-forming period of his own, already long, life.

For example, Miller explains: “What the student chiefly requires for a fruitful study of Hegel is faith in the essential greatness of the human spirit and its ability to attain to a knowledge of absolute truth” (ibid). Miller’s comments here and elsewhere in the *Preface* frame a narrative of personal quest, a *Pilgrim’s Progress* towards knowledge, understanding and truth. Miller’s narrative refers to a different, symbolic form of capital, a different kind of freedom from the “economised” (Brown 2015) or “disembedded” (Harvey 2005) liberalism which preoccupied Popper and the Mont Pelerin Society. The quest is portrayed as an arduous, but fruitful spiritual journey. Miller cites Hegel’s term “die Anstrengung des Begriffs” which he paraphrases as “the effort demanded by the Notion for its comprehension.” The way Miller writes about the study of Hegel’s philosophy suggests more than just reading a book; this is to be a life-changing encounter, an intellectual struggle. We shall see later that Miller associated the commitment required here with a special kind of manhood

and brotherhood, and that this quest therefore articulates an aspect of male gender performativity (Butler 1988; Butler 1990; Butler 2004; Flotow 2011; Hutchings 2003). This is a quest which Miller, at the age of 70, had at least partially completed through his study and translations of Hegel. The translation of the *Science of Logic* was offered explicitly to help others, the “layman” as well as “professional student,” to set out on the same philosophical path to spiritual redemption. With reference to Miller’s life story as narrated in his obituary, we shall also see that Miller’s story was characterised by important turning points corresponding with Hegel’s linear, progressive account of the “ages of man” (Hegel and Miller 1971: 56–64), and especially that the later stages of development demand a rejection or overcoming of the conceptual rigidity identified in the earlier stages.

Instead of excluding Miller, his experience of life and his understanding of Hegel, from our reading of his Hegel translations, as if such personal or ontological narratives are no more than a distraction from the serious business of grasping Hegel’s (political or religious) philosophy, the socio-narrative approach developed here aims to include as much of the sociolinguistic and narrative context as can be found. Miller has been the invisible translator for too long. It will be argued that openness to what Miller encountered during his long onto-epistemological (Barad 2007) journey with Hegel offers valuable insights into his translational and performative strategies and can contribute to readers’ appreciation and use of Hegel’s philosophy in the contemporary world.

## Methods and Summary of Chapters

The present volume therefore takes the entire printed and published translations, including all non-translated material, such as translator’s prefaces, editors’ introductions and book blurbs, as “primary narrative texts” (Bal 1997; Harding 2012) which reframe the philosophical content of Hegel’s original German texts in various, more and less subtle ways. Miller himself, it is worth stressing, is the primary narrator. There are several other explicitly named or merely suggested narrators, modern and historical, including, of course, Hegel. The texts are analysed with regard to linguistic and textual details which play a part in this narrative reframing process, for example, reducing the “frame-ambiguity” (Baker 2006/2018: 105–140) of Hegel’s philosophy at the time of their publication by shifting the emphasis away from a (putatively totalitarian) left-Hegelian position, which portrays Hegel as the forefather of Marxism, secularism and dialectical materialism, towards a position more compatible with the then current “embedded liberal” (Harvey 2005) values of western liberal democracy, but also (perhaps unintentionally) pointing towards the “economised” values of modern capitalism and, for example, American-led, Judeo-Christian cultural imperialism and consumerism.

Understanding how the translation of philosophy can contribute to the shaping and contesting of historical conceptualisations of freedom will require careful analysis of intersections between different types of narrative ranging from accounts of the personal commitments of the translator to metanarratives (Baker 2006/2018: 44–48; Harding 2012: 36–43) framing the broad political aspirations of the academics, publishers and other agents in the “field of cultural production” (Bourdieu 1988, 1991, 1993; Hanna 2016; Sapiro 2008, 2010).

The book is divided into three parts. Part One introduces the combined socio-narrative, Bourdieusian and feminist theoretical framework with an extended example drawn from archival research at the Bodleian Library (Chapter 2). This is followed by a detailed analysis of macro-textual<sup>4</sup> and paratextual reframing (Genette 1997) including all six translations, their colophon pages, introductions, acknowledgements and notes, which are construed here as an integral part of the primary narrative text (Chapter 3). Clues identified in this analysis frame the dynamic narrative context forming and transforming Miller and his life; they point towards wider metanarratives of decolonisation, women’s liberation, global liberalism and neoliberalism; and they provide an intersectional basis for reinforcing and/or contesting these narratives.

Part Two explores the personal and social background of Miller’s life and work in approximate chronological order, drawing out influences relevant to his translations of Hegel and our contemporary understanding of them: Miller’s direct experience of Nellie Shaw’s early feminist activism and the “no-money” communism practised in the early days of the Tolstoyan anarchist colony at Whiteway (Chapter 4); the abiding influence of Francis Sedlák as theosophical and esoteric philosophical role model, fellow translator and Hegelian (Chapter 5); and Miller’s career in the civil service, marriage, family life, membership of the Church of England Men’s Society and his fervent opposition to the ordination of women (Chapter 6).

Part Three analyses selected excerpts from the translations themselves. Chapter 7 considers the beginning of the passage “With What Must the Science Begin?” from the opening of Hegel’s *Science of Logic* (Hegel and Miller 1969) using a variety of analysis techniques. Chapter 7 concludes with an analysis of a significant divergence in Miller’s translation strategies between the *Science of Logic* and the later retranslation of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Hegel and Miller 1977). Chapter 8 develops this theme of divergence between translations further with specific reference to the master-slave narrative, Hegel’s version of the Antigone story and the reception of these accounts before, during and after the time of the translation. Miller’s inconsistent translation of the verb *aufheben* in the *Phenomenology*, which he had previously translated as *sublate*, is re-thought in terms of Miller’s creative invention and performance of an age-specific and gender-specific identity role, differentiating the younger

Hegel from the mature philosopher. Brief reference to Miller's own published writings forms the basis for a concluding chapter (Chapter 9) which assesses the narrative coherence of the case study with special reference to the "good reasons" (Fisher 1984; Baker 2006/2018: 141–164) it furnishes for listening to this translator's story. By way of summary, therefore, Chapter 1 has prepared and framed the basic research questions underlying this book: What can a case study on Miller's translations of Hegel tell us about the relationship between the context of a translator's life and the content of the books s/he translated, and how might such insights inform and transform our reading of the translated texts?

## Notes

1. Yvonne consented to the references to her house in this book. She no longer lives on Whiteway, and the name of the house has subsequently been changed.
2. "Ich, dieser, behaupte also das Hier als Baum und wende mich nicht um, so daß mir das Hier zu einem Nichtbaum würde; ich nehme auch keine Notiz davon, daß ein anderer Ich das Hier als Nichtbaum sieht oder daß Ich selbst ein anderes Mal das Hier als Nichtbaum, das jetzt als Nichttag nehme, sondern Ich bin reines Anschauen; Ich für mich bleibe dabei: das Jetzt ist Tag, oder auch dabei: das Hier ist Baum, vergleiche auch nicht das Hier und Jetzt selbst miteinander, sondern Ich halte an *einer* unmittelbaren Beziehung fest: das Jetzt ist Tag" (Hegel 1970a: 88). Notice the micro-level discrepancies in emphasis between Hegel and Miller; this is discussed in detail in Part Three.
3. The primary focus of this book is Miller's translations and retranslations not Hegel's texts or the interlingual correspondence between various sets of texts. Of course, these are important factors, which are referred to throughout, but they are not the primary concern of this book.
4. I use the term "macro-textual" to refer to translators' large-scale decisions about which texts and authors to translate and in which order. Micro-textual decisions relate to smaller-scale textual and linguistic details, such as word choices, emphasis etc.



## 2 Intersectional Narratives in and of Miller's Retranslations of Hegel

### Introduction

In the late 1960s, shortly before the publication of the first of his Hegel retranslations, Arnold Miller, a civil servant approaching retirement age, initiated a fascinating correspondence and friendship with Owen Barfield, a founding member of the Oxford literary group known as the 'Inklings'.<sup>1</sup> Barfield was an anthroposophist and translator of Rudolf Steiner. He was an Oxford graduate. He worked as a lawyer, running the family firm of solicitors, but, like Miller, he had developed his philosophical, literary and esoteric religious interests mostly outside academia. In his first letter to Barfield dated 30 May 1968, Miller introduced himself archly "I am not an anthroposophist, but I am not unfamiliar with Rudolf Steiner's teachings and all your books are on my shelf . . ." (Miller and Barfield 1968–1986: 119). The letter picks out comments Barfield had made about Hegel, accusing Barfield of spreading serious misunderstandings. Although Miller had not yet published his translations, translation must have given him enough confidence in his knowledge of Hegel to criticise and advise Barfield on how best to study Hegel. Barfield was an established public intellectual who had already published several books but not specifically about Hegel. In the letter, Miller recommends Hegel's *Science of Logic* as the best place to start a serious study of Hegel and warns Barfield:

You are a German scholar and do not need a translation. However, don't rely on the Johnston & Struthers version of the *Wissenschaft der Logik*, it is in parts inaccurate and altogether it gives a most inadequate and misleading account of this fundamental work. It is for this reason that I have made my own translation which is being published by Allen & Unwin in July or August this year.

(Miller and Barfield 1968–1986: 119)

Miller's comment in this letter marks the tip of the contextual iceberg explored in this book. It signals the underlying presence of the most powerful personal or ontological narrative in Miller's life which drove his passion for Hegel's philosophy and for translation, the narrative through



which Miller formed and transformed his identity as a man, a virtually self-taught intellectual, a Christian masculinist and a key figure in the Cold-War revival of Hegel. Miller's reading of the *Science of Logic* and his frustration with the Johnston & Struthers translation (Hegel and Johnston 1929) are just a small part of a larger story. His tone in the letter introduces a vital, performative dimension, raising difficult but potentially useful questions. When Miller himself retranslated Hegel's *Science of Logic* (Hegel and Miller 1969) how did he try to improve on his predecessors' "inadequate and misleading" work? What was it that Miller found so objectionable about the Johnston & Struthers translation? Why was this so important to him? But above all, how can the hidden narratives embedded in Miller's translations be placed alongside the more obvious, public dimensions of the Hegel revival and made practically useful or transformative for contemporary researchers interested in translation and Hegel's philosophy?

This chapter draws on theoretical ideas from translation studies to answer these questions with a broad, exploratory historical narrative elaborated with supporting evidence, analysis and discussion. During the post-war and cold-war periods, against a rapidly changing background of anti-German attitudes (Ammon 2019: 123) and anti-Hegelian attitudes (Hayek 1944, 1945/1976; Popper 2003; Stewart 1996), there was a steadily broadening interest in the social and political dimensions of Hegel's work, especially with reference to Marxism in the French political scene (Kelly 1992; Kojève 1969; Pinkard 2007; Roth 1988) and the flourishing of post-colonial and feminist critiques of traditional Western philosophy (Batchelor and Harding 2017; Beauvoir 1953; Hutchings 2003; Stone 2016; Stone 2012). By contrast, Miller and his Hegelian colleagues sought to restore or revive a different, liberal but also more traditional, understanding of Hegel. Miller's Hegel was wary of revolution, cautiously open to liberalism but pre-eminently compatible with the patriarchal Christian values of the Church of England at that time. In fact, the anglophone Hegel was rooted in late-Victorian and Edwardian British Idealism (Harris 1995; Mander 2011: 17–22; Mure 1949). Beyond this, Miller and his associates were fascinated by the unconventional discipline recently described as "Western esotericism," which includes mystical and occult beliefs such as clairvoyance and reincarnation (Cohen et al. 1985; Findlay 1985; Hanegraaff 2013; Miller 1983a). The transformative, socio-narrative approach developed here is designed to expose intersectional tensions in and around Miller's translations. It will be argued that the translations themselves enact and explore a specific male-gendered performativity (Flotow 2011), contesting public narratives which emphasise the social and political dimensions of Hegel's work while reinforcing narratives linking Hegel instead with religious, metaphysical and mystical themes (Baker 2006/2018; Hanna 2016; Harding 2012). The analysis thus prepares the ground for an investigation, later in the book, of the

transformative implications of these findings for contemporary feminist-informed and post-colonial re-readings of Hegel based on Miller's translations. Miller's translations complicate Hegel in potentially useful ways.

### **Socio-Narrative Theory as an Approach to Miller's Translations of Hegel**

The aim of the chapter is to develop and apply a theoretical approach for analysis of Miller's translations and re-translations of Hegel which is familiar to scholars working in translation studies but also appropriate and responsive to the special features of this extended case study (Saldanha 2013). A combination of socio-narrative theory (Baker 2006; Harding 2012) with a Bourdieusian approach to translation (Hanna 2016), drawing on insights from feminist translation studies (Flotow 2011) offers a basis for describing, analysing and explaining the dynamically intersecting narratives in which the production and circulation of these politically influential philosophical texts were embedded, furnishing tentative answers to the research questions and suggestions for further activities.

Socio-narrative theory takes narrative as a universal (Alleyne 2015; Baker 2006/2018: 3–4, 141–143; Fisher 1987), as the basis for all meaning making and therefore also for all explanation. According to Alleyne, the “narrative mode of cognition” organises ideas and experiences into stories but, crucially, contrasts with the “paradigmatic, scientific mode in that it operates in an emotive or emotional and expressive register” (ibid: 40). Difficult questions, such as those raised by Miller's comment in his first letter to Barfield, can therefore only be explained with reference to their narrative context, that is, the narratives with which they intersect. Miller's distaste for the Johnston & Struthers translation and his lifelong commitment to Hegel's philosophy, both of which are evident in several places in the Miller-Barfield correspondence, are elements of broader narratives through which Miller made sense, in spiritual, philosophical and ethical terms, of his own life and the social, political and material world he lived in, and also, of course, Hegel's philosophical texts. Investigating these narratives provides an honest basis (inclusive of emotion) for understanding not only the macro-level decisions in Miller's life, by means of which he navigated a dynamic intellectual and social space, but also the micro-level translational choices which form the logical, conceptual spaces mapped out in Miller's retranslations of Hegel.

The narrative framework developed by Baker (2006/2018) is based on a simple typology of narratives progressing from a smaller and more intimate scale to larger-scale, more abstract and remote accounts. The typology comprises personal or ontological narratives (2006/2018: 28–32); public narratives (2006/2018: 33–38); disciplinary narratives (2006/2018: 39–44) and metanarratives (2006/2018: 44–48). Baker has defined and discussed each narrative type in detail, however, the boundary between

narrative types is not fixed. In fact, Harding's extended case study (2012: 25–42) adapts Baker's typology to fit the specific circumstances to which the framework is applied. Baker's seminal account also draws on previous sociological research to identify a range of more detailed features of narratives, including temporality (2006/2018: 50–61); relationality (2006/2018: 61–66); causal emplotment (2006/2018: 67–71); and selective appropriation (2006/2018: 71–76). Analysis of texts on this basis shows how these features are present to a different extent in different narratives. The concept of *framing* is crucial to Baker's use of narrative theory in translation studies (2006/2018: 105–139). Every time a story is told, it is framed in a different way, for example, for a different audience. This applies especially when a story is retold in a different language or a different cultural context, but *reframing* is an almost universal feature, even of narratives re-narrated in the same language.

Harding's analysis (2012) draws on the uses of narrative theory in literary studies (Propp 1968), especially on the work of Mieke Bal, who makes an important distinction between the narrative *text* (written, spoken, visual or other modality), the *story told* and the *fabula* (the event layer of the narrative) (Bal 1997; Harding 2012: 44–50). This distinction is particularly relevant to the discussion of philosophical texts, where the events narrated (fabula layer) are often abstract and elusive relationships, and the precise way in which these relationships are construed or narrated (story told) can form and transform our comprehension of the text. As with reframing, this feature is crucial to the translation of philosophical texts, across linguistic or cultural borders.

The theoretical framework developed further in this chapter serves as a basis for analysing and organising the ideas and resources investigated during my research on the life and work of Arnold Miller. In methodological terms the project can aptly be described as an extended case study (Saldanha 2013: 211–215). While it focuses narrowly on the work of one translator of Hegel's philosophy, the project is inclusive in the sense that it takes Miller, the translator, as a starting point for a broader discussion which draws towards it the translation *products*, the six Hegel books which name Miller as the translator, but also multiple networks of other *participants* who were involved in different ways in the *processes* associated with these translations and retranslations of Hegel. In this sense, the project and the book constitute a historical, sociological investigation of a specific aspect of translation *practice* (Saldanha 2013: 5), the contextual narratives, relationships and dynamics which motivated Miller to become a translator of Hegel, which guided and transformed his translational decisions, and which now offer the possibility of transformative, creative engagement with that practice.

The combination of socio-narrative theory with aspects of Bourdieusian sociology situates the project among the sociological approaches to translation studies developed in recent decades (Baker 2014). Narrative

theory was introduced into translation studies by Baker with special reference to *Translation and Conflict* (Baker 2006). Violent political conflict also forms the focus of Harding's book *Beslan: Six Stories of the Siege* (2012) which further exemplifies and consolidates this socio-narrative approach. The central feature of narrative theory (Baker 2006/2018) or socio-narrative theory (Harding 2012) which makes it particularly appropriate for the conflict situations to which it has been applied is its fundamental commitment to multi-vocal and multilingual democracy. Narrative theory eschews cultural and linguistic elitism by providing opportunities for sociologists and translation theorists to listen to the voices of ordinary people, the victims as well as the perpetrators and theorists of conflict. This allows researchers to analyse not only what a wide range of people have to say about the situations in which they find themselves but also to investigate in detail how first-hand accounts are transformed, manipulated or reframed, especially by the mass media but also by political authorities and marginalised activist groups. Socio-narrative theory invites analysis of the complex relationships between official accounts (e.g. of violent incidents) and amateur, spontaneous responses. This is especially relevant nowadays, in the context of the New media. But how can this approach be appropriate for an analysis of Miller's translations of Hegel?

Miller's translations and retranslations of Hegel were published between the late 1960s and the late 1970s by respected academic publishers, Oxford University Press, Allen & Unwin and Blackwell, during the so-called Cold War, a period of relative peace for some people in some parts of the UK and the US. For many other people, it was neither cold nor peaceful. The translations may therefore seem remote from the world of violent political conflict, more concerned with the ivory tower of academia and academic publishing than with the battlefields of the Middle East, Northern Ireland, Vietnam, Paris, Chicago, to mention just a few contemporaneous conflict situations. However, Miller – and most of his contemporaries, who were elderly men when the translations were published – suffered but survived both World Wars and much of the Cold War (Judt 2005; McMahon 2003). Although these biographical factors might seem irrelevant to his translations of Hegel, Miller was not unacquainted with violent conflict and, at the age of 18, even acted as an interpreter while he was a German prisoner of war. Miller died in 1991, just months after the reunification of Germany.

For an analysis of his work against the background of conflict, it is perhaps also important to note that the English translations were published in the aftermath of two wars with Germany: the source culture was the vanquished enemy of the English-speaking target culture. While they are not always immediately evident in the books under investigation, questions of hegemony, power, victory, superiority, dominance, cultural appropriation, censorship and symbolic capital, which are features of the discourse on translation and conflict in translation studies (Baker 2005, 2006/2018;

Batchelor and Harding 2017; Cronin 2003; Hanna 2016; Harding 2012; Mason 2010; Tymoczko and Gentzler 2002), are omnipresent in the following discussion of Miller's life and work. Indeed, as works written and published in the aftermath of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars and against the background of continuing European imperialism and brutal colonial expansion, Hegel's books occupy a similar historical position to Miller's translations: philosopher and translator were both coming to terms with a transformed, post-war world (Pinkard 2000, 2002). Having said this, it is not ultimately its association with violent conflict and the social dynamics it engenders which makes socio-narrative theory an appropriate means of analysis for Miller's translations of Hegel but rather its open, inclusive and potentially transformative aspirations. Like the feminist translation theories to be introduced later (Flotow 1997, 2011), socio-narrative theory has the potential to transform, not merely to describe, interlingual and intercultural communication.

Investigating the social space in which Miller's Hegel translations were embedded and the relationships of framing and reframing (Baker 2006: 105–140) between textual and contextual narratives – structures which will be discussed further in Chapter 3 with reference to Genette's terminology of “paratexts,” “epitexts” and “peritexts” – demands a comprehensive, socio-narrative theoretical approach for several reasons. As already mentioned, the various sources of information about Miller and his work – including archives of letters and tape recordings of Miller speaking, publishers' archives, a few articles written by Miller and direct contact with people who knew the translator personally and professionally – cannot give simple or direct answers to many of the relevant questions. But in Miller's unique case, the fragmentary diversity of information and sources, and the fact that he had no university education also has an advantageous aspect. Had Miller, like many past and present translators of philosophy, been an established professor of philosophy and prolific exponent of his own views on philosophy and/or translation, it would have been tempting and relatively easy to classify him in a dismissive, essentialist manner as, say, a “right-Hegelian” or a “British Idealist.” This would, to some extent, end further discussion and leave the social space surrounding his development as a philosopher and translator closed, remote and irrelevant. The fragmentary nature of the sources and Miller's unqualified, outsider participation in the field of philosophy necessitate a deeper and more imaginative transformation of more and less coherent narratives which impinged on Miller throughout his life and re-emerge, sometimes in even more fragmentary and elusive form, in the language of his translations. For socio-narrative theory, at least as construed in the present book, the narratives in and around the translated texts are the units of analysis and the primary focus of interest.

The next section outlines aspects of Bourdieusian sociology which will be useful as conceptual tools in the subsequent narrative analysis of the Miller–Barfield correspondence between 1968 and 1986.

## Miller's Translation Practice in the Bourdieusian "Field of Cultural Production"

A key publication summarising research on Bourdieusian theory in translation studies was the special issue of *The Translator* (2005).<sup>2</sup> In the introduction to this seminal collection, Inghilleri (2005) notes that increased interest in Bourdieu and other sociologists reflects a trend away from an exclusive focus on the textual products of translation "toward a view of translation and interpreting as social, cultural and political acts" (ibid: 125). At this time, adopting a sociological approach to the translation of Hegel's philosophy represented a radical departure from conventional discussions of translation and philosophy which tended to focus exclusively on accuracy, consistency of terminology, fidelity, literary style and readability. As Inghilleri explains:

Bourdieu's work has also made a significant contribution to attempts within translation studies to focus more attention on translators and interpreters themselves – to analyse critically their role as social and cultural agents actively participating in the production and reproduction of textual and discursive practices. In particular, Bourdieu's concepts of *habitus*, *field*, *capital* and *illusio* have made a valuable and unique contribution to the theorisation of the interaction between agency and structure.

(ibid: 126)

In theoretical terms, the elaboration of the concepts of *habitus*, *field*, *capital* and *illusio* mentioned here represents a method "by which to challenge the persistent dualism within the social sciences between subject and object" (ibid: 129).<sup>3</sup> Bourdieu's approach to the subject-object dichotomy is valuable not because of its novelty – many philosophers and sociologists have addressed the same issue – but because it provides a novel vocabulary and set of conceptual tools with which to analyse intransigent philosophical antinomies in a broader context of social significance. Like Hegel's *Geist*, Bourdieu's *habitus* is a deliberately elusive, insubstantial term which illustrates the almost paradoxical interdependence between individual, human self-consciousness and the wider social context, *field* or *space*. Bourdieu's terms are not descriptive of phenomena; they are part of a philosophico-sociological method, tools for thinking with. In practice, therefore, Bourdieu's approach is appropriate to the context of Miller's translations of Hegel because, despite the many differences between Hegel and Bourdieu, Bourdieusian sociology is predicated on the need to move back and forth between the empirical and the theoretical in a self-critical and self-reflexive manner, in Hegelian terms, between *Logic*, *Nature* and *Spirit*, the three components of Hegel's philosophical system.

While Inghilleri (2005: 125) stresses the importance of moving forward from an exclusive concentration on the textual products of translation “toward a view of translation and interpreting as social, cultural and political acts” (ibid. 125), this does not preclude the possibility of moving back again to analyse linguistic details of the textual products of translation as firmly situated within a view of translation and interpreting as social and cultural acts. The present analysis locates Miller’s translations within what Bourdieu describes as the “field of cultural production.” Against this background – the social contextualisation – details of the translated texts, shifts and differences between different translations of the same texts, become intelligible as accumulations and redistributions of capital articulated or mobilised through a coherent set of intersecting narratives.

The field of cultural production (Bourdieu 1993) relevant to Miller’s translations of Hegel can be thought of with reference to a world book market structured economically, politically but also linguistically (Sapiro 2008, 2010). During the post-war and cold-war periods, the position and prestige of the German language, especially as an academic language, continued the dramatic decline caused by anti-German attitudes following WWI (Ammon 2019: 236–246). In the English-speaking world, suspicion of everything German, including music, language, literature and philosophy, was expressed through a proliferation of public narratives linking German culture with the rise of Nazism and Communism (Stewart 1996). As in the case of WWI (Muirhead 1915), there were also attempts to rehabilitate German culture in the 1950s (Fackenheim 1968; Findlay 1958; Harris 1995). The Miller translations play an ambiguous part in the dynamics of this complicated narrative of punishment, forgiveness and admiration, because to translate a cultural product is, on the one hand, to value and respect its content and its originator but, on the other hand, constitutes a form of appropriation. The translations are de-Germanised, cleansed to a variable degree of their associations with German history and German language. While translation allows a “re-consecration” of Hegel’s philosophy in the new, post-war, Anglophone world, it also invites criticism from a much wider, rapidly growing English-reading public.

Pierre Bourdieu, who originally trained in philosophy before switching to sociology (Grenfell 9–10) described and analysed the social and political implications of philosophy, including translations of German philosophy. His writings, especially *Homo Academicus* (1988: 36–72) and *The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger* (1991: 83) emphasise the conflict between philosophy and the other university faculties. To the extent that access to serious political discourse, for example, through university courses and the associated academic writing, is made to depend on an understanding of specific, for example, German, philosophical texts, the translation and reframing of these texts becomes a powerful, if not indispensable, tool of rival political parties or factions.



The key elements of Bourdieusian theory, *habitus*, *field* and *capital*, have been further developed for use in translation studies by Hanna (2016: 15–72). Hanna’s analysis of the dynamic distribution of power and/or capital throughout society, especially the accumulation and preservation of “institutionalised cultural capital” (ibid: 39) in university philosophy departments, is particularly relevant to an understanding of Miller’s work as, essentially, the work of an academic outsider who was able to use translation to gain surprising and uniquely privileged access to the otherwise exclusive domain of academic philosophy.

Hanna applies Bourdieu’s account of the different forms of capital to the context of translation and translators (ibid: 38–42). Cultural capital is accordingly broken down into *embodied* capital, *objectified* capital and *institutionalised* capital. “Embodied cultural capital is concentrated in the range of knowledge, skills, cultural, artistic and political preferences which the individual agent possesses . . .” (ibid: 38). Alongside general skills, a translator’s knowledge of at least two languages constitutes a specific, embodied capital. “The value of this investment is determined by the convertibility of cultural capital to economic or social capital” (ibid: 39). Objectified capital exists in the form of material objects and media, and once again, “the value, symbolic and economic of the reference books, dictionaries and other translation tools that a translator possesses is conditioned by how he or she invests in them and transforms them into assets that help maximise his or her symbolic and economic profit in the field of translation” (ibid: 39). Institutionalised cultural capital takes the form of academic degrees, titles or awards certified by an educational or cultural institution. Miller’s accumulation and compensation of various forms of capital is investigated later in the chapter with reference to the different types of narrative in which he participated.

In Hanna’s account, the analysis of cultural capital also serves to introduce the further Bourdieusian concepts of *distinction* and *ageing*. In the case of a retranslation of a philosophical work,<sup>4</sup> a new translator or group of philosophers involved with the publication of the retranslation may distinguish their work from that of their predecessors by advertising superior qualifications, status or experience. In this manner, the institutionalised cultural capital of the earlier translator experiences the process of ageing. Social ageing is the process whereby any product within the cultural field is conditioned “by the ongoing battle between the consecrated and the non-consecrated, the established and the newcomers, the avant-garde and the outmoded” (ibid: 62). In this sense, Miller’s predecessors, the previous translators of Hegel came to be regarded as outdated, Victorian, nineteenth-century translators, while Miller, although he had no university degree and was already elderly at the time of the translations, was portrayed as part of a new, post-war generation. His translations were made with knowledge of the Holocaust, Soviet Communism, the nuclear bomb, women’s liberation, the New Left and the “counterculture.”



However, this knowledge and repositioning is expressed or suppressed strategically in the translations by selectively reinforcing some narratives and contesting others.

One further theoretical relationship identified through Bourdieu's analysis of the social dynamic is that of *autonomy* versus *heteronomy* (Hanna 2016: 52–55; Pasmatzis 2012) which results from the homologies, or apparent similarities between fields of cultural production. Although Hanna's analysis focuses on the context of Egyptian translations of Shakespeare, his analysis is transferrable to the field of philosophy in translation, and related fields such as the political and the economic. In the relationship between philosophy, politics and economics, philosophers sometimes assert the supremacy and autonomy of philosophy based on its "purity" or detachment from the contingencies of practical life. For example, logic is sometimes compared to mathematics and described as a "structural science" as opposed to the "natural sciences" and especially the "humanities" – in German the *Geisteswissenschaften* or the "spiritual sciences" (Ammon 2019: 269). By contrast with the purity and therefore autonomy of the structural sciences, the popularisation (or democratisation) of individual strands of philosophical narratives for political purposes introduces a heteronomous dimension which, as we shall see, can also be reinforced or contested through translation.

A further dimension to the distinction between philosophy and the neighbouring fields of theology, sociology and politics relates to what Bourdieu describes as the "elevated" style. A similar spatial metaphor occurs in popular narratives about the "ivory tower" of academia which elevates academics and especially philosophers above mundane concerns. According to Bourdieu, this elevated style reproduces the illusory legitimacy of the high social, political and academic status of philosophy.<sup>5</sup>

The 'elevated' style is not merely a contingent property of philosophical discourse. It is the means whereby a discourse signals itself as an authorised discourse which, by virtue of its very conformity, becomes invested with the authority of a body of people and especially mandated to exercise a sort of conceptual magistrature (with its emphasis on logic or on ethics depending on the authors and the eras). In learned discourse as in ordinary speech, styles are ordered in hierarchies, but they also create hierarchies. For a thinker of high status an elevated language is appropriate. . . . It is through the 'elevated' style that the status of a discourse is invoked, as is the respect due to that status.  
(Bourdieu 1991: 1–2)

In other words, it is the philosopher's refusal to engage in sociological or political terms with the issues relevant to sociology and politics which creates a superior, elevated positioning or status for philosophy, from which philosophers are legitimately empowered to legislate on the theoretical concepts

used in these allegedly lower and less pure fields. By framing their elusive discourse in terms of logic, metaphysics, theology, mysticism and literature, philosophers sometimes detach themselves from and elevate themselves above the mundane concerns of practical ethics, sociology and politics.<sup>6</sup> In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the philosopher's skilful, rhetorical use of philosophical language (especially Aristotelian, syllogistic logic) secured the defiant, elevated status, stance or *hexis* of some philosophers. Increasingly through the twentieth century, Anglo-American, analytical philosophers' appropriation of the more scientifically orientated discourses of symbolic or mathematical logic, linguistic analysis, psychology and even neuroscience fulfil a similar function. By contrast, however, an impersonal, impartial, gender-neutral, culturally inclusive or democratic style has become mandatory in modern academia but nevertheless fulfils some of the same elevating and distancing functions of securing the symbolic dominance of theoretical experts over practitioners and "ordinary thinking."

The supporting role of translation in establishing and even extending the scientific credentials and therefore elevated status of translated authors is well known in translation studies through the work of Venuti (2010: 21–24) who discusses an example pointed out by Bettelheim (1983) regarding Strachey's over-scientific, technicalised translation of the German term *Fehlleistung* ("faulty achievement" or just "error") in Freud's work as *parapraxis*. In my PhD thesis (Charlston 2012), I construed what Venuti describes as "peculiarities in the diction of the translated text" as a textual embodiment of translatorial *hexis*. Strachey's over-scientific translation embodies an "autocratic" *hexis* seeking to strengthen and unify the authority of Freud through closer association with the high status of science (in the 1960s when the translation was made); by contrast, Bettelheim's "humanistic," anti-scientific stance corresponds to a more democratically circumspect *hexis*. Miller's elevated style is used strategically to fence Hegel's work off from contemporary politicisations.

Bourdieuian sociology provides a framework for understanding the redistribution of capital and the dynamics of the overlapping sociological and political fields within which Miller worked. In a sense, all the narratives relevant to Miller's work are about the dynamics and distribution of capital. I turn now to a different nomenclature shared with writers in feminist philosophy and feminist translation studies which encourages a rethinking of the social space around translation in terms of its power to form and transform personal and collective identities.

### Hegel Translation as Intimate, Transformative Gender Performativity

One thematic strand which emerged from the personal narratives of Miller's life is the sense that his attraction towards Francis Sedlák, as a man, a teacher and a philosopher, and his lifelong, intimate commitment

to studying and translating Hegel were “formative” acts of a collective but exclusive, masculinist intellectual identity. For Miller, these encounters were life-transforming, “plastic” and “formative” rather than merely “informative” in the senses developed and used by Carolyn Shread (2011: 293, 2019: 324) and Luise von Flotow (Flotow 2014) in the context of feminist translation studies.<sup>7</sup> Translating Hegel did not just provide Miller with information about Hegel, his language and his thought; it formed Miller, contributing to his continuing development into the man he was/became. For Miller, translation was therefore a “performative” enactment of his emerging, negotiated identity as a specifically historically situated kind of masculinist man, with both senses of “performative” discussed by Luise von Flotow (2011: 4–9) in response to the work of Judith Butler (1988, 1990, 2004), Chris Larkosh (2007), Parker and Sedgwick (1995a, 1995b). With reference to the work of Kimberly Hutchings (2003), the next paragraphs outline the theoretical background to these claims about how translating Hegel contributed to Miller’s performative being/becoming a man.

In *Hegel and Feminist Philosophy* (2003), Hutchings explains that the generations of feminist philosophers responding to the early work of Beauvoir saw Hegel as a pernicious source of the essentialism which sought to define and objectify what woman is, as a fixed category, determined biologically and conceptually in opposition to man. Hegel’s philosophy was also perceived as a driving force behind the pervasive binary distinctions, for example, between “mankind” and “womankind,” “reason” and “emotion,” “self” and “other,” “nature” and “culture.” Hutchings explains changes in Beauvoir’s relationship towards Hegel between the writing of *The Ethics of Ambiguity* (written in 1944) and *The Second Sex* (written in 1953) (Beauvoir 1953, 1997)<sup>8</sup> as she develops her account of what it means to be or become a woman:

Within the text [of *The Second Sex*], the [Beauvoir’s] usage of Hegel departs from the pattern of *The Ethics of Ambiguity* in that, rather than the systematic Hegel being foregrounded in opposition to Beauvoir’s own analysis, the Hegelian account of sexual difference in nature and the Hegelian story of the struggle for recognition and its outcome are explicitly used as resources for understanding what it means to be/become a woman. In particular, Beauvoir’s attempt to think what it means to be/become a woman relies on framing her (woman’s) situation in terms of Hegel’s account of the emergence of self-consciousness in the *Phenomenology*, together with a particular interpretation of the relationship between nature (being) and spirit (existence), self and other, individual and social within this account.  
(Hutchings 2003: 65)

Beauvoir’s putative reliance on Hegel provoked a reaction against Beauvoir and Hegel among the younger generation of feminists. For example, in

1970, several years before Miller's work on the *Phenomenology*, Carla Lonzi, an art critic and feminist activist known as cofounder of the collective Rivolta Femminile,<sup>9</sup> openly attacked the exclusively male focus of Hegel's "servant-master dialectic." Lonzi's article "Sputiamo su Hegel" (Let's Spit on Hegel) begins with the words "Woman must not be defined in relation to man" (Lonzi 1977). The confrontational nature of the discourse at this time masked an emerging realisation that the categories of woman and man and the practical identity roles assigned to them were rapidly losing definition and moving into a period of radical, dynamic renegotiation.

After discussing Beauvoir's own evolving response to Hegel in a chapter entitled "Thinking the Second Sex," Hutchings devotes the next chapter, "Re-thinking the Second Sex," to three accounts of Hegel's version of the *Antigone* story written in response to Beauvoir by Patricia Mills (1996), Luce Irigaray (1985) and Judith Butler (2000). These are taken as representative of three developmental phases in the history of feminisms (Hutchings 2003: 81). Hutchings defines these as critical feminism (Mills), sexual difference feminism (Irigaray) and postmodernist feminism (Butler). In this context, Hutchings' discussion focuses on the role of Hegel's philosophy as a critical resource in the changing perspectives about what it is to be/become a woman, as articulated by these writers. Against this background of developing feminist philosophical engagement with Hegel's conceptualisation of woman, my suggestion is that an analysis of specific details of Miller's translations of Hegel can provide an additional critical resource by drawing attention to the ultimately unsuccessful attempt by Miller and his associates to resist feminist re-conceptualisations of gender identity by re-enacting an untroubled, hegemonic, masculinist identity. This suggestion draws on the insights of feminist translation studies into gender performativity and translation.

Hutchings' engagement with Butler's postmodernist view of Hegel in *Hegel and Feminist Philosophy* thus intersects productively with a significant disciplinary narrative in feminist translation studies which is relevant to my analysis of Miller's translations of Hegel and inspires a further development of the socio-narrative approach presented so far. In the Preface to *Translating Women* (2011), Flotow contrasts two aspects of performativity relevant to the translation of philosophy. For Butler, the performance of gender roles is predetermined by the "discourse" (Butler 1990: 198). As Flotow explains, "Butler parallels the performance of gender identity with the performance by different actors, of the same script" (Flotow 2011: 5). Flotow contrasts this "pessimistic" sense of performance, which seems to preclude individualistic ways of "doing one's gender" (ibid), with a more "optimistic" view. By contrast with Butler, Parker and Kosofsky Sedgwick emphasise the "intentional" and "active" side of performance, casting it "as a connection between saying and doing, or rather saying as doing" (Flotow 2011: 6). While gender performativity for these contemporary writers is concerned with "freely

living out homosexuality in the contemporary United States” (ibid), there is a parallel sense in which Miller’s apparently anachronistic performance of an intellectualised, de-sensualised masculinist identity through his translations of Hegel shares intentional and activist elements of their performance. Miller’s translations can be read as a re-enactment of an existing patriarchal script, but under such radically changed and changing conditions that the masculinist performance can equally be construed as intentional, active, if not exactly activist.

In a tape recording discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, Miller describes the experience of being demobilised after WWI. The soldiers were each given a bottle of beer to celebrate their victorious homecoming. The military authorities had probably based their decision on the reasonable generalisation that most (English) men like beer. As Mary Lettington explained to me later, Miller simply did not like beer; he handed his bottle to the man sitting next to him. Some men – witnesses to his performance – may have jeered at him for this, but for Miller, being/becoming a man – i.e. his male gender identity – was not formed through beer drinking. Even as a young man, Miller’s conception of manhood or manliness was more concerned with intellectual prowess, moral and spiritual virility, as Miller puts it “the effort demanded by Hegel’s Notion,” a commitment to the God-man relationship. Refusing the beer was a small performative gesture; it expressed Miller’s possibly idiosyncratic interpretation at that specific time of what it was to be/become a man. Miller’s adoption of “outwardly conventional” clothing by contrast with his “Bohemian” mentor Sedláč, his decision to become a civil servant, his marriage and conversion to the Church of England were also performative (and therefore exploratory, risky) enactments of his interpretation of what it is to become a man, a (self)-educated intellectual, a husband, a father and a member of local church community. Through the lens of feminist translation studies inspired by Flotow’s discussion of Butler’s concept of gender performativity, my analysis therefore also addresses the question of the extent to which Miller’s translatorial strategies – his imaginative, formative and transformative ways of using words – might also be construed as examples of a special kind of male gender performativity in Flotow’s sense of “saying as doing.”

### **A Socio-Narrative Analysis of the Miller-Barfield Correspondence**

The Bodleian Library in Oxford holds an archive of letters between Owen Barfield and numerous correspondents including Arnold Miller (Miller and Barfield 1968–1986). The Miller-Barfield correspondence comprises 21 letters of different lengths, a card and a hastily written note. The dates range between 30 May 1968 and around Christmas in 1986, which means that the correspondence extended from shortly

before the publication of the *Science of Logic*, Miller's first translation, until the time of the last publication, the *Philosophical Propaedeutic*. While the letters touch on several of Miller's interests at the time when he was completing the translations, many of the references are fragmentary, and cross referencing with other sources (such as the publishers' correspondence archives) suggests that other potentially relevant topics were avoided in these letters. Nevertheless, fragmentary references, and even the absence of a comment where one might be expected, can be taken as clues to the ways in which various narratives circulated in Miller's social circle at the time of his translations. Such contextual narratives provide a cultural and linguistic backdrop to the activity of translation in the sense that they intersect with narratives, concepts and even isolated words in the texts being translated. For example, during or following a war, the word "war" or a fragment of text in a translation relating to war is potentially "primed" (Hoey 2004, 2005) with associations for readers who have recently shared the experience of war through the many narratives circulating at the time. Readers' familiarity with the context may encourage or inhibit the translator's choice of words or otherwise influence the way the translation is written, depending on the effect the translator is trying to achieve and, of course, the translator's sensitivity to this kind of priming. Clues to potentially relevant narratives found in the Barfield letters strongly suggest that Miller was aware of most of the significant public narratives and raise the question of how sensitively he responded in the translations. Narratives in the letters which seemed relevant to the context of Miller's translations of Hegel will now be grouped under headings corresponding to the narrative typology introduced into translation studies by Baker (2006/2018) and Harding (2012). This exploratory "analysis of narratives" (Alleyne 2015: 41–45) based on the Miller-Barfield correspondence provides a starting point for the more detailed and creative "narrative analysis" in Parts Two and Three.

For readers familiar with the discourse around Hegelian philosophy, the approach developed here may be reminiscent of the *Konstellationstheorie* initiated by Dieter Henrich to "get beyond the usual narrow focus on a few major writings of a few famous canonical figures, which fails to provide an accurate picture of a period as a whole" (Beiser 2008: 10). While Henrich's research related to the constellation of letters and other documents written by Hegel and his contemporaries, the present section and especially Part Two of this book adopt a similar approach regarding the translator, Miller. Socio-narrative theory provides an inclusive way of organising and analysing the constellation of data collected. The typology of narratives departs slightly from Baker and Harding in referring to personal or ontological narratives; local and familial narratives; broader public narratives; disciplinary narratives and metanarratives. These narrative types are characterised by narrative features, including temporality, spatiality, particularity, selective appropriation, causal emplotment. Processes

of narrative framing and reframing, which are particularly relevant to the context of translation, are also identifiable in the correspondence between Miller and Barfield and employ “frames” in the sense defined by Baker as “structures of anticipation, strategic moves that are consciously initiated in order to present a narrative in a certain light” (2006/2018: 167). Relevant aspects of Bourdieusian theory and feminist translation studies expand the discussion in different directions.

### *Personal/Ontological Narrative*

Several strands of personal narrative intersect in the discussion of Miller’s translations of Hegel, but Miller’s own story, which will be investigated in Chapter 6 based on his obituary, is of primary significance. According to the distinction made by Gergen and Gergen (Baker 2006/2018: 32; Gergen 1997) between *progressive*, *regressive* and *stability* narratives, Miller’s personal narrative can be characterised as initially progressive, as he moved forward from his strict religious upbringing from which he sought spiritual liberation and through the traumatic nadir of WWI towards his meeting with Sedláč in the early 1920s and discovery of Hegel. In a sense, the meeting marks the climax of his spiritual and intellectual life, after which the progressive narrative of quest (Alleyne 2015; Bal 1997; Polkinghorne 1995; Propp 1968) is transformed gradually into a long and relatively comfortable stability narrative. Although Miller continued to grow intellectually and in his understanding of Hegel, he also sought increasingly to achieve and maintain stability. At the time of the correspondence with Barfield, both men were in their 70s. They were no longer seeking new truths; they no longer desired change in the world around them. In the letter dated 31 July 1968, Miller states explicitly, “Hegel was the first philosopher I came across and he provided all I needed” (Miller and Barfield 1968–1986: 122).

However, the idea of a personal narrative is inherently more complex than it first appears. Although the primary focus of such a narrative is on an individual, it becomes increasingly evident that it is Miller’s interaction with others – human and non-human, physical and metaphysical – which forms and drives forward his personal ontology. Personal narrative is therefore inseparably connected with societal or public narrative, but it is, nevertheless, possible to distinguish a strand of narrative which corresponds closely with the individual person. Temporal and spatial framing, as identified in Baker’s account (2006/2018: 112–114), provide a good point of access to the personal narrative identifiable in the Barfield correspondence. The letters provide many clues about Miller’s physical movements, his travels between 1968 and 1986. Individual letters mention trips between Bromley near London and the Whiteway Colony near Stroud, and then the move to Cirencester. The letter dated 24 July 1977 mentions “a second visit to Bromley to look after the baby as Mary had



to go into hospital for a couple of days to have a ‘check-up’ . . . ”. Miller and his wife were sharing the experience of grandparenting during the final stages of his translation of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Several years later, in a letter dated 14 December 1980, Miller writes of a “seven-weeks holiday” in Canada and North America, visiting brother-in-law Ronald Reeve, who was a professor of theology and Anglican clergyman in Leamington. The Millers travelled “about 3000 miles,” and their trip included a retirement party in Ottawa, an ordination ceremony in Quebec Cathedral (“my brother-in-law was the preacher”), a wedding in Leamington and finally a three-day Hegel conference at the Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario. At this conference, Miller was asked if he would “complete” the translation of Hegel’s *Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (Hegel and Miller 1985), which Sir Malcolm Knox had left unfinished at his death in 1980. With reference to space, time and distance alone, such details therefore allow a relatively detailed “mapping” of the translator’s movements; they also point towards the existence of social networks within which Miller moved (Alleyne 2015; Crossley 2008; Pym 1998: 86–106). But analysis of the personal narrative encoded in the letters also offers deeper insights into Miller’s personal commitments which have a bearing not only on the language of the Hegel translations but also on the ethical dimension of his work.

In the letter already mentioned, dated 31 July 1968, in which Miller is discussing his reservations about Findlay’s interpretation of Hegel’s *Science of Logic* (“ . . . on this topic I am hard to please . . . ”), Miller explains that, for him at least, there is a personal dimension to the study of Hegel: “Most if not all commentaries fail to see that the *Wissenschaft der Logik* is, in truth, an initiation into spiritual knowledge and that a fruitful study of it therefore demands personal involvement on the part of the student . . .”.

It can be assumed that, for Miller, maximum personal involvement in Hegel’s philosophy is attained precisely by translating it. In this sense, translation is a continuation of the personal quest for spiritual knowledge, and the translations themselves are performative textual articulations of the personal, stability narrative of Miller’s spiritual and philosophical development at this time of his life. Miller’s account of his own lifelong progress towards “Reason” with the assistance of Hegel’s philosophy constitutes a “progressive narrative of self” (Baker 2006/2018: 32). It intersects with the activity of translation and the ethics of translating philosophy, especially regarding the extent to which Miller identified with Hegel’s views. Miller several times described himself as a “kindred spirit” with Hegel, but does this imply that Miller unquestioningly agreed with all Hegel’s views, even views which had become controversial at the time of the translations? How, if at all, can or should a translator of a historical work articulate dissent or divergence or the need for further explanation? These questions cannot be answered simply at this stage of the enquiry



but they suggest the possibility of tensions and/or a blurring of boundaries between the Miller the man, the husband, father and citizen, on the one side, and Miller the translator, the philosopher and acolyte of Hegel on the other.

Two of the letters (30 May 1968 and 3 December 1973) mention a binary distinction in Hegel's work between mere "Understanding" (*Verstand*) on the one hand and "Reason" (*Vernunft*) on the other (see also Inwood 2003; Mure 1940: 147–164), which is central to Miller's interpretation of Hegel and also to his own self-understanding, his personal ontology. Miller foregrounds the distinction in these letters but also in the translations (as will be shown later) through his selective use of initial capitals. In the first of these two letters (which is also the first letter to Barfield), Miller explains that "Hegel was a concrete thinker who refused 'to feed on the carcasses of dead thoughts or the still-born thoughts of the moderns' and he spent his life in vindicating the claims of *Reason against the mere abstractions of the Understanding*." (Miller and Barfield 1968–1986: 117) In the original letter, the last line is underlined in a different colour, presumably by Barfield. As a contextual clue to the intersection between personal narrative and Hegelian ontology, this sentence articulates Miller's profound philosophical commitment to what he sees as the "higher" claims of reason as opposed to the denigrated term "Understanding." The implication is that Miller thought of himself as having progressed beyond the stages of "ordinary consciousness" and "mere Understanding" to a higher level which is attainable only by the few, not the many. The metaphors "dead" and "still-born" as used here will become increasingly significant, especially in contrast to the term "pregnant," which Miller also uses metaphorically in the translations to suggest the logical, metaphysical or spiritual fullness and vitality of the fully actualised Hegelian "Notion." Such vivid language also points towards a misogynist narrative strand, according to which women are among several social groups regarded by Miller and his associates to be generally or naturally limited in the extent to which they can attain the higher levels of consciousness. Physical pregnancy is denigrated; mental fruitfulness is aspired to by a special group of men. This extraordinary claim and the relationship between "mere Understanding" and "divine Reason" will be analysed in greater depth later.

One narrative strand at the boundaries of the personal narrative is identifiable in the letter openings. The first letters between Barfield and Miller, numbered 117 to 124 in the archive, open with "Dear Mr Barfield" and "Dear Mr Miller" respectively. From sheets 125 to 130, following a request from Miller ("May we drop the 'Misters' now?" on sheet 125, letter 6 in the sequence), the less formal letter opening "Dear Barfield" and "Dear Miller" is adopted; finally, from sheet 131 to 144, the familiar form "Dear Owen" and "Dear Arnold" is used. Although it forms part of the stability narrative of Miller's later

years, the personal narrative articulated in the correspondence therefore also has progressive features in that the letter openings show a gentle progression in the correspondents' friendship from more to less formal. This progression can also be analysed with reference to Bourdieu's concept of social capital. Miller's approach to Barfield in the first place relied on the embodied cultural capital he had accumulated through his knowledge of Hegel's works – directly attributable therefore to his having translated Hegel – but also on the objectified cultural capital derived from his ownership of all of Barfield's books. Investments made by Miller over many years were then converted into social capital in that they empowered Miller to approach a famous writer and public intellectual (publisher and translator of Rudolf Steiner) on equal (or more than equal) terms, despite Miller's lack of university credentials, and to develop a close, first-name friendship which has subsequently been monumentalised in the archive of correspondence.

Mary Lettington told me an amusing anecdote relating to Miller's social ascent which contributes to this narrative. In the early 1960s, J.N. Findlay invited Miller to the Athenaeum club in London to discuss publication of his Hegel translations. Miller arrived wearing a polo-neck pullover rather than the shirt and tie compulsory for entry to this prestigious London club. Miller's arrival in "society" was rescued only when the doorman lent him a tie. Several years later, Miller was invited to the same club in the letter from Barfield to Miller dated 20 July 1968. Barfield closes his letter as follows: "Lastly are you ever in town? If so, I would hope you will some time continue educating me over lunch or dinner at the Athenaeum." Mary's anecdote is one of several which capture the asymmetric social dynamics of Miller's "outsider" status but also his irrepressibly genial, upward social and spiritual mobility.

Many of the materials investigated contain personal and/or ontological narratives originating from other participants associated to a greater or lesser degree with the translation process. Some are more fragmented than others. For example, Barfield briefly and selectively mentions his relationship with C.S. Lewis, and the fact that he (Barfield) is writing a book about the poet Coleridge. While these references in the Miller-Barfield correspondence provide an explicit literary frame for the relationship articulated through the letters, they represent only a small fragment of the personal narrative Barfield articulates through his own writing. Barfield's personal narrative thus intersects with Miller's within the text of the correspondence.

Fragments of personal, ontological narrative, giving clues about how individuals understand and conceptualise their own lives, of course, also occur in Hegel's works, for example, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of Logic*. There is a different emphasis in each book, and the personal narratives are almost always entwined within other narrative types, primarily philosophical disciplinary narratives.

***Public or Societal Narrative: Friends and Family***

The letters not only mention Miller's close family, his wife Frances (always known as Fran), his daughters Ann and Mary and brother-in-law Ronald (Ron) Reeve, they also point towards a wider circle of friends and acquaintances, including key Hegelian philosophers, such as J.N. Findlay, Sir Malcolm Knox and H.S. Harris. There is evidently an overlap between these two groups and the societal and disciplinary narratives in which they participate. For example, the trip to Canada in 1969 was a family visit but included a meeting with Harris in Toronto, bringing Miller close to the academic orbit of Emil Fackenheim, the celebrated liberal Jewish philosopher, reform Rabbi and Professor of Philosophy at Toronto, who wrote a seminal book on the religious dimension in Hegel's philosophy (Fackenheim 1968); Miller's visit was in the same year as the New Left "Year of the Barricade" conference at Glendon College (Owram 1999: 294–295). Miller may therefore have discussed these topics with his family and friends. He may also have discussed plans for the translation of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* with Harris on this occasion. Harris is mentioned in Miller's acknowledgements in the peritexts to this translation; he subsequently wrote a supportive review of the translation (see Chapter 3) and then some critical comments and corrections (see Chapter 8).

The letters to Barfield often interweave family narratives with references to the translations, taking in large distances and touching on diverse family and broader social dynamics, as the following quotation shows:

My translation of the *Phenomenology* is with OUP and should appear next spring. Findlay has supplied analyses of the paragraphs. It was quite a relief to get it off my plate. Fran is going into hospital on Monday . . . , so our movements will be restricted for a few weeks. Her brother is coming over from Canada for a viva voce at Oxford on first of May in connection with his DD thesis. If hard work were sufficient qualification he would undoubtedly get the degree.

(Miller and Barfield 1968–1986: 139)

This text shows how differently classifiable strands of narrative can intersect within even a short passage and invites a finer grained classification of "public narratives." Harding's (2012) revision of Baker's original typology of narrative (2006/2018: 28–49) subdivides Baker's "public narratives" into "shared/collective" narratives including "local" and "societal" narratives alongside the "theoretical narratives" and "metanarratives" (Harding 2012: 25). The text quoted earlier articulates strands of local (or familial) narrative relating to Fran's imminent operation and her brother's visit but, in this case, spanning the large distance between England and Canada (and therefore not strictly local). It also articulates narratives about the translation and publication processes and about Ron's defence

of his theology thesis at Oxford. Although such narratives, which recur throughout the data on Miller, his life and his translations, relate to academia and academic publishing, they can hardly be described as “theoretical.” They stand part way between limited, local narratives, which are of little interest to those not directly involved in them, strictly theoretical narratives, which are of special interest for example to academics in a specific field of research, and broader societal narratives, which have a claim to wider public interest. All these narrative strands are relevant to the present analysis, although narratives relating to the translation process and, for example, Miller’s relief at sending off the completed manuscript of the *Phenomenology* may seem most directly relevant.

Miller’s attitudes towards the women in his own family are significant for the subsequent discussion of Hegel’s attitudes towards women and Miller’s translation of the *Antigone* passage in the *Phenomenology*, discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8. It is evident from the letters that Miller cares about his wife’s and daughters’ health. Barfield knew the family, and Miller is sharing his concern with his friend. But his discussion of her operation raises an ethical question regarding Miller’s practical emotional literacy and duty of confidentiality to his wife and daughter, who may not have consented to his sharing of medical concerns with a male friend.<sup>10</sup> Although the letters provide only fragmentary clues about Miller’s attitude towards women, and this discussion must remain incomplete for reasons of confidentiality, I mention it here in preparation for subsequent discussion of Miller’s opposition to the ordination of women in the Church of England, a topical public narrative in the 1970s. In turn, such wider public narratives, especially those relating to the exclusion of women from high intellectual and institutional roles, intersect with a comment in the letter dated 4 December 1981 which is more directly relevant to the translation of philosophy. Miller writes:

A new translation of the lectures on the philosophy of religion is now being prepared in the States. I was invited to be “translator-consultant” but cried off when I found that they wanted to avoid all masculine pronouns for God.

(Miller and Barfield 1968–1986: 143)

This comment further demonstrates the intersection between wider theological/disciplinary narratives about the personality and masculinity of traditional representations of the Judeo-Christian God, which have a long history but were especially topical in the 1970s (Walker 2019: 370–371), and Miller’s occasional metaphorical use in his translations of terms relating to pregnancy, child-birth, sexuality, sensuality and physical maturity.

The relevance of these local/familial narratives relates to the extent to which Miller’s relationships with people in his immediate family impinges on his translations and the extent to which our understanding of these

relationships might transform our re-reading of the translations. For example, when Miller (translating Hegel) writes that womankind “perverts the universal property of the state into a possession and ornament of the Family” (Hegel and Miller 1977: 288), to what extent does this claim reflect Miller’s understanding of his own family? His choice of words here and the capitalisation of Family are not a matter of accuracy. As we shall see in Chapter 8, there are several equally appropriate translations for *verkehrt* which Miller translates as “perverts,” and the German word for family is not emphasised in German. These choices may have been introduced by Miller as rhetorical or conceptual reinforcements of Hegel’s perceived meaning. But how sensitive is Miller’s translation to his potential readers? Is Miller using the translation to reinforce what he takes to be Hegel’s claim that womankind’s natural or (ancient Greek) cultural allegiance to the Family can be dangerous to the state? Does the capital F for Family imply a special kind of philosophically validated family relationship which Miller accepts or rejects? To what extent and how does a reference by Hegel and/or Miller to a universal term, such as “womankind,” include the individual women or groups of women who shared their lives? If Hegel’s comment here refers exclusively to an ancient Greek context, are contemporary translators under an ethical obligation to make this cross-cultural distinction appropriately explicit? What are the implications of this translation in view of contemporary LGBTQ conceptualisations of gender? To what extent do/should translations of philosophical works tacitly support or explicitly contest controversial narratives contained in the original work? Should translators of philosophy be subject to a democratic imperative?

### *Public or Societal Narrative: Philosophy, Publishing and Translation*

Apart from narratives of Miller’s immediate family and friends, the letters reference the wider group of Miller’s generally male associates involved in various ways with his work as a translator of Hegel. Of course, these also overlap with the more intimate group, especially including Barfield himself. Barfield was a published author, a translator and a philosopher as well as a family friend. Barfield also published one of the few articles written by Miller (1972). Indeed, Barfield responded to Miller’s article in a rather critical article of his own, rejecting many of the points Miller had made (Barfield 1973), but this seems to have had only a minimal adverse effect on their friendship.<sup>11</sup> Nine of the letters in the archive, from December 1971 to December 1973 relate to the publication of Miller’s article.

After Barfield’s critical response to Miller’s article (Miller and Barfield 1968–1986: 130–138), there is a gap in the correspondence until March 1976 (Miller and Barfield 1968–1986: 139). This overlaps with the period in which Miller was translating Hegel’s *Phenomenology* (Hegel and

Miller 1977). One letter from the early 1980s not only shows that their friendship had remained intact but also gives a sense of their relationship, which in some respects resembles Miller's earlier friendship with Francis Sedlák, and the theosophical aspirations towards an exclusive intellectual/spiritual "brotherhood," which will be discussed in Chapter 5. Shortly before the letter was written, the Millers (Fran and Arnold) had moved away from Whiteway Colony to a house named Cranham's Lodge in Cirencester. The following invitation at the end of the letter can be regarded as a fragment of a stability narrative (Gergen 1997) in which the two men reassert their friendship, their love of language and intellectual conversation. Miller wrote:

PS Could you be tempted to spend a few days with us at The Lodge sometime next year when the weather is reasonably fine? We are in a very secluded position at the entrance to a private drive and could – if we wanted to! – sunbathe on the patio. . . . I would rejoice in some good talk. Think about it and let me know in due course.

(Miller and Barfield 1968–1986: 142, 14 December 1980)

Miller's language here is playful. The idea of tempting his friend to come to a secluded patio to sunbathe is mildly provocative, sensuous rather than intellectual. But the ridiculous is to be followed (logically perhaps) by sublime reasoning. In fact, the invitation is about philosophising rather than anything sensuous. Mary has confirmed that her father never sunbathed because he had fair skin which burned easily. Miller uses the word "rejoice," which has religious connotations for members of many Christian churches, to pivot from the sensuous (and ridiculous, as suggested by the exclamation mark) to the philosophical; he winds up with the business-like "let me know in due course." The word "rejoice" was probably ringing in Miller's ears at this time of year because, as a tenor in the church choir, he had almost certainly been singing the appropriately inviting Advent carol "O come, O come Emmanuel" with its refrain "Rejoice! Rejoice . . .". The opening line of the carol thus subtly frames and reinforces Miller's invitation to "come" to the Lodge. Miller's language in the quotation is full of allusions which would have been intelligible and delightful to Barfield, the poet and author of *Poetic Diction*. This aspect of Miller's written style has clear implications for anyone reading Miller's translations of Hegel. As we shall see especially in Chapter 8 with reference to the famous "Lordship and Bondage" passage in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the language of Miller's translations operates at multiple semantic and prosodic levels, often implicitly and subtly drawing on and reinforcing narratives associated with an English-language, Christian culture shared by his expected readership but therefore also potentially excluding readers unfamiliar with this context. In this sense, the style of the translations resembles that of the other writers in the Inklings group,

C.S. Lewis, J.R.R. Tolkien and Charles Williams, whose works are characterised by witty, hidden religious and philosophical allusions (Lindop 2015: 188–190). The suggestion prompted by the societal narrative of Miller’s friendship with Barfield is therefore that Miller’s language in the translations is framed by a similar narrative of comfortable, gentlemanly, literary playfulness, for example, as recommended in a wider disciplinary narrative about Bible translation by E.V. Rieu in the Introduction to his translations of the Gospels and in his comments in a related BBC interview (Rieu 1952, 1955) with which Miller was certainly familiar. In short, the target readership of the translations can be thought of with reference to this gentlemanly, intellectual social group.

Notes for Miller’s talk “On Translating Hegel,” which was subsequently developed and published as a paper (Miller 1983b), refer explicitly to Rieu’s work. Rieu claimed that what he aimed for in his approach to translation was an “equivalent effect” to the effect created by the original on the original readers. This resembles the notion of “dynamic equivalence” familiar in translation studies. One anecdote by Rieu recalls that the experience of translating the Gospels had the “effect” of converting him to Christianity. Translating Hegel seems to have reinforced Miller’s devotion to Hegel selectively. In this context, Frederick Beiser’s distinction between “antiquarian” and “anachronistic” approaches to Hegel in twentieth century reception history seems relevant to the translations (Beiser 2008: 7). Translators can exhibit greater or lesser concern for the antiquarian/historical accuracy of their work (although it is delusory to think anyone can know with certainty “what Hegel meant”), or they can show an anachronistic/ethically responsible concern for the impact of the translation on contemporary readers. Rieu and Miller were negotiating this interlocutory space.

Regarding the narrative feature of selective appropriation (Baker 2006: 71–76), it is significant with this narrative type that the letters mention some of Miller’s collaborators but not others. Although the letters refer explicitly to Miller’s translation and publication of *Philosophy of Nature* and *Phenomenology of Spirit*, they do not mention the difficulties Miller experienced with his collaborators on these translations, Michael Petry and Peter Fuss. They do not mention the ultimate failure of these collaborations. In this sense, Miller draws selectively on the events relating to his translations to construct and censor the societal narrative for Barfield’s consumption.

### *Wider Public Narrative: The Media*

In harmony with the traditional view that philosophy should be an autonomous discipline, in the sense discussed with regard to Bourdieusian theory (Hanna 2016; Pasmatzki 2012), independent of any involvement in contingent political or social matters, the correspondence makes only



limited direct reference to wider public narratives circulating in the media, such as major current-affairs events, even when these relate, explicitly or implicitly, to aspects of Hegel's philosophy. For instance, there are no direct references to ongoing social and political issues, such as civil rights and women's liberation demonstrations in Europe and the USA, the Vietnam war, the Yom Kippur war, the troubles in Northern Ireland or Britain's entry into the EEC, all of which were reported on BBC radio and in the Times newspaper to which Miller had regular access. As well as providing a further example of selective appropriation, this can be taken as an instance of the narrative feature of genericness (Baker 2006: 85–98), in the sense that such topics may have been considered inappropriate for the genre of personal correspondence, especially between philosophers. This analysis agrees with Mary Lettington's reference to her father's selective preference for what he considered the (philosophical) "mountains" rather than the (everyday) "molehills" of life (Lettington 2019).

However, the discussion in the letters does touch indirectly on some of the topics classifiable as wider public narratives with reference to the book *Where the Wasteland Ends* (Roszak 1972), recently reviewed by Barfield, which Miller had also read. Roszak's book, which will be considered later, deals with a wide range of topical events in the late 1960s in which several public narratives intersect. For Miller and Barfield, these issues are seen in a very broad, general context which corresponds more closely with that of metanarrative. Even as metanarrative, their interest veers away from practical political issues such as decolonisation, women's rights and trade union activism. Although Barfield opposes global "technocracy," both men are cautiously intrigued by the potential of New Age spiritualism and the possible benefits of psychedelic drugs.

Given Miller's commitment to making Hegel accessible to "the interested layman," it is surprising that he shows so little interest in social and political public narratives which might inform his readers' understanding of the translations and appreciation of Hegel. Such narratives might include, for example, historical narratives linking German philosophers, especially Hegel, with the rise of Nazism and communism but also contemporary narratives relating to changes in public perceptions of race and gender (see Chapter 8). It is evident from the Barfield correspondence that Miller was aware of these narratives but, given his commitment to the revival of Hegel's works, surprising that he and his associates avoided the opportunity of reframing the translations of Hegel more openly against the contemporary background or at least mentioning their relevance to topical issues.

One indirect pointer towards the public narratives linking Hegel in a potentially causal manner not only with the rise of Nazism and communism but also with race, gender and politics occurs in Miller's first letter to Barfield (30 May 1968). Miller quotes from a letter he had previously written to C.S. Lewis (8 December 1962). This letter provides a further



example of the narrative feature of selective appropriation (Baker 2006: 71–76) and deeper insights into the ethical dimension of Miller’s translations of Hegel. There are good reasons for assuming that Miller’s letter to C.S. Lewis was in the same vein as his initial approach to Barfield: it contained another polite but firm complaint by Miller, in this case about Lewis’s public dissemination of his misunderstandings of Hegel.

In the letter to Barfield, Miller quotes only the first sentence of the reply he received from Lewis, which is reproduced in full here. It is evident from this selectively appropriated quotation that Miller wanted primarily to communicate to Barfield that he had written a similar letter to Lewis (in fact less than a year before Lewis’s death in November 1963), and that Lewis, a good friend of Barfield and fellow member of the Inklings, had responded to his letter and accepted at least part of Miller’s criticism. Miller selected this event from a short series of communicative events contained in his correspondence with Lewis. In Bourdieusian terms, Miller mobilised the social and cultural capital inherent in this previous correspondence with Lewis to support his case against Barfield and to encourage Barfield to listen to his complaint. There is nothing unusual or necessarily unethical about the selective use of information. Narratives are always constructed selectively. However, the analysis of selective appropriation – investigating which events have been included or excluded from a narrative and looking for possible underlying reasons – can provide valuable information, especially, for example, about the motives behind translational decisions and therefore about the ethical dimension of Miller’s translations of Hegel.

The full reply from Lewis is published in a large collection of C.S. Lewis’s letters edited by Walter Hooper, who also added informative footnotes to most of the letters. Lewis’s reply to Miller reads as follows:

8 December 1962

Dear Mr Miller

I have a fear you may be right, and that perhaps I have seen Hegel too much through the spectacles of English Hegelians like Bradley and Bosanquet. I realise of course that Hegel himself would claim to be the Christian philosopher *par excellence*: but I supposed that his extreme immanentism vitiated the claim. We mustn’t embark on a controversy for when did any two people agree on what Hegel really adds up to? But I will certainly say no more about him unless I have time to reconsider the whole question. (Probably I am unduly informed by my detestation of his views about the State and about the *Antigone*.)

Thanks for writing. Best wishes, C.S. Lewis

(Lewis 2006: 1388)

In the letter, Lewis engages briefly with a theological, disciplinary narrative which, it must be remembered, was also a public narrative in the broader sense because Lewis had aired his views on Christian theology on BBC radio during WWII. An anthology of his radio talks was originally published in the 1950s under the title *Mere Christianity* (Lewis 2001). Lewis does in fact concede that Miller may know more about Hegel's theology than he does and undertakes to refrain from mentioning Hegel again until he knows more. In a sense, this acknowledgement must have been a triumph for Miller, who, at this time, had not yet published his translations. To Lewis, a famous Oxford don, Miller must have appeared as a well-read member of the public, an "interested layman" and nothing more. But the final sentence in brackets refers to a different event and tells a different story, articulating a different – political rather than religious – narrative strand. The intensity of the word "detestation" directed against Miller's favourite author reaches the boundaries of politeness and leaves little doubt that Lewis believed that the political arguments couched in public narratives against Hegel far outweigh any rescue which might be attempted based on his theology. His mentions of the "State" and "*Anti-gone*" are particularly significant because they demonstrate the intersection between details of Hegel's texts and wider public narratives about the reception of Hegel's philosophy at the time of the Miller's translations, which are relevant to contemporary postcolonial and feminist critiques of Hegel. Miller's selective quotation from this letter in his letter to Barfield confirms that he was aware of these wider public narratives but also that he had fenced off or censored the social and political dimension.

### *Theoretical or Disciplinary Narratives*

Two significant features of contemporary academic style are that it strives for impartiality and attempts to keep the element of entertainment associated with earlier, more literary, styles of academic writing in the background. Miller's translations of Hegel stand at an important transition in both respects. Although Hegel writes, in the *Science of Logic*, about "pure thought," and his project of constructing a system of "presuppositionless logic" (Hegel and Miller 1969: 60; Houlgate 2006: 29–69) relates directly to the derivation of precisely defined "categories" of thought and therefore to a very careful, "scientific" use of language, neither Hegel nor Miller are entirely consistent in eliminating from their writing metaphorical and other literary features which situate it historically, culturally and politically. In fact, through Hegel's use of the German language (Houlgate 2006: 72–98), his philosophy seeks to integrate literary, cultural, aesthetic and subjective aspects with structural, logical, merely observational and objective aspects. From a sociological perspective, the situatedness of Hegel's work and of Miller's translations need not be a philosophical disadvantage provided these features are recognised as such.

Alongside the point mentioned in the paragraphs on personal narratives, where Miller stresses the personal involvement required to study the *Science of Logic*, several other comments in the correspondence with Barfield relate to theoretical narratives circulating within philosophy and related disciplines such as theology, natural sciences and social sciences. Miller was not a professional philosopher working inside academia. He shares the role of “interested layman” with Barfield. Both men were in fact preoccupied with the controversial margins of philosophy, theology and psychology and especially literature. In their correspondence and in Miller’s translations, conventional theoretical narratives within the discipline of philosophy thus intersect with esoteric narratives of theosophy, Rudolf Steiner’s anthroposophy, the occult and clairvoyance.

Nevertheless, the one central philosophical theme or strictly disciplinary narrative to emerge from this analysis of Miller’s correspondence with Barfield, which is also found, almost as a preoccupation, in Miller’s other published writings, is the binary distinction he makes on repeated occasions between “Understanding” (often spelled with a capital and sometimes in the phrase “mere Understanding”) and “Reason.” Understanding is evidently the denigrated pole of the binary, and the distinction relates to a progressive theoretical narrative in which human consciousness becomes progressively more sophisticated as it approaches philosophical reason. The distinction has its roots in Hegel’s and Kant’s writing where *Verstand* and *Vernunft* are also contrasted in a similar but not identical way (Inwood 2003: 242–244; Mure 1940: 161–163, 172–174).<sup>12</sup> Miller gives a fuller explanation of this contrast to Barfield, which significantly complicates our understanding of the translations, especially because Miller openly relates his translation of Hegel’s *Science of Logic* not only to British Idealist philosophy but also to romantic and contemporary English literature. Miller’s complaint to Barfield (30 May 1968) reads as follows:

What is important is the way in which you almost totally ignore Hegel’s teachings. For by this treatment many of your readers who I am sure took to your guidance and instruction, remain unaware of the spiritual nourishment to be found in Hegel’s teachings. Hegel was a concrete thinker who refused “to feed on the carcasses of dead thoughts or the still-born thoughts of the moderns” and he spent his life in vindicating the claims of Reason against the mere abstractions of the Understanding.

I suppose the reason why Hegel has been so misunderstood in this country is that the influence of Bradley and Bosanquet hindered students from studying Hegel himself, and especially his great *Wissenschaft der Logik* [Science of Logic], with the result that they nourished quite false ideas about his doctrines. I once mildly rebuked CS Lewis – whom I much admire – for his serious misrepresentation of Hegel in

one or two of his books and in a letter to me he said, "I fear you may be right, and that perhaps I have seen Hegel too much through the spectacles of English Hegelians like Bradley and Bosanquet." When I read his sonnet 'Reason' in the volume of poems, I wished most heartily that he could have found that reconciliation of reason and imagination where it is to be found – in Hegel. Of course, the reason Lewis had in mind was not Vernunft but Verstand, Coleridge's Understanding. Hegel's Reason is identical with der göttliche Geist and is the place where, Hegel says, God reveals Himself to man. The fact is that Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik* is an initiation into that 'final participation' which is the subject matter of your very interesting book 'Saving the Appearances'. Hegel's *Naturphilosophie* surely is evidence of his concrete thinking in terms of the divine Reason. There Nature receives its due as a divine creation, and as such must be comprehended in other categories than those of the finite Understanding.

(Miller and Barfield 1968–1986: 119)

It is evident from Miller's comments here that he is committed to the re-examination and revival of Hegel associated in the English-speaking world with Findlay's work (Findlay 1958). Miller's translations are therefore reframed as a return to Hegel's own writings and an erasure of the intervening Victorian-English Hegelian or British Idealist enthusiasm for (an appropriately re-written) Hegel. This is therefore an implied disciplinary narrative of rescue, restoration, of purging, cleansing and purity pursued through a surrounding thicket of hindrances and misrepresentations. Restoration has become necessary because an undergrowth of British Idealist "misunderstanding" has insinuated itself between Hegel and his English readers. The new translator's task is to expose and clear away such misunderstanding. But Miller's references to poetry and literature also expose a practical difficulty facing him as a translator. He wants his translations to be read naturally, fluently, with sensitivity and flexibility, as persuasive, quasi-religious literature or even as poetry, not as rigid, mechanistic structures, disfigured by excessive and intimidating footnotes and inauthentic, analytical glossaries.<sup>13</sup> Miller's target readership is the "interested layman." He was prepared to share this translational tension between literary English usage and translated German philosophy with Barfield, who was writing a book about Coleridge at this time and, as a "German scholar" with a profound interest in religion, would understand Miller's literary-philosophical difficulty. But he is less trusting and, in a sense, paternalistic or patronising towards the readers of his "thin" translations, who remain sheltered from such thorny translational minutiae.

Miller's attitude towards contemporary philosophers also seems dismissive if not condescending, especially concerning the profound divergence between their politicised interests in Hegel and Miller's own religious or

spiritual position. The following quotation comes from one of the last letters in the collection written by Miller (4 December 1981):

Oxford asked me to check Knox's translations of the introductory lectures of Hegel's *History of Philosophy* and to see it through the press. It should appear in the spring or early summer and if they allow me any presentation copies, I shall be happy to send you one. What philosopher today would dare to say that "strictly speaking, the object of philosophy is God alone, or is to know God." It is a pity that so much of Hegel literature concerns itself with Hegel's development and early writings, and his social and [inserted word: political] philosophy and ignores the *Logic* and the philosophy of religion.

(Miller and Barfield 1968–1986: 143)

Miller's switch from the mundane matter of presentation copies and the practicalities of publishing to the high rhetoric suggested by the third sentence in the quotation is particularly revealing. It points towards a discontinuity between the awkwardness and obstructiveness of modern practical life ("if they allow me any presentation copies") and a heroic, romanticised, golden age associated with philosophers of the past. These possibly include Knox who had recently died, and certainly include Hegel and the ancients, who, Miller suggests, had the courage of their religious and philosophical convictions. Bathos, a fall from the sublime to the ridiculous or the trivial, is achieved in the last sentence through Miller's retrospective insertion of the word "political," perhaps deliberately, as an afterthought. The significance of the disciplinary narrative here is that, for Miller, the highest level of Hegel's system is absolute spirit which should be approached through religion and art, ultimately leading to philosophy. In other words, the primary concern should not be about politics or society but about man's relationship with God. No doubt Miller was gratified that modern philosophers were taking an interest in Hegel's work; what he found "a pity" was that modern philosophers had become ensnared in their quest for the truth by the distractions of the merely social and political. For Miller, these are distractions which must be dealt with but ultimately overcome if progress towards absolute truth and reason is to be made.

This disciplinary narrative, according to which the "story told" by philosophy leaves behind the social and political world as a passing phase along the road to spiritual salvation, can be identified in the literature on British Idealism (Boucher 2012; Mander 2011; Passmore 1968). Mander concludes his survey of the influence of Hegel on the British Idealists as follows:

Reviewing these various commentaries on Hegel by the British Idealists we are struck by both similarities and differences. There was widespread agreement that the heart of Hegel's thought lay in his logic and his philosophy of religion, while that his subject matter was ultimate

reality and not simply human conception was also unquestioned. (The *Phenomenology of Spirit* was accorded nothing like the attention it now receives.) . . . But interpretation was not a monolithic block. It was loose enough to permit different approaches, emphases, and applications, and it was far from uniform acceptance of the doctrines it found. While the majority embraced what they took to be Hegel's central claim of the identity of logic and metaphysics, others such as McTaggart, Bradley, and Seth Pringle-Patterson insisted that the study of thought must never be conflated with the study of things. Again, while most accepted that Hegelianism might bolster religion, McTaggart and Bradley were very clear that it could not support anything like theism. (Mander 2011: 50–51)

Accordingly, while the position expressed by Miller in the Barfield correspondence agrees in many respects with this overview of British Idealist conceptions of Hegelianism, for example, in his focus on the *Science of Logic* in preference over the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and his preference for Hegel's philosophy of religion rather than social and political philosophy, it would be inaccurate to suggest that Miller was simply a follower of British Idealism; British Idealism is too diffuse to allow that, and Miller clearly explains that the influence of Bradley and Bosanquet needs to be overcome in order to allow more direct access to Hegel, which is the motive behind his translations.

Miller's view of Hegel, Bradley and Bosanquet corresponds most closely with that of G.R.G. Mure, who has been described as the last of the British Idealists (Mander 2011: 539–541). Miller recommends Mure's *Introduction to Hegel* (1940) in his Foreword to his translation of the *Science of Logic* (Miller 1969), and Mure was consulted as an expert adviser by the publisher of Miller's translation, Allen & Unwin (AUC 1920–1968). Mure's *Introduction* devotes most of chapter XIII to Bradley, whose position is problematised as follows: "The undeniable ambiguity in Bradley's position scarcely excuses, although it partly explains, the degree of misinterpretation which the logic of idealism has in recent years suffered even from sympathetic critics" (Mure 1940: 158). In a similar vein, Mure links Bradley with Bosanquet:

Bernard Bosanquet was a more constant student of Hegel than Bradley. . . . His effort to show the essential and constitutive rationality in all the higher forms of experience, and everywhere to identify truth as system with individuality, suggest a total breach with Kant and a conception of true thinking much nearer to Hegel than to Bradley. But neither his Gifford Lectures nor in any later work did Bosanquet take the decisive step of throwing down the Bradleian barrier between logic and metaphysics.

(Mure 1940: 163)

A few lines earlier, Mure also suggests that Hegel might have thought of Kant as “a logician of the mere Understanding.” The close connection between Mure’s account in his *Introduction to Hegel* and Miller’s views in the Barfield correspondence is remarkable. Like Barfield and Sedlák (see Chapter 5), Mure’s vocabulary draws on sexually suggestive metaphors which would be unacceptable in modern academic prose: “flirtation with the fallacy” (ibid: 160); “Greek philosophy passed through perversion to neglect” (ibid: 161); “but if compromise mate with sympathetic mis-interpretation their issue can only be cretinous” (ibid: 161); “or rather that thought is by its very destiny stillborn” (ibid: 162). Contributing to the situatedness of the translations, this gendered style recurs in isolated cases in Miller’s translations, framing the translations with the language of this historically situated disciplinary narrative but, at the same time, acting out a particular male gender-identity role in which virility, intellectual rigour and erudition intersect. Words and structures in these texts tell the story in a specifically stylised way; their referents, the intellectual and spiritual events which form the content of these disciplinary narratives, correspond to the “fabula” layer. However, it is the transformative relationship between text, story told and fabula (Harding 2012: 43–50) which is relevant to the present, socio-narrative analysis of these disciplinary or theoretical narratives.

### *Metanarrative*

In their letters, Miller and Barfield do not explicitly mention the Cold War, for example, in terms of a nuclear-weapons stand-off between the USA and the Soviet Union. However, some of their comments and underlying concerns, especially including Miller’s work on the Hegel translations, intersect with the Cold-War metanarrative as construed in the context of translation and intercultural studies. In her introduction of meta-(master) narratives in the typology of narratives, Baker gives an impression of the scale and provenance of such narratives, comparing the cold-war meta-narrative with the metanarrative of progress as follows:

It is relatively easy to designate something such as Progress, which would have started out as a simple public narrative, as a meta- or master narrative. We know, with hindsight, that the narrative has persisted for decades and that the lives of ordinary individuals across the planet have been influenced by it. The Cold War is, perhaps, another such narrative. Even today it continues to have some impact on our lives and on international relations. Thanks to the power of media, Hollywood and Western academia (from James Bond movies to the endless books documenting and analysing every potentially relevant detail), the Cold War narrative, in its many varieties, also travelled far beyond its immediate geographical settings.

(Baker 2006/2018: 44–45)



According to this account, a metanarrative is developed from a simple public narrative; it gathers momentum and increases in scope, exhibiting something like a snowball effect in which smaller-scale public narratives are conflated. But Baker's suggestion here is that the transformation is not merely accidental. Popular media and theoretical discourse feed into the metanarrative, driving its inexorable growth. Baker continues: "the meta-narrative of the Cold War, for example, like the metanarrative of the War on Terror, was essentially an invention of the American political elite, soon to be followed by other political elites across the globe" (ibid: 45).

The Cold-War metanarrative orchestrated by politicians in the USA and its allies in response to what was considered the growing threat of communism supported the view that the West, led by the USA, was to become the new "Free World" (McMahon 2003; Tucker 2007). The implications for the publication and translation of European literature and philosophy were that, in the Western capitalist world, cultural assets from the "old world," including German philosophy, were selectively appropriated into the divisive Cold-War metanarrative of capitalism versus communism on the side of the "Free World" (Sapiro 2008; Sapiro 2010). In this global context, Hegel's philosophy was reframed as essentially "liberal" and "conservative" as opposed to "socialist" or "communist." Miller's Cold-War translations of Hegel were published against this commercial and political background and, as we shall see, actively reinforced the Cold-War metanarrative. However, as with most metanarratives, this telling of the account conflates multiple, intersecting and sometimes conflicting narratives.

After WWII, there were attacks against everything German, including Hegel's philosophy; German used to compete with French and English as an academic lingua franca, but after the war, German was used less and less (Ammon 2019: 236–246). Of course, this incentivised translators and publishers. The cultural capital locked up in German books could be appropriated, fused with other narratives, reframed, commodified. But, as mentioned in Chapter 1, post-war attacks, such as Karl Popper's taunt in the *Open Society and Its Enemies* (2003) against "Hegel's hysterical historicism" and other accusations linking Hegel with totalitarianism had to be countered.

Intersections between the phenomenon I have described as the Cold-War Hegel revival and the metanarrative of the Cold War were complex because defenders of Hegel had so many negative associations to overcome, including accusations linking Hegel with Nazism, communism, racism and misogyny (Bernasconi 2003; McCarney 2003; Stewart 1996; Stone 2012). There was growing interest in Hegel's philosophy, especially the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, among French philosophers, such as Sartre and de Beauvoir and among philosophers of the New Left, such as Herbert Marcuse (Kelly 1992; Magee 1978; Pinkard 2007; Roth 1988). This complicated the reception of Hegel, leading to fierce attacks against Hegel's imperialism, racism, orientalism and misogyny. Nevertheless,



familiarity with Hegel's philosophy, even if this was limited to the outlines of the famous "master/slave" passage from the *Phenomenology*, became a prerequisite for serious critical engagement with the work of Sartre, de Beauvoir, Marcuse, Fanon, Said (Magee 1978).

Against the various, Marxist-inspired, left-wing appropriations and politicisations of Hegel, Miller and Findlay held a position which is still argued today by liberal-minded and conservative supporters of Hegel:

Careful and attentive study of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* reveals . . . that Hegel's text is in fact one of the most subtle and perceptive accounts of human *freedom* that we possess. Far from being a sinister forerunner of Hitlerian fascism, Hegel emerges from the pages of his book – in the judgement of the 20th century's greatest political philosopher, John Rawls – as a 'moderately progressive reform-minded liberal'.

(Hegel and Houlgate 2008: viii)

Faced with concerns about the atheism of Soviet and Chinese communist regimes in the 1960s and 1970s, Hegelians also argued that Hegel was a profoundly (Judeo)-Christian philosopher as well as a liberal (Fackenheim 1968; Kelly 1992).

The most promising way of defending Hegel against negative accusations, rescuing him from the clutches of New Left and appropriating the cultural capital associated with his philosophy on the side of the liberalism and the "free world" in the Cold-War metanarrative was to argue that the negative accusations and seemingly radical, left-wing misappropriations were based on shallow misunderstandings of Hegel. According to this rhetorical aspect of the Cold-War Hegel revival, which is articulated in the translator's forewords to the Hegel translations discussed in Chapter 3, Hegel's enemies and false friends had either not read enough Hegel; or read the wrong parts of Hegel; and/or they had read "bad" translations of Hegel. For example, Popper's *Open Society* only references a slim volume of translated *Selections* from Hegel, published in 1929 (Loewenberg 1929). So, new, accurate and authoritative translations of Hegel's (major) works were essential.

As suggested at the beginning of this chapter, Miller's translations of Hegel were drawn, along with other aspects of the post-war Anglophone Hegel revival, into the Cold-War metanarrative on the side of the West. Weaker ties, for example, linking Hegel with German political history, Nazism, Marxism, communism and socialism, were strategically broken, so that Hegel could be portrayed as a protagonist on the side of Western Liberal Democracy, a credible Christian philosopher capable of maintaining links with an unassailable and coherent tradition extending back to ancient Greek philosophy. In fact, the repositioning of Hegel's philosophy did not even require the power of Hollywood or

the mass media; philosophers and translators such as Miller, Findlay and their colleagues were already well-prepared to argue that left-wing and radical New Left interest in Hegel, as articulated, e.g. by Sartre, de Beauvoir, Fanon, Marcuse (Magee 1978) was based on an incomplete understanding of the philosopher, a shallow reading of selected, possibly badly translated passages. All that was required was a firm reassertion of the traditional “right-Hegelian” position with its selective emphasis on the *Science of Logic* and the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* rather than the politicised preoccupation with the *Phenomenology of Spirit* remarked upon in Miller’s correspondence with Barfield. At least in the early stages, this must have seemed a “doxic” position of strength (Hanna 2016: 45–52), from which to contest the heterodox secularisation and politicisation of Hegel set in motion especially by French philosophers (Kelly 1992; Kojève 1969; Pinkard 2007; Roth 1988). However, the emergence of non-metaphysical interpretations of Hegel from the early 1970s onwards (Hartmann 1972; MacIntyre 1972; Pinkard 1987, 1996) suggests that, for some philosophers interested in specific aspects of Hegel’s work, the traditional metaphysical Hegel may have seemed unnecessary or inappropriate for the modern world. The narrative strands articulated in the Miller–Barfield correspondence which have relevance to the emerging Cold-War metanarrative are situated in the earlier stages of these disciplinary developments. Miller and Barfield remain relatively optimistic about the prospect of restoring spirituality and resisting the progress of materialism and technocracy, which, for them, are causally related with the evils of the preceding wars and the present political unrest.

The letter of 24 July 1977 points towards a group of public narratives about materialism, “technocracy” and “counterculture,” which were evidently circulating among intellectuals and shared by Miller and Barfield at this time. These public narratives are drawn into the Cold-War metanarrative of this historical period in a complex manner. In the letter, Miller responds to a collection of essays Barfield had recently published:

I have not yet read all the essays but three I have particularly enjoyed – The Rediscovery of Meaning, Language and Discovery, and The Coming Trauma of Materialism. I must get Roszak’s book, Where The Wasteland Ends. It seems very well worth having.

(Miller and Barfield 1968–1986: 140)

(underlining in the original)

“The Coming Trauma of Materialism” (Barfield 1977: 276–296) is Barfield’s review of *Where The Wasteland Ends* (Roszak 1972) which was written by Theodore Roszak, best known for his *The Making of a Counter Culture* (Roszak 1968). Roszak is widely credited with having coined the term “Counterculture.”

This reference is significant because it is one of the few items of documentary evidence confirming that Miller was aware of this group of public narratives fused into the Cold War metanarrative. “The Coming Trauma of Materialism” (1977: 276–296) takes up Roszak’s regressive public narrative, boosting it to the status of a cataclysmic, Spenglerian metanarrative. According to Barfield’s interpretation of Roszak, “modern science,” “Cartesianism,” “Uniformitarianism,” “Reductionism” and various forms of “Darwinism” have led to a technological age of “materialism” which threatens human spiritual values. Although not explicitly stated in the essay, these broad abstract “-isms” are homologous with metanarrative of menace posed by communism to the values of Western liberal democracy, especially in its more conservative, Judeo-Christian forms. However, the optimistic Barfieldian twist is to derive from Roszak’s narrative a counter narrative in which a renewed intellectual openness towards religion, mysticism and the occult, assisted by Rudolf Steiner’s philosophy, offers hope of rescue for the spiritual values threatened by materialism. Barfield’s discussion also mentions the Women’s Liberation movement, but locates it within the materialist discourse which Barfield associates with Darwinism: “. . . Begin with Women’s Liberation if you like. You will find three-quarters or more of the arguments both for and against unquestioningly based on it [Darwinism] . . .” (Barfield 1977: 282–283).

Throughout his book review, Barfield uses Roszak’s term “mindscape” for the materialist discourse and likens it to a “frozen liquid mass” which, “for those with eyes to see,” is beginning to show signs of melting and cracking. “As to the cracks, they seem to be of two kinds, the first originating more in the will and the second more in the intellect” (ibid: 284). The first kind of cause for the cracking of the frozen mass, the denigrated pole of the binary Barfield has set up, is characterised by “violent reaction against technological civilisation and its consequences” and includes recently formed environmental activist groups (i.e. these are not openly left-wing, political activist groups): “Alternative Society. Responsible Society, Confrontation, Dwarfs, Friends of the Earth, Resurgence etc., etc.” Barfield’s association of these will-driven groups with “violent reaction” and his repetition of “etc., etc . . .” can be taken as politely dissociative, that is, he may agree with their sentiment but not their methods. Miller may have sensed an intersection here with the social and political activism of his own earlier life following WWI. In the 1920s, as we shall see in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, Miller was associated with the Whiteway Colony, originally a Tolstoyan anarchist colony in which political activists of many different kinds met and attempted to develop an alternative, utopian society in ways which anticipated the New Age and Counterculture movements of the 1960s and 70s and contemporary activist movements.

Barfield also denigrates the newly forming “Human Potentials Movement,” as Roszak calls the further development of these essentially

environmental and ethical activist groups, by contrast with the other pole of the binary, the intellect-driven causes for cracks in the frozen mass of the materialist mindscape. "There is another kind of external impact from another source, namely, an increasing awareness of phenomena that simply do not fit in to the mindscape." Barfield refers to a huge collection of "*inexplicabilia* – the data that Science has excluded . . .," listing "second sight," "telepathy," "mesmerism," "the paranormal," "extra-sensory perception," "psychokinesis" (Uri Geller – famous for bending spoons with his mind), "acupuncture" (which had formerly been dismissed as "a load of old Chinese rubbish" [ibid: 288]) and psychedelic drugs (associated with the writings of Carlos Castaneda).

Such "paranormal" phenomena intrigued Barfield and Miller, although I have not found documentary evidence for their direct involvement with the phenomena or practices. The term "clairvoyance" is used several times in the correspondence and, as we shall see, Miller was certainly interested, with reservations, not only in clairvoyance but also in the concepts of "personal immortality" and "reincarnation," which he considered to be potentially compatible with and validated by Hegel's philosophy. Mary Lettington explained that, although Miller had no time for the "paranormal," her father was an avid reader of the works of psychiatrist Arthur Guirdham (1905–1992), who draws on Freud and Jung. Miller was especially interested in *The Cathars and Reincarnation* (Guirdham 1970), *A Foot in Both Worlds* (Guirdham 1973) and the associated ideas of personal immortality and direct personal experience of past lives.<sup>14</sup>

In terms of their content, the accounts by Roszak and Barfield mentioned in Miller's letter bring together widely divergent public narratives touching on charged social, political as well as religious issues, which Barfield elaborates and weaves into the overarching metanarrative: the threat of materialism. However, it is significant that, throughout this discourse, practical social and political consequences are almost entirely avoided, as if the metanarrative of "the present state of the world," as discussed in Barfield's *World's Apart: A Dialogue of the 1960s* (Barfield 1963) can be truly comprehended only in detached philosophical and spiritual terms but not with reference to social and political "realities." Nevertheless, because the word "materialism" is linked by association through the technical term "dialectical materialism" with Marxism and therefore with communism, Barfield's opposition to materialism intersects in a complex, elusive manner with the metanarrative of the Cold War.

The language used in Barfield's metanarrative account is also relevant here. Although the intersecting narrative strands relate to recognisable academic disciplines such as political science, psychology, environmental science, theology, cultural studies and so on, the language diverges strongly from modern (i.e. twenty-first century), objective academic style because of its literary aspirations and "elevated style." Possibly

because of the reference to Freud and Freudianism in his essay, Barfield's language in these essays is laden with sex-related metaphors, which, as we shall see later, also appear, although to a lesser extent, in Miller's translations of Hegel. The following quotation exemplifies Barfield's ironic, selective use of sexual metaphor in the discussion of cultural history. Like the carefully framed reference to "a load of old Chinese rubbish" quoted in the last paragraph (Barfield introduces the racist comment through an unnamed "temporary narrator" (Harding 2012: 20), i.e. as something someone else had said, but tries to retain the humorous impact for his own essay), the following references could be described as *risqué* or prurient in the sense that they attempt to create interest and possibly humour by pushing at the boundaries of what was culturally and/or ethically unacceptable. In this sense, they are performative of a specifically situated, male identity role.

Darwinism, directly and through Freudianism, has been responsible for the artificial abstraction of "sex" from gender or humanised sex. One's imagination boggles at the convulsions that must accompany any struggle of anal and oral eroticism to turn into something like romance or the marriage of true minds or even something altogether new; at the incertitudes, the qualms, the misgivings, the deflated egos, the sagging self-assurance of a permissive society, as its whole vast monkey ethic of solemnly inculcated sensuality, masturbation, perversion, abortion, hitherto fed to it from school, university, parliament, press, and sometimes pulpit, begins to subside beneath its feet.

(Barfield 1977: 294)

Making a transition from a discussion of (academic) psychology to a discussion of sex, Barfield begins this paragraph with the sentence: "There will be problems for the many as well as for the elites." His suggestion is therefore that sex is something for the "many," the common people, as opposed to the academic elites mentioned in the previous paragraph. The prosodic devices in "boggles," "struggle" and "sagging self-assurance of a permissive society" are designed to appeal to an elite literary sensitivity, which is more attuned to "romance and the marriage of true minds" but can derive amusement from looking, with detachment, down on the "vast monkey ethic" of the many. Barfield's discussion is thus framed by a public narrative according to which cultivated, educated men, transcend the merely physical need for sex and are interested in higher things. (See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the relationship between chastity and philosophy.) The literary/esoteric aspirations and impact of Miller's use of terms such as "perversion" and "perverted" as translations of the verb *verkehren* (Hegel and Miller 1977: 287–288) and "pregnant" for *gefüllt* or *erfüllt* (Hegel and Miller 1969: 663, 665) are discussed against this background in Chapter 5.

## Summary and Conclusions

Chapter 2 introduced a theoretical and methodological framework for applying aspects of socio-narrative theory, Bourdieusian sociology and feminist translation studies to investigate the uniquely formative, informative and transformative intersection of narratives in and around Arnold Miller's life and work. The theoretical tools were applied to archived correspondence from the time during which Miller was working on the Hegel translations. Miller corresponded with C.S. Lewis and Owen Barfield, both public intellectuals and members of the Oxford literary group "The Inklings." However, the typology of narratives and analysis of narrative features developed by Baker (2006/2018) and Harding (2012) was shown to offer an inclusive framework open to a range of participants' stories, including elements of Hegel's philosophy, with diverse and sometimes unexpected, ethically charged perspectives. The Bourdieusian approach to translation studies (Sapiro 2010; Hanna 2016) focussing on the distribution of capital within social fields drew attention to the ideological and commercial dimensions of translating Hegel. Insights derived from feminist translation studies (Flotow 2011; Shread 2019) encourage productive engagement with an increasingly untimely, masculinist gender performativity within Hegelian studies during the period. The analysis has practical consequences for contemporary, feminist-informed re-readings of Miller's translations.

Miller's translations and retranslations of Hegel were produced in a complex and dynamically evolving social space shaped by a multiplicity of intersecting personal and societal narratives. As the analysis of the Miller-Barfield correspondence showed, what is omitted or erased in individual accounts is sometimes as significant as what is explicitly articulated. Moreover, many potentially relevant spoken and written texts through which these narratives may have been articulated at the time have been irretrievably lost. Nevertheless, the published translations, supplemented with archival and conversational evidence, point towards an under-researched, intimate and intense intersection of narratives submerged in the translator's life but surfacing fragmentarily and influentially in the translated Hegelian texts. Chapter 2 identified the broad outlines of these places of intersection, suggesting how the translations contributed to the accumulation and redistribution of capital in dynamic social fields at the same time as enacting gender-related and age-related performative roles adopted and renegotiated by the various participants in the translation process. While the chapter suggested that it is possible to analyse the complex interlocutory space surrounding Miller's translations of Hegel with reference to the theoretical framework presented, the fragmentary nature of the data, construed as momentarily intersecting narrative strands, will necessitate a creative re-narration of the events and relationships brought into view. Chapter 3 turns towards the texts and peritextual elements associated with the translations as a basis for further investigation.

## Notes

1. The other members of the group, which used to meet in Oxford pubs from the early 1930s until around 1949, included C.S. Lewis, J.R.R. Tolkien and Charles Williams (Lindop 2015). Arnold Miller was not a member of the Inklings but was especially attracted to the work of Barfield and Williams, perhaps to a lesser extent also Lewis and Tolkien (Lettington 2019).
2. The wider context of sociological approaches to translation studies including those relating to Bourdieu has subsequently been analysed, for example, in (Wolf and Fukari 2007). The work of Hanna (2016) provides a recent, detailed case study with in-depth engagement with key aspects of Bourdieusian theory.
3. This central concern of contemporary sociology exhibits a homology, overlapping with its own historical origins in German Idealism, especially with Hegel's dialectically ambiguous treatment of *Geist* which encompasses subjective, psychological aspects, translatable in terms of "mind" and "mindedness" or "subjective spirit," as well as objective, social aspects associated with mutual recognition and translatable in terms of "objective spirit," either as a social phenomenon or as a (sometimes capitalised) metaphysical essence.
4. For a recent discussion of retranslation in the context of literary studies, see (Deane-Cox 2014).
5. It is interesting that, in their respective peritexts, both Baillie and Pinkard refer to Hegel as a "genius" thereby suggesting Hegel's special, elevated status as well as their (obligatory) deference to this status.
6. The metaphoricity of Kant's distinction between "pure" and "practical" is also relevant here. Like high/low in the list of practical taxonomies, pure/dirty plays an important part in defining status and stance and represents a metaphorical range along which translators can exercise a subtle suppression or inculcation of political allegiances. Science and logic are clean; sociology, politics and to some extent religion are dirty.
7. I am grateful to Ruth Abou Rached at the Freie Universität in Berlin for guiding me towards the branch of feminist translation studies developed by Luise von Flotow and Carolyn Shread, which, I believe, intersects productively with the work of Hutchings on Hegel and feminist philosophies, especially regarding concepts of performance and performativity.
8. The translations of Beauvoir's works cited in the references have been a topic of considerable critical interest in translation studies. Like Miller's translations, they should not be taken as standard or dismissed as outdated. They are valuable historical resources which can be rethought and have a transformative influence (Moi 2008, 2010).
9. Details: [https://artreview.com/features/ar\\_april\\_2018\\_feature\\_milan\\_womens\\_bookstore\\_collective/not\\_wiki](https://artreview.com/features/ar_april_2018_feature_milan_womens_bookstore_collective/not_wiki).
10. I discussed confidentiality with Mary and obtained her permission to quote from this letter provided the medical details about her mother's operation were removed.
11. In fact, the two men evidently enjoyed the kind of intellectual sparring depicted in Barfield's *World's Apart: A Dialogue of the 1960s* (Barfield 1963/2010), in which eight male characters meet in a rented cottage for a polite, gentlemanly but characteristically argumentative, cross-disciplinary symposium about the state of the world.
12. The reference to Mure's *Introduction* is relevant because Miller explicitly recommends this book in his translation of Hegel's *Science of Logic*.
13. See Chapter 3 for a comparison of the peritexts to Miller's translation of Hegel's *Naturphilosophie* with the rival "thick translation" offered by Michael Petry.
14. Further information on this topic is available at: [www.watkinspublishing.com/the-cathars-and-reincarnation](http://www.watkinspublishing.com/the-cathars-and-reincarnation).



### 3 Textual and Paratextual Reframing Strategies

#### Introduction

While Chapter 2 analysed aspects of the personal, social and political dynamics surrounding Miller's translations of Hegel and identified narrative types and features relevant to Miller at the time of the translations which intersect with narratives embedded in the Hegelian texts, the present chapter pursues this investigation into the texts and paratexts of the translations. The analysis in Chapter 3 accordingly draws on the structuralist work of Gérard Genette, which is well established in translation studies (Batchelor 2018; Genette 1997), using the terms *text* and *paratext* to distinguish between the parts of Miller's published translations which correspond to Hegel's original text (translated text) and any other components relevant to the published books (paratexts). In the present book, the paratexts are further subdivided into *peritexts*, components of the paratexts which are present in the published book, such as the foreword, editorial introduction, references, acknowledgements and so on, and *epitexts*, which are not present in the published book but relate more and less closely to it.

The "more and less" in the last sentence is very flexible. In the case of a retranslation of Hegel, the previous translation could be classified as a close and therefore highly relevant epitext, for example, both editions of Baillie's translations (Hegel and Baillie 1910/1931) can be classified as epitexts to Miller's publication of *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (Hegel and Miller 1977). Miller certainly referred to one or both versions, although his translations were based on an edition of the original German texts. The complete range of epitexts to Miller's translations would therefore be extremely large and ever expanding.

For instance, a popular book on German history purchased at a Berlin airport in 2019 made the following all-too familiar attack on Hegel: "Hegel veiled his thinking in such *senseless, meaningless webs of language* (Schopenhauer) that it's often almost impossible to work out what he really means. . . . Hegel's influence on German nineteenth-century thought, and on some thinkers to this day, is incalculably baneful. . . . The perfect



philosophy for extremists of both “Left” and “Right” . . . Hegel: the root of all evil” (Hawes 2017: 95). This text must also be included among the significant epitexts, because such comments demonstrate that Findlay’s and Miller’s curatorial, custodial strategy of protecting Hegel from politicising appropriations has ultimately been unsuccessful.

The focus of this chapter is on texts and peritexts. With particular reference to the concept of reframing (Baker 2006/2018: 105–140), the translated texts are briefly described (and therefore re-narrated) for the purpose of orientation, suggesting how narratives in the Hegelian texts are subtly but strategically reframed in translation and/or retranslation. The editors of the Miller translations, especially J.N. Findlay, who wrote peritextual introductions to several of the translations are then considered.

Each of the six texts Miller translated exhibits a different translation status on a continuum between translation and retranslation. In addition to their Hegelian content, each text tells a different context-specific story. With reference to other translations of the same works, a distinction between “thin” and “thick” translation is discernible, with Miller’s work situated towards the “thin” end of the continuum, avoiding explicit scholarly intervention and prioritising fluency and an authoritative, antiquarian, elevated translatorial and editorial style. The translations cannot therefore be taken as purely philosophical. They combine literary, scientific, religious and spiritual aspirations with a “euphemisation” or selective erasure of the political. In this sense, the translations are performative of a historically situated, gender-specific and age-related role, which carries ethical responsibility for reproducing without appropriate editorial or translatorial comment views which have subsequently been recognised as racist and gender-biased.

The chapter addresses two related questions: How can the translated books be analysed to show dynamic, structural relationships between the participants, processes and products of translation? To what extent do textual and peritextual elements reframe the translated Hegelian texts with reference to the wider, contemporary context of the translations?

### **Framing, Frame Space and Frame Ambiguity**

Theoretical concepts of *framing*, *reframing*, *frame space* and *frame ambiguity* introduced into translation studies by Baker (2006/2018: 105–140) are central to this chapter. With reference to Tannen and Wallat (1993: 60) and Goffman (1986 [1974]: 27), Baker distinguishes between narrative framing and the related concepts of *schema* or *schemata* and *frame-works*. While these concepts are generally used by sociologists to suggest a set of static beliefs and expectations about people, objects, events and settings which participants bring with them to a social interaction, “the definition of frames stresses the dynamic nature of interaction” (Baker 2006: 105–106). Frames are further defined as “structures of anticipation,

strategic moves that are consciously initiated in order to present a narrative in a certain light” (Baker 2006: 167). Clues to such strategic moves can be found in the textual and peritextual layers of the Miller translations; they are often fragmentary, sometimes no more than an association or connotation of an individual word, but, taken together, they emerge from the analysis of narratives (Alleyne 2015: 41) as a historical re-shaping of the dynamic social and cultural forces acting on, but also shaped by, the associated translation products, processes and participants.

The terms *framing* and *reframing* are also used in this dynamic sense, which, as Baker stresses, suggests “conscious,” “strategic” moves initiated, in the present context, by Miller as a translator and/or by the other participants involved in producing text and/or peritexts. Looking back to Chapter 2, Miller’s overarching reframing strategy was shown to include, for example, resistance to the political reframing of Hegel’s works, which was becoming increasingly evident in the 1960s, especially regarding the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In their mediation between Hegel and his anglophone readers, Miller and his associates sought to replace the political frame with what they took to be a more authentically Hegelian reframing, emphasising intersections, for example, with personal, metaphysical, theosophical and religious narratives and de-politicising Hegel in retranslation. Their strategy can be aptly construed as curatorial or custodial; they sought to protect the authentic and valuable Hegel from misappropriation, brutalisation and damage, like an artistic or cultural treasure. While their strategy opened some interpretive doors, it inevitably closed others. The aim of the chapter is therefore to analyse how small-scale reframing strategies implemented in the text and the peritexts contributed to this overarching strategy.

The concepts of *frame space* (Baker 2006: 109–112) and *frame ambiguity* (Baker 2006: 107) deserve special mention. Baker’s discussion of frame space is derived from Goffman (1986 [1974]). The frame space of a participant in an interaction is defined as the sum of a number of possible roles (which might include the roles of author, translator, custodian or curator, but also negotiable as well as fixed gender-related roles) and possible positions relative to the event and the other participants in the interaction (Baker 2006: 109). Now, by analogy with Baker’s discussion, the frame space of a translator of Hegel’s philosophy can be regarded as “normatively allocated” in the sense that certain actions, decisions or choices made by the translator are seen as acceptable when they fall within the frame space of the translator and unacceptable when they fall outside. According to this analysis, Miller’s criticism of the Johnston and Struthers translation of Hegel’s *Science of Logic* (Hegel and Johnston 1929), which was mentioned in Chapter 2 as an element in the narrative of motivation leading to Miller’s own retranslation of this work, was based on what Miller saw as a number of transgressions of the legitimate frame space for a translator of Hegel’s philosophy. One such transgression

of the frame space relates to a costly peritextual element in the form of a fold-out “Table of Categories” comprising five folded sections with four folds. The table, which offers a synoptic overview of the structure of the entire system of logic, must have been hand-glued into each of the hard-bound copies of volume one of this two-volume book (see Figure 3.1). For Miller, this table must have seemed unacceptable because it was not authored by Hegel (allographic) and contained significant inaccuracies. It was added by the translators as one of several aids to comprehension but, like many other choices and decisions evident in the text and peritexts of this translation, falls outside the legitimate frame space for a translator as perceived by Miller.<sup>1</sup> Miller’s retranslation repairs the damaged frame space simply by omitting the fold-out table. The decision was no doubt welcomed by the publishers because of the reduced production costs for this already long and esoteric book. With reference to Hanna’s discussion of doxa (Hanna 2016: 45–48), Miller’s curatorial role can be regarded as “orthodox” in that he rejects the heterodox innovation (the idea that translators might insert non-authorial aids to understanding), reasserting the prevailing orthodoxy of the Cold-War Hegel revival, which viewed translation as primarily faithful or subservient to original authorship rather than interpretive.




Figure 3.1 “Table of Categories” from the Johnston and Struthers translation (Hegel and Johnston): an allographic peritextual synopsis of the structure of Hegel’s *Science of Logic*.

According to Baker, frame ambiguity refers to the “special doubt” over the definition of a situation (Goffman 1986 [1974]: 302) which is “often experienced by different parties to a conflict as a by-product of competing attempts to legitimize different versions of the relevant narrative” (2006: 108). As in the many conflict situations analysed by Baker, frame ambiguity is a frequent occurrence in and around Hegel’s philosophy which can have relatively serious theoretical and ethical consequences (Stern 2002).<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, as we shall see later in the book with reference to the religious and/or political implications of certain passages in Hegel, “this ambiguity is often resolved or obscured in translation” (Baker 2006: 108).

### Reframing and “Fencing” in the Textual Layer of Analysis

Miller’s translated and/or retranslated texts are the locus for reframing strategies in different layers of analysis or scales of magnification, which each influence how intersecting narrative strands in and around Hegel’s writing are re-encoded in the translated text and potentially decipherable by readers. The largest magnification relevant to this case study relates to Miller’s decision to translate the six published texts in the first place. This macro-level corresponds with the discussion of translation strategy by feminist translation theorists de Lotbinière-Harwood (1995: 64), Simon (1996: 31–32) and others. Some translators would simply avoid translating Hegel on ethical grounds, e.g. because of his perceived misogyny and racism (Bernasconi 2003; Hutchings 2003; McCarney 2003; Stone 2012). In this light, Miller’s decision to translate the Hegelian texts represents a strong personal commitment to Hegel, but even Miller’s commitment was not entirely unified. While he preferred the *Science of Logic* and the *Philosophy of Nature*, he expressed reservations about translating the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and, for the reasons mentioned in his letters to Barfield (see Chapter 2), refused to take part in a collaborative project on Hegel’s religious philosophy. At the macro-level, the Hegelian texts are reframed by personal, spatial and temporal factors, such as who translated them, where, when and in which order. While reframing is most clearly identifiable in the peritexts (Batchelor 2018: 26–27, 145–147), which will be considered later, it also occurs at a micro-level within the translated texts themselves.

Miller’s translations of the German verb *aufheben* [*sublate*] and its nominalisations (e.g. *Aufhebung*) exemplify micro-level translation strategies, which are used to reframe the narrative content of whole books, thereby disclosing differential translatorial commitments and positioning. While he translated *aufheben*/*Aufhebung* consistently as *sublate*/*sublation* in Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, Miller adopted a different strategy when translating the same lexical item in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (see Chapters 7 and 8). To summarise findings which will be discussed

in greater detail in Part Three, Miller reinforced the distinction between the *Science of Logic* (Hegel and Miller 1969) and the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Hegel and Miller 1977) by using a large number of different English verbs (44 different verbs) in the *Phenomenology* to translate a single German term which he had translated consistently in his earlier translation of a different work. Even at the micro-level, Miller therefore frames the *Science of Logic* as a mature, systematic work of philosophy characterised by consistent use of special technical language (*sublate/sublation*), while the *Phenomenology* is framed as an early work characterised by unstable, exploratory terminology. This could be interpreted as Miller's translatorial response to the narrative of Hegel's development towards maturity and an attempt to reserve the specialist term *sublate* for exclusive use in the context of Hegel's logic and metaphysics, "fencing" these subdisciplines from the more popular social and political dimensions of Hegel's philosophy, which Miller found less interesting and possibly more vulnerable to dangerous misunderstanding.<sup>3</sup>

Between the macro and micro levels, Miller's reframing strategies are also evident at intermediate levels. For example, features traditionally associated with literary style, such as dramatisation, imagery, suspense and characterisation, and prosodic features such as alliteration, assonance and rhythm, also function as reframing strategies within the translated texts. The logical cohesion of paragraphs and the grammatical structure of sentences and clauses often contribute to the construction, projection and performance of Miller's version of the "elevated style" discussed in Chapter 2 with reference to Bourdieu. Such features are often used in conjunction with textual features such as font size, initial capitalisation of some nouns and pronouns, inclusion of (German) words or phrases in square brackets. For example, several of the books contain additions [*Zusätze*] written by Hegel's students. These are printed in a smaller font size, and there is some evidence that Miller tried to characterise the authors differently, reserving the most elevated, authoritative style for Hegel himself.<sup>4</sup>

My suggestion is that a broad understanding of Miller's commitments towards Hegel and practical implications for contemporary readers can be obtained by analysing textual evidence of his translation strategies at different degrees of magnification. At the level of entire books, for example, Miller translated Hegel's mature works first. As shown in Table 3.1, there was a gap of several years before he translated Hegel's first published work, the *Phenomenology*. The order in which Miller translated the texts expresses some degree of preference or prioritisation. Closer analysis of the translated texts, moving down the scale of magnification from entire books to the internal structuring of the texts into sections, subsections, paragraphs, sentences, clauses, phrases and down to individual lexical choices,<sup>5</sup> thus sheds more light on the details of Miller's reframing strategies and how these details relate to the wider narrative context of the

Table 3.1 List of Hegel's works translated and/or retranslated by Arnold Miller, in order of publication of each translation, showing the citation style in each case.<sup>6</sup>

No.	Title of the Miller translation	Publication of translation
1	<i>Science of Logic</i> (Hegel and Miller 1969)	1969
2	<i>Philosophy of Nature</i> (Hegel and Miller 1970)	1970
3	<i>Philosophy of Mind</i> (Hegel and Miller 1971)	1971
4	<i>Phenomenology of Spirit</i> (Hegel and Miller 1977)	1977
5	<i>Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy</i> (Hegel and Miller 1985)	1985
6	<i>Philosophical Propaedeutic</i> (Hegel and Miller 1986)	1986

translations. Although there is some overlap at the lower levels of analysis with traditional linguistic approaches to translation studies (Rieu 1952, 1955; Saldanha 2011: 152) with which Miller was familiar, the socio-logical theoretical framework adopted in this book takes this analysis beyond considerations of dynamic equivalence between source and target texts (Pym 2014: 8, 16, 31). Micro-level shifts (Bakker 1998: 269–274), not only between the German text and the English translation but also between previous translations and retranslations of the same text, are seen as part of a continuum of reframing strategies which connects translatorial commitments with the broader socio-narrative context contemporary to the translator but including the readership and reception of the translated texts.

### The Six Texts Translated or Retranslated by Miller

Miller is named as the translator of six different Hegel titles, but precisely what this means in terms of his authorship and responsibility for the content of the translations differs considerably in each case. Table 3.1 lists the six titles in order of publication of the translations.

It is evident that the first three books were published close together between 1969 and 1971. There was then a larger gap until the fourth publication in 1977 and between the remaining translations in 1985 and 1986 respectively. Even the timing and sequence of Miller's translations invite a narrative interpretation. Although Miller had retired from the civil service several years before and was able to devote most of his time to the Hegel translations, the sheer volume of work involved in preparing these long books for publication suggests that he started this work many years before the publication dates. The *Science of Logic* (Hegel and Miller 1969) alone runs to 844 printed pages; the *Philosophy of Nature* (Hegel and Miller 1970) comprises 450 pages; and the *Philosophy of Mind*



Table 3.2 List of German titles of Hegel’s works translated and/or retranslated by Arnold Miller, in order of first publication, showing dates of subsequent revisions.<sup>7</sup>

No.	German title of original publication	Publication of German original	Order of Miller translation
1	<i>Phänomenologie des Geistes</i> (Hegel 1970a)	1807	4
2	<i>Philosophische Propädeutik</i> (Hegel 1970g)	1808–1811	6
3	<i>Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie</i> (Hegel 1970f)	1812/16	5
4	<i>Wissenschaft der Logik</i> (Hegel 1970b; Hegel 1970c)	1812/13/16	1
5	<i>Naturphilosophie (Enzyklopädie II)</i> (Hegel 1970d)	1817/27/30	2
6	<i>Philosophie des Geistes (Enzyklopädie III)</i> (Hegel 1970e)	1817/27/30	3

(Hegel and Miller 1971) is 320 pages long. Archival evidence supports this suggestion, and correspondence with Miller’s daughter Ann (Hardie 2018) indicates that her father began the translations as early as 1949.

Comparison with Table 3.2, which gives the corresponding German titles alongside their publication dates, shows that Miller did not translate the books in the chronological order in which they first appeared in German.

For Miller, the first three titles he translated represented the fullest expression of Hegel’s mature system. In fact, the *Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, which comprises three volumes – known in English as the *Encyclopaedia Logic* or *Shorter Logic*, *Philosophy of Nature* and *Philosophy of Mind* – deserves this description because Hegel revised and republished the books in 1830, the year before his death. But, as the alternative English title suggests, the *Shorter Logic* (*Enzyklopädie I*) is a shorter version of the considerably longer and more detailed *Wissenschaft der Logik* – the *Science of Logic* – which Miller published first, in 1969.

Miller’s translations of the *Philosophy of Nature* and the *Philosophy of Mind* were published in an Oxford University Press (Clarendon Press) series, with matching book covers in the paperback versions, together with a revised translation of the *Encyclopaedia Logic* originally translated by William Wallace in 1875 (Hegel and Findlay 1975). In other words, by 1975 (the publication date of the *Encyclopaedia Logic*), Oxford University Press had published translations (in each case with a different translation status) of all three books of the *Encyclopaedia of the*

*Philosophical Sciences*. Together with their republication in 1952 of Sir Malcolm Knox's 1942 translation of *Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (corrected in 1945, reissued in 1949), these publications represent a strong commitment by Oxford University Press to Hegel's mature philosophy. Accordingly, regardless of the content of the books, their publication can be interpreted as a rebuff by Oxford University Press of the anti-Hegelian narratives associated with Popper (2003) and Russell (1946).

Miller's retranslation of the *Science of Logic* was published in a different series by a different but also highly respected publisher (Muirhead Library of Philosophy, Allen & Unwin, now absorbed into the Taylor and Francis Group) and constitutes an expanded statement of the logical foundation of Hegel's system also partially revised by Hegel in 1830. It was this group of titles, but especially the *Logic*, which had primarily interested the British Idealist philosophers, whose influence had been waning since WWI. While the new publications could be regarded as sustaining the British Idealist interest in these titles, the new books were also associated, not least through the title of the series editor's 1958 book (Findlay 1958), with the project of a post-war "Re-examination" and/or revival of Hegel and his works.

Miller's six translations and retranslations of Hegel cover a range of philosophical topics too broad to summarise in the present book. In the historical period relevant to the life and work of Arnold Miller, a large volume of secondary literature was also produced in English.<sup>8</sup> However, as I will explain, the narrative of individual and collective progress towards freedom serves as a unifying theme. In a sense, all these works published in English, and for that matter, works published in languages other than German and English, participate in the reframing, re-narration and therefore translation of Hegel: they use, re-use and sometimes transform technical vocabulary introduced and disseminated through the various translations. For example, the English-language discourse around Hegel has tended away from the translation of *Geist* as *mind* (preferred by some of the earlier translators, such as J.B. Baillie and William Wallace), settling instead on *spirit* (sometimes with a capital S but more recently with a lower-case s). Modern writers have also settled on *concept* as a translation of *Begriff* instead of the term *Notion* preferred by Miller and some of his predecessors (Walker 2019: 366).

As many authors on Hegel have admitted, the philosophical breadth of Hegel's system and the even broader extent of the surrounding discourse about Hegel make it difficult for any single book to approach the subject without superficiality or triviality. For my present purpose, which is to contextualise Miller's work, it is desirable, despite misgivings about superficiality, to find a readily identifiable thematic strand which coordinates aspects of Hegel's work relevant to Miller's translations. One introductory work, *Hegel: A Guide for the Perplexed* (James 2007) represents the view of many other authors on the identity of this central thematic strand.



James refers to the systematic scope of Hegel's philosophy mentioned earlier:

... given the systematic nature of Hegel's philosophy, a short introduction to his thought can at best provide only a partial account of his philosophical project. It would therefore help if we could identify a theme that runs throughout Hegel's philosophical system, which consists of a logic, a philosophy of nature, and a philosophy of spirit; for this theme might provide the key to understanding both the internal dynamic governing the development of this system and the principle which serves to unify its various moments. Fortunately, it is possible to identify such a theme, namely freedom.

(James 2007: 1–2)

James then explains his choice of “freedom” as the central focus for his guide with reference to the historical context of Hegel's work following the French Revolution but emphasises that “Hegel thinks that the significance of the concept of freedom should not therefore be limited to the domain of ethics but must instead be extended to include religion and even logic” (2007: 3). The significance of this point for an understanding of Miller's interpretation of Hegel should be evident, especially in view of the tension between political and religious dimensions of Hegel's thought which we have already encountered in Miller's correspondence with Barfield.

Hegel's “theory of freedom” is further defined and analysed in *A Hegel Dictionary* (Inwood 2003). Inwood explains that the German terms *Freiheit* and *frei* refer to *freedom* and *free* in all their social and political senses, “contrasting with ‘slavery,’ ‘dependence,’ ‘compulsion,’ ‘necessity’ and so on,” and that Hegel tries to “interconnect this variety of senses into a single theory of freedom”:

The core notion of freedom is this: something, especially a person, is free if, and only if, it is independent and self-determining, not determined by or dependent on something other than itself. But this formula raises three questions:

(Inwood 2003: 110)

The three questions posed and answered in some detail by Inwood can be summarised for the present purpose as follows: (1) Where is the boundary between something and its other? Deciding whether something or someone is self-determining or free depends on where this boundary is placed. For example, I have thoughts, perceptions, desires and a body; I inhabit a social and political environment; I live in a natural world “which surrounds and pervades my social environment and myself” (ibid). I may think of my thoughts or my body as most obviously my own, but to the

extent that I acknowledge that my thoughts and my body may have been determined by outside influences, such as language, diet, disease, DNA or injury, I must accept that any boundary between myself and what determines it must remain open. (2) “How is the relation of determining or dependency to be specified?” Inwood lists causal determination, physical compulsion or restriction, imprisonment, threats, slavery and “voluntary acceptance of another’s political, moral or doctrinal authority,” thereby suggesting a continuum of relationships from “negative” freedom from oppression towards a more “positive” sense of freedom in which voluntary acceptance of norms is constitutive of self-determination. (3) “How is freedom secured?” Inwood outlines three scenarios.

1. The relation of determination or dependency is severed, despite the persistence of both terms of the relation and of their otherness: e.g. I cease to care about my imprisonment or enslavement and retreat into myself.
2. The relation of determination is severed by the elimination of one of its terms: e.g. I am released from slavery or imprisonment, or, conceivably, I attain freedom by my own death.
3. The two terms cease to be, or to seem, other than each other, because one or the other, or both, takes over or sublates the other: e.g. my captor and I fall in love, so that we cease to seem (or to be) alien to each other and I cease to feel obedience to his will as a constraint on my freedom.

(Inwood 2003: 110–111)

In broad terms, the six Hegel texts translated by Miller address different aspects of these questions. The positive claim that Hegel’s philosophy makes a powerful contribution to the development of liberal thought (Houlgate 2008: viii) as well as the negative criticisms of Hegel based on the alleged associations with Nazism, communism, racism and sexism (Bernasconi 2003; Hutchings 2003; McCarney 2003; Stewart 1996; Stone 2012) all pivot on the details of how Hegel articulates his answers to these questions and, importantly for this book, how Miller subtly re-narrated Hegel’s answers in English during the Cold-War era. In other words, how do the translations influence different readers’ understandings of Hegel’s various conceptualisations of freedom in the works translated?

The following paragraphs are not supposed to be detailed summaries of Hegel’s texts, but they contain references to recent scholarship which might be useful to readers who wish to investigate further (Berlin 1969; Bird 2006; Houlgate 2005; Inwood 2003). The aim here is simply to prepare the ground for the discussion in Parts Two and Three, which suggest how the narratives in Miller’s life intersect with and reframe the narrative of freedom identified as central to Hegel’s work, especially regarding historical and contemporary criticisms of Hegel.

*Science of Logic*

Miller's *Science of Logic* (Hegel and Miller 1969) is a retranslation of the 1929 Johnston and Struthers translation of Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik*. He worked with the German text alongside the English translation and certainly consulted other works during the process of retranslation. As we know, Miller was strongly motivated to retranslate this text. He approved of Hegel's content but found fault with the existing translation.

Houlgate (2006) neatly explains the underlying task of Hegel's *Science of Logic* with reference to the categories of thought (*Denkbestimmungen*) which, if used unreflectively, as they had been by generations of philosophers and non-philosophers, can lead to misunderstanding:

In Hegel's view, however, such unreflective use of categories may be more problematic than we think. For it may leave us caught in a network of concepts that are in fact improperly formed and thereby distort our view of the world. In other words, it might leave us "in bondage to unclarified and therefore unfree thinking".

(Houlgate 2006: 10)

On this account, therefore, the narrative articulated throughout the *Science of Logic* is a progressive narrative (Gergen 1997) leading systematically, through the stages of "Being," "Essence" and "The Notion" (the three major subdivisions of the book), from the "bondage" or "unfreedom" of misunderstanding caused by unreflective use of the categories towards ever greater freedom.

The task of philosophy, for Hegel – in particular that of the *Logic* – is to free us from such possible misunderstanding and to render our theoretical and practical activity more intelligent and clearheaded by determining in a rigorous and disciplined way how the basic categories of thought are to be conceived. As "impulses," Hegel says, "the categories are only instinctively active." Consequently "they afford to mind only a fragmentary and uncertain actuality; the loftier business of logic therefore is to clarify these categories and in them to raise mind to freedom and truth."

(Houlgate 2006: 11)<sup>9</sup>

*Philosophy of Nature*

Miller's *Philosophy of Nature* (Hegel and Miller 1970) is an original translation of Hegel's *Die Naturphilosophie* and includes his translation of the *Zusätze* or *additions* written by one of Hegel's students, Karl Ludwig Michelet. Miller began work on this translation several years before publication, and sections of the text, especially those relating to Kepler's

equations and the planetary orbits in our solar system, would have been familiar to him from Sedlák's book, as discussed in Chapter 5. Miller collaborated with Michael Petry for a time, but the collaboration was abandoned (AUC 1920–1968). In a unique and uncomfortable publishing situation, Petry published his own three-volume translation of the same work (Hegel and Petry 1970) in the same year as Miller's single-volume translation (Hegel and Miller 1970). Differences between Miller's translation and Petry's are discussed later with reference to the peritextual layer.

Hegel's reference to "instinct" mentioned in the Houlgate quotation earlier provides a direct link to the next of Miller's translations, which also follows systematically from the *Logic*, namely *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature* (Hegel and Miller 1970). While the *Science of Logic* maps out the possibility of, and indeed the logical necessity for a natural world, the *Philosophy of Nature* articulates a systematically related, progressive narrative leading from the mechanical and physical beginnings of the natural world through to the emergence of organic life. While the later, organic stages of this narrative are dominated by "instinct," the crucial transition for Hegel's essentially humanist account is the emergence of minds capable of developing towards rational thought, in other words, minds capable of freeing themselves from the domination of natural "instinct" and becoming increasingly self-determining. Although the *Philosophy of Nature* refers extensively to the natural science of Hegel's time, it is not supposed to offer an account based on empirical science in the modern sense of the term. As Houlgate explains,

Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* is clearly not intended to be a work of straightforward natural science itself, but to be a work of philosophy in the manner of Aristotle's *Physics* or Kant's *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. It does not simply offer the results of empirical research and observation (or of mathematical analysis), but seeks to provide an account of the ultimate *conceptual* structure of nature. (Houlgate 1998: xiii)<sup>10</sup>

### *Philosophy of Mind*

Miller's *Philosophy of Mind* (Hegel and Miller 1971) is a revision of William Wallace's 1894 translation of Hegel's *Die Philosophie des Geistes* but with additions (*Zusätze*) written by another of Hegel's students, Ludwig Boumann, who edited the 1845 collected edition of Hegel's works in German. In this case, Miller performed a dual role as translator of the *Zusätze* and reviser of Wallace's translation. As already mentioned, the translation of *Geist* as *Mind* in the title of this book, which is attributable to Wallace and retained throughout the book, contrasts with the translation of *Geist* in the next Miller title, the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The text of the *Zusätze* in Hegel's discussion of Anthropology (Hegel and Miller 1971: 41–51,

55–64), which were translated by Miller, contains two particularly relevant passages, one is about racial differences; the other passage is about the “ages of man” (see Chapter 6).

The final stage of the progressive narrative towards freedom in Hegel’s sense of the term, that is, the stage after the emergence of minds capable of rational thought, is articulated in the third of Miller’s translations, which is also the third part of Hegel’s *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, namely, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind* (Hegel and Miller 1971). The *Philosophy of Mind* also progresses through three developmental stages from “Mind Subjective” (which comprises anthropology, phenomenology and psychology, but once again not in the modern sense of these terms) through “Mind Objective” (comprising law, the morality of conscience and the moral life) to “Absolute Mind,” which progresses through art and revealed religion towards philosophy. In the sense that the end of this progressive narrative – philosophy – reconnects with the logic discussed at the start of the *Encyclopaedia*, Hegel’s entire system can be described as a circular narrative. Many of the strands of disciplinary narrative articulated through this philosophical system reappear in Hegel’s other (earlier and later) lecture notes, although there are often important differences in the way these narratives are told in each case.

### *Phenomenology of Spirit*

Hegel’s *Die Phänomenologie des Geistes* was originally translated into English in 1910 by James Black Baillie. Baillie revised his translation in 1931, combining the two volumes into one and rewriting his own Introduction with minor changes to the translated text (Hegel and Baillie; Charlston 2013). One surprising feature of the retranslation strategy is that Miller’s retranslation does not retain Baillie’s title, *Phenomenology of Mind*. Such surprises in the text and even in the titles of the translations suggest the presence of intriguing reframing narratives.

Miller’s fourth translation, *Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit* (Hegel and Miller 1977), touches on many of the topics contained in the *Encyclopaedia* but deals with them in quite a different manner. While the mature system articulates a progressive narrative towards freedom, the *Phenomenology*, Hegel’s first published work, can be thought of as articulating a series of regressive narratives (Gergen 1997), illustrating how different human conceptualisations of the world and self-conceptualisations, which fall short of a philosophical understanding of the categories of thought, each lead to a collapse of the social, moral or cultural order built upon them, thereby necessitating new conceptualisations of the world and of the self. In a sense, each failure therefore leads to a renewal, so that, despite the smaller-scale failures, there is a sense of overall progress through the larger subdivisions of the book: “Consciousness,” “Self-Consciousness,” “Reason,” “Spirit,” “Religion” and “Absolute

Knowing.” Regarding Hegel’s narrative of freedom, the *Phenomenology* thus presents and analyses several failed attempts to achieve freedom.<sup>11</sup>

### *Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy*

In the case of the last two titles, *Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (Hegel and Miller 1985) and *Philosophical Propaedeutic* (Hegel and Miller 1986), Miller’s role was to prepare for publication manuscripts already translated by others. By this time, however, his reputation as an established translator of Hegel lent prestige and continuity to these final publishing projects. This effect is described in Bourdieusian terms as Miller’s accumulation of cultural capital.

Hegel’s *Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (Hegel and Miller 1985) in fact contains several different introductions to this topic written by Hegel at different stages of his career. These texts also relate to the narrative of freedom in the sense that they outline the progressive development of the concept of philosophy through history.<sup>12</sup>

### *Philosophical Propaedeutic*

Hegel’s *Philosophical Propaedeutic* (Hegel and Miller 1986) is also composed of several different sets of lecture or lesson notes, in this case, intended for boys in the “Lower Class,” “Middle Class” and “Higher Class” of grammar school. The text covers many of the themes developed more fully in Hegel’s mature system, as the editors explain:

Admittedly the detailed ordering of the text is not always that of the mature writings and some of the categories only briefly broached here by Hegel undergo considerable further development in the Encyclopaedia. None the less the basic ideas and structure of the mature system is here in microcosm.

(George 1986: xxi–xxii)<sup>13</sup>

### Reframing in the Peritextual Layer

Peritextual elements in the Miller translations are classifiable based on their authors as either anonymous, translatorial or editorial. Some peritextual elements are untraceably anonymous. Examples include the title pages, the colophon with publisher’s information, some of the blurbs on the back covers and the subject indexes. Three of the books contain short “Translator’s Forewords” authored by Miller. One contains a short “Translator’s Foreword” by Sir Malcolm Knox (T.M. Knox), who had died before publication of the translation. Four contain extended “Introductions” written by the editor J.N. Findlay. The last of the translations was edited by Michael George and Andrew Vincent, who also provided

an extended a “Preface,” “Acknowledgements,” an “Introduction” with notes, a bibliography and a subject index.

These peritextual elements frame narratives relevant to the wider context of Miller’s work to a varying degree. For instance, in his Foreword to the *Science of Logic*, Miller mentions the growing interest in Hegel “across the Atlantic”; Findlay’s university affiliations link him and therefore also the Hegel translations with prestigious American universities; Yale (1969, 1970), Boston (1977); Findlay’s anti-communist comments, for example, in the Foreword to the *Phenomenology* (Findlay 1977: xxiv) also frame the Hegel revival relative to the Cold-War metanarrative in allegiance to the West, the USA, democracy and the “free world.” At a general level of interpretation, the peritextual framing thus subtly suggests that whenever Hegel’s philosophy contends that freedom is to be thought of as self-determination, this is, in some sense, more compatible with the West and with Western liberal conceptions of political freedom than with socialism or, for example, with Soviet communism.

Genette’s account of the function of paratexts in general supports the case that the peritextual framing of Miller’s translations is not irrelevant. Many ostensibly trivial details in and around the book act as a “threshold of interpretation,” controlling the readers’ access to and experience of the text itself. As Genette explains:

For us, accordingly, the paratext is what enables a text to become a book and to be offered as such to its readers and, more generally, to the public. More than a boundary or a sealed border, the paratext is, rather, a *threshold*, or – a word Borges used apropos of a preface – a “vestibule” that offers the world at large the possibility of either stepping inside or turning back. It is an “undefined zone” between the inside and the outside, a zone without any hard and fast boundary on either the inward side (turned toward the text) or the outward side (turn towards the world’s discourse about the text).

(1997: 1–2)

The advantage of analysing Miller’s translations of Hegel with reference to static peritextual elements, such as the words on the page or the presence/absence of the fold-out table, is that the approach provides an objective analysis of what is physically present in the books under investigation. But static features identified at this level of analysis are the products of dynamic processes and relationships between the various participants in the translation process. Deeper analysis suggests that, in some cases at least, apparently fixed boundaries, for example, between translator and editors, between visible participants (i.e. those mentioned in the peritexts) and invisible participants, such as Miller’s original collaborators who were dismissed from the project, are not as clear as they at first seem (Batchelor 2018: 33, 152–153). The structural elements discussed in this



section thus relate outwards from a fixed peritextual element towards dynamic narratives associated with the translators and other participants including potential readers. The analysis exposes an important tension between an ostensibly fixed, philosophical content of Hegel's books and the more variable, historically contingent, linguistic and social context of Miller's translations. As shown later in the book, the tension between static and dynamic, rigid and flexible is significant regarding Miller's understanding of Hegel.

### *Peritexts and Places*

Regarding the spatial dimension, the peritexts make explicit reference to countries, cities, villages and even individual buildings, such as colleges and houses. In addition to these absolute (or geodesic) spatial references, there are also relative spatial references, such as "across the Atlantic" and "oriental." Based on culturally determined associations which readers might have with these places, such references act as clues pointing towards divergent narrative strands, which are therefore subtly articulated through the peritexts. For example, the list of selected world cities on the publisher's colophon page, which differs in each of the six Hegel translations, reflects the growing internationalisation of the academic publishing industry during the 1960s and 70s (Sapiro 2008, 2010). The absence of cities in the communist countries further reflects political and economic conditions during the Cold-War period. Miller's reference "in this country and across the Atlantic" refers to the same Cold-War context but with particular reference to a narrative of the "current revival of interest in Hegel," which is therefore spatially defined through the peritexts.

Surprisingly few references to Germany occur in the peritexts. This could be interpreted as an instance of what Bourdieu describes as "euphemisation": the peritexts play down the association of Hegel with Germany. In this sense, Hegel and his works are appropriated through *re/*translation for the English-speaking world. Links with Germany and painful associations with period of Nazification are thus minimised. The peritexts in some of the books refer to historical German and Swiss towns and cities (Jena, Berlin, Basel, Tübingen) visited by Hegel (Pinkard 2000). As significant elements of multiple intersecting narratives, the peritexts therefore also exhibit the feature of selective appropriation; peritextual silences are sometimes more significant than what is explicitly narrated and present in the peritexts.

The mention of selected English, American and Canadian cities, towns and villages, such as Oxford, Toronto, Yale, Stroud and Whiteway, refer to the contemporary context of the translator and editor and may have specific associations for different readers. The translations were published in Oxford (London and New York). H.S. Harris, one of Miller's friends and advisors, especially for the publication of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*,



was professor of philosophy at Glendon College in Toronto. Findlay was professor in Yale and Boston at the time of publication of the translations. As we shall see in Part Two, Miller had close personal connections with Whiteway Colony near Stroud in the Cotswolds. The explicit mention of these places in the peritexts contributes to the reframing of Hegel's texts for their intended, largely British and American readership.

### *Peritexts, Causality and Temporality*

Analysing the peritexts with reference to the narrative features of temporality and causal emplotment (Baker 2006/2018: 50–51, 67–69) further demonstrates the presence of multiple narrative strands and especially multiple, overlapping timescales, which serve to dislocate the Hegel texts from their original associations (including any accumulation of associations contested by translators and editors) and reframing them in the contemporary world of the translator. As with the references to place, it is possible to distinguish between absolute (chronological) time references, such as the mention of specific dates, and to a relative sense of time. For instance, Findlay's reference to Miller's "new translation" in his Foreword to the *Science of Logic* and Miller's opening comment in his own Translator's Preface to the same text that "It is now nearly forty years since the first complete translation . . ." both refer to a relative time scale and imply a causal relationship of "ageing."

The dates mentioned in the peritexts refer selectively back to different narrative strands relevant, for example, to the publication of Hegel's original books in the early decades of the nineteenth century, but also relevant to the publication history and the translation history of each book. It is striking that the degree of precision of these time references, and whether they are given with chronological detail or only in relative terms, is variable and thus contributes to the selectivity in the narration of these historical "retroversions" (Harding 2012: 48). To pursue Findlay's and Miller's relativised time references to the previous translation of the *Science of Logic*, the selective lack of detail with regard to the previous translation contrasts with the precise details given for the Lasson, 1923 German edition of the *Science of Logic* and indeed for the 1952 Hoffmeister edition of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* which is also mentioned in Miller's *Preface* (1969: 14). The detailed references to the German editions reinforce the link between the Miller's new translation and the original German while reducing the relative importance of the intervening, and in Miller's opinion inaccurate, original translations. These framing strategies exemplify the Bourdieusian concepts of "distinction" and "social ageing" (Hanna 2016: 62–63) which make a positive contribution to the curation and marketing narrative, namely that the new translation is authoritative and closely (causally) linked to the original German text, thus bracketing out the relevance of rival products.

### *Peritexts and People*

As already mentioned, authors of the peritexts may be named or unnamed, and their individual association with different parts of the peritext remains relatively uncertain. These people may act as “temporary narrators” until the translator’s voice takes over as the proxy for the original author, that is, until Miller’s voice assumes the role of Hegel.

Peritexts often refer to people less directly involved with the translation process than the translator and editor, but because they have been named in the peritexts, their involvement (as remote co-participants in the narratives articulated here) becomes more explicit. The people mentioned are evidently participants in different narrative strands, people from different historical periods and different geographical locations, woven together into one or more of the peritextual narratives. But the list of people mentioned in the peritexts is selective; only some of the participants in the associated narratives are mentioned explicitly. Detailed consideration of the narrative context suggests that some people were deliberately excluded.

Accordingly, the peritexts mention Hegel and selected German contemporaries. Earlier (Greek) philosophers are mentioned and historically later participants, such as editors are also named. Furthermore, the peritexts name contemporaries of the translator and editor, also including some historical figures associated with the history of Hegel’s philosophy in English translation. Unsurprisingly, most of the people mentioned are philosophers and most are male (Shread 2019).

John Niemeyer Findlay (1903–1987) authored editorial peritexts in four of Miller’s six translations and is recognised as the driving force behind the Cold-War Hegel revival (Houlgate 2005: 300).<sup>14</sup> A brief digression into Findlay’s biography (Cohen et al. 1985) prompted by his relevance to the peritexts exposes similarities and differences between the life experiences of editor and translator. Findlay recalls his childhood in Pretoria, South Africa, “in a very golden manner.” The years from 1903 to 1914 seemed “a belle époque in which I played with my cousins and friends in the suburban estate which surrounded our large bungalow house.” The bungalow, which was home to “a large patriarchal household of whites and blacks,” was presided over by Findlay’s father, “a Freemason rather than a Christian” although he “exemplified Christian charity and benignity” (Findlay 1985: 2–3). The idyllic, colonial beginning to Findlay’s story thus differs markedly from Miller’s strict “Calvinistic” childhood in London (see Chapter 6).

Despite the divergence between Miller’s and Findlay’s early experiences, the two men represented different aspects of the same war-time generation. Findlay was just four years younger than Miller; by the time they met in the late 1950s, they had both “lived through” the same historical events although in very different ways. Both men had retained from their youth an interest in Western esotericism. A broad definition of this discipline

includes freemasonry and clairvoyance, which was practised by Miller's sister (see Chapter 6). It also includes theosophy, not only in the form developed and publicised by Helen Blavatsky and Annie Besant but also in other forms, e.g. as transformed by Rudolf Steiner, whose works Barfield translated, into the related "anthroposophy" (Hanegraaff 2013: 100). Findlay and Miller both mention an early interest in theosophy, which, in both cases, was superseded by their deeper commitment to Hegel.

The central "religionist" claim (Hanegraaff 2013: 11–14), which links theosophy, anthroposophy and the orientalist interpretations of various religions and cultural practices with aspects of Hegelian philosophy, is that of a hierarchy of thought which ascends from relatively "low" forms of thought related to basic natural needs, overlapping with the term "ordinary consciousness" (a term which occurs throughout the Hegel translations), towards the "highest" (or "deepest") and most "spiritual" forms of thought associated with the mind of God, the Absolute and the workings of pure Reason (Hanegraaff 2013: 66–68). The distinction between lower and higher forms of thought is certainly present throughout Hegel's writing, but what is relevant to this chapter is the extent to which Findlay's peritexts introduce an esoteric, patriarchal, orientalist and religionist reframing of Hegel's philosophy, possibly with elitist or anti-democratic implications. This point can be re-worded as a question: to what extent do Findlay's peritexts regulate or curate access to the "higher" philosophical truths articulated in the translated texts?

The features of Findlay's written style in the peritexts reframe the translated texts in complex ways. On one hand, Findlay's peritexts reframe the translations by re-situating them in the Cold-War period. For example, in his Introduction to the *Philosophy of Mind*, Findlay claims that reading Hegel alongside the newly translated *Zusätze* allows readers to see Hegel's opinions in "a surprisingly fresh, 'modern' light" (Hegel and Miller 1971: v). Later, on the same page, Findlay refers to the "scrambling" and the need to "unscramble" historical nineteenth-century editorial interventions. But the genealogy of the term "scramble" reframes the editorial and post-editorial processes in distinctively post-WWII terms. *Scrambling* and *unscrambling* are familiar terms for the encryption and code-cracking processes associated with Alan Turing, the German Enigma Machine and British war-time intelligence (Smith 2007). In this way, Findlay's mid-twentieth-century vocabulary, which would have been familiar to adult readers from public narratives about these successful, anti-Nazi intelligence operations, and his reference to "the present generation" and "the collapse of its culture" (ibid: vii) are used strategically to give the Hegel texts contemporary relevance and a "modern" feel.

On the other hand, by contrast with this contemporary spatio-temporal reframing, Findlay's texts also exhibit features indicative of a literary or "elevated style," which reframe the translated texts by pointing towards older and in some cases more esoteric disciplinary traditions. This strategy

is achieved through decidedly “unmodern” vocabulary, grammatical structures and prosodic devices such as alliteration and assonance usually associated with “high” literary style (cf. Hanna 2016: 20–36, 139 for a discussion of high and low literary styles). One striking example from the Introduction to *Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind* is the phrase “athwart the flux of time” (ibid: viii) which might be described as archaic. Findlay’s use of terms like “diremption” and “sublation” without any further explanation should also be mentioned. Another feature of Findlay’s elevated style is his use of strong, colourful vocabulary in relatively abstract, theoretical contexts. He also introduces neologisms into the discourse around Hegel, with terms like “out-thereness” (ibid: xv); “yieldingness” and “I-conformity” (ibid: vi); and his translation of Hegel’s term *Vorstellung* as “pictorial-idea” (Walker 2019: 369). While the archaic usage and the neologisms function as elements of the “elevated style” because they are temporally and socially differentiated from and, in this sense, elevated above ordinary usage, Findlay’s mention of “mysticism” (Miller 1977) and “extra sensory perception” (“The phenomena of extra sensory perception also accord well with Hegelianism . . .” ibid: xiv) glamorise Hegel’s text using literary means to point towards other-worldly or paranormal narratives. It is in this sense that biographical details about Findlay’s life can shed light on details of his peritextual reframing of the Hegel translations (Cohen 1985).<sup>15</sup>

By contrast with Findlay’s “elevated” peritextual style, the Introduction and other peritextual elements in Miller’s final retranslation *G.W.F. Hegel: The Philosophical Propaedeutic* (Hegel and Miller 1986) offer a markedly different style which incorporates many of the features required for modern academic publications. In general, the style is impartial and objective, avoiding the “strong,” emotionally charged, literary vocabulary favoured by Findlay. It includes more detailed and standardised referencing in the form of a glossary, a relatively up-to-date bibliography and suggestions for further reading. The content of the introduction, co-authored by the two editors, Michael George and Andrew Vincent, is largely descriptive and based on recent research, for example, on historical pedagogical conditions relating to the grammar school in which Hegel taught. The introduction attempts to contextualise not only the original Hegelian text but also gives details of the translation history.

## Peritextual Reframing in the Miller Translations: Narratives of Solidarity and Exclusion

### Science of Logic (1969)

Miller’s retranslation of *Hegel’s Science of Logic* was originally published by Allen & Unwin in a series known as the Muirhead Library of Philosophy. A one-page advertisement for this series, which dates to

the 1890s, makes no mention of the previous translation of this work (Hegel and Johnston 1929), which appeared in the same series.<sup>16</sup> In fact, the text of the advertisement (authored by H.D. Lewis) is the same as in the earlier translation. This allographic peritextual element by a named representative of the publisher's series establishes solidarity with the British Idealist tradition of Hegelianism by mentioning several of the authors associated with its development. While the new book was published as an 848-page paperback, the earlier translation was in two hardback volumes and featured the special (allographic), pull-out chart of Hegel's system already mentioned.

The title page names A.V. Miller as the translator and mentions that a Foreword was written by Professor J.N. Findlay. Mention of Findlay's academic title not only suggests his higher personal and professional status in the form of institutionalised cultural capital but also implies the asymmetric relationship, on the one hand, between translators and the subservient act of translation, and on the other, the high-status professors of philosophy whose approval of the translation endows it with philosophical, institutional and commercial value. This asymmetric dynamic expressed through the peritexts reflects but also disguises the fact that Miller did not have academic qualifications and constitutes a recurring theme observable in the peritexts of the other titles. The division of labour between expert philosopher and translator contributes to the narrative of authority and reliability, which is further communicated by the prestigious reputation of the publisher and series. A dedication "to the memory of Francis Sedlák 1873–1935" is printed in block capitals on an otherwise blank page. No further details about this dedicatee are given, but the mention of people's names in (translatorial) peritextual dedications and acknowledgements suggests that these individuals shared personal and professional narratives with the translators/editors. This suggestion is pursued in Chapter 5.

At face value, Findlay's half-page Foreword (Findlay 1969) to Miller's retranslation of the *Science of Logic* is simply a recommendation of the translation by an important expert in the field. However, on closer inspection, the Foreword communicates different messages. The brevity of this (editorial) allographic peritextual element contrasts with Findlay's Forewords to the other Hegel translations published in the OUP series. In these books, Findlay's peritextual contribution is between 19 pages (*Philosophy of Mind*) and 130 pages (*Phenomenology of Spirit*). Miller's translation published by Allen & Unwin was a commercial rival to the closely related, much shorter (Encyclopaedia) *Logic* (Hegel and Findlay 1975) which Findlay was to publish four years later with OUP. Although Findlay was prepared to recommend Miller's *Science of Logic*, his involvement was considerably less than in the other books, and he only thinly disguises his reservations about the translation. For example, he writes, "That he [Miller] has been always wholly successful in rendering every

passage would be too much to expect . . ." (Findlay 1969). After this potentially wounding suggestion, Findlay quickly rescues Miller by praising his "astonishing faithfulness."

Despite this sense of rivalry and condescension, and the discrepancies between the two men's embodied and institutionalised cultural capital, they share a joint commitment to the preservation and rehabilitation of Hegel, which overrides their differences. Findlay describes Hegel as "a world-mind" and explains that "[T]he book [Miller's translation] will go far in dispelling the picture of Hegel as a magus of false dialectic. He will appear as the greatest of European thinkers . . . whose most obscure, botched utterances are often worth many of the lucidities of modern philosophers." This translation is thus peritextually framed with reference to modern public and disciplinary narrative according to which Hegel has been misrepresented philosophically (especially by Popper (2003) and falsely linked with an evil German past associated with Nazism, Fascism and communism. Findlay's peritext reframes Hegel as a "world-mind" and "the greatest of European thinkers" with this particular purpose in mind. Although the original title of the book *Wissenschaft der Logik* is given in German, the words "German" and "Germany" do not appear in this Foreword.

Miller's two-page Translator's Preface is his longest translatorial peritext. Miller begins with a reference to the "nearly forty years since the first complete translation of Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik*" but does not give the name of the translators (Johnston and Struthers), whose work, as we know, he did not trust; nor does he explicitly name the publication date (1929). He mentions a current growth of interest in Hegel and the need for a more accurate translation, especially for "the student who is unfamiliar with German." He then expresses his hope that the translation will be "useful . . . to the interested layman" and supports this with a reference to G.R.G. Mure's *Introduction to Hegel* (1940/1966) according to which philosophy is "no more the exclusive business of professionals than is art or religion." To encourage prospective students of Hegel, Miller singles out "faith in the essential greatness of the human spirit and its ability to attain to a knowledge of absolute truth" as the chief requirements for a fruitful study of Hegel. These phrases form part of Miller's performative, translatorial mission statement, explanatory of his own experience of studying and translating Hegel's work. As such, they form part of a progressive, personal or ontological narrative of Miller's self-identification with Hegel.

Moving to the public and disciplinary narratives also mentioned in Findlay's Foreword, Miller then refers to the "crasser errors and misconceptions about Hegel," which have been cleared away by scholars, such as Mure, Findlay and Kaufman. Each of these scholars had written vehemently against Popper's condemnation of Hegel (2003). Naming these men can be interpreted as a performative expression of solidarity

with the Cold-War Hegel revival. Miller returns to the mission statement in a few remarks about the main obstacles to an understanding of Hegel's *Logic*. He clearly articulates a tension or opposition between "ordinary thinking" ("abstractive intellect, which holds its concepts rigidly apart") and "dialectical thinking" which demands a special effort to rid ourselves of these characteristics.

Although Miller is ostensibly writing about his approach to Hegel's *Logic*, his language is reminiscent of Christian literature, such as Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, which urges believers to "be on our guard" against temptation and sin. Miller's language frames a traditional quest narrative urging readers of Hegel to be on their guard against prejudice and the presuppositions of ordinary thinking. These weaknesses are contrasted with the "effort to rid ourselves of . . .," "essential connectedness" and ultimately the "comprehension" of the "Notion," which represent the means towards and the end of philosophy in the sense of Hegel's *Science of Logic*. Miller's Preface thus establishes solidarity with fellow travellers on this quest and encourages the specialist intellectual virility apparently required for the study of philosophy.

### Hegel's Philosophy of Nature (1970)

From the different book cover design – dark red with bold white lettering in different font sizes and styles, another significant peritextual element – it is evident that Miller's translation of *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature* is not part of the same book series as his retranslation of the *Science of Logic*. In fact, the book cover and the title page of *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature* both contain details about the German source text. The peritextual indication that this book is "Part Two of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830)" establishes cohesion not only between the parts of Hegel's three-part encyclopaedia but also between the parts of the OUP series. The bracketed date suggests that Hegel's three-part encyclopaedia was written or published in 1830. As Findlay's *Foreword* explains, much of Hegel's work on these texts was carried out in preparation for lecture courses given between 1805 and 1830 (the year of Hegel's death) (ibid: vi), and much of the material contained in the translation, the so-called *Zusätze* (or Additions) was added after Hegel's death, based on Hegel's own notes and notes taken by Hegel's students (ibid: vi-vii). Further information on the book cover that the text has been "translated from Nicolin and Pöggeler's edition (1959) and from the *Zusätze* in Michelet's text (1847) by AV Miller" is not only surprisingly complex for a book cover;<sup>17</sup> it also points towards narratives which are only incompletely explained in the peritextual matter inside the book. While expert readers of Hegel might have immediately grasped and welcomed such complexities, Miller's commitment to making Hegel accessible to the interested "layman" is undermined by this intimidating bibliographic



detail on the book cover and title page. The book cover thus reinforces a narrative of solidarity between experts while tending to exclude easily intimidated or casual readers.

The structure of Findlay's Foreword matches the approach adopted in the other books in this series. Findlay begins by contextualising *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature* with reference to the other two parts of the *Encyclopaedia*. He then turns to the publication history of the German editions and mentions, somewhat awkwardly, that part of the plan for this series has unfortunately been frustrated. Findlay then introduces the principal sections of Hegel's book: Introduction; Mechanics; Physics and Organics.

The awkwardness discernible in these peritextual elements is presumably attributable to the failed collaboration with Michael Petry (which is, of course, not mentioned) and to Findlay's circumspection about its reception by modern scientists. As Houlgate explains, Hegel's *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* had long been an "object of ridicule and disdain"; Popper had mocked Hegel's theories of sound and heat; Hegel's a priori "proof" that there could only be seven planets, coinciding with the credibility-destroying discovery of the asteroids between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter, was broadcast with anti-Hegelian derision in Jacob Bronowski's 1970s television series (Houlgate 1998: xi).

The sense of complexity communicated through the book cover and title page is continued in Findlay's opening paragraph in which he praises the "liveliness and literary sparkle" of William Wallace's nineteenth-century translations of the other two parts of the *Encyclopaedia*, which is said to "atone for their occasional looseness and use of periphrasis, which points to what can only be described as a spiritual identification with the genius of Hegel" (ibid: v). Findlay mentions plans to publish a new version of Wallace's translation of the "*Philosophy of Mind* (or *Philosophy of Spirit*)," as if the final title has not yet been decided. As in his references to Miller in the other translations, Findlay's introduction of Mr. A.V. Miller is guarded and qualified: "though I have considered all his renderings and have given him what help I could with many difficult terms and passages." From the very start of this book, Findlay's comments frame the translation with a sense of complexity, difficulty and confusion, suggesting tension between editor and translator, and perhaps uncertainty about Findlay's commitment to this part of the project.

Miller's very short Translator's Foreword also makes veiled reference to circumstances surrounding the translation project. "This translation of Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* was begun many years ago, but for various reasons had to be laid aside when less than a fifth part of the whole work had been completed." With the benefit of hindsight, such references seem to articulate a denial of the competitive relationship between Miller's version (Hegel and Miller 1970) published by OUP and Petry's rival translation of the *Philosophy of Nature* (Hegel and Petry 1970), published in the Muirhead Library of Philosophy in the same year.



Michael Petry's three-volume translation of *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature* (Hegel and Petry 1970) can be classified as an epitextual element to the Miller translation, as explained earlier. As Petry claimed in letters to his editors and advisors at Allen & Unwin, the text of the translation benefitted from his near-native command of German and from a labour-intensive approach to translation which Petry devised for this work. He translated everything three times and then chose the most appropriate version for inclusion in the published translation (AUC 1920–1968).<sup>18</sup> Miller makes no such claims either about his familiarity with German or the details of his translation process.

Indeed, the most noticeable difference between the Miller's and Petry's translation of the *Philosophy of Nature* relates to the peritext. Petry researched the *Philosophy of Nature* in detail for his PhD at Oxford, during the collaboration with Miller, and became an expert on pre-nineteenth century science and its influence on Hegel's book. Much of this research is published in the three-volume translation in the form of a long, translatorial Introduction, which runs to 177 pages. Each volume contains extensive notes with bibliographical details and indexes. The backmatter peritexts in Volume I run to more than 100 pages. An interesting feature of Petry's rich and sophisticated peritexts is the use of typography to distinguish different elements, establishing a typographical coherence with reference to language and context. For example, the notes contain text in bold, italics, bold-italics and plain text; there are also occurrences of Greek words and phrases and German words printed in old gothic script. While Petry's translation has the features of a "thick" translation, Miller's translations exemplify "thin" translation (Appiah 1993).

One potentially significant speculation about the peritextual framing of the *Philosophy of Nature* is that if the book had been judiciously reframed as a precursor to the burgeoning of New Age philosophy in the late 1960s and 1970s, it may have been more popular (Magee 2008). By contrast with Petry's emphasis on the history of empirical science, Miller's and Findlay's shared interest in esotericism could then have been an advantage rather than an awkwardly guarded secret. A more open acknowledgement of the fact that Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* was never intended as a rival to empirical science but as an independent interdisciplinary may have accelerated and enriched the current growth of interdisciplinary interest in biosemiotics (Weber 2013), the post human (Braidotti 2016), vibrant materiality (Bennett 2010) and feminist new materialism and feminist epistemologies (Van der Tuin 2014, 2016), all of which draw on and critique Hegel's philosophy of nature.<sup>19</sup> As we saw in Chapter 2, Miller was already aware of the emergence of the "Counterculture" in the 1960s and of the links with his own interest in esotericism which was partly inspired by his connections with Whiteway (see Chapter 4) and his friendship with Sedlák (see Chapter 5). A potentially valuable dimension of the translator's commitments which could have been articulated through the peritexts was effectively elided.

### Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* (1971)

Although the book cover and content of *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind* (Hegel and Miller 1971) show a strong resemblance to those of *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature* (Hegel and Miller 1970) and *Hegel's Logic* (Hegel and Findlay 1975) published in the same series, the translation project differed in several respects, including peritextual elements and the distribution of roles between translators and editors. As explained on the book cover, *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind* is part three of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, revised by Hegel in 1830. The main paragraphs of this text were translated by William Wallace in 1894 and published by the Clarendon Press. In this edition, only the additional paragraphs or *Zusätze*, taken from the text of Boumann's 1845 German edition, were translated by Miller. The book contains a Foreword by Findlay and a four-page Index. Unlike the *Philosophy of Nature*, in which Miller translated the complete text including the *Zusätze*, and which included a very short Translator's Foreword by Miller, the *Philosophy of Mind* does not contain a separate translatorial peritextual element. Findlay's 19-page Foreword is followed directly by two pages of Contents. The peritextual similarities create a strong visual cohesion between the three books of the *Encyclopaedia*. This sense of cohesion was articulated in Hegel's original text by the numbering of paragraphs.<sup>20</sup>

Findlay begins his *Foreword* (Findlay 1971) by briefly explaining the translation history and the background to Boumann's *Zusätze*. One curiosity is that, in line with Boumann's 1845 German edition, these additional authorial and allographic paragraphs, which sometimes extend over several pages and are printed in a smaller font than Hegel's main, numbered paragraphs, are provided only in Section I (Mind Subjective) of the three-section book. Section II (Mind Objective) and Section III (Absolute Mind) contain only Hegel's numbered paragraphs without additions. Wallace's original translation contained only Hegel's main, numbered paragraphs. The new Findlay/Miller edition therefore restores the structure of Boumann's 1845 edition and represents an improvement on the 1894 Wallace translation because of its additional content. As part of his customary advertising claim, Findlay rounds off his first paragraph by explaining that to read the Hegel text together with the *Zusätze* "is to see many of Hegel's opinions in a surprisingly fresh, 'modern' light" (ibid: v). However, Findlay also uses the first paragraph of his Foreword to advertise that the "missing" *Zusätze*, which might have accompanied Section II of this book, can be found in the translation of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, translated by T.M. Knox, also published by the Clarendon Press, which also deals with "Mind Objective," Hegel's systematic term for social, ethical, political philosophy. Findlay's peritextual Foreword can therefore be seen to fulfil multiple functions. It reframes the translation of the Hegel text with narrative retroversions relating to Boumann's 1845 edition, published 15 years after Hegel's death; to Wallace's 1894

translation; and to the current Clarendon Press revival of Hegel's works driven by contemporary advocates of Hegelian philosophy, such as Findlay, Knox, Mure and Miller.

In his second paragraph, Findlay engages in greater detail with the complexities of the editorial background to the *Zusätze*, explaining that Boumann had used multiple sources: two manuscripts which Hegel used for his lectures in 1817 and 1820; five bodies of notes, two written out by Hegel's students and used by Hegel for lectures given in 1828 and 1830, but also "enriched" by the notes of major von Griesheim, Dr Mullach and Boumann himself (ibid: vi). Findlay quotes Boumann's explanation of his editorial strategy of bringing "the more or less raw material of the planned lectures into the artistic form rightly demanded of a scientific work" and capturing the "soul" of Hegel's lectures (ibid). With a provocative rhetorical question, Findlay moves from the historical to the contemporary context: "Who shall say that more of Hegel has not survived in Herr Boumann's reconstruction, based on a living memory of a living performance, than in what will ultimately be served up to us in all its dismembered repetitiousness by the *Hegel-Archiv*?" Findlay touches here upon what must have been a very sensitive nerve in the late 1960s and early 1970s, namely the conflict between, on one hand, traditional academic orthodoxy based on the lived experience and intellectual authority of great minds and, on the other, meticulous empirical, archival research. In terms of his principal argument here, which is to promote the OUP series of Hegel translations, Findlay's point is that, regardless of what the recently established *Hegel-Archiv* might "serve up" in future, the present edition, with all its faults attributable to Boumann and his contemporaries, has something valuable to offer to the contemporary world. Findlay drives this point home with an overt reference to the contemporary situation as he perceives it: "Meanwhile the present generation, threatened with a widespread collapse of its culture, its morals and its capacity for systematic insights of any kind, must make do with materials which, whatever their defects, at every point show the undoubted imprint of surpassing, saving, philosophical genius" (ibid: vii). This dystopian narrative of cultural, intellectual and moral collapse resonates with cultural-conservative public narratives of this period, which is sometimes referred to as the "permissive age." The Hegel revival is thus framed against a fundamentally pessimistic background, presumably as a philosophical or literary palliative if not as a realistic remedy.

Findlay turns next to Miller's translation of the *Zusätze*. Introducing Miller as "a dedicated Hegelian," Findlay mentions that Miller had also translated the *Science of Logic* and the *Philosophy of Nature*. He explains that Wallace's translation of the main Hegel paragraphs has not been "tampered with" and that Miller has translated *Geist* as "Mind" instead of "Spirit" to agree with Wallace's translation in the remainder of the text. In fact, Miller does not capitalise the word *mind*. Findlay expresses

his customary reservations about the translation, this time focussing on Wallace's translation, which is "not faultless, but it seemed better to let it stand, with all its expressive life and its historical interest to many" (ibid: vii). He jokingly generalises these reservations with an allusion to Voltaire's *Candide*, "The best of all possible translations, like the best of all possible worlds, is plainly a self-contradictory concept . . ." (ibid). Although Wallace's translation has been preserved intact, his five *Introductory Essays*, translatorial peritexts to the original translation, have been omitted because they anachronistically link Hegel with Herbert Spencer whose positivism might be "unfamiliar" (a euphemism for anathema?) to contemporary readers. Findlay's comments here reinforce the argument that the editorial peritexts encode a strategic reframing of the translation, connecting it with selected historical and contemporary narratives and dissociating it from others in line with the present editor's intentions.

Findlay's outline of the content of the book begins with a discussion of Hegel's notion of *Geist* ("Mind or Spirit") which is situated historically with reference to Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Aristotle. A brief definition is given by analogy with Aristotle's *nous*, which, "in knowing the form of an object, thereby knows itself and which, in its highest phases, may be described as a pure thinking upon thinking" (ibid: viii). It is interesting to note Findlay's reference to the "highest phases" of mind, a pervasive conceptual metaphor relating to the hierarchical structure of Hegel's philosophy but also resonating with the Neoplatonist and theosophical narratives which interested Findlay, Miller and their associates. In addition to situating the concept of mind spatially and historically, Findlay makes a further connection with the more recent philosophy of Husserl and, at the same time, although many of his readers may not have realised this, with Findlay's own professional association with Austrian and German phenomenologists. Findlay had already translated Husserl and written his doctoral thesis on the work of Alexis Meinong (see online reference given in footnote 15). "In the conscious constitution of objects, athwart the flux of time, we have the necessary foundation for the constitution of a consciousness of consciousness, a point remade latterly and hammered home by Husserl" (ibid).

Findlay's long paragraph on Anthropology, which he describes as the "nature-immersed phases of subjectivity" (ibid: xii), contains explicit references to race and to extra-sensory perception. He deals dismissively with what will subsequently become a controversy over Hegel's racism (Bernasconi 2003; McCarney 2003), giving brief examples of Hegel's views on an "unchangeable Arabian spirit," an "English soul" and a "negro soul" which "seem to us prejudices, but they are the sort of empirically grounded prejudices from which scientific anthropology or sociology, rather than philosophy, will afterwards develop" (ibid: xiii-xiv). Findlay is also careful to frame his reference to extra-sensory perception within a hierarchical, progressive narrative: such phenomena are experienced at

the level of “feeling” but are superseded by more consciously structured epistemologies, returning to significance only at yet higher levels (“setting feeling free for more important uses” [ibid: xv]):

At this level, [the lower level of feeling] psychic life involves possibilities of interpenetration which vanish at higher consciously structured levels. The mesmerist and his subject, the mother and her unborn child, deeply sympathetic friends and relatives, all experience a psychic seepage from the experiences of others which are quite intelligible on a Hegelian philosophy of spirit, however incredible they may seem to the naive materialistic naturalism of everyday understanding. The phenomena of extra-sensory perception also accord well with the basic premises of Hegelianism, though Hegel warns us against attributing any extraordinary significance to them.

(Findlay 1971: xiv)

While the everyday understanding might be surprised at examples of “psychic seepage” experienced e.g. between a mother and her unborn child, such phenomena are easily grasped by those who have travelled further along the road to pure thought. Findlay recommends Hegel’s “questing, cautiously empirical attitude to the extra-sensory,” thereby holding out a tantalising prospect that such phenomena might be understood more fully through deeper immersion in Hegelian philosophy. While this peritextual framing strategy may have appealed to theosophical initiates and even to some New Age readers, it is cryptic, condescending and forbidding. The elevated style of Findlay’s peritext therefore confounds an opportunity to reframe Hegel as a philosopher whose work might illuminate the esoteric at a practical, more widely interesting or accessible level.

### Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1977)

Miller’s retranslation of *Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit* (Hegel and Miller 1977) was published with a gap of six years after his first three translations which were clustered around the years 1968–1971. *Die Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807) was Hegel’s first published work and its relationship with Hegel’s so-called “mature system,” as formulated in the three volumes of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830) and discussed earlier, has always been controversial (Westphal 2009). The peritexts to the 1977 Findlay/Miller version contain clues pointing towards the narratives constituting this controversy around the time of publication. Broadly speaking, the position suggested through the peritexts is that the *Phenomenology* should not be considered an essential or integral part of Hegel’s systematic philosophy (Findlay 1977), and that subsequent interpretations of parts of the *Phenomenology*, especially the famous “Master/Slave” and “Antigone” passages discussed in Chapter 8

have been misleading about Hegel's intentions as a philosopher (Houlgate 2013) and are associated with potentially dangerous political consequences (communism, feminist philosophies, destabilisation of western liberal democracy, etc.). Miller's retranslation thus stands at an intersection in the interpretation of Hegel's works and articulates a specific positioning in the dynamic field surrounding it.

Chapters 7 and 8 integrate analysis of the frontmatter and backmatter peritexts, including Findlay's long Analysis (Hegel and Miller 1977: 495–591), into a more detailed discussion of Miller's translation in the light of the biographical analysis offered in Part Two.

### **Hegel's Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy (1985)**

The peritextual elements to *Hegel's Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (Hegel and Miller 1985) comprise a short, one-and-a-half page Translator's Foreword written by T.M. Knox with an anonymous note probably written by Miller, mentioning Knox's death in 1980 and Miller's role in completing the translation for publication. This is followed by two pages of contents. An index of slightly more than two pages is provided at the end of the book. As with Miller's last translation project, this publication mobilises Miller's accumulated cultural capital as an experienced translator of Hegel, combines it with Knox's even greater cultural capital (Sir Malcolm Knox was a professor as well as a translator and published author) and invests this accumulated capital in the wider cultural project of the Cold-War Hegel revival.

### **G.W.F. Hegel The Philosophical Propaedeutic (1986)**

The sixth and last of Miller's Hegel translations, *G.W.F. Hegel The Philosophical Propaedeutic* (Hegel and Miller 1986), was published by Basil Blackwell in 1986. The title page shows that the book was translated by A.V. Miller with editors Michael George and Andrew Vincent. There are several significant differences by comparison with the peritexts to the previous translations. The dust cover on my hardback copy emphatically promotes Miller's work, explaining that "[T]he translation was started by WT Harris in 1860 and was recently completed and revised by AV Miller, who is internationally known for his many Hegel translations."

The peritextual elements following the title page and publisher's colophon are more structured than those in the Findlay editions. They comprise a *Contents* page; one and a half pages of *Preface* by Michael George and Andrew Vincent; half a page of *Acknowledgements*, which mention institutions, such as the Suhrkamp Verlag, the journal *Educational Theory* which published an article written by the editors, from which part of the introduction is taken, and the Library of Balliol College, Oxford; a blank



page; a 20 page Introduction (with bibliographical notes); three synoptic tables (Hegel's Mature System in Outline; The parts of the *Propaedeutic* in relation to the later works; The parts of the *Propaedeutic* in relation to the 1830 system); and a list of abbreviations of Hegel's works. At the end of the book, the Bibliography indicates: primary (German) texts utilised; Hegel's works in translation; selected bibliography on Hegel's philosophy and a short (almost three-page) Index. By contrast with the earlier, Findlay-edited translations, this volume therefore shows many more peritextual signs of contemporary scholarship and academic convention, which can be summed up with reference to a contrast between Findlay's authoritative approach and a less individualistic sense of accessibility and accountability.

The editorial Introduction is subdivided into an introductory section, nine pages on *Hegel's Educational Theory*; a subsection *The Propaedeutic and the System of Philosophy*, further subdivided into *Logic*, *Nature* and *Spirit [Mind]*; and *Some philosophical terms in the Propaedeutic*, which, as an extended glossary of Hegelian terms, also contrasts with the other Miller translations which did not provide glossaries. The *Introduction* closes with numbered *Notes to the Introduction* giving bibliographical references including recent translations by Miller and others. The synoptic tables, reminiscent of those provided in the 1929 Johnston and Struthers translation of the *Science of Logic*, are editorial peritexts, which contrast with the translations produced by the Findlay/Miller team.

The editors attempted to reframe this book as a modern introductory text accessible to younger readers, such as the school pupils for whom Hegel wrote the lectures and lessons. However, they (and/or their publishers) evidently felt or were persuaded that changing Hegel's title, *The Philosophical Propaedeutic*, would breach the legitimate frame space for editors of a retranslation. Miller may have found a title such as "Hegel's Introductory Lectures: for beginners, intermediate and advanced students" anachronistic and inaccurate, but this may have boosted book sales and encouraged new readers.

## Summary and Conclusions

Chapter 3 investigated the selective appropriation and reframing of Miller's translations and retranslations of Hegel in the macro-textual and peritextual layers. Miller's choices of which texts to translate and in which order to translate them were made strategically to restore and curate a historically and culturally situated selective appropriation of Hegel's mature system. Miller's initial selection included the *Science of Logic*, the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* and the *Philosophy of Right* – and articulated a hierarchical model for personal and collective freedom based on rational/spiritual self-determination. By contrast, Miller translated the *Phenomenology of Spirit* – Hegel's first published work, which had become increasingly popular because of its perceived

contribution to New Left, postcolonial and feminist discourse – with reluctance, strategically “fencing” it off from the mature Hegel. Based on the work of Genette (1997) and its application to translation studies (Batchelor 2018), Chapter 3 analysed the use of editorial and translatorial peritexts in each of Miller’s six Hegel translations as the most explicit component of this reactionary reframing strategy. Although translator, editors and advisors were complicit in reframing Hegel, they were not entirely aware of or responsible for the consequences of these strategies.

The theme of freedom, especially the relationship between different conceptions of freedom along a continuum between negative freedom from oppression and positive freedom as a form of self-determination within existing and/or renegotiated social structures, links Hegel’s philosophy with narratives in and around Miller’s life. In particular, the transformative practices associated with translating Hegel emerge from this analysis as contributory factors in the formation and transformation of Miller’s sense of “being at home with oneself in one’s other” (James 2007: 140), his developing awareness of himself as a publicly acknowledged, culturally influential translator of Hegel and his relationships, with the living, the dead and, perhaps, with the immortal. Reframing strategies in and around the translations thus combine Miller’s response to Hegel’s text and to the dynamics of his own contemporary social space with a performative element, a specific kind of “saying as doing” (Flotow 2011: 6).

The next three chapters, in Part Two, investigate narratives of Miller’s life as a basis for understanding the reasons for the strategic reframing choices Miller and his associates made. Part Three returns to the translated texts to examine micro-textual framing strategies in greater detail.

## Notes

1. By contrast, in Miller’s retranslation of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Hegel and Miller 1977), paragraph numbering was added to the text. Miller and/or Findlay evidently considered this strategy not to transgress the frame space, presumably because it helped readers (to cross refer to Findlay’s Analysis at the end of the book) and was not over-intrusive.
2. See Chapter 8 for a quotation from Robert Stern’s book (2002) noting the ambiguity of Hegel’s philosophical style in certain texts.
3. I have coined the term “fencing” in this context to suggest the use of framing strategies specifically to demarcate narratives from one another. Many details of Miller’s translations fence off religious and metaphysical aspects of Hegel’s philosophy from the possibly more controversial, historically contingent, political and ethical dimensions.
4. A more detailed analysis of textual reframing strategies found in Miller’s retranslations is provided in Chapters 7 and 8, which investigate selected passages from the *Science of Logic* and the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.
5. Miller’s choice of “diremption” (Entzweiung), “sublation/supersession” (Aufhebung) and “urination” (pissen) exemplify this type of reframing. The translator consciously censors or fences off readers’ access to specific aspects of the semantic spectrum suggested by the original.



6. The referencing system used throughout the present book for in-text references to the various translations and retranslations of Hegel's works, showing Hegel's name separated from the translator/s name by a stroke, is designed to distinguish readily between different translations of the same work.
7. The references to the German edition refer to the collected edition of Hegel's works published by Suhrkamp. Like its predecessors, Knox's translation of *Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (prepared for publication by Miller) contains versions of the introduction, not the complete set of lectures.
8. An accessible summary of the literature surrounding Hegel's work is provided in Houlgate's *An Introduction to Hegel* (2005: 300–303).
9. Useful introductions to this text are provided by Inwood (2003: 2–4, 316) and Houlgate (2005: 26–48, 2006: 9–11).
10. As earlier, see also: Inwood (2003: 316) and Houlgate (ed.) (1998: xii–xiv).
11. See especially Houlgate (2005, 2013), Stern (2002), Westphal (ed.) (2009).
12. See especially Inwood (2003: 317, 220–221), where the idea of philosophical progress towards freedom of thought is explained briefly.
13. Inwood mentions this text briefly (2003: 2, 22, 216), George (1986) explains the idea of education towards freedom.
14. Houlgate has commented that Findlay's approach to Hegel is "somewhat too 'soft': he is a philosopher whose thought has the coherence of a work of art rather than of rigorous logical necessity." (2005: 300). Houlgate's comment therefore "fences" off the rigorous necessity of philosophy as an autonomous discipline from the heteronomous or soft interdisciplinarity which characterises Findlay's elevated style of writing.
15. Further information about Findlay, his "rational mysticism" and interest in the Kabbalah is accessible at: [www.newkabbalah.com/findlay.html](http://www.newkabbalah.com/findlay.html) and [www.jfindlay.com](http://www.jfindlay.com).
16. As demonstrated by the British Academy funded project, *In Parenthesis*, which explores the work and friendship of the philosophical war-time quartet: Mary Midgley, Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot and Iris Murdoch ([www.womeninparenthesis.co.uk/about-us/](http://www.womeninparenthesis.co.uk/about-us/)), women philosophers interested in Hegel were already significant in Britain at the time of Miller's translations. A peritextual reference to the involvement of Constance Jones in the previous translation of this work could have strategically opened the exclusivity of the target readership for the new translation. This was one of several peritextual opportunities missed. The work of Elizabeth Haldane on the early translation of the *Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy* is also played down in the relevant peritexts rather than taken as an advantage. Male philosophers tended to bracket out women from their discipline.
17. Findlay's comments on the German source text from which the translation was made seem to contradict the claim on the book cover. The translation was accordingly not made from the latest (1959) Nicolin and Pöggeler edition as claimed on the cover, but rather from the 1847 Michelet edition, but the new edition was "consulted for the text of the numbered paragraphs" (i.e. everything except the *Zusätze*). The resulting sense of obscurity is further darkened by the following claim: "It was our intention to supplement the present volume with a volume of Notes [. . .]" but, "Circumstances of an extremely unfortunate character have, however, made it impossible for us to carry out this part of our task [. . .]" (viii). Findlay's comments here point away from Hegel's text and Miller's translation towards two censored narratives in the contemporary context of the translation.

18. In a letter to Sir Malcolm Knox (T.M. Knox) dated 23 March 1968, Petry explains his translation process: “I have in fact made three complete translations of the work [Hegel’s *Philosophy of Nature*]. The first one is, to all intents and purposes, literal, and reproduces the text word for word. The second is the best I could do to make Hegel speak *English*. The third, the one I sent you, is an attempt to combine the first two and incorporate the results of my research into Hegel’s sources and the natural science of the day” (AUC 1920–1968: 128/13).
19. I am grateful to Lin Charlston whose ongoing research alerted me to the contemporary relevance of Hegel’s *Naturphilosophie*, for example, in feminist new materialisms.
20. The (textual) paragraph numbering in the *Philosophy of Mind* thus begins with §377, indicating that this is the third book of the encyclopaedia.



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Part Two

# Powerfully Emerging Background Stories



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## 4 Nellie Shaw's Whiteway

### A Place for Translations and Transformations

#### Introduction

In a foreword to Nellie Shaw's first book *Whiteway: A Colony on the Cotswolds* (Shaw 1935: 5), Joseph Burtt, another of the founders of the colony, reflects on the idealistic utopianism of the early days of 1898. He draws a wide-sweeping arc from the vegetal and mineral to the spiritual, the cosmic and beyond, "If our feet were down in the potato trenches, our heads were up with the stars. We felt like gods." Burtt's description sets the small colony against a vast, almost infinite spatial background, but the past-tense verbs leave little doubt in the reader's mind that, at the time of writing, in 1935, at least some ideals of the original Tolstoyan anarchist utopia were already long buried. In her own preface, Shaw explained her motives for writing the book: "I cannot bear the thought that the splendid attempt to create a little Utopia in the midst of a capitalistic world should fade into oblivion, or that the self-sacrifice, courage and devotion to high ideals should be forgotten." Her writing about the colony was an integral, resilient and performative part of her early-feminist activism. She wrote because she wanted the creative and critical energies associated with Whiteway to find a resonance in the future. She wants her friends' political efforts to continue to make a difference.<sup>1</sup>

When the first colonists arrived in winter 1898, Arnold Miller was not yet born; Stalin was in his early 20s; Hitler was a 10-year old. After just three years, around 1902, Shaw explains that many of the original anarchist principles, such as no money, no sex, non-resistance and no leaders, had been abandoned or transformed. When Gandhi visited in 1909 – Tolstoy himself had advised Gandhi to make the trip to the Cotswolds – he noted in his diary (Gandhi 1999: 369; Hunt 2005: 53) that the colonists were "not living up to the ideal," in other words, no longer adhering to the foundational Tolstoyan principles.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps the most surprising thing about Whiteway is that, despite numerous criticisms, setbacks and some extremely bad press, the colony still exists today (2019); it has its own Facebook page; maintains its special legal status of "use/occupation" through monthly meetings in the Colony Hall; and asserts

its identity publicly with an annual fair. Arnold Miller was introduced to Whiteway in the early 1920s when he met Shaw and her partner, Francis Sedlák (Shaw 1935; Shaw 1940). Miller must have visited many times subsequently. He proposed to his future wife there in 1931. In 1965, when he was working on the translations, he bought one of the houses “on the colony” (to use the local expression) where he and his wife Frances lived until 1979.

The primary significance of the Whiteway story for Miller’s translations of Hegel is that this was the place where he met Sedlák. For Miller, Whiteway remained a place of potential, an intersection, a meeting place and a pathway towards the shining of Hegelian philosophy. Miller’s relationship with Sedlák and Sedlák’s own story will be the focus of Chapter 5. But the secondary, more negative significance of Whiteway is almost as important as the first. Direct experience of life at Whiteway and the many narratives about the colony, including those in Shaw’s book, brought Miller into contact with key concepts of radical political philosophy in the early twentieth century. As will be shown in Chapter 8, these intersections have ethical implications for decisions Miller made in translations. As suggested by the word “Rivendell,” the name of Miller’s house there, which refers to a place in the literary fantasy world of J.R.R. Tolkien’s *Lord of the Rings*, it was also a place riven by deep political and social divisions.

Mary Lettington allowed me to borrow a well-used copy of Shaw’s book complete with its beautifully hand-drawn “ruralist” dustcover depicting a few houses on a hill (Shaw 1935). In the book, Shaw refers explicitly to anarchism, communism, equality of the sexes, individualism, pacifism, socialism and Theosophy. She even mentions Hegel a few times. But the colonists’ commitment to the dynamic and sometimes self-contradictory ideals of personal and political freedom is a coordinating theme, which not only underlies all these terms and but also runs through much of Hegel’s philosophy (James 2007: 2, 140). In later life, Miller distanced himself, at least outwardly, from the unorthodox religious and political experimentation of Whiteway. Instead, he embraced a masculinist, Anglican, cultural conservatism, which he thought compatible with a mature, philosophical understanding of the positive freedom of the “organic state” based on Hegelian philosophy (Mure 1949). But it is undeniable that, from his early adulthood, Miller was intimately acquainted with the vocabulary and radical ideas of the Whiteway colonists.

My research into the Whiteway Colony began with Miller’s reference to his address at “Rivendell, Whiteway, near Stroud, Gloucester” at the end of his Translator’s Foreword in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Hegel and Miller 1977: xxxi). The occurrence of these words in the peritext to the translation represents a fragment of a larger contextual frame, a place of narrative intersections. The colony was referenced in several places online which led me to the sources on which this chapter is based. Shaw’s two books (1935, 1940) introduce an early feminist narrator of key

personal, social and political events leading up to and interwoven with Arnold Miller's life and work. Her work offers a different perspective, intersecting in complex ways with the translation of Hegel's philosophy, a subject which has been dominated by men. Her work constitutes a significant female and feminist other to Miller's gender-related performativity, his exploration, through translation, of what it is to be/become a certain kind of man.

One feature of Shaw's books is her openness to sharing the activity of writing with other co-authors, such as Joseph Burt. Her books include quotations, sections and even whole chapters written by other writers. She sought help from female and male friends, including in her books supporting letters from H.G. Wells, Dr Edvard Beneš, exiled president of Czechoslovakia following Hitler's invasion in 1938, and entire chapters by Francis Sedlák and Arnold Miller himself (Shaw 1940: 7–10). She would sometimes dictate her memories to a colonist friend who would later type out the text for her. Shaw wrote many letters and drew on social skills and a network of contacts to find a publisher to take on Sedlák's books and her own. In the preface, Shaw explains how she approached H.G. Wells and obtained a letter of recommendation, a facsimile of which is reproduced in the frontmatter of the book. Although translations of philosophy almost always rely on this kind of open writing, involving multiple sources and networks of individuals, this aspect is often downplayed or concealed in favour of a more unitary, authoritative, hierarchical model of authorship: canonised source author, expert but relatively anonymous editor/s, translator, publisher/s and supporting experts.

The story of Whiteway sketched in this chapter is based on the early chapters of Shaw's book and the archive materials, giving a rough sketch of the history of the colony. It exemplifies the intersection of multiple narrative strands, articulating the social dynamics surrounding the translator and impinging on his work.

### **A Utopian Quest for Freedom: Croydon Brotherhood Church and Land Hunting**

Shaw's account traces the initial impetus behind the Whiteway Colony back to the political and religious commitments of the Croydon Brotherhood Church in London. Rev. J. Bruce Wallace set up the first "Brotherhood Church" and "Brotherhood Co-operative Trading Society" in Clerkenwell. Shaw mentions the Fabian Society and the Independent Labour Party. She belonged to both parties and to a local group known as the "Croydon Socialist Society." The members of these groups were dissatisfied, feeling "the need of something warmer, more vital, more appealing to the idealistic side of our natures than mere economics." They set up their own Brotherhood Church in Croydon with John C. Kenworthy as their honorary pastor in June 1894. They held meetings



every week in the old Salvation Army tin tabernacle in Tamworth Road. “Every kind of ‘crank’ came and aired his views on the open platform, which was provided every Sunday afternoon.” The “cranks” included atheists, spiritualists, individualists, communists, anarchists, vegetarians, anti-vivisectionists and anti-vaccinationists. “Every kind of ‘anti’ had a welcome and a hearing, and had to stand a lively criticism in the discussion which followed” (Shaw 1935: 19). Given Shaw’s sensitivity to gendered language, which we shall soon witness, it is significant that, through the possessive pronoun, she attributes male gender to the “cranks.” The use of religious language – church, pastor, preach and gospel – in this and the next quotation is at least partially ironic. The group was not without Christian moral values, but members were more interested in political activism and generally opposed to established, hierarchical forms of worship. However, their political positions were not fixed. The colonists’ revolutionary, anarchist views; their reluctance to accept leadership or hierarchy; and the participation of women at all levels of political decision making contrast with many details of Hegel’s outline of the ideal state in his *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right* (Hegel and Houlgate 2008) and G.R.G. Mure’s Hegelian model for an “Organic State” described later in this chapter (Mure 1949).

Shaw explains that the “gospel of Tolstoy” preached by Kenworthy was “nothing more or less than Communist Anarchism.” On Sunday night, Kenworthy lectured against voting and conventional political “machine,” which offended many of the socialists who promptly left the group (Shaw 1935: 22). From the very start therefore, and almost by definition, there were bound to be tensions between members of a Tolstoyan anarchist collective, not least regarding the priorities of life. The colonists’ priorities diverged widely from Hegel’s emphasis on spirit as a higher manifestation of civilisation than nature. Shaw expresses the underlying naturalism of the colony in terms of “bread labour.” The first priority was to produce the necessities of life, food, shelter and clothing. All of these were directly or indirectly the product of the land, consequently the land should be free for people to use and produce these necessary things.” Other cultural and natural physical activities were initially relegated to secondary place, even sexual activity. “Chastity, or other abstinence should be the ideal, and practised as far as possible, marriage being tolerated but not encouraged” (Shaw 1935: 24).

The values of private property and a settled, heterosexual, monogamous family life, which are fundamental to Hegel and Mure’s model for a successful civil society and state, are thus openly contested in Shaw’s account of the early principles. From a Hegelian perspective, basing social organisation on the “necessities of life” would be tantamount to reducing humanity to a lower level of spiritual development, a merely natural or animal level. But the ideal of chastity, which is discussed in connection with Francis Sedlák in Chapter 5, suggests a transcendence or limitation

of the sexual to achieve “higher self-realisation of man” (Sedlák 1908: 335). This is perhaps more compatible with Sedlák's, and to some extent Miller's, understanding of Hegel. But there is a fundamental tension regarding the sustainability of a community in which the highest ideals are attainable only by a few members, and future generations are provided by those who fall short of these ideals. Hegel's hierarchical solution seemed to satisfy Miller in his later life, but presupposed fixed gender roles which had already become unstable and unacceptable in the minds of individuals like Shaw, Sedlák and many others.

Shaw's account of the early years of Whiteway also suggests that the colonists were, at least in principle, open to ethnic and cultural diversity. She mentions a group of persecuted primitive Christians, the Doukhoborts, who believed that it was wrong to kill. This meant that members of their community had refused to serve in the Russian Czar's armies. Tolstoy supported the cause of the persecuted Doukhoborts and several refugees associated with this group came to Whiteway (on their way to Canada). There are further examples of openness to social and cultural diversity in the history of Whiteway, but these are interwoven with an underlying “orientalism” associated with Theosophy and Western Esotericism, discussed further in Chapter 5. Prior to the establishment of Whiteway, Aylmer and Louise Maude, who were both translators of Tolstoy and had lived with him in Yasnaya Polyana, visited the Croydon Brotherhood in London and encouraged the group to put Tolstoyan principles into practice. Translators therefore introduced the initial Tolstoyan momentum behind this intercultural, activist project.

Although Shaw only refers explicitly to the “equality between the sexes” a few times, her account of the formation and development of the Whiteway Colony is framed by narratives relevant to various aspects and phases of feminism. These include the narrative types discussed in Chapter 2, sometimes intersecting with each other and with other narrative strands not directly related to obvious feminist themes. The narratives often forcefully articulate the asymmetric distribution of power between men and women, including genderised attitudes and language. For example, in her preface (1935: 9), Shaw criticises distorted newspaper reporting about the Colony. One newspaper article had published a report about the origins of Whiteway. According to the newspaper, the pioneer colonists were “five gentlemen dressed in Norfolk suits of tweedy texture and particularly easy cut” who bicycled around England in search of a home. Shaw contests this description on personal grounds because: “Of the five ‘gentlemen’ two were women, of whom I was one.” But her response becomes more public and openly politicised when she reads later in the newspaper account that these “gentlemen went home and returned with their women and a few other belongings.” This statement infuriated Shaw and showed a complete lack of understanding for the principles of the early colonists. “The pioneer women of Whiteway did

not account themselves, nor were they accounted by the men as chattels.” The men and women of the Whiteway colony were, at least at the start, all “staunch upholders of the principle of equality between the sexes. So it was hardly likely that the relatives or friends of these men would be designated as ‘belongings’” (1935: 10). Miller had read and was aware of this public narrative of the equality of the sexes. Although many of the political principles of the early colonists were challenged, undermined and seem to have had little impact on Arnold Miller’s generation, the success and enduring relevance of early feminist attitudes and activities, for example, as an influence on British religious, political and educational institutions, is beyond doubt. Miller’s familiarity with Shaw’s views about gender equality, as expressed in the book with which he was familiar, thus has ethical implications for his intransigent handling of relevant passages in his Hegel translations and retranslations (see Chapter 8).

For the later Miller, Shaw’s books and the story of Whiteway represented something deeply personal – Miller helped organise Nellie Shaw’s funeral in 1947 – but he probably found her thinking and actions pre-Hegelian, immature, betraying less developed forms of self-consciousness and spirit. In this respect, Shaw’s character as a narrator influences the coherence of her story and our assessment of it today. Her integration of pleasure and politics contrasts with Miller’s and Sedlák’s attempt to separate the two. Shaw’s joy in the physical contrasts poignantly with the vow of chastity which Sedlák subsequently imposed on their “free union” relationship (see Chapter 5). In 1898, Shaw cycled miles with another of the founding colonists, Arnold Eiloart, hunting for a suitable plot of land for the planned colony; at one point, he cycled in front, she was behind. She was wearing what was then referred to as “rational dress,” with a “neat Norfolk jacket reaching to my knees” because women’s legs were still considered to be “matters of secrecy.” As they plodded “mechanically” along, the only cheerful things she could see were “the gleaming bronzed calves of my friend in front” (Shaw 1935: 39).

But this is only one aspect of the Shaw’s story in which fragmentary strands of different narrative types intersect. For example, the reference to “rational dress” is ironic. The masculine style of clothing described as rational revealed forbidden glimpses of femininity. Shaw’s account laughs at the old-fashioned values. Her retrospective telling of the story is joyfully defiant of the Victorian suppression of sexuality, but, at the analytical level of the fabula (see Chapter 2), the events narrated constituted more than a mere breach of social convention. This bicycle ride was, at the same time, an act of deliberate, calculated political defiance. Elsewhere in the narrative, exuberant language shows Shaw’s happiness, expectation, excitement and friendship. She speaks of the “beloved village,” the kindness of friends, how thankful they were for a meal, the “most picturesque and charming spot.” But Shaw was also aware of practical, geological properties relevant to farming technology and the future success of the

colony: "the ground, with limestone rock underneath, quite shallow soil in parts, only really deep in the depressions in the valley, along which ran a small stream" (Shaw 1935: 43). Eventually, they located the 42-acre plot at Whiteway in August 1898.

### The "Organic State" as a Source of Oppression

This subsection introduces a detour in the account of Whiteway to draw attention to the dynamics of ideological conflict existing between the colony and the established order. The canonical political ideology contested by the colonists, the source of oppression from which their anarchism and various "antis" sought to break free, can be summarised under the term "organic state." This term was used by G.R.G. Mure (1949), a philosopher admired by Miller in his later life, who acted as philosophical adviser for Miller's translation of Hegel's *Science of Logic* in 1969 and whose *Introduction to Hegel* (Mure 1940) Miller recommends to readers of his translation (Hegel and Miller 1969: 13). The suggestion underlying my detour and linking it back to the relationship between Whiteway and Miller's translations is that Mure's 1949 article represents part of a concerted attempt to repair complex damage suffered by the organic state at this time, i.e. post-WWII, and that Miller's translations can be appropriately regarded as supporting this effort towards the restoration of an essentially patriarchal organic state which had been undermined by individualists and political activists, including the Whiteway colonists. In the article, Mure, who has been described as the last of the British Idealists (Mander 2011: 539–540), asks what he considers the fundamental question facing political philosophy since antiquity: does or should the state transcend the individual natures of its citizens, or should the individual be the supreme reality?

The organic theory of the State was maintained against individualist opposition by Plato and Aristotle. In an age of revolt against Aristotle, Hobbes and Locke in this country rejected it; but the British idealists of the 19th and early 20th century upheld it, basing themselves not only on Plato and Aristotle, but also on Rousseau, Fichte, and Hegel. In fact they argued it with such success that it might almost be said to have become orthodox in British philosophy, although an undercurrent of individualist opposition always persisted.

(Mure 1949: 205)

In Mure's article, the organic state is portrayed as the hierarchically and patriarchally organised British Empire in the late-Victorian and Edwardian eras. It is a parliamentary monarchy with an advanced capitalist economy and a vast colonial empire. Religion, the State apparatus and education are closely entwined. It has tradition on its side and has now

been victorious in two world wars, but it faces serious, enduring political challenges from within: from the working classes, from women and from many (former) colonies. Although Germany was the enemy in the wars, the translation and appropriation of German philosophy in the generation preceding the two world wars is presented as integral to the development of British political philosophy. Mure recommends that the organic state should be retained despite criticism, reformed but not abandoned.

To the liberal individualists Mussolini's corporate State and Hitler's Third Reich appeared to damn the organic theory beyond redemption. The idealists were shouted down. 'The organic state' became a term of abuse to be applied either to what its enemies regarded as a product of false theory, or to a certain type of existing state which they felt to be monstrously wicked. The issue was not much clarified by the varying attitudes of political writers to Soviet policy and Marxist doctrine. Today controversy concerning the nature of the state is so near to common life, so closely bound up with cruel memories and agonising hopes and fears, that there is a danger of its degenerating even in England into a mere ideological brawl.

(Mure 1949: 205–206)

For Mure, Miller and some of their contemporaries, their own direct experience and philosophically informed perception of the twentieth century, including the revolutionary activism of the Whiteway colonists and including the large-scale political revolutions and the brutal, technologised wars of the first half of that century, reinforced rather than undermined their commitment to the traditional model of the organic state. For Miller in particular, his earlier radical and utopian political and religious commitments and especially those of his friends at Whiteway were not just transformed but in several respects reversed by the experience of reading and translating Hegel against this dynamic and violent political background.

Mure mentions differences between Plato, Aristotle and Hegel; he also mentions the divergence of British Idealist philosophers Bradley and Bosanquet from Hegel, which Miller referred to in his letters to Barfield (see Chapter 2): "But the political theories of all these thinkers have certain metaphysical presuppositions in common" (Mure 1949: 206).

As we know from Miller's letters to Barfield, the crucial metaphysical divergence which at least partially explains Miller's conversion from a political radical to his mature, "outwardly conventional" position (see Chapter 6) was the distinction between "ordinary thinking" and "pure thought": although the Whiteway anarchists were inspired by an ideal of freedom, they remained trapped within ordinary thinking which led them inexorably towards the kind of destructive individualism which Mure opposes to the organic state. Their notion of freedom remained abstract and utopian in the sense of unattainable.

However, while Miller may have thought that the Whiteway experiment ultimately failed by contrast with the organic state because it lacked the rational certainty attainable through pure thought in philosophy, some of the colonists' attitudes and commitments did approach the criteria for Hegel's conception of positive freedom. In their idealism, the colonists were committed to spirit rather than matter or nature, their idealistic goal shares something with the Hegelian concept of "being with oneself in one's other" (James 2007: 30); there is a sense in which, like the Hegelians, the colonists transcended the need for rigid certainty; they and their community briefly flourished on uncertainty; a brief optimistic idyll, a world of possibility, potential, but still an idyll. Looking forward, their experiment can be described as "prefigurative" in Marianne Maeckelbergh's sense (Maeckelbergh 2009): it prefigured and had elements in common with the hippies and counterculture movement of the 1960s and with the Arab Spring, Occupy and Global Social Justice movements of the 2010s and Extinction Rebellion in the present decade. In this sense, Whiteway's experimental and prefigurative opposition to the organic state did not fail; it continues to provide inspiration; especially in transformative dialogue with Hegelian philosophy with which it may seem to be diametrically opposed.

As already suggested, the target for Mure's and Miller's reactionary revival of Hegel was not the philosophical and religious idealism of the Whiteway generation but rather the opening their revolutionary activism had created for individualism, liberalism and materialism. Like Findlay and Kaufman, Mure's real target in his article on the organic state was one of the founding fathers of neo-liberalism, Karl Popper. Mure condemns Popper's "complete ignorance" of Aristotle and Hegel: "One would say, indeed, that he had flung scholarship to the winds in pursuit of his thesis, could one be sure that he had had any to fling" (Mure 1949: 207). Mure's strong language, especially his use of sexual metaphor, may have been an influence on Miller's style in the translations, as the following quotations demonstrate: "There is nothing to be said for a *eunuch* theory of political thinking. . . . By *self-mutilation* the mind achieves nothing. . . . Philosophical analysis is *perverted* to become the instrument of propaganda" (Mure 1949: 206) (*italics added*). It was in opposition to this kind of rhetoric that Nellie Shaw and the Whiteway colonists sought to rebel.

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The later chapters of Nellie Shaw's account catalogue the transformation of the colony through communism to a kind of uncomfortable individualism which may have confirmed Miller's commitment to a more Hegelian approach to social organisation. A passage found among the papers held in the Gloucestershire Archives captures the mood of frustration in the year of Shaw's death. In a notice to colonists (Foster 1900–1966), the

author, who may have been Fred Foster, and was evidently responsible for organising the colony meeting, tries to prick consciences into action. He reminds fellow colonists that they are here in the colony because they believe in “freedom” and that the colony stood for freedom “in the past.” The author of the notice goes on to explain that freedom means trying to cause the least possible interference in the lives of your neighbours. Freedom is not a “fairies’ gift to fall into any man’s lap,” and people who value it must be prepared to work for it. Although there are people who will try to take freedom from you, they are greedy for authority, and authority is equivalent to freedom “stolen” from somebody else. The notice ends by telling readers that they “must” attend the meeting. The meeting on the principle of freedom was held on 3 December 1947. Shaw may have attended but her death is recorded as 14 December 1947.

The discussion of freedom in this short note reads more like J.S. Mill than Hegel, but in its negativity, it suggests libertarian rather than classical liberal values. The choice presented is between the fairy story that freedom is everyone’s right and the depressing reality of universal greed. But by this time, in 1947, Miller had already absorbed enough Hegelian philosophy to appreciate, but perhaps also to overestimate, the shortcomings of the Whiteway project in political philosophy. Indeed, his interest in philosophy had already moved, in Hegelian terms, considerably beyond the merely political. Nevertheless, Miller co-authored the order of service leaflet for Nellie Shaw’s funeral and offered his services as co-executor (Maxfield 1901–1986). It is probable that he composed the short tribute to her life which also appears on the gravestone she shares with Sedlák and on which Miller’s ashes were scattered in 1991. The tribute reads: “She lived simply, fully and fearlessly.”

## Summary and Conclusions

Chapter 4 considered Nellie Shaw’s early feminist account of the formation and transformation of a utopian, Tolstoyan anarchist colony which was influential on Miller’s political, philosophical and spiritual development. The early colonists tried to establish solidarity through collective action; they challenged gender roles, conventions and institutions, such as marriage, paid labour and the use of money. Their ideal was a negative freedom from the oppression imposed upon them by the hierarchical, patriarchal “Organic State” (Mure 1949). Chapter 4 accordingly examined the intersection between narratives of collective and individualistic freedom in the practical setting of Whiteway Colony. This provides a basis for understanding Miller’s subsequent personal and translatorial responses to Hegel’s dialectical engagement with these fundamental poles along a continuum from negative to positive freedom. Miller shared the colonists’ commitment to personal, spiritual freedom but ultimately disagreed with their methods.



Shaw's account gave Miller insights into the commitments of pre-war activists which contributed to his subsequent development away from political theory and practice. The spiritual/intellectual freedom he found in Hegel's philosophy was characterised by cultural conservatism, inward struggle rather than collective negotiation. As we shall see later, his personal trajectory, including his traumatic experiences of working as an operating-theatre orderly in WWI and his subsequent working life, contributed to his aversion from the physical and ethical hardships endured by the early colonists.

Arnold Miller may have appreciated some of socio-political virtues and liberal aspirations of the Whiteway colony – after all, he returned here in the 1960s to complete his work on the translations – however, it is undeniable that he wanted something different from the colony way of life with its sometimes “curmudgeonly” individualism and dynamic, sometimes mercurial social organisation. The narratives collected in Shaw's account of Whiteway became part of the actuality of Miller's young adulthood. Her usage of key political concepts, such as socialism, communism, anarchism and her struggle for feminist self-determination helped to shape Miller's understanding and use of these and related terms in his translations of Hegel. However, despite the efforts of Miller and his associates to restore patriarchy, Shaw's hopes for the flourishing of feminist activism have been fulfilled in many respects.

The legal status of the colony based on the “use/occupation” principle was established in 1911. The colony now has its own Facebook page celebrating the 120th anniversary in 2018.<sup>3</sup> I am indebted to colonist Michael Grendon for valuable research on the history of the colony, more of which would have been included in this chapter but for limitations of space.

A relatively recent published work on Whiteway was also authored by a woman. *Whiteway Colony: Social History of a Tolstoyan Community* was published in 1993 by Joy Thacker who grew up on the colony (Thacker 1993). Her book draws on archived material and private collections of photographs. It directed me towards the Gloucestershire County Archives which contain several boxes of letters, newspaper clippings, photographs and other documents relating to Whiteway, especially the papers of Fred Foster and Alan Maxfield, which contain information far beyond the scope of this chapter (Foster 1900–1966; Maxfield 1901–1986). Unfortunately, I have not had access to the minutes of the monthly colony meetings, some of which have apparently been lost or are not available for inspection. However, thanks to the support of Mary Lettington, I have visited the colony, and my conversations and e-mails with colonists were a valuable source of background. Several of the colonists travelled widely in the world, sending postcards with photographs of famous tourist attractions to Nellie Shaw, many of which (especially from around 1903 to 1911) have been collected and archived in the Gloucestershire



Archives. Michael Grendon, mentioned earlier, has collected and archived the extensive ethnographic writings and drawings of “Gassy” Marin, an early colonist who travelled the world, wrote and spoke many languages including Esperanto.

In the narrative relating Miller’s life experiences to the content of his translations, the story of Whiteway is a “retroversion.” It was intimate to Miller but remote in time, with a “reach” of more than 60 years (Harding 2012: 48–49). But Miller revisited Whiteway and its story many times and must have remembered it as an unsuccessful attempt to achieve negative freedom from the oppression of the patriarchal Organic State which Miller had come to respect. Miller had reasons for assuming the inadequacy of the Whiteway experiment. He had witnessed its shortcomings first-hand. In conversation, Mary Lettington used the term “curmudgeonly” to describe negative attitudes among some of the colonists, for example, at colony meetings. The archive material substantiates this aspect with one historical clipping from the front page of “The Citizen” newspaper, 12 December 1936, reporting a fight during a colony meeting which had to be broken up by the police (Maxfield 1901–1986). For Miller, the truth of freedom had to be sought elsewhere, in the philosophy and spirituality of pure thought not in the more troubled arena of political and social activism. The energy of these distant experiences and their intersection with Hegelian philosophy is dormant in Miller’s translations but can be detected and mobilised through attentive re-reading.

## Notes

1. The tenses in this opening paragraph are occasionally subtly but strategically mixed to communicate a sense of overlapping, intersecting time scales which is thematic to the “retroversion” of this chapter. The Whiteway experiment was prefigurative in the sense that it prefigures contemporary attempts to challenge the orthodoxy of capitalism. Shaw’s account looks backwards and forwards, self-reflectively. This overlapping sense of time also plays a part in Miller’s subsequent “re-membling” of his reading of Shaw’s account in his translations of Hegel.
2. Gandhi’s visit to Whiteway is mentioned by James D. Hunt in *An American looks at Gandhi: Essays in Satyagraha, Civil Rights, and Peace*, 2005: 53, footnote 22, according to which Gandhi wrote to Polak on 26 August 1909, “Whiteway was at one time a Tolstoyan Colony. The settlers have not been able to live up to the ideal. Some have gone, others are living there but not carrying out the ideal.” The quotation is taken from *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, Vol. 9, 1999: 369.
3. Accessible at: <https://en-gb.facebook.com/events/whiteway-colony/whiteway-colony-fête/229398194385432/>.

## 5 Sedlák's Intersectional Philosophy

### Introduction

The deuce! What is the matter?" I murmured. "What has happened to me?" A feeling came over me, as if I had just come into existence, and I was curiously amazed to find myself alive. Yes, there was a wood about me. The sun was shining through the leafy roof. I stared at the trees in an absent-minded mood. Something seemed to have vanished from my memory, and, try hard as I would, I could not recollect myself. All that I saw appeared as a kind of phantasmagoria wrested from the context of my experience. Only a sense of intense wonder pervaded me. Was I awake after all?

But now there flashed on my mental vision the radiant smile on Dr. Veverka's face. A wave of strange joy welled up in my heart. It was as if I had found the key that would unlock every mystery. I sighed with relief. "What a marvellous man!" I kept on repeating, under the vivid impression of a mysterious something that surrounded his person, radiated from his eyes, thrilled in his voice. "Just look at him," I soliloquised, "and can you help wishing to be with him always?" I have not yet been in love; but if it is true that a mere remembrance of the beloved being suffuses everything around with glory, then I must have fallen in love with Dr. Veverka – and fallen in love at first sight! His very presence appeared like a guarantee of eternal life.

(Sedlák 1911: 17–18)

The passage quoted is remarkable for several reasons. It is a unique example of English written and published by a non-native speaker.<sup>1</sup> The author was Czech philosopher František or Francis Sedlák, Arnold Miller's mentor and the dedicatee of his first Hegel translation. It is remarkable because it occurs as part of an unlikely framing narrative in the second chapter of a short book *A Holiday with a Hegelian* written by Sedlák around 1911 after he and Nellie Shaw had failed to find a publisher for his translation of Hegel's *Science of Logic*. Although Sedlák supposedly burned the manuscript of his translation in disappointment, the main, embedded narrative of this short work contains much that could, with a

broad definition of translation, be described as translation. But the passage is also remarkable because the two characters are men. In Chapter 1, a young Englishman, “Richard Broadway, junior partner of Broadway and Co., corn merchants, London” (Sedlák 1911: 15) who is on holiday in Tetchitse in Moravia, coincidentally Sedlák’s birthplace, meets an older man, Dr Veverka. Having recognised that the young man is interested in philosophy, Veverka gently proceeds, throughout the book, to introduce him to the mysteries of Hegel’s *Science of Logic*. Initially, in the manner of a Socratic dialogue, Broadway asks “What is thought?”; Veverka replies, “Your question suggests that you are accustomed to view Thought as though it were an objective thing. So long as you entertain such an external standpoint towards it, you cannot, of course, grasp its nature” (ibid 11). Much of their dialogue is indeed pseudo-Socratic in form although easily recognisable as Hegelian in content; and, as we shall see later in the chapter, the love expressed by Richard Broadway for his fascinating new mentor is emphatically supposed to be thought of as Platonic rather than sexual. Although mediated through the eyes, their man-for-man love is of the mind not necessarily the body.

Sedlák’s unconventional, framing narrative with its playful reference to homosexual love between men, which was illegal in Britain at this time, is intended to amuse, to shock the shockable, to intrigue and attract adventurous, imaginative and independent-minded English-speaking readers to his introductory philosophical text. It can be thought of as a defiant flourish of translatorial *hexis* (Charlston 2013); an example of exploratory male gender performativity (Flotow 2011); and a brave attempt by an exotic, heterodox, vagabond philosopher to convert embodied (inter)cultural capital into much needed cash. One old photograph in the archives shows Sedlák at his desk smoking. The setting is probably the wooden-framed house on Whiteway which Sedlák built, because the window frame is recognisable from other photographs in the archive. Sedlák’s large hands in the photograph are compatible with his farming background but also with his ability for hard physical work. He earned his passage to Russia to visit Tolstoy by working as an engine stoker. In Whiteway, he was remembered for having ploughed a field single-handed in a day. He combined physical strength with minute, precise handwriting and a passion for mathematical detail. The relationship described in Sedlák’s framing narrative and in the selected details from his life raise significant questions. What can Sedlák’s story tell us about Miller’s development as a person, as a philosopher and as a translator? How does this narrative intersect with the other associated narratives?

Although Sedlák’s language, style and intersectional, provisional understandings of philosophy are central to this chapter, it is the content of the above passage which justifies its inclusion here. By the 1920s – more than a decade had passed since the publication of *A Holiday with a Hegelian* – Sedlák had been interned for four weeks during WWI as a “technical

enemy” and had then succeeded with much help from Nellie Shaw and probably others, in publishing his major work, *Pure Thought and the Riddle of the Universe* (Sedlák 1921). It was around this time that Arnold Miller made his first visit to Whiteway and met Sedlák for the first time. Miller refers to this meeting in his writings and notes. He described Sedlák as a “fine figure of a man” and recalled his “enthusiasm” (Miller 1993; Petry 1993). Mary Lettington’s obituary describes their meeting as a crossroad in her father’s life (Lettington 1991). In the absence of a more detailed description, we might speculate that, although it took place in a Cotswold garden, the real-life meeting between Sedlák and Miller shared some of the features of the fictional meeting between Richard Broadway and Dr Veverka. Leaving the intercultural dynamics of their encounter on one side, Sedlák introduced Miller to Hegelianism and became Miller’s mentor or “teacher.” Both men also referred to Hegel as their teacher. After their first meeting, Miller must have travelled several times to Whiteway from London, where, as we shall see in the next chapter, he eventually married and found employment as a civil servant. Their conversations must have been profoundly transformative for Arnold Miller.

While Sedlák’s early life was more adventurous and exotic than Miller’s, both men found stability and intellectual fulfilment in Hegel’s work, especially in Hegel’s insistence on a pure beginning for philosophy. This demand resonates with the esoteric traditions which fascinated Sedlák and which prescribe a purging of the soul as a form of initiation into a closed and elite “brotherhood” (sometimes including women, e.g. in the case of some Theosophist and Rosicrucian groups). Initiated members can progress towards a higher truth inaccessible to ordinary thinking and ordinary minds. For Miller and Sedlák, the closest possible engagement with Hegel’s work and the closest proximity to pure thought was achieved through the prodigious task of translating Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, in Sedlák’s case into English as his second or third foreign language, in Miller’s into his native language. As we shall see, Miller thought of this task more as a “test” of his understanding than as a communicative act. But for both men, this ultimate trial seems to have constituted a public demonstration of a very special kind of manhood, spiritual or intellectual virility, at least partly defined by a renunciation or partial denial of sexuality and a performative act of distancing or distinction from women to achieve or intensify the spiritual goal of the God–man relationship.

### Intersecting Narrative Strands Interwoven Throughout Sedlák’s Works

Despite the fragmentary nature of the data, my research did uncover a large volume of background information about Sedlák, his early experiences and interests prior to his unsuccessful translation of Hegel’s *Science of Logic* and his subsequent friendship with Miller. In addition to his own

publications, Sedlák is mentioned in several books and articles in English (Hegel and Petry 1970; Miller 1993; Petry 1993; Shaw 1935; Shaw 1940; Thacker 1993), usually as a romantic and eccentric character associated with Whiteway and Theosophy, but sometimes in connection with Hegel. There is considerable scope for further research into his life, works and influence. This chapter selects from the data strands of personal and public narrative which have a specific bearing on Miller's translations of Hegel. The resources included Nellie Shaw's biography of Sedlák which contains a short chapter written by Arnold Miller soon after Sedlák's death (Miller 1940). I also had access to copies of Sedlák's two books (1911, 1921) and most of the articles he published, especially between 1906 and 1912 in the *Theosophical Review* and *The Theosophist*. Many of these articles are accessible online.<sup>2</sup> Mary Lettington kindly gave me typed copies which belonged to Arnold Miller (Sedlák 1906, 1907, 1908). I inspected the second, unpublished volume of *Pure Thought and the Riddle of the Universe*, which is held in the Bodleian Library in Oxford in the form of a set of hand-written school exercise books with a complete typescript, prepared by Miller and his family in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These materials were deposited at the Bodleian by A.V. Miller in 1972.<sup>3</sup> An archive in the Special Collections at Essex University (Miller n.d.) contains further papers relating to Sedlák and Miller.

The present chapter analyses narratives embedded in Sedlák's story as articulated by Shaw, Miller and Sedlák himself. The emerging story combines a progressive personal or ontological narrative (Baker 2006/2018; Gergen 1997) of spiritual self-realisation with disciplinary narratives of cosmological, metaphysical and religious speculation and a tentative engagement with Theosophy and occult science. The overall progression is from uncertainty, confusion and complexity towards purity and the truth of Hegel's mature system. The relationship between heterodox and orthodox cultural activities as discussed by Hanna (2016: 46–48) is also significant. Sedlák uses subtle framing and frame ambiguity in his writing to link Hegelian philosophy with his earlier interests in Theosophy and astrology as a deliberate strategy for connecting narratives inside and outside the doxa. The narrative feature of genericness (Baker 2006/2018: 85–98, 167) is evident in some of Sedlák's articles in the *Theosophical Review* and in the books, especially *A Holiday with a Hegelian*, where, as we have already seen, Sedlák varies his style and the content of the narrative to match and/or lampoon the magazine-article genre.

Sedlák himself is the inventive (and often unreliable) narrator of his own personal story in many of these sources. Most of the articles and several passages in his books reference events in his own life, although these are always retold with a specific literary, theosophical or philosophical purpose. In her biography *A Czech Philosopher on the Cotswolds: being an account of the life and work of Francis Sedlák* (Shaw 1940), Shaw takes the role of narrator for most of the book, giving many first-hand details of

Sedlák's life as her "free union" partner, and filling in from memory much that he had told her about his earlier years. But, as in her previous book, Shaw is prepared to share author/narrator roles or blur the boundaries. The book contains a letter of recommendation from "Dr Beňes, President of Czechoslovakia," the chapter written by Arnold Miller about Sedlák's philosophical work (Miller 1940) and a final autobiographical chapter "My Military Experiences" written by Sedlák in 1900. The other archival sources also contain fragments of textual and visual/textual information relevant to the re-assembly and narrative analysis of Sedlák's story.

Sedlák's writings exhibit a unique interweaving of esoteric, scientific and philosophical themes, which to some extent "fences" off his more creative work from the academic disciplines he draws on, thus contributing to the heterodox nature of his work. Traces of this intersectionality occasionally emerge in Miller's translations of Hegel. The following discussion accordingly suggests a genealogical, intertextual relationship between Sedlák's work and specific details in Miller's translations which are discussed further in Part Three.

### *Mathematical Pregnancy, Chastity and Pure Thought*

Sedlák begins his book *Pure Thought and the Riddle of the Universe* (1921) by explaining that since he could not find a publisher for his translation of Hegel, he will now attempt to "go beyond Hegel" in his speculative understanding of cosmology. In this context, he uses metaphorically gendered language in an idiosyncratic way, probably informed by his early interests in Western Esotericism (Hanegraaff 2013). The following passage from Sedlák's book exemplifies his metaphorical use of the word "pregnant," which also occurs surprisingly in Miller's retranslation of Hegel's *Science of Logic*, suggesting an abiding closeness in the two men's thinking (Hegel and Giovanni 2010: 587; Hegel and Miller 1969: 663, 665).<sup>4</sup> In this case, Sedlák's discussion of Kepler's third law frames the principal astronomical narrative with an unexpected theosophical or astrological reference.

In any case, in order that the relation  $s/t = v$  acquire the significance of a premise to further development under our present heading, it must be conceived as pregnant with its own negation, i.e. with another than its own original significance in simple reference to orbital velocity; and we cannot but connect this its other significance with the time required by the proper planets to traverse spaces equivalent to the distance between their foci.

(Sedlák 1921: 276)

The phrase "*conceived* as pregnant" reinforces this metaphorical sense giving a mystical feel to the otherwise highly technical context. Sedlák's

implication is possibly that, by analogy with mammalian pregnancy, the significance of “the premise” is augmented: what was “one” becomes “more than one.” Sedlák’s language generally pushes the generic boundaries of modern scientific discourse in multiple ways, but this need not be dismissed as careless or inept; it seems more likely that he wanted to challenge what he perceived as a rigid, mechanistic science which obscures more spiritual forms and speculative representations of thought. It is probably in this sense that Miller subsequently emulated Sedlák’s strategy. Figure 5.1 shows calculations from Sedlák’s book in which astrological symbols for the planets (Mercury, Jupiter, Venus, etc.) are used in a similarly provocative manner.<sup>5</sup>

Alongside Sedlák’s innovative use of the term *pregnant* and other gender-relevant terms, his views on sexual activity were also exploratory and unconventional. Nellie Shaw’s account of Sedlák’s decision to renounce sexual relations with her, following Tolstoy’s example, is remarkably honest and understandably uneasy:

But especially Tolstoy’s inculcation of asceticism and chastity appealed to Francis, under which influence he tried, and not vainly, to mould his life on these lines.

I will not dwell on this phase unduly, but it is in place to say that to the best of my ability I strove to help him on his thorny pathway, the pursuance of which has wrecked many an apparently happy home.

The jibe against Tolstoy on account of his age could not be levelled against Francis, who, at the age of 27, voluntarily gave up that which most men prize.

(Shaw 1940: 65)

Shaw’s unease and disappointment here contrast with her delight on first meeting with Sedlák:

Yet I was irresistibly attracted by him and was only too glad when he opened out with some narrative of adventure, in which of course he played the chief part.

(Shaw 1940: 59)

Male chastity and asceticism followed by occasional bouts of debauchery are a recurring theme in Sedlák’s writing. The underlying causal emplotment (Baker 2006/2018: 67–71) is that sex and sensuality, which, in Sedlák’s writing, are associated with women, are a distraction from “pure thought” and the “spiritual life,” which, by implication are attainable only or primarily by chaste men.

Sex is necessary for reproduction but, for those who wish to rise above the merely “instinctive” or “animal” level, the influence of the natural, the physical, the carnal, must be overcome by asceticism, which is associated



with Venus that the specified orbit is equated with the space traversed with Uranus' and Neptune's equatorial velocities in the course of their sidereal periods, and these two planets are now before us in the express sense of distinctly embodied aspects of this identity, it commends itself to our dialectical instinct that this their fundamental identity should have its distinct record in connection with the now necessary alteration of the original value of the specifying numbers  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ .

Now, the simplest way to secure such a record is to identify the numerators of the ratios represented by  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ ,

these ratios being respectively  $\rho_{\mathcal{U}} \left| \frac{10S_{\mathcal{V}}}{7} \right.$  and  $\rho_{\mathcal{H}} \left| \frac{10S_{\mathcal{H}}}{196} \right.$ .

Therefore, consistently with the fact that the accent in connection with the once again emphasized identity of the Earth with Venus falls on Venus, it suggests itself to substitute for  $\rho_{\mathcal{U}}$  and  $\rho_{\mathcal{H}}$  simply  $\rho_{\mathcal{V}}$ . But because the distinction belonging to the Inwardness of the emphasized fundamental unity should not vanish without a trace, it commends itself to us, on further thought, to substitute for  $\rho_{\mathcal{U}}$  and  $\rho_{\mathcal{H}}$  either the least or the greatest distance of Venus from the Sun. And if

$$\alpha = (S_{\mathcal{V}} - e_{\mathcal{V}}) \left| \frac{10S_{\mathcal{V}}}{7} \right.,$$

and

$$\beta = (S_{\mathcal{V}} + e_{\mathcal{V}}) \left| \frac{10S_{\mathcal{H}}}{196} \right.,$$

the equations (1) and (2) acquire the form :

$$(2\pi r t / \delta)_{\mathcal{H}} = 2\pi \rho_{\mathcal{H}} (S_{\mathcal{V}} - e_{\mathcal{V}}) \left| \frac{S_{\mathcal{V}}}{0.7} \right. \quad . \quad (\text{XIX})$$

$$(2\pi r t / \delta)_{\mathcal{V}} = 2\pi \rho_{\mathcal{V}} (S_{\mathcal{V}} + e_{\mathcal{V}}) \left| \frac{S_{\mathcal{H}}}{196} \right. \quad . \quad (\text{XX})$$

## 2. Side-issues in the Evaluation of the Right Side of the Resulting Equations.

### a. The Evaluation of $e_{\mathcal{V}}$ .

It suggests itself at once that, in so far as Venus forms the extreme of abstract immediacy to the system of the

Figure 5.1 Page 311 from Sedlák's book *Pure Thought and the Riddle of the Universe Volume I* (1921), framing an intersection between astronomical and astrological disciplinary narratives.



historically with concepts of *purging*, *initiation* and *purity* – all terms which occur in the passage from Hegel’s *Science of Logic* analysed in Chapter 7. On the other hand, too much asceticism can lead to debauched excess as a reaction. Framing an orientalist narrative, Sedlák frequently refers to “the flesh pots of Egypt” in this context. The most complete statement appears in “A Justification of Chastity” (Sedlák 1908: 57).

In its broader historical context, this pervasive theme is also framed by narratives of (male) intellectual superiority, esoteric brotherhood, gender exclusiveness in higher education and politics, which stand in opposition to narratives of universal suffrage and broad democracy voiced in Shaw’s account of the formation of Whiteway Colony. Sedlák’s views thus engage provocatively with changing relationships between men and women and the development of women’s movements, early feminist and post-colonial activism around 1900, which, in turn, prefigured the counterculture and New Left developments in the 1960s, and thus intersect with Miller’s work.

### *Theosophy and Western Esotericism*

Theosophy and other forms of “Western esotericism” became fashionable in the late decades of the nineteenth century, especially through the writings and publications of Helena Blavatsky, Annie Besant and the group of writers surrounding them (Hanegraaff 2013: 41). Sedlák contributed several articles to the two periodicals associated with the Theosophical Society, *The Theosophical Review* and *The Theosophist*. Until the 1990s, theosophy<sup>6</sup> was virtually excluded from academic discourse because, despite its undeniable historical influence on individuals such as Owen Barfield, J.N. Findlay,<sup>7</sup> Arnold Miller and Francis Sedlák, theosophy contradicts the precepts of rational scientific method (Hanegraaff 2013: 143–146). None of these men involved with Miller’s translations of Hegel fully embraced the theosophy propounded by Blavatsky but all expressed a passing interest in the unorthodox ways in which theosophy engages with what Miller later described as the “God–man relationship” (see Chapter 9). It is interesting that the term “brotherhood” is frequently used to describe theosophical groups although the two leading figures were women. Blavatsky’s theosophy was perceived as “the central, ancient and universal tradition of superior knowledge and wisdom that should be revived, in the modern world, as an alternative to traditional Christianity and positivist science” (ibid: 41).

In this sense, theosophy may have acted as a late-Victorian “counterculture” analogous to Theodore Roszak’s *Counterculture* of 1960s, as discussed by Barfield and Miller (see Chapter 2). Blavatsky founded the *Theosophical Society* in 1875, and between 1906 and 1912, Sedlák wrote articles for the two journals published by this society. The *Theosophical Society* became “the most influential occultist organisation at least up to

the 1930s" (Hanegraaff 2013: 41). Blavatsky's theosophy was strongly influenced by nineteenth century German philosophers, including Fichte, Hegel, Herder, Schelling and others, especially in its "orientalist" meta-narrative of European racial and cultural superiority:

In the complex dialectics of the Orientalist imagination (famously placed on the agenda by Edward Said), Western audiences defined their own identity with implicit or explicit reference to the "Otherness" of the East. Negative stereotypes such as the supposed passivity or lasciviousness of the "Oriental mind" could thus be used to suggest the superiority of European attitudes and values; but the latter could be criticised in Orientalist terms as well, notably by presenting a country like India as the home of ageless Wisdom and contrasting it to the narrowmindedness of Christian orthodoxy and its obsession with sin, or the shallowness of modern notions of secular progress.

(Hanegraaff 2013: 130)

Even in his works published in the theosophical periodicals, Sedlák occasionally distances himself from the theosophical mainstream, describing Blavatsky's *Secret Doctrine* as "fanciful." However, in this context and in his other publications, he also often weaves together strands of theosophy, Indian religions and Hegelianism, profiling himself as having passed through these other philosophies on his way towards Hegel and the absolute truth of "pure thought" which is both personal and synonymous with God.

Hegel is most anxious to bring home to his students, of whom I am proud to be one, that on approaching the system of pure reason, it is absolutely necessary to realise the consciousness of that Ignorance which is the beginning of Wisdom. Only he who truly and sincerely admits that in spite of all his scientific culture he knows that he knows nothing, can hope to cross the threshold of intellectual blindness to truth. In Theosophical parlance, it is only those who are ready for initiation into the purest esotericism that can truly enter into the spirit which dictated Hegel's *Logik*. He did not boast in saying that it is an exposition of God as He is in His essence. His students are naturally few; those who cannot as yet see with the eyes of the spirit naturally turn away. Alas, we yearn to find a Guru, we are thrilled with the thought of coming in touch with the Master of Wisdom, – yet how few are those amongst us who recognise him when we meet him!

(Sedlák 1906: 339)

In *Pure Thought and the Riddle of the Universe* (1921), Sedlák seems to make fun of the narrow seriousness of conventional modern

science: theosophical and Rosicrucian literature have already gone beyond the merely physical:

Conformably with the standpoint of modern physical science that all bodily functions are accompanied by electric action, and that whenever electric action occurs ether must be present, the aspect of the Soul on the side of the physical Body is spoken of in the theosophical literature as the “etheric double”. This term indicates that the vehicle of Vitality – in Rosicrucian literature the “vital body” – becomes visible to the trained sight as a perfect duplicate of the physical body which it “ensouls”. Being physical, a slight tension of the nervous system renders vision sufficiently acute to discern it, in which case it is found to be violet-grey in colour and to vary as to its texture, with the quality of its gross counterpart.

(Sedlák 1921: 29)

Sedlák implies – perhaps deliberately outrageously – that he (and other theosophists) have seen the colours and texture of the soul and their correlation with the body. The “slight tension of the nervous system” would accordingly be achievable through meditation or with the help of Hinton’s cubes (White 2018: 43–46).<sup>8</sup> According to Nellie Shaw’s account (1940: 107–109), Sedlák did not strictly believe in the effect of Hinton’s cubes but he used them in his last illness to take his mind off the physical pain because he had refused conventional medical treatment. In *Pure Thought and the Riddle of the Universe*, however, he explains their use as follows:

In order to supersede this immediate conflict between the two tendencies brought together in mathematical consciousness, we must deepen their immediately only direct unity into the negative one representing the true Being itself. And we find that the *experience* of this process of deepening is procured in the simplest manner by a training in visualization of Mr Hinton’s block of cubes.

(Sedlák 1921: 239)

Miller’s continued interest in the themes interwoven throughout Sedlák’s work is not only articulated subtly through the text of his translations of Hegel; it is also confirmed by his private reading. My correspondence and conversations with Mary Lettington (Lettington 2019) frequently touched on Miller’s profound interest in the psychology of C.G. Jung; the novels and other writings of members of the “Inklings,” especially Owen Barfield, whose interest in Rudolf Steiner locates him within the tradition of Western Esotericism discussed by Hanegraaff; Charles Williams, whose recent biography (Lindop 2015) links him especially with the Rosicrucian movement; and Arthur Guirdham, a psychiatrist, whose investigations of the reincarnation of members of the Cathar

community from the twelfth century also place him within the same tradition.<sup>9</sup> Miller's talk on Hegel's belief in personal immortality is discussed in the final chapter of this monograph and further confirms this Sedlák-related dimension of his development towards and possibly beyond Hegel.

## Summary and Conclusions

Francis Sedlák, Nellie Shaw's "free union" partner, was Miller's philosophical mentor and the dedicatee of his first Hegel retranslation. Sedlák's Bohemian lifestyle, unorthodox theosophical and esoteric writings and especially his work on Hegel inspired Miller as a young man but contrast strongly with Miller's outwardly conventional appearance and attitudes later in life. Chapter 5 drew together selected strands from Sedlák's story to characterise the creative energy and intellectual intimacy of their friendship. Fragments of these narratives re-emerge in Miller's Hegel translations through subtle, micro-textual reframing. Intersecting with Miller's explicit commitment to translate Hegel more faithfully than his predecessors, the translations are therefore also performative acts of "re-membrance" of his earlier life, promise-fulfilment and solidarity with a socially marginalised "kindred spirit." Miller's "focalisation" of the translations was influenced by Sedlák's individualistic theosophy, his views on chastity and self-denial as a means towards spiritual and purity and philosophical truth. As discussed in Chapter 7, the translations contain occasional encrypted references to these themes, such as Miller's metaphorical use of *pregnant* and *impregnation* in a chapter on the syllogism in Hegel's *Science of Logic*, but also, for example, his use of terms such as *purging*, *initiation*, *diremption* and *sublation*, which are suggestive of esoteric or occult meanings, in the other translated works.

In the narrative relating Miller's life experiences to the content of his translations, Sedlák's story is another "retroversion" like the Whiteway story, another quest for freedom and truth, but this time, the point of departure is "purity" rather than a utopian bid to resist social injustice and oppression. Notice how the title of Sedlák's book *Pure Thought and the Riddle of the Universe* sets up a binary opposition between the specially initiated philosophical mind and everything else, which is construed as an infinitely complex riddle or a mathematical problem. The dynamic of this binary was inspired by Hegel – especially the opening passage of the *Science of Logic* which is considered in Chapter 7 – but, for Miller, it was brought to life and driven forward by the enthusiasm, energy and poetry of Sedlák's unorthodox, sometimes esoteric interpretation. The purity of Miller's thought, which he brought with him into the translations, was something he had shared with this man, his mentor, but transformed throughout his subsequent life and through his own performative act of translation.

## Notes

1. Sedlák's portrayal of the young English intellectual as "absent-minded" is deliberately ironic. The relationship between English anti-intellectualism or absent-mindedness and notions of foreignness in the early decades of the twentieth century is explored in detail by Collini (2006).
2. Back copies of *The Theosophist*, *The Theosophical Review* and other relevant titles are available at: [www.iapsop.com/archive/materials/theosophical\\_review/index.html](http://www.iapsop.com/archive/materials/theosophical_review/index.html) (accessed 20/09/2019).
3. The Sedlák papers are referenced in the Bodleian Collection at: MSS. Eng. misc. d. 987, e. 947–949 with the title of Philosophical Works of Francis Sedlák ([www.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwmss/wmss/online/modern/sedlak/sedlak.html](http://www.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwmss/wmss/online/modern/sedlak/sedlak.html)).
4. At the places referenced, Miller uses the terms "copula pregnant with content [. . .]" and "[. . .] impregnation of the copula" in the context of the syllogism and two pages later, "[. . .] in this negativity is pregnant with content." The corresponding German terms are *erfüllt*, *Erfüllung* and *inhaltsvoll*, translated by Giovanni as "replete" and "repletion" (Hegel and Giovanni 2010: 587).
5. Contemporary scientists and scientific philosophers tried to demarcate themselves from pseudo-science, mysticism and the occult.
6. Hanegraaff emphasises the importance of modern Theosophy especially regarding Orientalism as follows: "All these elements – the comparative study of religions, the Indo-European model, mythographic theories of phallicism and solar worship, India as the home of ancient wisdom and a superior spirituality, and the dialectics of Orientalism – are of fundamental importance if one wishes to understand the most influential esoteric movement of the 19th century, modern Theosophy" (Hanegraaff 2013: 130).
7. J.N. Findlay, the editor of most of Miller's translations, mentions early esoteric influences including his father's Freemasonry and his own enduring interest in Theosophy and the Kabbalah in *My Life 1903–1973* (Findlay 1985). See also: [www.newkabbalah.com/findlay.html](http://www.newkabbalah.com/findlay.html) and [www.jnfindlay.com/findlay/2006/08/findlays\\_ration.html](http://www.jnfindlay.com/findlay/2006/08/findlays_ration.html) (accessed 20/09/2019).
8. As Shaw explains, 27 children's playing blocks painted in different colours were arranged in different configurations. The cubes were then contemplated to achieve visualisation, "seeing mentally the block of cubes on all sides." The process required hours of practice and was believed to lead to clairvoyance. Hinton, the inventor, was a relative of the famous mathematician and logician George Boole, whose work laid the foundations for computer science.
9. These writers shared several of Miller's interests, especially in spiritual, religious and esoteric matters. Miller's childhood and development have much in common with Charles Williams, also a working-class scholarship pupil in London who subsequently achieved literary fame (Lindop 2015). The narratives of Williams' life overlap with themes relevant to Sedlák, such as his attempt to escape from married life and his belief that renouncing sexual activity would enhance poetic and philosophical intensity. Miller's interest in reincarnation coincides not only with the period in which he was translating Hegel but also with the publication of Guirdham's works (1970, 1973; Lettington 2019). Mary explained her father's interest in Guirdham in an e-mail of 20 April 2019.

## 6 Miller's Story

### A Translator's Life in the Text of the Translation

#### Introduction

In a 45-minute interview (Miller 1982) about his experiences of WWI recorded by a family friend who was collecting war memories, Miller recalled the scene in which he first offered his services as an ad-hoc interpreter. The interview thus contributes to an understanding of his development as a translator.<sup>1</sup> At the time of recording Miller was 83. His account reaches back 64 years to (November) 1918, shortly after he had been taken prisoner by German soldiers in the trench war near the Somme. By 1982, he had read and translated a significant proportion of Hegel's published works; at the time of the events he describes, he spoke some German and French but had probably not read any Hegel at all. Suffering from dysentery and infested with lice, the 19-year old Miller was initially taken to a Casualty Clearing Station. He describes the conditions as "unpleasant," giving graphic detail about his own body, which was "lousy as a cuckoo":

When I got in there were some of our troops and some French troops who were prisoners of war a German *Sanitäter* that is another RANC man [Royal Army Nursing Corps] and a French corporal who was also an RANC and neither knew the other one's language and when I [long pause] when I let them know that I could speak German and French a bit you know they didn't know they nearly fell down and worshipped me they started giving me extra rations you know which meant another thick slice of bread and jam which I dared not eat.

(Miller 1982)

Miller's account indicates the strained interlingual dynamics of this setting. Added to the background of filthy conditions in which they are forced to work, the nursing staff cannot communicate effectively with each other or with their patients. As in most international conflict situations, translation and interpreting skills are of crucial importance, but they are seldom provided adequately at an official, institutional level (Moreno Bello 2014;



*Figure 6.1* Miller's photograph of a hospital ward in the École St. Rémi in Charleville-Mézières. Miller worked here as an operating-theatre orderly towards the end of WWI.

Tryuk 2016). The fact that Miller had the skills required in this situation was a lucky coincidence which came to his advantage when he was posted as an operating-theatre orderly in the École St. Rémy in Charleville-Mézières (Figure 6.1) and later in the Langensalza POW camp. Miller developed his intercultural advantage and the associated language skills beyond the war.<sup>2</sup> But this coincidence of supply and demand for language skills was not entirely accidental. Miller's knowledge of languages is traceable to his schooling, and his studious attitude possibly relates his strict, Calvinistic family background. Within his family, however, his academic achievements were exceptional. Miller's unique response to his education equipped him with embodied cultural capital which he mobilised in this conflict situation.

But two details of this fragment of personal narrative deserve special mention because they frame the events on which Miller's account is based by referring to other public narratives which had become important to Miller's self-understanding and which possibly influenced the way he told this story. The first is the phrase "they nearly fell down and worshipped me"; the second is "another thick slice of bread and jam which I dared not eat."



When I listened to the recording at Mary's house in Stroud, the idea that the nurses "nearly fell down and worshipped" the translator, Miller, intrigued me. The wording has a religious feel but, for me, it evoked a colonial-era, orientalist image of master and slave, Robinson Crusoe and Friday, in which the vanquished native falls down and worships the glamorised coloniser in awe at the power and sophistication of his skills. Mary suggested that Miller was bemused by the triumph of mind and learning over the practical contingencies of war and that making the recording must have brought back the trauma of these events. But to fall down and worship is still a religious act, and it will be significant to the remaining account of his life and his engagement with Hegel's philosophy that Miller uses vocabulary and imagery here which are associated with the Christian religious tradition. For Miller, translation is often framed by a remote but omnipresent religious/Biblical metanarrative. Ultimately, *logos*, the power of the word, is something he shares not only with Hegel but with God.<sup>3</sup>

Miller's reference to "another thick slice of bread and jam" and his difficulty in accepting this reward – "which I dared not eat" expresses a tension between the sensuous physicality of the thick slice of bread and jam, and the simultaneous negation of this desire which is attributable to Miller's constant awareness of his dysentery. Elsewhere in the recording he refers to "my condition" and the "unpleasant" consequences which might ensue were he to eat too much. In retrospect and with an awareness of Hegelian philosophy, this tension maps onto a grand, and for Miller almost omnipresent, binary division between body and mind, nature and reason. Although this chapter begins with a focus on very small details in Miller's account, they exemplify the intersection between a simple personal narrative – memories of the war – and the framing of these memories with reference to the binary dynamics typical of Hegel's philosophical metanarrative: not only the diremption of nature and spirit, but the triumph of human reason and spirit over the denigrated, repulsive physical realities of war.

The significance of the recorded interview is not just that it contains information about Miller's WWI experiences; it also raises the central theoretical focus of this chapter: the relationship between events in a translator's life and aspects of narrativity in the works s/he translates. In fact, three closely related questions apply: to what extent did the events of Miller's life influence his translations; to what extent did his reading and translating Hegel shape his understanding and re-telling of the events in his life; and how might this analysis transform our contemporary re-reading of the translations? A tentative answer to these questions is that the respective narrative texts – including Miller's accounts of his imprisonment and his translations of Hegel – represent places of intersection between fragmentary narrative strands, which can be followed, like a bread trail, providing an increasingly intelligible narrative analysis (Alleyne 2015: 41–45).



As the foregoing analysis shows, individual words and phrases in the account seem to be “primed” in the sense described by Michael Hoey in his book *Lexical Priming: A New Theory of Words and Language* (Hoey 2004, 2005). Words and the way people use them are always influenced by prior associations, previous narratives in which the same or similar words have occurred in the user’s experience. Within any narrative account, a kind of resonance exists at the levels of text, story told and fabula (Bal 1997; Harding 2012: 43–45), relating the narrator’s experience to that of the listener, the known to the unknown, the past to the present and the future, and especially in the case of Hegel’s philosophy, relating the potential to the actual, in dynamic, intersubjective interplay. The overarching narrative of Miller’s life was his quest for self-understanding and truth, but this quest was increasingly concentrated in the mind. There are large areas of his lived experience which he simply wanted to shut out. However, Miller’s narrative of quest was built up gradually, performed and shared, especially through the long process of reading and translating Hegel.

The remainder of Chapter 6 brings together two related texts to exemplify the transformative intersectionality between translator and translation: the complete text of Arnold Miller’s obituary, which was originally published in the *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain* (Lettington 1991), and a selection of quotations from Miller’s retranslation of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Mind* (Hegel and Miller 1971), which sketch Hegel’s version of “the ages of man.” While the obituary exhibits the narrative feature of genericness (Baker 2006: 85–98, 167) in that it provides a selective but authoritative, retrospective tribute to Miller’s life in conformity with the expectations for a specific kind of text, the obituary; the relevance and genericness of the Hegel quotations in the final subsection of this chapter is more complex.<sup>4</sup> The quotations are original translations by Miller (other parts of the book had already been translated by William Wallace), and this suggests that Miller may have drawn on his own experience of language, life and literature more than in the case of a retranslation where considerations of “differentiation” from the previous translation play a greater role (Brownlie 2006; Deane-Cox 2014: 12–14).

### **In Memoriam: A.V. Miller**

Within translation studies, there is already a body of research about the use of data on translators’ personal lives, including obituaries (Adamo 2006; Basting and Bandia 2006; Gomez 2017; Munday 2014; Pym 1998). By contrast with many of the obituaries described in the existing research, Miller’s obituary contains considerable detail, especially because the author of the obituary was intimately aware of the details and importance of Miller’s translation work. In Gomez’s recent analysis, some bereaved family members of translators based in Ohio did not even know which languages the translator worked with (Gomez 2017: 57). The obituary

was written by Miller's younger daughter, Mary Lettington, pictured with her father in Figure 6.3. Mary was close to her father, discussed his work with him and was familiar with his reading and other interests. The detailed, comprehensive content and the fluent, philosophically informed style of the obituary demonstrate the intimate intersection between Miller, his work and members of his family, especially his daughter, shortly after his death. The obituary combines elements of personal and local-family narrative with disciplinary, philosophical narrative. Mary asked for the obituary to be left intact with minimal comment as a coherent piece of situated writing. The language of the obituary is the language of Miller's immediate social environment and intersects, in the sense of "lexical priming," with the language in the translations.

### **A.V. Miller: Obituary as Published in the Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain**

A.V. Miller was a true scholar. He combined an awesome intellect with an equally awesome modesty, gentleness, humility and humour. He was one of the last Victorians, being 92 when he died and his life spanned most of this century. By virtue of circumstance and his own search for truth through Hegelian philosophy, his life makes a fascinating chronicle of one man's journey through a century of almost unimaginable change in the outer world and the triumph of his own intellectual and spiritual quest.

He was born in 1899, the fourth child in four years, to a poor but devout, Water Board Inspector and his wife and reared in the rigid doctrines of the Strict and Particular Baptists and the respectable working-class. His intelligence showed itself early on by winning him a scholarship at Hilldrop Road County Secondary School in North London, whence he matriculated at 16. He was already outgrowing the dogma of the Baptist and began his philosophical quest by flirting with Theosophy before being called up to the Rifle Brigade in March 1917.

After a year's training he arrived in the trenches of NE France in March 1918. His experience of trench warfare must be one of the shortest in history. No sooner had Arnold dug his hole on the first morning in action than Jerry appeared out of the mist and promptly made him a prisoner of war.

Because of his knowledge of German and French he was moved to a German military hospital at Charleville-Mézières where he spent the rest of the war as a theatre orderly. There, he experienced all the horrors of a World War One operating theatre, as well as malnutrition, dysentery and lice.

Somehow, amongst the degradation and carnage, a close-knit cosmopolitan community of priests, nuns, doctors, nurses, captors and

captives sustained and supported each other through their common humanity and the search for mutual understanding. What a breeding ground for philosophy that must have been.

Following his demobilisation and fruitless attempts to find work, Arnold volunteered to go to Vienna with the Quakers and distribute food to the starving children. He travelled on the first post-war Orient Express across war-torn Europe and arrived in Vienna in 1920. It was there that he developed communist leanings, had a great deal of fun, and with his dolichocephalic head, Roman nose, shock of wild, wavy red hair, laid-back manner and insatiable appetite for debating the eternal verities, he anticipated the hippie life by 40 years.

Back in London, in the 20s, and still unemployed, he was drawn irresistibly to the soap boxes of Hyde Park Corner. Turned out of the park at midnight, he and a fellow soap box orator would spend the rest of the night pacing the miles back and forth across London between their respective homes in Chiswick and Islington – still in earnest debate. It was this same Chiswick chemist who directed Arnold to Whiteway, a small commune on the Cotswolds, where he met Francis Sedlák, a Czech refugee and Hegelian philosopher, whose disciple and friend he became.

This meeting marked the crossroads in his life. By the late 20s his outer life has become conventional and his remarkable inner journey into Philosophy has begun. He became a civil servant, married his beloved Francesca and eventually sired two daughters during World War Two. In Hegel he had finally identified his Pole Star and from that moment he left the external world to take care of itself and followed Hegel with unfaltering steps.

World War Two diverted his attention only temporarily with the nightmare of commuting to London by day, air raid warden duty by night, and rearing two babies in an air raid shelter. With the war over he spent most evenings after work steeping himself in Hegel. Alone and completely self-taught, untutored by any formal academic structure, he struggled to grasp Hegel's great dialectic "through which the individual soul finds itself on a new elevation and with new powers".

His by now considerable knowledge of German soon enabled him to realise that the only English translations of Hegel were but vapid shadows of the original. They were frequently inaccurate and a travesty of the Master's work. Tentatively, he began to experiment with his own translations, the better to test his understanding and make good the deficiencies.

Meanwhile, mainstream philosophy was travelling another road – and in the opposite direction. Neo-Hegelianism had long since been relegated to some dusty cupboard of the late 19th and early 20th centuries with the publication in 1936 of *Language Truth and Logic*. By the 1940s, Logical positivism was the order of the day and philosophy

identified itself almost exclusively with mathematics and the natural sciences. There is nothing so sweet to those seeking to establish an ideology as a common enemy, and so Hegel became an anathema and was castigated as the evil genius behind totalitarian continental philosophy. Arnold's unorthodox Hegelian voice had yet to be heard but there was to be one lone voice which would herald him, from within the establishment pale, and without whom Arnold's voice would never have been heard. That voice belonged to John Findlay, Professor of Philosophy at London University. In 1958 he published *Hegel – a Re-examination* and the academic world sat up and took notice.

Findlay approached Hegel neither as a Communist, Theologian nor Natural Scientist, but as a Phenomenologist. While Logical positivism held sway, those like Findlay, who specialised in Hegel, were themselves in a philosophical backwater. Findlay was no exception, but his book marked a watershed and the tide imperceptibly turned.

Arnold suspected that in Findlay he might find, if not a kindred spirit, a sympathetic colleague, as proved to be the case. In the late 1950s, shortly before his retirement, he submitted samples of his translation to Findlay, who immediately recognised the quality of his scholarship and invited him to an introductory meeting. The years of isolation were over.

With Findlay's backing, the longer *Logic* was published in 1969 to unanimous international acclaim. He spent the next 17 years translating and publishing most of Hegel's major works, six volumes in all, the *Logic* alone comprising more than 800 pages. He attended Hegelian conferences and seminars both in the UK and the US up until six months before his death when he was rising 92. Undaunted by his lack of formal education, he tackled Higher Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry and Greek Philosophers. He seemed to inhabit Hegel's mind as though it were his own and the very fabric of his being. A.V. Miller brought Hegel to the English-speaking world and made his work available to anyone who could read and had the tenacity to stretch the mind and spirit to a formidable level. Hegel is no easy task master.

Of course, the longer *Logic* and the *Phenomenology* are of special interest to Hegelians because they are seen to contain his basic methodology. Arnold, however, considered the *Logic* alone to be Hegel's masterpiece and the *Phenomenology* an optional extra, to the point where he resisted for several years all demands to translate it. For him, the specialised fields of the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of the Subjective Spirit were of overriding importance and led him to the very heart and essence of Hegel, despite the fact that these long and complicated works were ignored by more orthodox Hegelians.

But it was Frances, on the home front, ever Arnold's bridge to the external world, who issued the ultimate spiritual challenge. Faced with rearing two daughters in the post-World War Two era, she demanded to know the relevance of Hegel to the spiritual development of their children. Arnold reflected and found Hegel and Christianity to be essentially sympathetic. In 1946 he was baptised along with Ann and Mary, and almost immediately confirmed into the Church of England. Church membership became a focus of family life and Arnold regularly read the lesson, doing more than a little justice to the effortless prose and understanding of the Authorised Version of the Bible.<sup>5</sup>

Philosophy to Arnold was no mere intellectual exercise but a living, breathing organism. He brought this unshakeable conviction alongside his astounding scholarship, into the halls of Academia. By translating in his beautiful, lucid manner he presented Hegelians with a challenge in informed, modern English. His quiet presence, modesty and disarming, unaffected humour, justly earned him the love and respect of all who knew him and he became something of a legend in his lifetime.

The experiences of a World War One German military hospital scarred him for life. As children we grew up with the horror stories of that time. But, because he told of unspeakable things, as though they were just everyday events and tacitly disclaimed the impact that they surely must have had, we, too, accepted the starvation, dysentery, crude amputations, limbs mixed up in coffins, blood, butchery and pain as just something that had happened.

He was not in a hospital again until his 89th year, and it was only then that he relived those earlier experiences, with all the anguish of an 18 year old boy, utterly unequipped for such indecencies and with tears running unchecked down his cheeks. The tears flowed down our cheeks too and we realised, at last, that he like so many, had carried these wounds to the heart and the spirit for more than 70 years.

It was perhaps why, when not engrossed in Hegel, he turned so often to laughter and light entertainment, to anything that was comfortable and not disturbing. In retrospect, much of his life may well have been the flight from too much pain, endured too young; unhealed, because it was never acknowledged or validated. Perhaps, too, it was why he was so passionately committed to mind and spirit. What men do is too terrible to contemplate.<sup>6</sup>

Arnold was wise, too, in his choice of partner, for his Frances supplied all the practical applications of intelligence which he so obstinately abjured. Frances and Arnold or "Frarnold" as they were affectionately known, were a family firm. He relied on her totally to pay the bills and provide all his creature comforts and the means of survival. Without "Frarnold" there would have been no A.V. Miller, Hegelian philosopher and translator.

As father and friend, he was a rare gift. But, he, wise man though he was, was blessed with his fair share of human folly. He could never resist an invitation to play, or discourse, or tell stories, but he could be difficult to live with. His exasperating refusal to address the molehills of day to day living could effectively offset the unswerving vision of the Mountains of Truth, Reason and Wisdom where his towering intellect and humility had their proper home. He was no mean pianist and could harmonise any tune by ear and the old music hall songs like “Nelly Dean” and “Lily of Laguna” were an integral part of life with the Millers. He was a genial man, entertaining and a natural wit. The family home was always open to an ever-increasing circle of friends. Nearly a hundred people gathered to celebrate his 80th and then his 90th birthday.

It was easy to think that he might delay the act of “perfect restoration” to his divine nature forever. But the last two years witnessed a gradual but progressive weariness. He had only one ambition left; to write his own major work. It was not to be. His genius lay in translating and illuminating the work of his master, Hegel. Arnold was surely the man of whom it was written:

Before the living spirit which indwells a philosophy can be revealed, it must be brought to birth by a kindred spirit.

It was both a joy and grief to see Arnold receive the acclaim of the Hegelian world with such naive and delighted surprise. He was utterly without hubris or intellectual arrogance that is so often endemic to academic life. Perhaps this was, after all, the better part, spared the petty jealousies of the intellectual elite – for he remained outside the system to the end. The acclaim was never substantiated or officially recognised by the accolade of an honorary degree. No university ever welcomed him into its fold. It never occurred to him that they should – he was blissfully unaware of such worldly trappings. But to his family and friends and doubtless to many students, lecturers and professors who owe him so much, a tribute to that mammoth contribution of solid and inspired scholarship should have been made.

His death was unhurried, a joyous celebration and affirmation of a life complete. We who knew him loved him and we honour his greatness – the man and his work.

Mary Lettington

Arnold Vincent Miller, Hegelian philosopher and translator, born London 10th of January 1899, published translations of Hegel: *Science of Logic* 1969, *Philosophy of Nature* 1970, *Philosophy of Mind* 1971, *Phenomenology of Spirit* 1977, *Introduction to Lectures on History of Philosophy* 1985, (collab.), *Philosophical Propaedeutic* 1986. Married 1933 Frances Reeve, (two daughters), died Cirencester 19 March 1991.

Transplanting this text from its original context into a chapter of a book about Miller's translations inevitably reframes it, transforming the way the narrative is told and influencing the ways in which readers might access the event layer of the narrative, the fabula. The author of this text, Mary Lettington, shared linguistic and literary space and time with Arnold Miller. And it is this shared, reiterated discourse, the fleeting but repeated exchange and reuse of certain words and phrases in a variety of private and public situations, which forms the most relevant intersection between Miller's life and his translations of Hegel.

A complete list of individual participants involved in Miller's life would be very long. Based on the obituary, the list would naturally include family members, teachers, colleagues and friends. Probing more deeply shows that Miller's social network comprised anthropologists, clairvoyants, clergymen, doctors, fraters, mystics, novelists, nurses, philosophers, poets, professors, psychologists, soldiers and a mysterious chemist from Chiswick. Local groups include fellow prisoners of war in France and Germany, Quakers in Vienna, the colonists at Whiteway, Civil Service colleagues, members of the Church of England Men's Society and members of the Hegel Societies.<sup>7</sup> The list of private and public institutions relevant to Miller's life is equally revealing: the British Army; the BBC (radio, but not television); the Church of England; the Inklings; Oxford University Press; Speakers' Corner in Hyde Park (a vibrant meeting place for religious and political proselytising between the wars); the Theosophical Society; The Times newspaper (especially, the crossword). At the global political level, nation states also enter Miller's story: Britain (Empire and Commonwealth); Austria; Germany; Canada and the USA (the latter two countries sometimes referred to jointly as "across the Atlantic"). Mary Lettington gave details of the Millers' listening, viewing and reading habits in an e-mail dated 28 January 2016. The e-mail also mentions the family's interest in live theatre. "Fran and Arnold had season tickets for the New Theatre Bromley (now the Churchill)." These references confirm the communicative channels through which Miller had access to public narratives. Miller was aware of the moon landing, student riots in Europe, IRA terrorism, but these were merely contingent "molehills" by comparison with the "mountains" of Hegelian philosophy. Much to the amusement of his daughters, Miller refused to accept the possibility of a moon landing on principle. The real event must have caused him some embarrassment.

While it would be impossible within the constraints of this book to pursue all the stories suggested by the obituary, it provides a valuable narrative basis for further research. Chapters 4 and 5 have already investigated two key episodes from this account, the Whiteway story and Sedlák's story. The next part of this chapter explores the overall shape of Miller's trajectory, linking findings from archival research with the obituary account. Relevance is attributed to the language-mediated boundaries between philosophy, religion and political power, between amateur and



professional involvement with these disciplines, between the “inner” and the “outer” aspects of Miller’s personality identified in the obituary.

## Archival and Conversational Research

Archival research and extensive conversations and correspondence with Mary Lettington added valuable insights. I consulted a variety of sources, especially the A.V. Miller archive held in the Special Collections of the Albert Sloman Library at the University of Essex (Miller n.d.), which includes some of Miller’s notes, letters and documents associated with Francis Sedlák; the archive of correspondence with the publisher Allen & Unwin held in the Museum of English Rural Life (MERL) at the University of Reading (AUC 1920–1968); an archive of papers associated with the Church of England Men’s Society held in the Gloucestershire County Archives (Miller was an active member of this society for many years) (CEMS 1985); an archive of correspondence associated with Miller’s translation of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* held in the archives of Oxford University Press (OUP 1973–1978), which contains information about a subsequently abandoned collaboration with Peter Fuss together with editorial discussion relating to this translation and a set of reviews. I checked the details about Miller and his family against records of births and deaths, military records including the recording held by the Imperial War Museum discussed earlier (Miller 1982), information about Miller’s schooling from the Old Camdenians’ Society (Hudson 2009; King 1957); and some general historical information about working in the British civil service. In view of Miller’s opposition to the ordination of women priests, I also consulted relevant historical church archives on the question of the ordination of women priests (AGOW 1978; Cheeseman 1982; Phillips 2001). In an e-mail of 15 April 2015, Mary explained her father’s position on this issue:

When it first became mooted that women might be ordained, Arnold was horrified, appalled. He considered that it would be sacrilegious even to think about women being priests. It really was anathema to him. Yet he knew his history and that some of the first priests were women. He revered Jung, who revolutionised 20th century thinking about women. He admired great women (George Eliot, Marie Curie etc.) but in Arnold’s book they were always inferior to men. Why did he never consider the possibility that patriarchy and man’s historical and consistent preoccupation with war and resolving all issues through war, might just be flawed?

(Lettington 2019)

Although the wealth of information contained in these sources far exceeds the scope of the present book, the selection presented in the following



paragraphs extends and connects many of the relevant narrative strands mentioned elsewhere in the book.<sup>8</sup>

Military records for the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade (Prince Consort's Own) showed the entitlement of Private 0/560, Arnold Vincent Miller, to the "Victory Medal and/or the British War Medal." Census research also provided valuable additional information relevant to the period covered by these opening paragraphs of the obituary. The records (Miller 1901; Miller 1911) revealed that Arnold's older brothers, Harold (15) and Norman (14) were already junior clerks working for the National Telephone Company and Metropolitan Water Board. This corroborates the reference in the obituary to the "respectable working class": even a junior clerk would have needed excellent hand-writing skills, fostered in a serious-minded, religious family. Mary Lettington, herself a mystic, remembered that her father's older sister Hilda (aged 13 years at the time of the 1911 census) was a clairvoyant. The University of Essex archive contained an old, hard-backed exercise book labelled Hilddrop Road School with Miller's name and the year 1907. The book was full of hand-written notes, presumably written many years later in preparation for the Hegel translations. I contacted this school, now known as the Holloway School, and although further details about Miller's education were not available, I was sent two histories of the school corroborating and adding to the reference in the obituary (Hudson 2009; King 1957).

The mention in the obituary of Miller's "respectable working class" origins, "one man's journey" and his "philosophical quest" identify the overall narrative structure of his story as a progressive narrative of quest (Alleyne 2015: 83–85; Baker 2006/2018: 32; Gergen 1997: 175; Polkinghorne 1995), moving from humble origins through outstanding personal achievement and despite many, publicly acknowledged hardships, including the world wars, to a happier and more illustrious conclusion. The humorous account of his capture by "Jerry," a nickname for the Germans, offsets the degradation suffered in the war. Close to the mention of dysentery and lice, the metaphor of a "breeding ground for philosophy" suggests an additional irony which may have appealed to philosophical readers of the obituary who had progressed through the hardships of war to the relative luxury of philosophical reflection. However, this metaphor also articulates the sub-plot of escapism: Miller's experiences in WWI were so traumatic that he spent the rest of his life trying to avoid violence, conflict (political and personal, but not intellectual) and especially physical discomfort and stress. Hegel's philosophy offered Miller an immaterial "purity" as a welcome refuge from his memories of war.

The opening of the obituary is relevant to Miller's development as a translator because it contains clues towards wider social narratives, such as the educational reforms taking place in England (Hudson 2009: 7–8) and the rapid decline in the popularity of German as an academic language and school subject outside the German-speaking countries (Ammon

2019: 236–246) and of German philosophy in the light of Prussian militarism (Muirhead 1915). Miller's translations of Hegel are products of the “unimaginable change” taking place throughout his life, but also contributed to that change. A sense that Miller negotiated his personal identity between “inner” and “outer,” “amateur” and “professional” roles is another theme which recurs throughout the obituary. It helps to explain Miller's motives for translating Hegel and transforms the interpretive space this opens for contemporary readers of his work, especially regarding Miller's development and exploratory performance through translation of his role as a man, a father and a masculinist, in the sense that he asserted a now-outdated, exclusive gender role for intellectual, religiously minded men.

The interwar years referred to in Lettington's obituary account are crucial to Miller's early political commitments and activities but, apart from this text, there is little documentary evidence linking Miller directly with relevant public narratives. The *Save the Children* organisation was set up around this time by Eglantyne Jebb and operated in Vienna (Mulley 2009). A parallel aid operation known in German as *Quäkerspeisung* (Quakers 2015)<sup>9</sup> was run by American and British Quakers in Vienna (Proctor 2014). Regarding Miller's “communist leanings,” the KPÖ – the Austrian Communist Party was formed in 1918 and ran in the *Nationalrat* elections in 1920.<sup>10</sup> It is also worth noting that the *Spartakusbund* [*Spartacus League*], an anti-war group founded in Germany by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht in 1919, was later renamed as the KPD, the *Communist Party of Germany* (Priestland 2009). Despite lack of evidence, it is likely that Miller's charity activism and “communist leanings” related at some level to these activities, organisations and their participants.

Miller's attraction to the Speakers' Corner in Hyde Park, a meeting place for religious, social and political activists, on his return to England, is consistent with the social and political “leanings” suggested in the previous paragraph and with his subsequent introduction to Whiteway. The claim later in the obituary that he subsequently became outwardly conventional implies that, inwardly, he nevertheless retained some of his earlier political convictions. In other words, a tension existed between the views of his youth and those of adulthood. The “ages of man” passage in Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* (Hegel and Miller 1971), which Miller had certainly read and translated by 1970, and which is discussed later in this chapter, may have helped him to resolve this tension. The possibility that he thought he had “superseded” but “preserved” his earlier convictions will be explored in Chapters 7 and 8 with reference to Miller's translations of the German verb *aufheben*/*sublate*. No doubt, Miller's midnight conversations with the Chiswick chemist touched on similar matters relating to the young men's coming of age.

In an article published by Michael Petry after Miller's death (Miller 1993: 103–113), Miller reminisces about his first meeting with Sedlák,

“ . . . I first met Sedlák while on a weekend visit to Whiteway Colony. He was in the garden, barefoot, scything the grass . . .” (ibid: 108) and continues, “Until the outbreak of the second world war, I usually spent my holidays at Whiteway, in the company of Sedlák and Nellie Shaw and a few of their friends” (ibid: 109).<sup>11</sup> Miller’s description of Sedlák as “barefoot, scything the grass” captures in a few words Miller’s more conventional perception of the eccentricity and cavalier unconventionality habitually expressed by the Czech philosopher. These details corroborate the distinction between an outer conventionality and an inner, perhaps generally less accessible, esoteric spiritual life. It was at this time, between 1935 and 1940, when Miller wrote the short chapter on Sedlák’s philosophy for Nellie Shaw’s biography (Shaw 1940). The marked difference in dress style documented in an old photograph taken in 1935 (ibid: facing page 110) is expressive of a deep cultural divergence between Miller and Sedlák. It shows Miller, in office suit and tie with highly polished black shoes, standing in the long grass of the Whiteway garden next to Francis Sedlák, who sports a long grey beard and is dressed like Tolstoy. Despite these differences, the two men shared a vision of philosophical truth with Hegel.

Mary Lettington’s retrospective description of her father’s commitment to Hegelian philosophy leaves little doubt that this was perceived within the family as tantamount to an obsession. While the phrase “with unfaltering steps” reinforces the framing narrative of quest, the comment that Miller “left the external world to take care of itself” suggests a detachment between Miller’s growing interest in Hegelian philosophy and his lack of interest in the immediate domestic world. Mary described how Miller would routinely “disappear” into his room to continue his work on Hegel. The sense of division between (Hegelian) philosophy and everyday reality identified by Lettington is reinforced by a distinction between the “mountains and the molehills” of life later in the obituary. Although Miller showed a keen interest in current affairs, he seldom makes any connection in his letters and notes between contemporary public narratives and Hegel’s philosophy.

However, another fascinating retroversion (Lettington 2019) relates to a trip Miller made to Germany in the interwar years, after reading Hitler’s *Mein Kampf* in German. Miller realised the immediate danger to some Jewish friends and wanted to warn them. Younger friends whom Miller had possibly met in the POW camp or in the aftermath of WWI were persuaded to flee but the older generation refused, insisting that they were Germans.<sup>12</sup> This experience must have had a powerful impact on Miller’s attitude towards the political events occurring at this time, accentuating distinctions between home and abroad; safety and danger; inner and outer commitments and their consequences. With hindsight, the anecdote suggests an element of ethical responsibility and even guilt associated with understanding the language of an enemy. To the extent that violent

conflict is often compounded with interlingual and intercultural misunderstanding, the possibility that translation and/or retranslation could have influenced events, saved or lost lives, is not an exaggeration and may have been an enduring motivating factor for Miller.

The relevance of the obituary to Miller's development as a translator is evident in the account it gives of his early social and political activism, the distinction between inner and outer lives, his active awareness of the ethical implications of translation, especially in this conflict situation, and regarding his transition to a more conventional outer life. It can only be assumed that Miller's inner life, in which his interests in theosophy and the esoteric were preserved alongside his traumatic memories of WWI, was transformed through his study of Hegel under the influence of Sedlák, while his outer life evolved at home with his wife and two daughters and at work. The separation between these two aspects of Miller's life and the relationship between them is doubtless also significant. In the posthumously published article mentioned earlier, Miller specifies his sense of religious quest at the time of his first meeting with Sedlák as follows:

At that time I was ready to explore any teaching which offered a more hopeful doctrine about man's destiny than that taught in the Calvinistic religion in which I had been brought up. When I expressed a wish to know more about his [Sedlák's] book, I was treated to a lengthy talk on Hegel. He spoke with such enthusiasm about the great philosopher that I felt I ought to study him. . . . When Sedlák learned that I had a fair knowledge of German, he advised me to ignore the secondary literature and to begin to study the *Logic* itself. . . . I shall always be grateful to Sedlák for his readiness to help me when I was in a difficulty.

(Miller 1993: 109)

Like the obituary, these words were written many years after the events they describe, but this further justifies the assumption that in Hegel, and in the Anglican religion which he subsequently adopted, Miller found the "more hopeful doctrine about man's destiny" which he was seeking at this time.

The archive of Miller's papers at the University of Essex contains a typescript of a short, informal talk entitled 'Some problems of a translator' (Miller n.d.) with some additional hand-written notes in the margin. Miller explains his semi-official translation activities during WWII and his early attempts at translating Hegel:

My own experiences as a translator began in the Civil Service. My two languages are German and French and the work covered a wide range of subjects; but we were well supplied with dictionaries and the work presented little difficulty. [Handwritten addition:] With the

outbreak of war I was kept on the translation of military medicine. I worked with a doctor who helped me out when I got stuck with medical technicalities.

(Miller n.d.)

It is significant that Miller translated from German and French and that he seems to have worked in a team (“*we* were well supplied with dictionaries” and “I worked with a doctor”). Added to his WWI experience of ad-hoc interpreting, translating in small teams no doubt contributed to his training as a translator. The notes for this talk corroborate the corresponding passage in the obituary, but the difference in style by contrast with the generic constraints of the obituary further exemplifies the narrative feature of genericness with two different accounts (story told) of the same events (fabula):

It was shortly before my retirement that I decided to translate some of the major works of the German philosopher Hegel. I had been reading him for many years in German and had already translated a few of the more difficult passages of his *Science of Logic*, partly to make sure that I really understood what he was saying and also because the existing translation contained a number of inaccuracies and did not, in my opinion, do justice to the original.

(ibid)

While the obituary dramatises and monumentalises the events as appropriate to the genre, Miller’s own account in his talk about the problems of translating Hegel (I have not managed to determine who the intended listeners were) is characterised by modesty and respect for Hegel. Although his personal, intellectual and spiritual life had diverged considerably from the time of his friendship with Sedlák, Miller was still visiting White-way in 1947. He played a significant part in the arrangements for Nellie Shaw’s funeral and burial in Miserden Church, as mentioned in Chapter 4. Indeed, the obituary specifically mentions the relationship between Miller’s interest in Hegel and his responsibilities as a husband and father. Narratives concerning the Church of England intersect here with details about the Miller family and Hegelian philosophy.

Family life, especially the relationship between family members and the rest of society, plays an important part in Hegel’s philosophy, not only in the *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right* (Hegel and Houlgate 2008) but also in the Antigone story from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Hegel and Miller 1977), part of which is discussed in Chapter 8. Based on the obituary, it is significant, that it was Miller’s wife, Fran, who “issued the ultimate spiritual challenge” and represented “Arnold’s bridge to the external world.” Miller was initially reluctant to have children; he was a relatively elderly father and much absorbed with his civil-service work

and with Hegel. Mary expanded on this point explaining<sup>13</sup> that Miller saw his role in the family as “basically earning the money. . . all he did was play with the children, he hated being unpopular.” It suited him for Fran Miller, as mother of the family, to take responsibility for the children’s education. “Mother did everything. He never challenged.”

In Hegel’s re-telling of the Antigone story – his free interpretation of Sophocles play – Hegel writes of two different types of law, human law, which applied, within the ancient Greek context he has in mind, in the external world of human affairs, including war and ruling the country, which is the domain of men (in fact, patriarchs, like Creon in the play); and divine law, which applied, again within this ancient Greek context, in the family, which is portrayed as the domain legislated by women. Miller’s marriage, conversion to Anglicanism and subsequent devotion to the church, especially his membership of the Church of England Men’s Society, which promoted serious commitment to the role of fathers/husbands within the church community, marks another crossroad in his adult life. On Hegel’s account of the ages of man from the *Philosophy of Mind*, a man’s role is primarily outside the family: “It is in this conservation and advancement of the world that the man’s work consists” (Hegel and Miller 1971: 63). However, the topic of elderly male detachment from active participation in political life reappears uncomfortably in the Antigone story (see Chapter 8).

Mary Lettington commented on an abridged version of her father’s obituary entitled *In Memoriam: A.V. Miller* (Anon 1991: 124) published in *The Owl of Minerva*, the journal of the *Hegel Society of America*, which claimed that Miller’s wife, Fran, “shared his love of philosophy.” Lettington laughed in disbelief. “My mother hated Hegel. She used to say, “What has Hegel ever done for me?” Lettington’s own assessment of the position of Hegel in the Miller family was that, for her mother, living with a Hegel translator was “like sharing the house with her husband’s mistress.”

Miller’s quasi-Hegelian view of fatherhood, marriage and family life was troubled by the changes of modern society. At the time of the translations, his views corresponded with an active, social and cultural conservatism and stand in contrast with his own youthful radicalism and activism. Miller and his associates were committed to resisting the burgeoning “counterculture” discussed in Chapter 2 with its focus on the younger generation, popular music and culture, psychedelic drugs, sexual permissiveness, the women’s liberation movement and New Left developments in political theory. In this respect also, the obituary illustrates the intersection between multiple narrative strands and offers a partial explanation for the buried tensions between Miller’s earlier and later life and the disparity between the inner and outer aspects of his character. It also confirms the inextricable interwovenness of these strands with Miller’s work as a translator of Hegel’s philosophy. In the early 1970’s, the Church



*Figure 6.2* Miller as proud father of the bride in 1965, with daughter Mary Lettington, the author of Miller's obituary.

of England was engaged in serious debate over the role of women in the church. Like many members of the Church of England Men's Society, Miller was opposed to the ordination of women priests (Cheeseman 1982; Phillips 2001).<sup>14</sup> Although the subject of women priests is remote from Hegel's philosophy, it is difficult to imagine that Miller did not regard Hegel as an ally in this polarising debate. By 1985, the Church of England Men's Society acknowledged that many of the values it had promoted were no longer sustainable, and the society announced its decision to disband in an aptly named document entitled "A time to be born and a time to die" (CEMS 1985). By this time, Miller had already completed his translations of Hegel.

### **Translator/Translation Intersections**

The account of the "ages of man" in the following excerpts from Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* (Hegel and Miller 1971) intersects with the content of Miller's obituary in several respects, but there are poignant differences



between the idealised generalisations of the Hegelian text and Miller's own experiences of growing up through the war years. The potential for peace, innocence and love in Miller's childhood was frustrated by the rigidity of his "Calvinistic" upbringing and, as for millions of other children in the world, thwarted by the contingencies and trauma of violent conflict. Italicised pronouns in the quotation also illustrate Miller's selective genderising in the translation, which will be discussed later. The relevance of the following quotations does not relate to their correspondence with Hegel's German text but to the ethical tensions between the content of the texts, Miller's own experiences and those of his imagined readers.

Childhood is, therefore, the time of natural harmony, of the peace of the individual with *himself* and with the world; the beginning which contains no opposition, just as old-age is the end which is free from it. The oppositions which may occur in childhood remain devoid of any serious interest. The child lives in innocence, without any lasting pain, in the love *it* has for *its* parents and in the feeling of being loved by them. This immediate and therefore non-spiritual, purely natural unity of the individual with *its* genus and with the world generally, *must* be superseded; the individual *must* go forward to the stage where *he* opposes *himself* to the universal as that which exists in and for itself, already finished and complete, *must* go on to apprehend *himself* in *his* self-dependence. (Italics added)

(Hegel and Miller 1971: 57)

The necessity of superseding childhood, articulated through the three repetitions of "must" in this translation, is instantiated or emplotted differently if the child's experience is based on peace and harmony, as portrayed in the Hegelian account, or on hardship and war, as in so many realistic cases, including Miller's. A similar divergence of perspective is suggested by the following Hegelian rejection of permissive education based on play:

For this reason we must describe as *completely preposterous* the pedagogy which bases itself on play, which proposes that children should be made acquainted with serious things in the form of play and demands that the educator should lower *himself* to the childish level of intelligence of the pupils instead of lifting them up to an appreciation of the seriousness of the matter in hand.



. . . With regard to one side of education, namely, discipline, *the boy* should not be allowed to follow *his* own inclination; *he* must obey in order that *he* may learn to command. Obedience is the beginning of all wisdom; . . .

. . . By nature, the child is neither bad nor good, since *it* starts without any knowledge either of good or of evil. To deem this unknowing innocence an ideal and to yearn to return to it would be silly; it has no value and is short-lived. Self-will and evil soon make their appearance in the child. This self-will, this germ of evil, must be *broken and destroyed* by discipline. (Italics added)

(Hegel and Miller 1971: 60)

It is significant that while both Miller's children were girls, and he uses the pronoun "it" for child in several cases, the "educator" is portrayed as male, and it is the "boy" who must "learn to command." Once again, however, the emphasis on discipline as opposed to play would seem to demand a context-dependent response and requires relativisation. Children whose early years have been characterised by peace and love, as suggested by Hegel, may require a differently timed and articulated introduction to discipline from those who grew up in hardship. Moreover, Hegel's claim that the cure for the evil of self-will is to be found in discipline may have seemed considerably more provocative to readers in the late 1960s than in the early decades of the nineteenth century. In this sense, Miller's translation is performative of a socially and historically situated, stereotypical, elderly male, gender role. The translation thus enacts pedagogical authoritarianism despite the possibility of these divergent experiences and despite Miller's usual aversion to any kind of rigidity or confrontation. It seems unlikely that Miller was unaware of the discrepancy between his own childhood and education and that portrayed by Hegel. Presented with such ethical tensions between the content of the text and the translator's own experience, other translators have demonstrated considerable imagination in avoiding or mitigating translatorial complicity with values they cannot accept. This will be shown in Chapter 8 based on a comparison of different translators' handling of a passage from the Antigone story in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The juxtaposition of Miller's life against Hegel's Ages of Man passage raises important questions of translator integrity and variations in loyalty between the original author and the anticipated readership.<sup>15</sup> Miller's choice of phrases like "completely preposterous"<sup>16</sup> and "broken and destroyed"<sup>17</sup> is emotionally charged, socially situated and actively reinforces the authoritarian focalisation of this passage.

As the following excerpt suggests, the Hegelian retrospective understanding of the "ages of man," from the perspective of old age, attributes political activism to a specific developmental stage which must eventually be overcome. It is reified and dismissed.

But in the youth this ideal still has a more or less subjective shape, whether it lives in him as an ideal of love and friendship or as an ideal of a universal state of the world. . . . The content of the ideal imbues the youth with the feeling of power to act; he therefore fancies himself called and qualified to transform the world.

(Hegel and Miller 1971: 61)

At the time of the translations, therefore, Miller presumably looked back on his own activism as a compelling and briefly exciting aberration of youth, a transient, utopian phase associated with the dangers of violence and misunderstanding he had witnessed in two world wars and in connection with the Whiteway experiment. The phrase “fancies himself” distances Miller the translator from Miller the youthful activist. This essentialist, judgemental perspective diverges from that of pragmatic activists like Nellie Shaw who tried to adapt and renegotiate their ideological positioning in the light of changing circumstances.

The following excerpt from the Hegelian text articulates the transition from youth to mature manhood. While Miller became “outwardly conventional,” he preserved his youthful commitment to Hegelian idealist philosophy, especially as it seemed to validate this transition and acceptance of the “existing order of things.” This passage articulates a significant narrative of breach associated with the coming of age of a young man which is presented as a rational justification for abandoning youthful ideals.

. . . the mature man also considers the ethical world-order something in which its essential nature is already in existence, which has not waited for him to bring it into being. Thus he is for, not against, the existing order of things, is interested in promoting, not opposing it; he has thus risen above the one-sided subjectivity of youth to the standpoint to an objective intelligence.

(Hegel and Miller 1971: 57)

. . . and therefore the man behaves quite rationally in abandoning his plan for completely transforming the world and in striving to realise his personal aims, passions and interests only within the framework of the world of which he is a part. Even so, this leaves him scope for an honourable, far-reaching and creative activity. For although the world must be recognised as already complete in its essential nature, yet it is not a dead, absolutely inert world but, like the life-process, a world which perpetually creates itself a new,

which while merely preserving itself, at the same time progresses. It is in this conservation and advancement of the world that the man's work consists. . . . What is true in these ideals is preserved in the practical activity; what the man must purge himself of is only what is untrue, the empty abstractions. The scope and nature of his activity can vary considerably; but the substantial element in all human activities is the same, namely, the interests of right, ethics and religion.

(Hegel and Miller 1971: 63)

The intersection between the narratives of Miller's personal life and the seemingly prescriptive content of Hegel's masculinist, authoritarian account is particularly evident regarding Miller's lifelong commitment to "the interests of right, ethics, and religion." However, especially taken out of context, the passage leaves readers with the provocative thought of how to identify the "untrue" and differentiate between "empty" and full abstractions.

## Summary and Conclusions

Chapter 6 presented the complete text of Miller's obituary. The obituary exhibits the narrative feature of genericness, re-narrating with intimacy and respect the trauma of Miller's experiences as a prisoner of war, ad-hoc interpreter and hospital orderly in WWI; his contact with social and political activists in Vienna, London and Whiteway Colony; his friendship with Shaw and Sedlák; marriage, adult baptism and confirmation in the Church of England; and his growing preoccupation with the translation of Hegel. Selected details in the obituary were supplemented with reference to archival research and direct communication with Lettington to show how the obituary genre both conceals and reveals narrative content. The fusion of Miller's personal narrative and Hegel's account of the "ages of man" from the *Philosophy of Mind* was explored through quotations from Miller's translation of a Hegelian text relating to childhood, schooling and the transition from youth to manhood. This analysis revealed a significant narrative of breach associated with the transition to manhood with suggestions of gender bias in the translation which intersect with narratives from Miller's life.

Miller was traumatised by his experiences in WWI. He never received the university education for which he was precociously suited. His resolute commitment to religion, esoteric and Hegelian philosophy had an escapist dimension, but he had become suspicious of what he considered naïve, emotion-driven political activism. As he grew older, he preferred the positive freedom offered by traditional, patriarchal institutions.

Although Miller would have objected vigorously to the idea of a biographical study of a translator, he may have been less resistant to the suggestion in Chapter 6 that, while some documents contain fragments indicative of his life story, the most sustained and sophisticated articulation of his personal narrative is embedded inseparably in and around his translations of Hegel. The translations were identity-forming acts for Miller as well as informative re-narrations of Hegel's works. Miller's personal narrative is a progressive narrative of quest for truth, freedom and fulfilment, but it is characterised by multiple turning points, including a significant breach, corresponding with the transition from youth to manhood. In finding Hegel, Miller effectively turned his back on the traumatic memories and uncertainties of his earlier life but also on some of his youthful ideals. The long stability narrative of his adult life is a narrative of positive freedom acquired through translation. Translating Hegel allowed Miller to explore and renegotiate for himself a traditional adult male identity role. He believed this role was true to the principles of Hegel's philosophy and urgently needed to be reinstated in the modern world. But the kind of spiritual authoritarianism Miller espoused in later life had already been irrevocably superseded or abandoned for many younger men and women.

## Notes

1. The recording is held in the Imperial War Museum Oral History collection (32893), accessed at: [www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/80032437](http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/80032437) on 20/09/2019, but Mary Lettington had copies and kindly gave me one for my research.
2. Miller also served as a semi-official medical translator during WWII (Miller n.d.).
3. A recently published article on translation and philosophy by a Chinese author (Zhang 2019) engages with Hegel's ethnocentric and logocentric conception of thought in a particularly relevant manner with reference to Derrida, Foucault and Heidegger. One of the weaknesses of Miller's preoccupation with Hegel was that it was exclusive of other writers, other cultures and religions, as if Hegel and God (construed in a specific way) had exclusive rights over pure thought. This applies especially to Miller's rejection of the British Idealists but also to more modern philosophers. For Miller, Hegel was the only philosopher required.
4. The quotations are taken from one of the *Zusätze* (additional text written by Ludwig Boumann in response to Hegel's paragraph 396 of Part III of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*). They therefore give insights not just into Hegel's philosophy but also into its contemporary reception. Although published in a philosophical work, the quotations are taken from a chapter on Anthropology; their genericness is further complicated by the fact that the genre of philosophical writing has always been broad but has also changed considerably since Hegel's time, especially regarding the relationship between literary and purely philosophical aspects of philosophical writing.
5. The significance of this reference to the Authorised Version will become clearer in Chapter 8 which discusses contemporaneous revisions of the biblical texts

and Miller's preference for established terminology, such as *bondage* rather than *slavery*. The texts of the Hegel translations and the Bible are thus shown to intersect.

6. The reference to *men* here is expressive of Mary Lettington's experience and evaluation of the links between patriarchal, masculinist attitudes and violent action (Lettington 2019). See endnote 7.
7. I am grateful to Jim Devin, Stephen Houlgate and Nicholas Walker, long-standing members of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, who knew Miller through this Society and have given me valuable information about his work at annual conferences over several years.
8. Chapter 9 gives details of a dedicated website at: <https://avmiller.co.uk>, designed to share information about Miller's life and encourage transformative participation with his translations.
9. Quaker feeding, an allusion to the biblical "feeding of the five thousand"; the Bible uses the same German word *Speisung* for feeding.
10. Alongside other minority parties, including the Christian National Unity List, Jewish National Party, Socialist and Democratic Czechoslovakians and Carinthian Slovenes. Details of the election results are available at: [https://austria-forum.org/af/AustriaWiki/Nationalratswahl\\_in\\_Österreich\\_1920](https://austria-forum.org/af/AustriaWiki/Nationalratswahl_in_Österreich_1920).
11. Mary discovered a note in her personal papers confirming that Arnold also took Fran to Whiteway and proposed to her on 6 April 1931, during a visit to Sedlák and Nellie Shaw. The Millers' views on marriage at this time evidently diverged from those of Shaw and Sedlák.
12. Mary first referred to this trip in an e-mail about Miller's German connections dated 15 March 2015.
13. In conversation on 9 October 2019.
14. Further information about the ordination of women in the Church of England is accessible at the following websites, which contain links to the sources cited in this chapter: [www.churchsociety.org/issues\\_new/ministry/wompriest/iss\\_ministry\\_wompriest\\_intro.asp](http://www.churchsociety.org/issues_new/ministry/wompriest/iss_ministry_wompriest_intro.asp) and <https://womenandthechurch.org/news/archive-movement-ordination-women/>.
15. This applies especially in the retranslation of the Antigone story by the Hegel Translation Group (Hegel and Shannon 2001). The translators use various devices such as footnotes, paraphrase and the insertion of words in square brackets to euphemise Hegel's "chauvinistic" discussion of *Weiblichkeit* – *womankind*.
16. Hegel's phrase is "eine völlige Verkehrtheit" (Hegel 1970e: 81). As will be discussed in Chapter 8, Miller translates the verb *verkehren* as *pervert* elsewhere, and subsequent translators have retranslated this as *invert*. The phrase here could be translated more literally as "a complete perversion" or "a complete inversion." "Preposterous" is an example of Miller's elevated style; it incorporates a play on contradictory Latin terms and therefore implies a certain level and type of schooling, as well as a socially determined sense of humour.
17. Miller fuses together two clauses, preserving the force of Hegel's rhetoric in modern English: "Dieser Eigenwille muß durch die Zucht gebrochen, – dieser Keim des Bösen durch dieselbe vernichtet werden (Hegel 1970e: 82).

**Part Three**

# **Comparative Analyses and Affirmative Response**



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## 7 Intersecting Translational Strategies in Miller's *Science of Logic* and *Phenomenology of Spirit*

### Introduction

Miller's comment in the first of his letters to Owen Barfield (see Chapter 2) documented his commitment to the "personal dimension" of Hegel's *Science of Logic*. The translatorial peritexts (see Chapter 3) in the frontmatter of his retranslation (Hegel and Miller 1969) also reframed the personal narrative articulated through Hegel's text with reference to Miller's life. He strategically dissociated his retranslation from its predecessor, the 1929 Johnston and Struthers translation and from certain non-Hegelian aspects of the British Idealist tradition, linking it instead with events in his own personal narrative by referring to his mentor Francis Sedlák (in the dedication) and to the time he spent at Whiteway Colony. In the Translator's Foreword, he singled out the chapter entitled "With What Must the Science Begin?," explaining that "This chapter is of great importance for an understanding of the beginning of the *Science of Logic*, for in it Hegel has made it quite clear why he begins with *pure being*" (Hegel and Miller 1969: 13). Miller continued:

It may safely be said that the main obstacle to a grasp of the *Logic* is the fact that we are unaccustomed to dialectical thinking and loth to make the effort to rid ourselves of the prejudices and presuppositions on which our ordinary thinking rests. We have always to be on our guard that we do not allow ourselves to rely solely upon the understanding, the abstractive intellect, which holds its concepts rigidly apart in isolation and overlooks their essential connectedness. This is what Hegel calls 'die Anstrengung des Begriffs', the effort demanded by the Notion for its comprehension.

(Miller 1969: 13–14)

Miller's Preface reinforces Hegel's emphasis on the importance of beginning a study of philosophical logic in a presuppositionless manner, in other words, accompanied by nothing more than the thought of pure being. The logic begins with simplicity and unity. The logical terrain to



be explored is not the place for history, prejudice or contemporary social and political concerns. Before setting out, readers are advised to clear their minds (Houlgate 2006: 163).<sup>1</sup> But Miller's comment also warns against risks, as if the road ahead is not only long and arduous but also beset with perils and temptations. It is significant that, although Miller stresses the private, personal dimension of the study of philosophy, this is not a journey to be made entirely alone. In fact, readers will be accompanied by a plurality of guides. Not only must "we" make the effort to rid "ourselves" of presuppositions; we must always "be on our guard" against the lure of "ordinary thinking," "the understanding, the abstractive intellect." Although the framing is subtle here, Miller's advice strategically frames the reading of this book as a personal, exclusive but shared journey of quest. Readers have been told earlier in the Preface that the goal of this quest is nothing less than "to attain a knowledge of absolute truth." The translatorial Preface therefore unmistakably implies that not only Hegel but Miller himself has made this journey and is therefore qualified by prior personal experience to be our guide, or more precisely, one of a select group of guides.<sup>2</sup> Readers are invited by Miller's translatorial "we" to join the strategically circumscribed "interlocutory space" (Parker and Sedgwick 1995a: 9) of this "brotherhood."

On one reading, Hegel's book offers an account (a multi-layered narrative) of Hegel's journey through a difficult terrain, described in the last paragraph as a "logical space."<sup>3</sup> Like all narratives, Hegel's account is deliberately selective; it is characterised by Hegel's richly metaphorical, literary use of the German language, multiple digressions, retroversions reaching back to the recent history of German philosophy and to ancient Greek times, offering a diversity of perspectives. But as a philosophical text, it also develops a special logical language and an elaborate disciplinary narrative trajectory of its own. Throughout this account – the circular logical narrative which leads from the unity of pure being through multiple binary oppositions, diremptions and divagations<sup>4</sup> back to the unity of redemption, absolute truth and freedom – Hegel is the principal guide, in fact, the teacher and lecturer, ushering his inexperienced readers through the rugged and variable conceptual landscape mapped out by his speculative *Science of Logic*.

On a more translator-oriented reading, the English translation additionally offers Miller's account of his own somewhat different journey through a structurally equivalent although not identical logical space, also guided by Hegel (and others, including Johnston and Struthers and, as we now know, his unconventional mentor, Francis Sedláč). In all these iterations, Hegel's *Science of Logic* presents the primary progressive narrative towards truth and freedom, but we have been warned that the road is beset with snares and trouble, and even at the brink of the presuppositionless logic, we must be aware that the dangers and temptation through which Miller is to lead us may not be the same as those envisaged

by Hegel. The beginning therefore requires extra precautions. Indeed, Miller's predominant aim in retranslating the *Science of Logic* was to help his readers, including "the interested layman," to avoid obstacles which Miller believed Johnston and Struthers had introduced into their translation and which might cause inexperienced readers to lose their way or to become confused. Miller's distaste for the first translation was probably based on his own negative experience of it. There is therefore a practical, cartographic aspect to Miller's work. "Inaccuracies" in the Johnston and Struthers translation might send readers off in wrong directions during their journey through the carefully structured logical space ahead of them. Miller's strategic corrections of Johnston and Struthers should not be thought of as merely "forensic" stylistic shifts (Al-Batineh 2019; Baker 2000; Bakker 1998). The many small changes relative to the Johnston and Struthers text, which will be considered in this chapter, shape how Hegel's story is re-told by Miller in English "strategically," and this, in turn, influences how modern readers understand the fabula, the event layer; that is, the topography of the logical space mapped out by Hegel in his investigation of the categories of thought. Miller thus draws on and shares his own experience of having travelled this journey many years before.

The present chapter begins with a discussion of peritextual framing in the Johnston and Struthers (Hegel and Johnston 1929) translation of Hegel's *Science of Logic*. This is followed by a comparative analysis of Miller's retranslation of the passage "With What Must the Science Begin,?" drawing on the theoretical approach and biographical information presented in the previous chapters. The analysis considers Miller's strategic use of textual emphasis (italicisation) to undo what he perceived as distortions and potential misunderstandings introduced by his predecessors; and his reframing and re-focalisation of the Hegelian "we" to specify and include a different target readership than suggested by Johnston and Struthers. Against this background, the last subsection of the chapter analyses significant divergences in Miller's translation strategies between the *Science of Logic* (Hegel and Miller 1969) and the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Hegel and Miller 1977) as a sophisticated form of translatorial retroversion (Harding 2012: 48–49), using translation to look back from the mature philosophical position of the *Science of Logic* to the relatively immature phenomenological approach adopted in Hegel's first published work.

### Peritextual Framing and the Johnston and Struthers Translation

The questions on which this chapter is based probe further into the reasons for Miller's warning to Barfield not to rely on the Johnston and Struthers translation of the *Science of Logic*. What exactly was it about this translation that Miller found so objectionable? What did he do in his

retranslations to remedy the defects he found? What does this tell us about Miller's commitments and more generally about the use and re-reading of translated philosophical texts? Regarding the transformative and participatory aspirations of the present book, do you agree with Miller's strategic decisions? How and why would you do things differently?

Partial answers to these questions have already been suggested. In discussing the peritexts to the Miller translations with reference to Genette's theory of paratexts (Batchelor 2018; Genette 1997), Figure 3.1 showed the fold-out Table of Categories pasted into Volume I of the two-volume Johnston and Struthers translation. Miller's strategic non-inclusion of any such table in his retranslation is indicative of his broader response to the peritextual elements in these books. Miller's decision to remove editorial (peritextual) and translatorial (textual) additions from the Johnston and Struthers version is explainable with reference to the intersecting narratives interwoven around the Cold-War Hegel revival. Miller perceived these as obscuring the purity and clarity required for a genuine philosophical approach. The fold-out table of categories introduced into the peritextual space what Miller saw as extraneous, inauthentic, non-Hegelian elements. The same strategy underlies other aspects of Miller's response which are easily identifiable in the peritexts and in the text of the translation. To reinforce this point, the peritexts surrounding the Johnston and Struthers translation of Hegel's *Science of Logic* (Hegel and Johnston 1929) are briefly revisited.

The title page shown in Figure 7.1 presents the academic qualifications of the two translators, a demonstration of their institutionalised cultural capital, and it advertises the Introductory Preface by Viscount Haldane of Cloan. Richard Burdon Haldane was a high-ranking Scottish Liberal and subsequently Labour Party politician as well as an influential writer on philosophy. He served as Secretary of State for War between 1905 and 1912 and was Lord Chancellor in 1924 in the first Labour government in Britain (Mander 2011: 514–517; Passmore 1968: 60, 332f). His sister, Elizabeth Haldane co-translated Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. Haldane is also linked indirectly with Francis Sedlák, because Sedlák contacted Haldane and quoted some comments by Haldane in the Preface to Volume I of *Pure Thought and the Riddle of the Universe* (Sedlák 1921) which was discussed in Chapter 5. Bearing in mind Miller's aversion to the contemporary (Cold-War) preoccupation with the political dimension of Hegel's work, he probably wanted to erase links with pre-war British Idealism and its politics. The "need" for a new translation therefore presumably included a negative component: the need to dissociate Hegel from such peritextual framing narratives.

Haldane's Introductory Preface is followed by an anonymous Editor's Note, a short Translators' Preface, 4 contents pages and two glossaries (German-English and English-German). Volume I contains the fold-out Table of Categories, and Volume II closes with a short list entitled "Some

# HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC

TRANSLATED BY  
W. H. JOHNSTON, B.A., AND  
L. G. STRUTHERS, M.A.



*With an Introductory Preface by*  
*Viscount Haldane of Cloan*  
*K.T. P.C. O.M. F.R.S.*

VOLUME ONE

LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD  
NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Figure 7.1 The title page of the 1929 Johnston and Struthers translation of Hegel's *Science of Logic* (Hegel and Johnston 1929), showing peritextual references to British academia, aristocracy and the political élite.

English Books on Hegel's Logic." Together with the decision not to include a table of categories, which was an invention of the translators rather than a component of Hegel's original book, the decision not to include a glossary in Miller's retranslation has further, significant implications regarding the translation process, the translated text and also the way in which readers use the translation. In fact, none of Miller's six Hegel translations contains a glossary.

A note printed below the heading of the Johnston and Struthers glossary reads as follows: "Words used to translate the names of categories, or in a technical sense, are spelt with initial capitals." Readers are led to assume that the categories mentioned here will correspond with those listed in the Table of Categories and that this peritextual strategy will be continued throughout the text. A further example from the German-English glossary illustrates the problem facing translators of Hegel and partly explains Miller's frustration with the approach adopted by Johnston and Struthers:

*Table 7.1* Glossary entry and explanatory note from the Johnston and Struthers translation of Hegel's *Science of Logic*, illustrating the difficulty of translating Hegelian terminology (Hegel and Johnston 1929:27).

<i>German</i>	<i>English</i>
Vorstellung	Sensuous representation, image, imagination, presentation, idea, general idea, ideation

Note: This word, which has occasioned great difficulty in translation, commonly stands in Hegel for something between sensuous intuition (*Anschauung*) or perception (*Wahrnehmung*) on the one hand, and Notion (*Begriff*) on the other. It usually means representation before the mind, in sensuous or semi-sensuous form, of some particular or universal. It is applied sometimes to a faculty, sometimes to an activity and sometimes to the product of an activity. Often it corresponds roughly to the "general idea" of the English empiricists, occasionally to the "image" of modern psychology.

The impression communicated by the glossary entry reproduced in Table 7.1 and especially the associated note that Hegel's terminology is difficult to translate and bewildering in context was something Miller and the Hegel revivalists wanted to avoid in their retranslation. This suggestion would fuel Popper's accusation of obscurantism against Hegel. The Translator's Preface (Hegel and Johnston 1929: 19–20) partly explains the strategies adopted by Johnston and Struthers, but was presumably similarly unwelcome to Miller. It emphasises the role of British Idealist philosopher J.M.E. McTaggart, explaining that the first 50 pages of the translation had been started by Constance Jones at the suggestion of McTaggart; that she had based her translation "as closely as possible" on McTaggart's terminology as used in his *Commentary on Hegel's Logic* (Cambridge University Press 1910); and that they (Johnston and

Struthers) had continued in the same vein. They explain that they were students of McTaggart and “felt ourselves absolved from the task of supplying explanatory notes or appendices, in which in any case we could not hope to excel or usefully to supplement the work of McTaggart” (ibid). This stands in partial contradiction of the fact that they did supply glossaries and the table of categories.

While promoting McTaggart, a British Idealist philosopher, the translators are also sarcastically critical of Hegel’s language, style and, by implication, also his philosophy, culture and nation.

Little attempt has been made to impart grace to Hegel’s remarkable style. No doubt roughness and obscurity abound; but these qualities are often a necessary consequence of Hegel’s peculiar conception of his subject-matter and attitude to it. . . . But our aim throughout has been to represent as exactly as possible in English what Hegel was apparently trying to say in German, regardless of the notorious “Himalayan” severity and the strangeness of phraseology. Without doubt, in many places we have failed to understand the thoughts perfectly.

(Hegel and Johnston 1929: 20)<sup>5</sup>

When Miller wrote, in his own Translator’s Preface (Hegel and Miller 1969:13), that “there is perhaps a need for a more accurate rendering of this important work which is indispensable for an understanding of his [Hegel’s] system,” this need included the removal of what he must have perceived as the now entirely unacceptable peritextual framing imposed on the work by his predecessors. Indeed, their frank admission that, despite their academic qualifications and proximity to a famous British Idealist philosopher, they had “failed to understand the [Hegel’s] thoughts perfectly” (ibid) must have energised Miller to pursue his own retranslation of their imperfect work competitively and therefore performatively to demonstrate his superior understanding.

### Comparing Translations of “With What Must the Science Begin?”

In the published versions of Hegel’s *Wissenschaft der Logik* and in the translations, the 11-page text of “With What Must the Science Begin?” occurs after Hegel’s authorial peritexts, the two Prefaces [*Vorreden*] and Introduction [*Einleitung*]. It is the first passage in the First Book, The Doctrine of Being. The word “science” in the title refers interchangeably to the science of logic – the title of the entire book – and to the broader discipline of philosophy, reinforcing Hegel’s systematic claim that logic is the beginning of philosophy. While the modal verb “must” indicates that what is to be investigated is a necessary beginning of logic and/or philosophy, the

structure of the opening paragraphs exhibits an ironic interplay between an *in medias res* narrative, characterised by frequent more or less explicit retroversions to recent and more distant events in the past, especially German-Idealist preoccupation with the idea of a beginning or foundation of philosophy (Bowie 2003). This structure is juxtaposed ironically with the overall rhetorical thrust of Hegel's account here, which insists on an *ab initio*, *ab ovo* or "presuppositionless" beginning for logic and therefore for philosophy. In this way, Hegel powerfully differentiates the science of logic, which, he claims, must be pursued *ab initio*, i.e. beginning from the position of "pure being," from other disciplines and indeed other forms of narrative which routinely begin *in medias res*. The idea of a "clean start" possibly had a special appeal to some of Hegel's contemporaries. It certainly also appealed to many in the post-world-war era, which had been widely characterised as a "new age," following the perceived ethical and political nadir of events like the Holocaust, Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the Nakba. To Miller and others in his generation who had seen and heard too much of war, the purity of Hegel's logic may have had the additional appeal of offering a respectable and viable escape route from an increasingly alien, dystopian, permissive, technocratic world. Even this pure beginning is interwoven with surrounding narrative strands; and the turn towards purity, the urge to free oneself from every context, which is implied by this passage, is therefore a distinctively performative act. In Miller's case, it is the distinctive feature of an idiosyncratically truth-seeking, gendered identity role.

Miller's advice to Barfield in the correspondence discussed in Chapter 2, therefore prompts a return to the questions of what it was that Miller found objectionable in the Johnston and Struthers translation, and how and why he tried to improve on his predecessors' work. The following descriptive and comparative analysis of the chapter "With what must the science begin?" from the opening of Hegel's *Science of Logic* approaches Hegel's text as a layered narrative which exhibits many of the features of narratives introduced and discussed throughout the book. The focus is on Miller's retranslation of this passage (Hegel and Miller 1969: 67–78), the first two paragraphs of which are shown in the right-hand column of Table 7.2 alongside the earlier Johnston and Struthers translation (Hegel and Johnston 1929). Reference is occasionally made to the entire approximately 5000-word long text of this passage, especially in the numerical analysis. My analysis is selective, focussed on establishing a coherent understanding of intersecting narrative strands discussed in the earlier chapters as well as those specifically framed in the peritexts, as discussed earlier.

Differences between Miller's retranslation and the original Johnston and Struthers translation can be identified and classified with reference to familiar linguistic and textual features. In view of Miller's comments about the passage in his letters to Barfield (see Chapter 2), these differences provide a good indication of points about which Miller was dissatisfied. However, as already explained, details in the textual layer subtly



Table 7.2 Opening paragraphs of “With What Must the Science Begin?” from Hegel’s *Science of Logic*.

WITH WHAT MUST THE SCIENCE BEGIN?	With What Must the Science begin?
<p>Johnston and Struthers translation</p> <p>It has only recently been felt that there is a difficulty in finding a beginning in philosophy, and the reason for this difficulty, as well as the possibility of solving it, has been much discussed. The beginning of philosophy must be either mediate or immediate, and it is easy to show that it can be neither the one nor the other: so that either method of beginning is refuted.</p> <p>It is true that the principle of any philosophy also expresses a beginning, but this beginning is objective and not subjective; it is the beginning of all things. The principle is a content somehow determined, – Water, the One, Nous, Idea, – Substance, Monad, and so forth; or, where it relates to the nature of cognition and so is designed rather to be a criterion than an objective determination (like Thought, Intuition, Sensation, Ego, or Subjectivity itself), it is still the determination of the content to which interest is directed. On the other hand the beginning as such, considered as something subjective in the sense of some contingent way of introducing the exposition, remains neglected and indifferent; and so the need of the question, with what we are to begin, still seems unimportant compared with the need of a principle, which alone seems to contain the interest of the matter, – the interest as to what is the truth and the absolute basis of all things.</p> <p>(Hegel and Johnston 1929: 80)</p>	<p>Miller retranslation</p> <p>It is only in recent times that thinkers have become aware of the difficulty of finding a beginning in philosophy, and the reason for this difficulty and also the possibility of resolving it has been much discussed. What philosophy begins with must be either <i>mediated</i> or <i>immediate</i>, and it is easy to show that it can be neither the one nor the other; thus either way of beginning is refuted.</p> <p>The <i>principle</i> of a philosophy does of course, also express a beginning, but not so much a subjective as an <i>objective</i> one, the beginning of <i>everything</i>. The principle is a particular determinate <i>content</i> – water, the one, <i>nous</i>, idea, substance, monad, etc. Or, if it refers to the nature of cognition and consequently is supposed to be only a criterion rather than an objective determination – thought, intuition, sensation, ego, subjectivity itself. Then here too it is the nature of the content which is the point of interest. The beginning as such, on the other hand, as something subjective in the sense of being a particular, inessential way of introducing the discourse, remains unconsidered, a matter of indifference, and so too the need to find an answer to the question, With what should the beginning be made? remains of no importance in face of the need for a principle in which alone the interest of the matter in hand seems to lie, the interest as to what is the <i>truth</i>, the <i>absolute ground</i>.</p> <p>(Hegel and Miller 1969: 67)</p>

influence the “story told” which represents the reader’s only access to the “fabula” or event layer, that is, the logical landscape through which Hegel and Miller are attempting to guide their readers. Beyond mere description, the analysis in the following subsections also investigates why Miller adopted these strategies with reference to his partial reconstruction of



Hegel's textual emphasis and his strategic, translatorial expansion of the Hegelian "we" to transform the interlocutory space.

For cross reference, especially for readers who wish to compare the translated versions with the German original, Table 7.3 presents

*Table 7.3* Hegel's original German text of the passage from Table 7.2 (left) alongside the same passage from the most recent translation of the *Science of Logic* (right). The \* refers to a translatorial footnote not reproduced here.

<i>Womit muß der Anfang der Wissenschaft gemacht werden?</i>	<i>WITH WHAT MUST THE BEGINNING OF SCIENCE BE MADE?</i>
Hegel's German original	Giovanni translation
In neueren Zeiten erst ist das Bewußtsein entstanden, daß es eine Schwierigkeit sei, einen <i>Anfang</i> in der Philosophie zu finden, und der Grund dieser Schwierigkeit sowie die Möglichkeit, sie zu lösen, ist vielfältig besprochen worden. Der Anfang der Philosophie muß entweder ein <i>Vermitteltes</i> oder <i>Unmittelbares</i> sein, und es ist leicht zu zeigen, daß er weder das eine noch das andere sein könne; somit findet die eine oder die andere Weise des Anfangens ihre Widerlegung.	It is only in recent times that there has been a new awareness of the difficulty of finding a <i>beginning</i> in philosophy, and the reason for this difficulty, and so also the possibility of resolving it, have been discussed in a variety of ways. The beginning of philosophy must be either <i>something mediated</i> or <i>something immediate</i> , and it is easy to show that it can be neither the one nor the other; so either way of beginning runs into contradiction.*
Das <i>Prinzip</i> einer Philosophie drückt wohl auch einen Anfang aus, aber nicht sowohl einen subjectiven als <i>objektiven</i> , den Anfang <i>aller Dinge</i> . Das Prinzip ist ein irgendwie bestimmter <i>Inhalt</i> : das Wasser, das Eine, Nus, Idee, – Substanz, Monade usf.; oder wenn es sich auf die Natur des Erkennens bezieht und damit mehr nur ein Kriterium also eine objektive Bestimmung sein soll – Denken, Anschauen, Empfinden, Ich, die Subjektivität selbst –, so ist es hier gleichfalls die Inhaltsbestimmung, auf welche das Interesse geht. Das Anfangen als solches dagegen bleibt als ein Subjektives in dem Sinne einer zufälligen Art und Weise, den Vortrag einzuleiten, unbeachtet und gleichgültig, somit auch das Bedürfnis der Frage, womit anzufangen sei, unbedeutend gegen das Bedürfnis des Prinzips, als in welchem allein das Interesse <i>der Sache</i> zu liegen scheint, das Interesse, was das Wahre, was der <i>absolute Grund</i> von allem sei.	The <i>principle</i> of a philosophy also expresses a beginning, of course, but not so much a subjective as an <i>objective</i> one, the beginning of <i>all things</i> . The principle is a somehow determinate <i>content</i> – “water,” “the one,” “nous,” “idea,” or “substance,” “monad,” etc. – or, if it designates the nature of cognition and is therefore meant simply as a criterion rather than an objective determination, as “thinking,” “intuition,” “sensation,” “I,” even “subjectivity,” then here too the interest still lies in the content determination. The beginning as such, on the other hand, as something subjective in the sense that it is an accidental way of introducing the exposition, is left unconsidered, a matter of indifference, and consequently also the need to ask with what a beginning should be made remains of no importance in face of the need for the principle in which alone the interest of <i>the fact</i> seems to lie, the interest as to what is the <i>truth</i> , the <i>absolute ground</i> of everything.
(Hegel 1970b: 65)	(Hegel and Giovanni 2010: 45)

Hegel's German text (Hegel 1970b) of the corresponding paragraphs alongside a parallel extract from the most recent complete retranslation (Hegel and Giovanni 2010), which will be discussed briefly later in this chapter.

My suggestion for the use of the passages quoted in Tables 7.1 to 7.6 in this chapter (and the Tables in Chapter 8) is that readers look for differences, try to understand why Miller made the choices he made, but also consider how you might do things differently from Miller and why. My analysis is not supposed to be the only possible response.

### *Strategic Restoration and Curation of the Mature Hegel*

Apart from the difference in words per paragraph, the most prominent difference between the two versions shown in Table 7.2 is the translators' use of textual features, especially initial capitals in Johnston and Struthers and the italicisation of selected words and phrases in Miller. The presence and/or absence of these features is also evident in the modern edition of the Hegel text and in Di Giovanni's retranslation (Table 7.3). Closer inspection, including a numerical analysis of these details throughout the approximately 5000-word text of Hegel's chapter "With What Must the Science Begin?" gives substance to this visual impression and reveals a patterning which suggests a subtle intersection of translational strategies with the wider narrative context. Table 7.4 presents a simple numerical analysis of initial capitals (excluding sentence-initial capitals) found in the chapter. Examples of these in Table 7.2 are the capitalised words "Water, the One, Nous, Idea" in paragraph two of the J+S translation (left column).

As discussed with reference to the note on the Johnston and Struthers glossary of terms, the capitalisation of nouns corresponds with the special (technical) significance of these words as "categories" in Hegel's philosophical system. The capitalised words are supposed to correspond with the fold-out table of categories illustrated in Figure 3.1. In other words, the initial capitalisation relates directly to a translatorial peritext, an item not directly attributable to Hegel but rather to the translators' interpretation of Hegel's system, which they link explicitly to the work of British Idealist philosopher J.M.E. McTaggart. It is conceivable that the visual impact of this persistent use of capitals throughout the Hegel translations

*Table 7.4* Total number of non-sentence initial words with initial capitals in Johnston and Struthers and in Miller.<sup>6</sup>

	<i>Capitalised in both texts</i>	<i>Capitalised in one text but not the other</i>	<i>Total capitalised words</i>
J + S text	5 initial capitals	156 initial capitals	161
Miller text	5 initial capitals	0 initial capitals	5

was interpreted by English-speaking readers as old-fashioned, bombastic or in some way typical of German writing because initial capitals are conventional for all nouns in German. This impression may have contributed to anti-Hegelian and anti-German narratives, like Karl Popper's sarcastic dismissal of "Hegel's hysterical historicism" (see Chapter 1). This context-related textual feature, foregrounding (technicalising) and/or emphasising specific terms in the translated text by repeated capitalisation, contrasts visibly with the italicised words or clusters of words in the Miller retranslation, which correspond approximately with the emphasis found in Hegel's German original.

Miller's intervention here is relevant to the opening disciplinary narrative of Hegel's chapter, which relates to the mediation of philosophical ideas. Access to Hegel's ideas on the beginning of philosophy is mediated through the German language of his text, but translation adds additional layers of mediation – in this case, relating to the previous translators' interpretation of Hegel's meaning and their desire to make a difficult text more accessible by capitalising and therefore foregrounding what they saw as key words. Miller's response was to strip away some of this extraneous mediation, rather like an archaeologist on discovery of a palimpsest. For Miller, the interpretive interventions introduced by Johnston and Struthers obscured the underlying purity of Hegel's thoughts and may have prompted negative reactions. The driving narrative behind Miller's approach was therefore also relevant to the content of Hegel's chapter. Miller begins by purging, purifying his predecessors' work in a translational process which mimics the "purging" required before beginning the quest narrative articulated throughout Hegel's *Science of Logic*. But there is, of course, a deep irony associated with this process which haunts Hegel's project as well as Miller's. The intimate association between language and thought means that even the sincerest process of purification is always already mediated by the rhetoric of purification (Houlgate 2006: 72–98).<sup>7</sup> As already mentioned, the rhetoric of a clean start, a fresh beginning, also had a special appeal for many during the early years of the Cold-War period, so that the restoration of Hegel's philosophy could never be other than a re-narration in a new context. In other words, Miller's purging and revisions brought with them their own layers of mediation and associations, analysed in this book in terms of narrative reframing. Even a series of corrective retranslations cannot therefore remove "distortions" introduced through translation (Berman 2000: 276–289; Deane-Cox 2014: 14, 189–190) to provide immediate access to the original author's ideas.

As shown in Table 7.5, the words and phrases italicised in Miller's translation generally correspond with emphasis in the original German text. Johnston and Struthers use italics only for six words in the title of a reference in brackets.

Table 7.5 Total emphasised (italicised) clusters in Hegel's original and Miller's retranslation.

	<i>Italicised in both texts</i>	<i>Italicised in one text but not the other</i>	<i>Total italicised</i>
Hegel text	92	30 italic	122
Miller text	92	11 italic	103

Table 7.5 enumerates correspondence and discrepancies in the passage under analysis, referring to one or several words emphasised continuously as an “italicised cluster.”

In Miller's copy of the 1923, Lasson edition of the *Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (Hegel 1923),<sup>8</sup> emphasis in the Hegelian text is achieved by means of a wider typographical spacing between letters (kerning). However, an italic typeface was adopted in the more recent German edition (Hegel 1970), and I have reproduced this style in the tables in this chapter. Although Miller's reproduction of most of Hegel's emphasis (103 out of 122 clusters) and removal of the initial capitals constitute the most prominent textual difference between the translated texts, it is important to note that neither Johnston and Struthers nor Miller were fully consistent in their handling of textual emphasis. Without explanation, Miller failed to emphasise 30 clusters and additionally italicised 11 terms not emphasised in the latest edition of the Hegel text. The discrepancies may be attributable to his use of two different editions, but it is more significant that even with the 11 italicised clusters added by Miller, Miller's version reduces the use of italics for emphasis; in other words, the data suggest that he strategically reframed Hegel's style by toning down the emphasis.

Miller's adoption of this translational strategy probably reflects his understanding of E.V. Rieu's theory of “equivalent effect” discussed in Chapter 2. According to this approach, restoring but adapting Hegel's emphasis for modern English readers is just one of a series of strategies designed to bring readers closer to an imagined Hegel, including, for example, Miller's avoidance of footnotes, glossaries and other obviously editorial or translatorial interventions which might interrupt the flow of reading. Like a modern, Christian Bible translator, Miller wanted to maximise the person-to-person intimacy between the authorial voice (Hegel writing in modern English) and the (general) reader or what Miller refers to as “the interested layman.” However, one small group of readers was particularly important for the success of the translation project. To be taken seriously as a publishable translation, Miller's work would have to be read by expert Hegelian philosophers who had access to the

original German and could compare Miller's new translation with the existing version. In terms of performativity, Miller required "recognition" (Butler 2000) by Hegel experts who could compare his work with the German original. Miller's re-shaping of the emphasis in the translations is addressed to these "witnesses" (Parker and Sedgwick 1995a: 11).

Miller must initially have convinced Findlay, with whose help he prepared the manuscript for presentation to the publisher – Allen & Unwin – the same company which had published the Johnston and Struthers translation in the book series known as the Muirhead Library of Philosophy. No doubt Findlay had given his recommendation to publish. He probably also stressed the need for a new translation of the *Science of Logic* and mentioned the fact that Hegel was a set author in university philosophy courses (AUC 1920–1968).<sup>9</sup> An expert report on Miller's typescript was provided for Allen & Unwin by G.R.G. Mure in 1967. The report is held in an archive of Allen & Unwin papers in the Special Collections at Reading University Library and makes fascinating reading. Mure begins by pointing out the distinction between "a fairly literal crib"<sup>10</sup> and "a version in readable English, not translationese." He continues, "Nobody has yet published a genuine English version of the *Science of Logic*. I doubt if it is possible. . . . The Johnston and Struthers version is also a crib" (Mure 1967–18.4.67).<sup>11</sup> As implied by his comments about Miller's typescript, he evidently had his own idea of what a "genuine English version" would be, and Miller's version essentially failed to meet his requirements. However, between the lines of criticism, there are signs of reluctant approval, which were no doubt partly attributable to Miller's effort to bring readers closer to the original Hegel. Mure compared the two translations and concluded that "Miller often, though not always, is the more accurate and perhaps the more readable." Mure would have noticed that the initial capitals in the Johnston and Struthers translation had been removed and that Hegel's original emphasis had been largely adhered to. He would have noticed numerous terminological details some of which are discussed briefly in the following paragraphs. And he seems to have been tentatively persuaded by Miller's effort to achieve a "readable" style.

Mure's report records the "need" for a new translation, and, as we shall see, Mure certainly welcomed a post-British Idealist return to Hegel. His article on the Organic State, discussed in Chapter 4 (Mure 1949) argued for the restoration of a classical liberal-conservative ideology in opposition to what he perceived as a growing threat of individualism. Hegel's *Science of Logic* provided the soundest, most authoritative theoretical basis for this restoration ideology.

However, Mure's ideal for the "next English version" which should be "rather more than a translation" diverges widely from what Miller was offering. Mure wanted more rather than less translatorial and editorial mediation. The "brief footnotes" in the French translation which he

recommends as a model for Miller or other translators to emulate occur on almost every page and are generally between five and ten lines in length, often longer (Hegel and Hyppolite 1939). As discussed in Chapter 3 with reference to Michael Petry's three-volume translation of *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature* (Hegel and Petry 1970), what Mure is calling for in his report is a "thick" translation or a scholarly edition; what Miller offered was a "thin," more widely readable translation with minimal scholarly intervention. In Mure's opinion, Miller's work might be used in combination with a detailed commentary. It is therefore interesting to speculate that in deciding to override Mure's expert opinion about Miller's work, the publishers possibly came up with a diplomatic compromise. Instead of combining Miller's thin translation with detailed footnotes and commentary, as Mure had suggested, Miller included a strong recommendation and a quotation from Mure's introductory book on Hegel (Mure 1940) in his Translator's Preface. Despite Miller's efforts to give less mediated access to Hegel than his predecessors, Miller's retranslation nevertheless became entwined in a contemporaneous social and intertextual network; like the reference to McTaggart in the Johnston and Struthers translation, the reference to Mure renders the translation more, rather than less, mediated. This tension between the mediated (interpretation of Hegel) and the immediate (direct, intimate access through the artefact of a persuasive and fluent authorial voice) is, of course, evident throughout the text of translation, but especially regarding Miller's partial reproduction and toning down of Hegel's italics for emphasis.

Mure's *Introduction to Hegel* (Mure 1940) articulates a position close to Miller's in several respects. He stresses the continuity of philosophical tradition especially between Aristotle and Hegel and, above all, the sense that British Idealists, especially Bradley and Bosanquet, had obscured something intrinsically valuable in Hegel. Like Miller in the Barfield letters and elsewhere, Mure emphasises the binary distinction between "mere Understanding" and "Reason" (see Chapter 2). The most notable passage in Mure's report on Miller's translation is his requirement that a translation should contribute to articulating "the 'Bacchanalian revel' of Hegel's palpitating exposition." Mure's use of language here is reminiscent of the intensely emotional, elevated, quasi-literary style found in the writing of Barfield, Findlay and especially Sedlák. It is expressive of the passion, which he also shared with Miller, behind his commitment to Hegel as the philosopher of truth.<sup>12</sup> By contrast, Miller's style in the translations avoids sensualised, emotive metaphor but is no less passionate in its sustained commitment to Hegel's vision of philosophical truth. It is tempting to speculate that if Miller had the opportunity of meeting Mure – I have found no evidence that they did meet – his enthusiasm for Hegel would have convinced Mure that the translator's heart was in the right place. Overall, Miller's manuscript must have convinced the publishers that his "thin" translation in conjunction with Mure's *Introduction*

was capable of meeting the “need” for a new translation, despite Mure’s reservations.

For Hegelians like Mure, Findlay, Knox and Miller, the return to a moderated but genuine Hegel was not only a deeply personal matter, it was always already enmeshed with other competing narratives. Despite its central focus on a pure beginning, even Hegel’s opening suggestion that the beginning of philosophy must be either “mediated” or “immediate” begins the account *in medias res*, framing this passage with reference to a historical debate between Jacobi, Goethe, Hölderlin, Hegel and others at that time concerning the epistemology of immediate certainty. This topical disciplinary narrative about immediacy was especially relevant to Miller’s explicit concern with the “God-man relationship.” To summarise a complex topic, Miller saw in Hegel’s philosophy a rational explanation for the claim that man’s relationship with God is paradoxically both immediate and mediated (Inwood 2003: 184; see also Houlgate 2006: 86–87). But Miller and his associates in the Cold-War Hegel revival were additionally motivated to refute anti-Hegelian narratives, such as those voiced by Popper, Russell and C.S. Lewis, which accused Hegel of being an unreliable obscurantist (Stewart 1996), whose philosophy was associated with the rise of Nazism and Communism. In addition to bringing the translations closer to the original in this textual and linguistic sense, Miller was also trying to rehabilitate Hegel’s philosophy in English, to give it respectability and restore the cultural capital Hegel and German philosophy had lost as a result of the two world wars and the associated decline in German as an academic language (Ammon 2019: 236–246). To this end, Miller not only sought to correct his predecessors’ mistakes, he adopted translational strategies designed to improve the rhetoric in which the philosophical texts are couched, in other words to communicate Hegel’s ideas more persuasively, or at least as persuasively as he could within the context as he perceived it. In terms of narrative theory, this amounts to a selective reinforcement of some narratives and narrative features and a commensurate contesting of others.

Miller’s reframing strategy here is particularly relevant. While many philosophers in the 1970s were interested in Hegel’s works for broadly social and political reasons (MacIntyre 1972; Pinkard 1994; Pinkard 2007) – that is to say, they tended to focus on social and political themes or narratives with social and political implications in Hegel’s works, and especially on works, such as the *Phenomenology* and the *Philosophy of Right*, which engaged with these narratives more directly than the *Science of Logic* – Miller and several of his associates (including Barfield) sought to draw attention away from social and political narratives and towards logical, metaphysical, psychological, esoteric and religious narratives. In this sense, despite their reservations, they therefore resembled the British Idealists but with a more explicit focus on Hegel rather than any of the British or American interpretations of Hegel. However, adopting this



strategy tended to reinforce anti-liberal, Eurocentric, patriarchal, misogynist narratives inherent in Hegel's work, which were increasingly under attack, for example, by New Left philosophers, French communist and feminist writers (Hutchings 2003; Kelly 1992; Magee 1978; Roth 1988). The peritextual reference to G.R.G. Mure's *Introduction* contributes to this effect because, in his essay "The Organic State" (Mure 1949), Mure had articulated and reinforced his conservative opposition to individualistic liberalism. From this perspective, the need for a return to Hegel articulated through Miller's retranslation of Hegel's *Science of Logic* was linked, unmistakably for those familiar with Mure's article, with a perceived political and cultural need, shared e.g. by Owen Barfield (see Chapter 2), to resist the modern, countercultural trend towards greater democracy, decolonisation, liberation of women, educational and cultural permissiveness. Although the *Science of Logic* articulates a narrative of presuppositionless purity of being and therefore detachment from political affairs (Houlgate 2006: 163), the association with Mure, which is evident at peritextual and textual levels, contributes to the sense that the philosophical freedom aspired to as the goal of Hegel's and Miller's arduous narrative of quest will resemble Mure's Organic State more than Popper's Open Society.

While Mure's extrovert, hyperbolic, sensualised style ("palpitating exposition"), which resonates with elements in Barfield (see Chapter 2), Findlay ("pitch-like abstractions"; later in this chapter) and is sometimes echoed by Miller, Miller's less emphatic style in the translations also has a more introverted, personal tone, possibly in response to Hegel's call for purging and purity at the start of philosophy, and maps onto a translatorial narrative of delayed gratification: freedom and truth are attainable only after a long abstinence and hard mental effort. Miller's removal of the emphatic capitals in the Johnston and Struthers translation represents a curtailment of his predecessors' pre-mature enthusiasm. Their grasp of Hegel's categories is still only at the level of "mere Understanding"; for Johnston and Struthers (in Miller's eyes), the categories are rigid, tabulated lists of terms. The categories are or will become important during the exposition, but they are not to be grasped in the first few pages "like a shot from a pistol" or with the help of a fold-out table of categories (see Figure 3.1). For Miller, ensuring the absence of any emphasis other than Hegel's and even downplaying Hegel's emphasis constitute a performative act of discipline, part of the "purging" required on the approach to pure being.

Miller's translation of the phrase "nach Außen" (literally "towards the outside"; used by Hegel as a spatial metaphor, suggesting the "outside world" in a social sense, and implying, therefore that same sense of interiority: we Hegelians, we intellectuals or we of the brotherhood) as "among the uninitiated" is revealing in this context. The phrase occurs towards the end of "With What Must the Science Begin?": Hegel: "Diese



Verwechslung bringt statt unmittelbarer Klarheit vielmehr nur eine um so grellere Verwirrung und gänzliche Desorientierung hervor; nach Außen hat sie vollends die größten Mißverständnisse veranlaßt" (Hegel 1970b: 77); Miller: "This confusion, far from clarifying the problem of a beginning, only adds to the difficulties involved and tends completely to mislead; among the uninitiated it has given rise to the crudest misunderstandings" (Hegel and Miller 1969: 77).<sup>13</sup> Hegel's demand for a pure beginning for philosophy and the suggestion that outsiders or non-philosophers were doomed to misunderstand may have had an additional appeal for Miller because it frames an embedded narrative of initiation into an esoteric society or "brotherhood" of philosophers. The Christian sacrament of baptism and the rites practised by many groups associated with Western Esotericism – including especially the Theosophists, with whom Barfield, Findlay, Miller and Sedlák were acquainted – all represent forms of cleansing, purification or purging antecedent to an initiation into full membership (Hanegraaff 2013: 112–113). *The Theosophist* (see Chapter 5) and the *Theosophical Review*, which published articles by Sedlák, all of which, as we saw in Chapter 5, were carefully annotated and indexed by Miller, often described members of the group as a "Brotherhood" (see Chapter 5). Miller's single use of the term "the uninitiated" in the text of "With What Must the Science begin?" (ibid) thus resonates with the terms "purging," "pure" and even "presuppositionless" in reinforcing a "fencing" narrative according to which only an exclusive group of initiated philosophers, members of a predominantly male brotherhood, are allowed to progress beyond mere Understanding through Reason (*die göttliche Vernunft*: see Chapter 2) towards freedom and absolute truth. This group therefore represents Miller's target readership; his readers are not exclusively "professional philosophers" but include the "interested layman" (Miller 1969), that is to say, precociously intellectual, earnest young men like Miller and Charles Williams who, despite their lack of university education (Lindop 2015),<sup>14</sup> were prepared to immerse themselves during young adulthood in serious study in pursuit of religious, poetic or philosophical truth. Hegel's account is thus reframed as a narrative of firm resolution and delayed gratification according to which the barrenness of the empty logical space, which may intimidate weaker brethren who crave more immediate rewards, must be endured and embraced before progress can be made towards the "higher" regions. In this sense, Miller's toning down of Hegel's emphasis and resolute closeness to the German textual emphasis enact an idealised performative role in which discipline and self-denial prepare the way towards spiritual freedom and philosophical truth. However, despite Miller's presumed intentions, please remember that the features noted in this analysis do not represent a restoration of Hegel's emphasis; Miller's re-emphasis participates in new disciplinary narratives specific to the time of his translations.

**“Fencing” and Re-Focalisation of the Hegelian “We”**

At the level of syntax and grammatical structure, there are considerable differences in some sentences between Johnston and Struthers and the Miller version. In other cases, Miller’s retranslation corresponds almost exactly with the structure in the Johnston and Struthers translation. Compare, for example, the end of the last sentence of the first paragraph (Table 7.2), which shows structural similarities between the two versions [“and it is easy to show that it can be neither the one nor the other: so that either method of beginning is refuted” (J+S)/“and it is easy to show that it can be neither the one nor the other; thus either way of beginning is refuted” (Miller)]. By contrast, the structure of the first sentence of the second paragraph in Miller’s retranslation diverges significantly from that of the Johnston and Struthers version [“It is true that the principle of any philosophy also expresses a beginning, but this beginning is objective and not subjective; . . .” (J+S)/“The *principle* of a philosophy does of course, also express a beginning, but not so much a subjective as an objective one . . .” (Miller)]. While such structural differences can be construed as stylistic<sup>15</sup> or, less dismissively, as rhetorical,<sup>16</sup> the transformative, socio-narrative approach supported by Bourdieusian social analysis and feminist translation studies adopted in this book takes the analysis further, regarding even subtle structural or grammatical differences as significant in terms of narrative, specifically influencing the way different narrative strands are re-narrated. Since Miller worked closely with the Johnston and Struthers text, it can be assumed that he was relatively satisfied that sentences he retained or only modified slightly corresponded with his own understanding of Hegel’s text and his own reframing strategy, while major changes or interventions indicate significant disagreement. Even very small changes indicate not only that Miller had noted and approved his predecessors’ work, but his non-intervention also implies an ethical complicity with the position articulated by Hegel through the previous translation. The dual aim of this book is firstly to encourage readers to comprehend these decisions, interventions and non-interventions, and secondly to look for alternative, more contextually appropriate alternatives, especially if these alternatives disagree with the existing translations. Chapter 9 takes up this point through an invitation to readers to participate in an interactive website dedicated to Miller’s translations of Hegel.

Contrary to his general approach of maximising structural proximity to Hegel’s German, Miller did sometimes introduce significant structural changes by comparison with Johnston and Struthers and Hegel, including the breaking up of long sentences, even when this meant departing from the original Hegelian parsing and punctuation. For example, in the second paragraph shown in Table 7.2 and already discussed earlier with reference to italicisation, Johnston and Struthers had translated Hegel’s sentence “Das *Prinzip* einer Philosophie drückt wohl auch einen Anfang aus . . .”

as “It is true that the principle of any philosophy also expresses a beginning . . .”, thereby slightly changing Hegel’s emphasis by omitting the italicised word and using the generalisation of “any philosophy,” but also by paraphrasing “wohl” as “It is true that . . .”. Miller’s retranslation “The *principle* of a philosophy does, of course, also express a beginning . . .” readjusts the emphasis, most obviously by restoring the italicised word “*principle*,” but, by contrast with the general point made earlier regarding italics and emphasis, Miller’s retranslation here additionally engages with the grammatical structure of the sentence. Miller uses the emphatic English structure “does of course also express” instead of the unmarked “expresses” which corresponds more closely to Hegel’s original; in this way, he shifts the focus of this first clause towards what is effectively a caesura after “beginning,” thereby preparing for the anaphoric reference after the comma: “beginning, but not so much a subjective as an *objective* one.” In this case, Miller’s purpose was presumably in line with his general commitment to a restoration (or improvement) of the prosodic features of Hegel’s text, which Johnston and Struthers had distorted by repeating the word “beginning” after the comma. Miller probably objected to the casual use of “true” at the start of the Johnston and Struthers paragraph, because truth is a central notion in Miller’s understanding of Hegel; Hegel did not use the word *wahr/true* in this sentence, and so its appearance in the translation seemed unjustifiable. In this sense, the grammatical structure of this sentence in the retranslation intersects with the social dynamics of the Hegel revival. Grammatical features are not merely textual details, they influence the way the story is told as well as the underlying fabula. Truth is not present at the beginning of the logic; it must be derived systematically. Johnston and Struthers misled their readers by narrating truth into the empty logical space which Hegel is painstakingly preparing. Their loose or casual use of paraphrase contrasts with Miller’s tireless commitment to communicating Hegel’s philosophical intentions as faithfully as possible.

This does not mean that Miller slavishly mimicked Hegel’s sentence structure. On the contrary, as the second sentence in the second paragraph shows, Miller was prepared to break up Hegel’s long sentences, presumably when he felt this did minimal damage to the philosophical content. Here, Miller takes the full stop after “etc.” at the end of a sentence and begins ungrammatically with “Or, . . .”, so that there is no main verb in the structure between “Or, . . .” and “subjectivity itself.” Miller then begins a third sentence, starting with “Then . . .” so that three sentences separated with full stops correspond to one sentence in Hegel and in Johnston and Struthers, and by way of further comparison, also in Di Giovanni (see Table 7.3).

While there are strong similarities between German and English at many levels, creating the impression that word-for-word translation would be almost intelligible, there are some notorious structures which

are almost always restructured by translators because a word-for-word translation would give an unintelligible calque. An interesting and significant example occurs in the last sentence in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 and relates to the impersonal passive structure “womit anzufangen sei.” The clause was translated by Miller as “With what should the beginning be made?” avoiding the problem by adding the noun “beginning” as a direct object of the verb “made.” But the German clause is further complicated by an indirect question, which requires the use of the subjunctive mood in German. Translated literally, Hegel’s structure “das Bedürfnis der Frage, womit anzufangen sei . . .” would give an indirect, impersonal question something like: the need for the question with what one might be (required or expected) to begin. This was translated by Johnston and Struthers as “the need of the question, with what are we to begin” without a question mark. While Miller’s strategy in the retranslation was to repeat the word “beginning” here with the verb “made,” Johnston and Struthers solved the problem of the impersonal passive indirect question by introducing an unspecified “we.” This non-Hegelian, translatorial “we” suggests both the inclusion of interlocutors in a conversation or the members of a group as well as the potential exclusion of non-members, but the context does not make it clear exactly who the referents of this plural personal pronoun are and therefore who might be included or excluded. This kind of unspecified “we” is often used in lectures or textbooks implying, for example, that listeners or readers share the same problem-solving goal in arithmetic: if we want to know the answer, we must multiply both sides of the equation by four.

Now, in the empty logical space mapped out in this beginning chapter of Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, Miller may have thought the suggestion of such a non-Hegelian, translatorial “we” was intrusive, a further example of the casualness which characterised the Johnston and Struthers translation, a demonstration of their “mere Understanding” of a situation which logically excluded the presence of any “we.” In short, this situation, at the beginning of logic, is characterised by the presence of nothing except pure being, but “we” implies the presence of more than one person. Speculations of this kind might account for Miller’s rephrasing of this specific sentence.<sup>17</sup>

However, analysis of the whole chapter “With What Must the Science Begin?” using textual analysis software adds further complexity to the question of the translatorial and the Hegelian “we” in the Miller retranslations. Concordancing software, such as WordSmith 5.0, which has been available online for many years, is designed for use in corpus linguistics, that is, for the analysis of corpora of one or more texts, and has been used extensively in Translation Studies (Olohan 2004). Indeed, large corpora of translated and untranslated texts have been compiled in recent years and developed with enhanced visualisation software for various kinds of comparative research.<sup>18</sup> However, WordSmith 5.0 can be used at a very small

Concordance

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N	Concordance	Set	Tag	Word #	#	Sent	Par	#	Lead	Sec	Sec	File	%
1	so the need of the question, with what we are to begin, still seems unimportant			198	551%	0	4%		0	4%	omit 02 Text.bd	4%	
2	to be in the logical thought-process. We have here only to consider how the			387	9	6%	0	8%		0	8%	omit 02 Text.bd	8%
3	Sciences, 3rd Edn. Vorbegriff, § 61 f.). We need only quote here that there is			487	13	5%	0	11%		0	11%	omit 02 Text.bd	11%
4	in its last and absolute truth. We have remarked in the introduction			701	18	6%	0	15%		0	15%	omit 02 Text.bd	15%
5	. In this science of manifested Spirit we start from empirical and sensuous			770	2032%	0	17%		0	17%	omit 02 Text.bd	17%	
6	this, no more is requisite than that we must contemplate, or rather, putting			975	2532%	0	21%		0	21%	omit 02 Text.bd	21%	
7	reflections and opinions otherwise held, we must just absorb, that which is			988	2537%	0	21%		0	21%	omit 02 Text.bd	22%	
8	last term, the foundation. — Still further, we see that Absolute Spirit, which is			1,618	44	6%	0	35%		0	35%	omit 02 Text.bd	36%
9	it equally results on the other hand that we must regard as result that to which			1,750	4614%	0	38%		0	38%	omit 02 Text.bd	38%	
10	last derived: it is a result, in so far as we start from the first and reach the last			1,788	4731%	0	39%		0	39%	omit 02 Text.bd	39%	
11	(The case is not that of the construction we are directed to make in order to			2,051	5518%	0	45%		0	45%	omit 02 Text.bd	45%	
12	it is only the proof which shows that we did right to draw just these lines,			2,073	5558%	0	45%		0	45%	omit 02 Text.bd	45%	
13	way the reason why in the pure Science we begin from Pure Being was above			2,123	5750%	0	46%		0	46%	omit 02 Text.bd	46%	
14	of other considerations or connections. We cannot extract any closer			2,282	64	9%	0	50%		0	50%	omit 02 Text.bd	50%
15	who partly will not be satisfied because we begin with Being (from whatever			2,507	7224%	0	55%		0	55%	omit 02 Text.bd	54%	
16	definite concept of the science. Were we too to observe this procedure we			2,565	73	6%	0	56%		0	56%	omit 02 Text.bd	56%
17	. Were we too to observe this procedure we should have no particular Object			2,571	7318%	0	56%		0	56%	omit 02 Text.bd	56%	
18	, pure form quite without content: we should have nothing but the idea of a			2,599	7376%	0	57%		0	57%	omit 02 Text.bd	56%	
19	as such. It remains to be seen what we possess in this idea. So far, there is			2,618	7457%	0	57%		0	57%	omit 02 Text.bd	57%	
20	Absolute, which in fact it would be were we concerned with the forms of			2,851	8359%	0	62%		0	62%	omit 02 Text.bd	62%	
21	this further point, that that with which we must begin, cannot be something			3,221	9354%	0	70%		0	70%	omit 02 Text.bd	70%	
22	abstract beginning, should demand that we begin, not with the Beginning, but			3,336	9724%	0	73%		0	73%	omit 02 Text.bd	72%	
23	: it is in the course of the Science that we are to discover what the matter is;			3,368	9775%	0	73%		0	73%	omit 02 Text.bd	73%	
24	in the disadvantage of the illusion that we are speaking of something known,			3,889	11241%	0	84%		0	84%	omit 02 Text.bd	84%	
25	self-consciousness, whereas in fact we are speaking of something remote			3,904	11279%	0	85%		0	85%	omit 02 Text.bd	85%	
26	to the ego, so that this ego from which we start is not pure knowledge which			4,116	11853%	0	89%		0	89%	omit 02 Text.bd	89%	

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26Set

Figure 7.2 Concordance lines from the Johnston and Struthers translation of “With What Must the Science Begin?,” generated with WordSmith 5.0 using the search term “we.”

scale with minimal preparation of the text. I used it in this way initially to produce concordance lines showing every occurrence of the German word “wir” in the original Hegel text under discussion in this chapter for comparison with the corresponding English word “we” in the Johnston and Struthers translation and the Miller retranslation. The concordance search of the German text showed that Hegel only used the personal pronoun *wir* four times in this 4,418-word text in German. The four occurrences of *wir* are clustered together between word numbers 2,498 and 2,547.

Figure 7.2 shows a concordance result produced from a text file containing the Johnston and Struthers translation of this passage. On screen, the search term “we” is highlighted in blue and aligned at the centre of each line. The co-text to the left and right of the search term can be expanded to show more or fewer words. The view selected here was chosen to illustrate single lines of co-text one beneath the other in the order in which they occur in the text.

The concordance result shown in Figure 7.2 shows that Johnston and Struthers used the English plural personal pronoun “we” 26 times, considerably more times than Hegel used the term “wir” in German. These

occurrences are distributed widely throughout the text rather than clustered together. As already mentioned, there are familiar reasons for this translation strategy relating to certain impersonal passive structures in German which read more fluently if the English translation contains a subject with an active verb. As discussed earlier with reference to Table 7.2, Miller objected to Johnston and Struthers' use of "we" as shown in the first concordance line of Figure 7.2 and restructured the sentence to avoid "we." In terms of narrative theory, the shift involved here can be described as a re-focalisation (Bal 1997: 142–161); Miller shifted the perspective from "we" to "beginning." A similar re-focalisation occurs in the first sentence from Table 7.2, where Miller replaced "it has been felt" (Johnston and Struthers) with "thinkers have become aware" (Miller).<sup>19</sup> Miller may have had philosophical and editorial reasons for avoiding the implications of "we" at this stage of the *Logic*. But, based on this example, it might be assumed that Miller would continue his strategy of avoiding the gratuitous use of "we" throughout the text and indeed through the entire book. The findings shown in Figure 7.3 are therefore surprising and significant.

It is surprising, regarding Figure 7.3, that Miller's retranslation strategy cannot simply be explained as an attempt to bring the text closer to the

The screenshot shows the WordSmith 5.0 Concordance window. The menu bar includes File, Edit, View, Compute, Settings, Windows, and Help. The concordance table has columns: N, Concordance, Set, Tag, Word, #, Sen, Para, Para, Head, Sec, Sec, File, and %. The text in the concordance lines is from the first paragraph of the text shown in Figure 7.2. The search term 'we' is highlighted in the concordance lines. The bottom of the window shows a toolbar with buttons for concordance, collocates, plot, patterns, clusters, filenames, follow up, source text, and notes. The status bar at the bottom indicates '20 Set'.

N	Concordance	Set	Tag	Word	#	Sen	Para	Para	Head	Sec	Sec	File	%
1	the first in the process of thinking. Here we have only to consider how the			we	423	12	8%	0	9%	0	9%	omit Miller Text	8%
2	it has been done elsewhere. Here we need truly quote from it this, that			we	515	1425%	011%	011%	011%	011%	011%	omit Miller Text	10%
3	can also be regarded as arbitrary, that we propose to consider thought as such.			we	1,265	3375%	026%	026%	026%	026%	026%	omit Miller Text	26%
4	of all things, the logical beginning, we may add the following further			we	1,394	3827%	028%	028%	028%	028%	028%	omit Miller Text	28%
5	or establishing by means of which we first obtain the result that what we			we	1,617	4170%	033%	033%	033%	033%	033%	omit Miller Text	33%
6	we first obtain the result that what we began with is not something merely			we	1,624	4178%	033%	033%	033%	033%	033%	omit Miller Text	33%
7	the last and the last is also the first. We see therefore that, on the other hand			we	1,883	47	7%	038%	038%	038%	038%	omit Miller Text	38%
8	reflections or points of connection. We cannot really extract any further			we	2,460	63	8%	050%	050%	050%	050%	omit Miller Text	50%
9	a pure beginning be made. In that case, we have nothing but the beginning itself,			we	2,654	7025%	054%	054%	054%	054%	054%	omit Miller Text	54%
10	first specific concept in the science. If we too were to observe this method,			we	2,749	72	5%	056%	056%	056%	056%	omit Miller Text	56%
11	too were to observe this method, then we should be without a particular object,			we	2,757	7220%	056%	056%	056%	056%	056%	omit Miller Text	56%
12	, wholly form without any content; thus we should have nothing at all beyond			we	2,786	7273%	057%	057%	057%	057%	057%	omit Miller Text	56%
13	idea of a mere beginning as such. We have therefore only to see what is			we	2,802	7314%	057%	057%	057%	057%	057%	omit Miller Text	57%
14	of the absolute – as it would in fact be if we were at all concerned with the form			we	3,051	8253%	052%	052%	052%	052%	052%	omit Miller Text	62%
15	by beginning in some other way. But we cannot leave entirely unmentioned			we	3,639	9914%	074%	074%	074%	074%	074%	omit Miller Text	74%
16	first truth must be something with which we are acquainted, and still more,			we	3,690	10073%	075%	075%	075%	075%	075%	omit Miller Text	75%
17	, and still more, something of which we are immediately certain. This			we	3,699	10033%	075%	075%	075%	075%	075%	omit Miller Text	75%
18	ego in raising itself to that stand-point, we lose the very advantage which is			we	4,045	10911%	032%	032%	032%	032%	032%	omit Miller Text	82%
19	intuition and asserted as the beginning, we are not concerned in the science of			we	4,413	11648%	030%	030%	030%	030%	030%	omit Miller Text	90%
20	diverse determinations. However, as we have remarked, the enunciation and			we	4,571	120	7%	033%	033%	033%	033%	omit Miller Text	93%

Figure 7.3 Concordance lines from Miller's retranslation of "With What Must the Science Begin?," generated with WordSmith 5.0 using the search term "we."



Hegelian original in the sense that there is a greater word-for-word correspondence or equivalence between the texts. Although the word “we” occurs only 20 times here by comparison with 26 occurrences in the Johnston and Struthers translation, these numbers are significantly higher than the four occurrences of “wir” in Hegel’s original text. Accordingly, the suggestion that Miller may have wanted to avoid the re-focalisation brought about by the frequent use of “we” throughout the Johnston and Struthers text is contradicted by the evidence from the concordance investigation that Miller’s retranslation also re-focalises the Hegelian text in a similar manner.

Furthermore, Miller disagreed with Johnston and Struthers in many of the individual cases. As we shall see, Miller’s translatorial “we” corresponds even less than the numerical difference between 26 and 20 would suggest because Miller removed many of his predecessors’ “we” structures and inserted his own in different places. Indeed, consideration of the wider narrative context surrounding Miller’s retranslation, especially the intersection of multiple narrative strands in the sense of a frame ambiguity, according to which readers cannot know exactly who the referent of “we” is (Baker 2006/2018: 107–109), suggests that the referent of Miller’s translatorial “we” – the implied group of speakers and listeners – diverges in multiple respects from that of Johnston and Struthers.

Firstly, since two named translators were responsible for the Johnston and Struthers translation, W.H. Johnston, B.A. and L.G. Struthers, M.A., and they repeatedly refer to themselves in their Translators’ Preface as “we,” linking themselves especially as “former pupils of Dr McTaggart at Trinity College in Cambridge,” there is a considerable risk of ambiguity regarding the continued use of “we” in the early pages of the translation itself. This is particularly evident in concordance line 4 from Figure 7.3, which states “We have remarked in the introduction” [“Es ist in der Einleitung bemerkt”; literally: It is in the Introduction noted]. This “we” is supposed to refer to Hegel, his readers and his introduction, not to any of the several allographic peritexts with which it might be confused.

A second ambiguity derives from the narrative feature of temporal frame ambiguity, which is inescapable in the case of translations and especially retranslations of texts originally written many years previously. As with the “recent times” (Miller) and “recently” (J+S) corresponding to Hegel’s “in neueren Zeiten” (Table 7.3), where the temporal reference of the translations invites ambiguity (does this refer exclusively to Hegel’s time or does it include the even more recent times associated with the translation and retranslation of Hegel’s text?), there is a temporal dimension to the translatorial “we.” Does Hegel’s “wir,” on the four occasions in which he uses the first-person plural pronoun in the present text, include only readers contemporary with Hegel, or might it equally include future generations of readers, even readers of translations? Consider, for

example, the idea that early and mid-twentieth century philosophers had also “recently” been contemplating the possibility of a radical new beginning of philosophy.<sup>20</sup>

While Johnston and Struthers were closer, in 1929, to the British Idealists, and their “we” can be thought to include readers whose interest in Hegel is, in a sense, mediated by or dependent on their interest in the British Idealist philosophy contemporary to their own generation, the opposite is the case for Miller, Findlay and even for Mure. One of Miller’s aims in retranslating the *Science of Logic* was to distance Hegel’s text from the British Idealist tradition. Miller shared this aim with Mure and, to some extent also with Findlay, and for them, the translatorial “we” was targeted towards quite a different group, the exclusive group of those interested directly in Hegel without the mediation of the British Idealists or indeed the more contemporary Marxist, feminist, post-colonial and New Left interpretations and critiques of Hegel. In fact, the translatorial “we” in Miller’s translations is more exclusive than inclusive. Like Miller’s reference to the “interested layman,” the translatorial “we” is not democratic in the sense of including as many people as possible. On the contrary, the re-focalisation and reframing of Miller’s translation of the *Science of Logic* narrows the target readership to the small group of serious-minded, sufficiently educated or self-educated “thinkers” or intellectuals (at that time, probably therefore mostly middle-aged to elderly men) prepared to commit themselves to the “effort demanded by the Notion” (die Anstrengung des Begriffs). This point is articulated explicitly through the peritexts, implicitly through the removal of peritextual aids to understanding, such as the glossaries, tables and footnotes, but most strongly perhaps through the elevated style (see Chapter 2) of the translations themselves, which does not pander to the “man in the street” but addresses the “man in the congregation.”<sup>21</sup> The matter of an elevated style also applies to Findlay’s Introductions (see Chapter 3) and Analysis (in the *Phenomenology*, see Chapter 8).

Closer analysis of the concordance lines shown in Figures 7.2 and 7.3 lends credence to this suggestion. Both Johnston and Struthers and Miller translated all four Hegelian occurrences of “wir” as “we” (concordance lines 16 to 19 in Figure 7.2).<sup>22</sup> Predictably, Miller also translated the Hegelian “wir” as “we” in each case (lines 10 to 13 in Figure 7.3). However, regarding the non-Hegelian and therefore translatorial uses of “we,” Miller agreed with Johnston and Struthers only in four cases (concordance lines M: 1, 2, 8 and 14; J+S: 2, 3, 14, 20). Regarding Miller’s response to Johnston and Struthers, this means that Miller actively disagreed with his predecessors in 18 cases (4 Hegelian, 4 M and J+S agree, 18 disagree = 26). Moreover, in his own translation, Miller actively used the shift from various forms of passive structure in German to a plural personal pronoun in English to reframe, re-focalise and, in this context, specifically, to re-personalise his retranslation.



These relatively minor structural shifts should be recognised as strategic acts of translatorial reframing. They are neither accidental nor merely stylistic; Miller was evidently aware of the significance of the translatorial “we” or he would not have systematically rephrased 18 occurrences of “we” in the previous translation. But Miller also evidently wished to personalise the relationship between authorial voice (Hegel addressing his students in German; the translator’s voice addressing English-speaking readers) and readers of the translation. In a manner reminiscent of the process of ageing described by Hanna (Chapter 2 and Hanna 2016: 62–63, 128–139), Miller’s strategy here dissociates Hegel from the group of addressees referenced by the translatorial “we” used by Johnston and Struthers, which, as we know from the peritexts included the pre-war generation interested in Hegel through British Idealism, especially McTaggart. At the same time, however, Miller’s translatorial “we” points towards a different, newer generation of readers to whom Hegel’s voice is supposed to speak more directly. As we know from Miller’s peritextual quotation from G.R.G. Mure’s *Introduction*, the group addressed by Miller is not limited to professional philosophers, because “philosophy is no more the exclusive business of professionals than is art or religion. If there were not in every man, however intermittently he feels it, and however inadequately he interprets it, the *nisus* towards attaining a total and unreserved self-consciousness, there would be no professional philosophers” (Miller 1969: 13). Miller’s translatorial “we” includes every man who has been driven by this “*nisus*” or urge towards absolute truth sufficiently seriously to take up Hegel’s *Science of Logic* as a means towards that goal and who is prepared to make the enormous intellectual effort required to pursue this goal. By contrast, however, it excludes those who cling doggedly to “ordinary thinking,” “mere Understanding” and “the abstractive intellect, which holds its concepts rigidly apart in isolation and overlooks their essential connectedness.” Miller’s translational strategy of rephrasing and reframing around the personal pronoun “we” is designed to bring readers as close as possible to Hegel. Like Rieu’s translations of the Gospel which were designed for “the man in the congregation” rather than the “man in the street,” Miller’s strategy is to reinforce the intimacy of a mentor–pupil relationship between Hegel and his pupils. Miller himself had experienced this kind of intimacy, especially with his mentor, Francis Sedlák, who introduced him to Hegel and to the idea that pure thought is attainable only through denial of the physical, emotional, feminine, etc. Miller’s translatorial, grammatical work here is intended not just to correct errors but to renew, refresh and revitalise a living, esoteric intellectual relationship. Exclusive though it unavoidably is, Miller’s reframing strategy thus anticipates and encourages the metaphorical birth, growth and development of a community of new philosophical minds, newly empowered aesthetic, religious and political agents. The feminist-informed re-reading of Miller’s translations proposed throughout

this book attempts to comprehend and then transform the exclusivity and hierarchical structuring of Miller's reading of Hegel.

### Divergent Strategies Between Hegel's "Mature System" and the *Phenomenology*

At peritextual and textual levels of analysis, there are many similarities between the retranslation of Hegel's *Phenomenology* and the other Miller translations. Linking back to subsection 7.1 and the relevant parts of Chapter 3, the analysis now turns, firstly, to significant peritextual elements in Miller's retranslation of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Hegel and Miller 1977) which distinguish this text from Miller's previous translations, pointing away from Hegel's content towards the various narrative types relevant to the participants, processes and products of retranslation. Overall, the distribution and content of peritextual elements in this translation reinforce an asymmetry of power between Findlay, the editor and professor of philosophy, and the re-translator, Arnold Miller, an outsider, self-taught intellectual and Hegelian whose work is cautiously endorsed by Findlay. But other tensions are also expressed through the peritexts. While Findlay avoids direct reference to Marx or Sartre in his Foreword (Findlay 1977), the book blurb by Robert C. Solomon of the University of Texas, Austin, (Solomon 1979) specifically mentions Hegel's inspiration of Marx and Sartre, and even uses a gender-inclusive "he or she" pronoun for potential readers. Understandably, neither the editorial nor the translatorial peritexts mention the abandoned collaboration with co-translator Peter Fuss (OUP 1973–1978) or the difficulties in deciding whether to include numbered footnotes within the body of the text (originally to be written by H.S. Harris) or whether to include a separate "Analysis" section in the backmatter (eventually provided by Findlay).

The final part of the chapter explains how micro-textual and linguistic details in Miller's retranslation of the *Phenomenology* are used to reframe the content of the text, contributing to Miller's distinctive re-narration of the phenomenological account articulated by Hegel. Such micro-textual reframing is discernible either by comparison with the original German, with previous and subsequent translations (e.g. as shifts) or with reference to recognisable patterns within the translated text, such as patterns of consistency/inconsistency in the translation of specific lexical items (*aufheben*/sublate).

### Erecting a Peritextual "Fence" for the (Un)-Initiated

Similarities and significant divergences at the peritextual level are first presented and analysed. Like Miller's retranslation of the *Science of Logic* and the other Miller translations in the OUP series of Hegel's works, Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* can be classified as a "thin" translation.

In this respect, it contrasts with the Michael Petry translation of *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature* in three volumes (Hegel and Petry 1970) with its copious footnotes, detailed scholarly introduction and references, which exemplifies “thick” translation. Despite the long editorial Analysis section at the end of the book, which makes the book physically thicker, it has no glossary of terms, relatively few footnotes in the body of the text and no detailed references to other secondary literature. The authoritative, elevated, literary prose style of Findlay's Foreword matches that of the other translations in most respects, and this style is sustained in the Analysis section at the end of the book, which is not provided in any of the other translations. Like the others in the series, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* also contains a short two-and-a-half-page index.

Unlike Findlay's Forewords in the retranslations of the three-volume *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (Hegel and Miller 1970; Hegel and Miller 1971; Hegel and Findlay 1975), the Foreword to *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* does not begin with a discussion of the original German text. It contains no mention of earlier Baillie translation or the difference in the title (*Spirit* instead of *Mind*). Instead, Findlay begins his Foreword directly with a discussion of the distinction between the *Phenomenology* and the “mature works” of the *Encyclopaedia*. Findlay explains that Hegel saw the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a “forepiece” to the *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences*,

but it is meant to be a forepiece that can be dropped and discarded once the student, through deep immersion in its contents, has advanced through confusions and misunderstanding to the properly philosophical point of view. Its task is to run through, in a scientifically purged order, the stages in the mind's necessary progress from immediate sense consciousness to the position of a scientific philosophy, showing thereby that this position is the only one that the mind can take, when it comes to the end of the intellectual and spiritual adventures described in the book.

(Findlay 1977: v)

Findlay's opening paragraph thus “fences” off the new translation from Hegel's mature system, confronting the unsuspecting reader from the start with the idea that this book is confusing, difficult and not representative of the real, true or complete Hegel associated with the “properly philosophical point of view.”

In nine long paragraphs characterised by the complicated sentence structure typical of the elevated style, Findlay subtly undermines the prominence of the *Phenomenology* in contemporary public narratives while placing it alongside but at a distance from Hegel's mature system. For example, the progress of the *Phenomenology* is described as a series of “intellectual and spiritual adventures” and a “sequence of thought-adventures

up to and including his own advance to the position of Science in about 1805" (ibid: v). The romantic associations of "adventure" in Hegel's early work contrast here with the rigour of scientific logic to be found later in Hegel's mature works. Findlay explains that "Hegel subsequently realised that this [the sequence of thought-adventures] was not the only possible necessary sequence or pathway to Science, and certainly not the pathway to Science that would be taken by men in the future" (ibid: vi). When Findlay explains that the dialectic, as elaborated by Hegel, is "a richer and more supple form of thought-advance than mathematical inference," he is not merely contrasting different compartments of Hegel's work, he is exploiting the peritextual space to reach forward in time and engage with the twentieth century traditions of Anglo-American mathematical and linguistic philosophy associated with Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and the logical positivists, including Popper, who had famously vilified Hegel.

The following three sentences from Findlay's Foreword exemplify his use of the elevated style to distance himself and Miller's retranslation from the communist pole of the Cold-War metanarrative.

Spiritual sansculottism can have no program but the downing and doing-away of everything and everyone: it can generate no principle of self-differentiation, it can throw up no genuine or permanent leadership. It is a government by junta, by cabal and intrigue, and can achieve only the universal suppression and liquidation of individuality. It would have been interesting if, instead of this dialectical criticism of the relatively innocuous and transient synthesis of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, dismembered almost as soon as formed, we had had Hegel's criticisms of the far more adhesive pitch-like abstractions of the Communist Manifesto, in which the feet of humanity would seem as if for ever entangled.

(Findlay 1977: xxiv)

Findlay uses sarcasm ("spiritual sansculottism"), high rhetoric (repeated "no"; "as if forever entangled") and violent metaphor (liquidation; dismembered) linking the language and topos of the French Revolution with the perceived cultural decline of the recent war years and the permissiveness the 1960s and 1970s. This strategic reframing, which exemplifies the narrative feature of temporality (Baker 2006/2018: 50–61) is repeated in other textual and peritextual elements and contrasts with the (probably commercially motivated) reference to Marx and Sartre in the book blurb (Solomon 1979).

Miller's half-page Translator's Foreword (Miller 1977: xxxi) is shorter than his Translator's Preface to the *Science of Logic* (Miller 1969); it comprises just two short paragraphs but like the Preface closes with the translator's name and address in Whiteway. In the first paragraph,

Miller specifies the German edition on which the translation is based, the F. Meiner, Hamburg 1952 edition, edited by J. Hoffmeister. This was the most recent edition at that time. It is significant that it is Miller who provides this background information, which was given in Findlay's editorial Foreword in the other translations, because it suggests that Findlay wished to concentrate on what was perhaps perceived as the more important task of "fencing" the translation from Hegel's other works and from left-Hegelian interpretations associated with Marx and Kojève.<sup>23</sup> As in his Preface to the *Science of Logic*, although with considerably fewer words, Miller also refers to his imagined readership: "the English reader who has no German." By contrast with the Translator's Preface to *Science of Logic*, no reference is made here to American readers or indeed to the many millions of English speakers in other countries who would also be potential readers. However, in the next three sentences, Miller gives significant details about his translation strategy. With the metaphor of "steering a course between," which perhaps alludes to the Homeric travels of Jason and the Argonauts between the perilous rocks of Scylla and Charybdis, Miller refers to "avoiding loose paraphrase" and departing at times "from a rigid consistency in rendering Hegelian locutions where this seemed to be more helpful to the reader." He mentions his sparing use of capitals, which he uses, in general, only for "terms which have a peculiarly Hegelian connotation." Finally, he explains that the German term *Verstand* [understanding] has been translated by "the Understanding." The usual English meaning is intended if the word is not capitalised.

Miller's wording here is compressed and carefully chosen for the broad range of intended readers. For those new to Hegel, very little confusing detail is given, for example, no mention is made of the existence of a previous translation of this book by J.B. Baillie. This would certainly have been known by Hegel experts, as would the change of title from Baillie's *Phenomenology of Mind* (Hegel and Baillie 1910/1931) to Miller's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, a significant move which is also not mentioned in the peritexts.

This omission raises the matter of whether this book, which is presented as a translation (i.e. with no predecessor sharing the same title), should instead be described as a retranslation (Brownlie 2006; Deane-Cox 2014: 12; Hanna 2016: 128–132). For those familiar with Hegelian philosophy, Miller's phrase "loose paraphrase" may be read as a criticism of the previous generation of Hegel translations, including Baillie's. The avoidance of loose paraphrase is a component of what distinguishes the present translation from its predecessors. In this sense, Miller's comment frames the present translation with a veiled, (esoteric) backward glance at the Victorian translations of Hegel. These were described by Mure as characterised by the "intoxication of Carlylese" (Mure 1940: vi). Later examples will show that Baillie's translation of the *Phenomenology* was indeed characterised by loose paraphrase.

Similarly, the term “rigid consistency” seems innocuous, but distinguishes the new translation from the widely-accepted demand for terminological consistency in philosophical works. This phrase serves as a terse explanation for the absence of a glossary, which was provided in earlier translations, such as Johnston and Struthers 1929 translation of the *Science of Logic* and in Hyppolite’s 1940s French translation of the *Phenomenology* (Hegel and Hyppolite 1939).<sup>24</sup> The emphasis is therefore placed on communication (“more helpful to the reader”) rather than terminological consistency. Miller’s choice of “Understanding” as his example of capitalisation is not arbitrary. The same term is picked out in the secondary literature written by Findlay, Knox and Mure, who also flag the narrow, rigid sense of Understanding through capitalisation in English. Miller’s careful (measured) explanation of his translation strategies in this Foreword is in keeping with his commitment to making Hegel’s philosophy accessible to a wider readership, including the “layman” as well as the expert. The translations themselves might therefore also be expected to address a divergent readership, but with the proviso that Miller probably had a certain type of earnest, religiously and/or theosophically interested, male reader in mind.

Miller concludes his Translator’s Foreword with messages of gratitude, firstly to Findlay, for his “encouragement and advice” but then also to Professor H.S. Harris of Glendon College, York University, Toronto. Miller’s claim that Harris “saw parts of the translation and offered helpful criticism and suggestions” identifies Harris as another important, explicitly identified participant in the production of this translation. Indeed, this peritextual reference to Harris points outside the space of the book to the allographic epitexts. Harris wrote two reviews of Miller’s translation (Harris 1979a; Harris 1979b); he is mentioned in the archive of publisher’s correspondence (OUP 1973–1978); he circulated a list of corrections which is now archived online (Harris 1978) and made other critical references. Miller visited Harris in Canada, and Harris visited Miller in England.

The formal thanks offered to Miller’s wife, Frances, in this peritextual space are a rare acknowledgement of the existence of women in Hegelian philosophical discourse and also a clear reference outside the book to local, family narratives, the circumstances of which would have been familiar to several of Miller’s associates who had visited him and knew Frances. The reference to typing positions the translation historically and socially, pointing towards the distribution of labour between men and women at the time, especially in the civil service where Miller met Frances, and where typing was a skill increasingly allocated to women alongside Pitman shorthand and other clerical and/or secretarial skills.<sup>25</sup> If the translator was subordinate to the philosopher, the translator’s typist occupied an even less elevated role in the hierarchy of philosophical translation. The peritexts therefore constitute an unmistakable locus for intersections

between narratives relating to Miller's life and those specific to the content of the books he was translating, in this case regarding the role of women in the family and in society.

### **Reframing at the Lexical Level and the Special Case of *Aufheben***

This subsection turns to significant micro-textual and lexical details. The translated Hegelian texts themselves contain evidence of Miller's divergent reframing strategies between the earlier and later Hegel. In turn, this reframing relates to the wider narrative context, especially at the time of Miller's retranslation of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Hegel and Miller 1977). The practical implications of these findings for a rethinking and re-reading of Hegel through Miller will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8.

One clue to understanding the numerous micro-textual divergences discernible between Miller's retranslations of *Hegel's Science of Logic* and the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is to be found in the retranslated title "*Phenomenology of Spirit*." The first English translation of this Hegel text – *Die Phänomenologie des Geistes* was entitled *The Phenomenology of Mind*, translated by J.B. Baillie in 1910, revised in 1931 (Hegel and Baillie 1910; 1931). Miller and Findlay took the bold step of changing a prominent word in the English title of the book from *Mind* to *Spirit*. Both words are possible translations of the German *Geist*. The term *Mind* was established in English especially through the English titles of Hegel's canonical philosophical texts. Although there had long been uncertainty about which term should become standardised, changing the title of this book was a surprising decision, for which I could find no explanation or reference in the archives I researched. The argument given by Findlay in his Foreword to *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind* for retaining the word *Mind* in the title and text of this book, which was mentioned in Chapter 3, had evidently been abandoned or reversed. The result was that OUP currently has two Hegel texts in the series containing the word *Geist* in the original German title but translated differently by the same translator/editor team: *Philosophy of Mind* (Hegel and Miller 1971) but *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Hegel and Miller 1977). In the case of the *Phenomenology*, the reasons for the choice of *Spirit* are probably too complex and undocumented to unravel. However, in functional terms and with reference to Hanna's Bourdieusian theory (2016: 62–63), the choice of *Spirit* in the title of Miller's retranslation serves to distinguish or dissociate the new translation from Baillie's work. By contrast, the choice of *Mind* was used to associate the Findlay/Miller retranslation of Wallace's *Philosophy of Mind* with the original translation and translator. This is not a question of accuracy; multiple intersecting narratives were involved. The choice of a single word in such a prominent position in the title of the *Phenomenology of*



*Spirit* points towards significant tensions and divergences in the wider interpretive context surrounding this retranslation. Since the 1970s, the term *spirit/Spirit* has become widely accepted as the translation of *Geist* in Hegel's works. The connotations and implicature of this choice are buried in the surrounding context of disciplinary narrative.

Turning now to the close connection between lexical choices and textual emphasis, throughout the body of the text of the *Phenomenology*, Miller matches his own emphasis through italicisation approximately with that of Hegel's German text.<sup>26</sup> As with the passage from the *Science of Logic* analysed at the start of the chapter, this often means removing the previous translator's emphasis through initial capitalisation and substituting italicisation. In the case of Baillie's original translation, it is a feature of Baillie's translation style that he often gives alternative translations, sometimes translating a single German word with two or three English words. For example, Baillie translates the single (italicised) German word *Gerechtigkeit* in the Hegel text (Hegel 1970: 340) as "Righteousness and Justice" (Hegel and Baillie 1910/1931: 265). In this case, Miller's version reads simply: *justice* (italicised as in Hegel) (Hegel and Miller 1977: 279), giving the impression (to an expert reader who has access to the German original) of an improvement in accuracy, or to use Miller's phrase from the Translator's Foreword, a move away from "loose paraphrase." Notice that the connotative distinction between loose and rigorous here enacts a performative commitment to discipline, accuracy and purity; a denial, in this case, of Baillie's self-indulgence in his own literary flair. In the same spirit of interpretive economy, Miller's strategy of returning to the authentic Hegel probably also explains the erasure of Baillie's 25 "explanatory statements" and 239 footnotes (Charlston 2012: 123).

However, in the *Phenomenology*, Miller does sometimes (inconsistently) use initial capitals for words used in a special Hegelian sense. The most visually evident example of this is *Spirit* which is always capitalised, possibly reinforcing the religious dimension of Hegel's philosophy which was important to Miller, because words of religious significance, such as God, the Holy Spirit or Holy Ghost, are traditionally capitalised in Christian texts in English. Another prominent example is in the final quotation from an adaptation of Schiller's poem *Die Freundschaft* at the end of the chapter Absolute Knowing: "from the chalice of this realm of spirits/foams forth for Him his own infinitude" (Hegel and Miller 1977: 493). Baillie had translated this as follows: "The chalice of this realm of spirits/Foams forth to God His own Infinitude" (Hegel and Baillie 1910/1931: 476).<sup>27</sup> A sense of competition and/or negotiation between the two translators is evident here. Miller evidently agreed with some elements of Baillie's translation, wanted to preserve but moderate his predecessor's interpretation at the micro-textual and lexical level. Further significant examples of emphasis through initial capitalisation in the *Phenomenology* include "the Understanding" which Miller explained in his Foreword, but

also “Lord,” which occurs once with initial capital in the *Lordship and Bondage* passage, and “Family,” which is capitalised in and around the *Antigone* story, as will be discussed in Chapter 8.

The translation difficulties and Miller’s strategy for improving on his predecessors’ work are similar at the structural, syntactic level to those described with reference to the *Science of Logic*. Despite his reservations about translating the *Phenomenology*, Miller achieved satisfying, economical reformulations of many of Baillie’s often over wordy renditions. One memorable example is when *Spirit* makes its first appearance (Charlston 2012). This is in fact the first time Hegel uses the word *Geist* (Hegel 1970: 145) in the main chapters of the text (i.e. apart from the Preface and Introduction):

With this, we already have before us the Notion of *Spirit*. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is – this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’.

(Hegel and Miller 1977:110)<sup>28</sup>

Notice Miller’s initial capitalisation of Notion and Spirit (special Hegelian sense) and italicisation of Spirit (matching Hegel’s emphasis). But Miller also gives emphasis to We, suggesting a special Hegelian sense of group membership, and possibly also Miller’s own sense of philosophical interiority, an (elderly) male brotherhood, an intimacy between intellectuals. Comparison with Baillie’s translation of the same passage demonstrates the neatness of Miller’s translation of the last phrase:

With this we already have before us the notion of *Mind* or *Spirit*. What consciousness has further to become aware of, is the experience of what mind is – this absolute substance, which is the unity of the different self-related and self-existent self-consciousnesses in the perfect freedom and independence of their opposition as component elements of that substance: Ego that is “we,” a plurality of Egos, and “we” that is a single Ego.

(Hegel and Baillie 1910/1931: 104)

Especially in view of Baillie’s strategy of offering alternative translations for some lexical items, Miller’s response of eliminating such “loose paraphrase” and moving closer to a word for word translation may seem to contribute to an overall standardisation of Hegelian terminology. But, as will be discussed in Chapter 8 with reference to Inwood’s *A Hegel Dictionary* (2003), Hegel’s richly metaphorical and dynamic use of language and terminology is resistant to rigid standardisation, and Miller explicitly committed himself to avoiding “rigid consistency” in order to preserve some

of the dynamism of Hegel's language. It is this aspect of Miller's approach which inspires my suggestions for a re-reading of Hegel through Miller.

Correspondence in the publisher's archive (OUP 1973–1978) relating to the publication of Miller's retranslation of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* shows that the Delegates and advisors favoured the inclusion of a glossary and explanatory footnotes (in the manner of Hyppolite's French translation). In fact, Mure's ideal would probably have been a "thick" translation like Michael Petry's translation of the *Philosophy of Nature* (Hegel and Petry 1970). Several of his comments suggest this, especially the report shown in Figure 7.4.

While Miller had shown that he was capable of translating terminology consistently, for example, with *aufheben* = *sublate* in the *Science of Logic* and *Geist* = *Spirit* in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, his strategy with *aufheben* in the retranslation of the *Phenomenology* is astonishing, especially in view of the discussion of this specific term by the publishers and advisory team. As the following analysis suggests, Miller's apparent inconsistency may have been part of a deliberate strategy relating to Miller's performative stance towards the reception culture, which can be investigated based on socio-narrative theory, Bourdieusian sociology and the discussion of




Figure 7.4 An excerpt from Mure's report on Miller's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, suggesting the use of a glossary and standardised translation of key terms. The suggestions were strategically ignored. Image by permission of Oxford University Press.

gender performativity in the context of feminist translation studies (Butler 2000; Flotow 2011).

Eight years after his retranslation of the *Science of Logic* (1969), in his retranslation of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1977), Miller not only abandoned his own previous choice of *sublate* in favour of *supersede/supersession* in the majority of cases (42.5% of 308 occurrences)<sup>29</sup> but also introduced a considerable lexical variety with 44 different translations of *aufheben*, including a variety of English phrasal verbs. Table 7.6 summarises the findings from a concordance search for

Table 7.6 Miller's translations of *aufheben* in *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Hegel and Miller 1977).

<i>Translation of aufheben</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Translation of aufheben</i>	<i>Total</i>
Abolish	4	Overcome	12
Annul	1	Put an end to	5
Be behind us	1	Put aside	1
Be only a moment	1	Put behind	2
Be stripped	1	Raise (up)	2
Be stripped of self-subsistence	1	Reduce	3
Be subjected to	1	Reduce to a moment	3
Be subordinated	2	Reduce to nothingness	1
Be the downfall of	1	Remove	4
Be unsundered	1	Resolve	3
Cancel	19	Rid itself of	7
Cease to	1	Rule out	1
Count itself nothing	1	Set aside	28
Destroy	3	Set itself at nought	1
Do away with	12	Sublate	3
Efface	1	Supersede	131
Eliminate	8	Suppress	1
Get rid of	7	Suspend	10
Leave behind	2	Take away	1
Lose all validity	1	Transcend	5
Not be conflict	1	Transform	1
Not be self-centred	1	Not found	2?
Not be self-subsistent	1		
Nullify	9	Total	308

all parts of the verb *aufheben* in the Gutenberg Project German text of the six main chapters (i.e. excluding the *Vorrede* and *Einleitung*),<sup>30</sup> which were then matched manually with their equivalents in the Miller retranslation. Table 7.6 shows the number of occurrences of each translation. While the verbs and verb phrases listed are given in the infinitive form, the actual occurrences involved different nominal and verbal forms and various tenses and moods. The most frequent occurrences are shaded.

Apart from two occurrences which were not found, the total of 308 occurrences corresponds with the totals found in the German and in Baillie's translation (Charlston 2012; Charlston 2013; Hegel and Baillie 1910/1931). However, Miller's translations differ considerably from those of Baillie, the first translator of the *Phenomenology*, who also used a variety of different lexical items. Like Johnston and Struthers in their translation of the *Science of Logic* (Hegel and Johnston 1929), Baillie showed a preference for *cancel* and *transcend*.<sup>31</sup> Indeed, significantly for the present discussion, Miller's translations in the *Phenomenology* also differ from his own preference for *sublate* throughout his translation of the *Science of Logic* (1969). Miller apparently wanted not only to dissociate his translations from those of his predecessors but also to demarcate the *Phenomenology* from the *Science of Logic*, possibly thereby reserving the term *sublate* for the most "mature" exposition of Hegel's philosophical system and introducing the term *supersede* (along with many other translations) for Hegel's less mature but more popular *Phenomenology*, with its more socially and politically controversial content and reception history.<sup>32</sup> The sheer number and variety of Miller's translations of *aufheben* exhibits remarkable creativity and imagination in defiance of the expectation of consistency expressed by the advisors and by subsequent critics of Miller's translation (Harris 1978, 1979a, 1979b; Pinkard 1994: 17–19). Elsewhere, I have described this kind of defiant translatorial stance as the translatorial *hexis*, a variation of Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* (Charlston 2012; Charlston 2013; Charlston 2018; Simeoni 1998). In this book, especially in Chapter 8, I stress the gender-performative aspect of this stance. In a symbolic and intellectualised sense, Miller's deliberate inconsistency in the translation of *aufheben* in the *Phenomenology* and his virtuosic creativity in providing 44 near synonyms in English is an enactment of his identity-forming, virile prowess. He is showing off that he has understood Hegel's philosophy so well that he can now guide and teach others, through the ordinary language and phrasal verbs of this long list, to approach the logical purity required for the study of the *Science of Logic*.<sup>33</sup> It is the act (and the test or trial) of translation which proves his understanding and contributes to the formation of his philosophical identity. In this sense, translation has become didactic and the translator is performing the role of a paternalistic teacher, guiding his uninitiated readers but holding back the full complexity of the subject at hand.

Miller's most frequent choice, *supersede*, was used extensively and in similar contexts by Sedlák in his *Pure Thought and the Riddle of the Universe* (1921), which paraphrases the argument of Hegel's *Science of Logic*. Miller's choice of *supersede* and *supersession* will be discussed further in Chapter 8. The second most frequent verb Miller used is *set aside* (9.1%), which, interestingly, introduces a lateral or horizontal metaphor instead of the verticality suggested by *aufheben*, *sublate*, *supersede*, *overcome* and *transcend*. Miller did not give any detailed explanation for the strategy he developed. His strategy with this term has been criticised by Terry Pinkard, a recent re-translator of the same text, as "inconsistency," and it does in fact obscure intertextual and intratextual lexical cohesion with this term.<sup>34</sup> However, Miller's strategy is not attributable to carelessness or ignorance of the "correct" or "standard" translation.

Miller's apparently deliberate inconsistency with *aufheben* strategically adjusted perceptions about Hegel by making the translation less lexically cohesive than the original. Without detailed research, such as that summarised in Table 7.6, readers could not easily follow the line in Hegel's argument mapped out by his recurrent use of the word *aufheben* which recurs throughout Hegel's works and receives special attention, including a detailed definition, in the *Science of Logic* (Hegel and Miller 1969: 106–108). Miller's approach contrasts with Pinkard's 2018 translation of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which consistently translates *aufheben* and its derivatives with *sublate/sublation* (Charlston 2012: 159f). While *aufheben* is translated consistently, as a fixed technical term in Miller's *Science of Logic* and in Pinkard's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the use of a different verb (*supersede*) in most cases in Miller's *Phenomenology of Spirit* differentiates the two texts from one another; and the use of several other translations for *aufheben* (as shown in Table 7.6) significantly reduces the prominence of this concept in Miller's retranslation of this book. The Hegelian logical term *sublate* is thus erased or elided in Miller's *Phenomenology*. The strategy could be attributable to Miller's interpretation of Hegel's age and relative philosophical maturity. In 1807, when the *Phänomenologie* was first published, Miller seems to be suggesting that Hegel was still using *aufheben* loosely, in an unsystematic way. In 1812–1816 when the *Science of Logic* was first published, Hegel was not very much older, but Miller took the *Science of Logic* to be a logically perfected work; indeed, it was subsequently revised by Hegel in 1831, the year of his death, and therefore represents the most mature Hegel. However, whatever the details of his reasoning were, Miller's adoption of this divergent strategy in the *Phenomenology* functions as a significant reframing strategy, one of several pointers towards the wider narrative context discernible in the text and peritexts. It is indicative of Miller's active, non-neutral participation in the reframing of this text relative to the rapidly changing social and cultural conditions of its reception. The practical implications of Miller's

differential reframing or “fencing” strategy between earlier and later Hegelian texts for future, transformative re-readings of Hegel will be explored in Chapter 8.

## Summary and Conclusions

Chapter 7 began with peritextual and micro-textual analyses and comparison of different versions of a significant passage from Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, illustrating the interweaving of Miller’s subtle, textual reframing strategies with the surrounding narrative context. Miller asserted his own legitimacy as a translator by faithfully restoring Hegel’s textual emphasis, thereby dissociating the retranslation from the “loose paraphrase” of its British Idealist predecessor by Johnston and Struthers. He re-focalised the Hegelian “we,” resisting popularisation to address and include a different, select, highly educated readership corresponding to his own preference. The strategy was shown to be performative of a situated, gender-specific intellectual role, which was increasingly contested in contemporary public narratives of liberalisation and permissiveness.

Miller’s approach in the *Science of Logic* (1969) was then contrasted with divergent reframing strategies in his later retranslation of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1977). Miller’s apparently deliberate and provocatively creative use of terminological inconsistency in the translation of *aufheben*/*sublate*, which he had translated consistently in the *Science of Logic*, “fenced” this early work off from Hegel’s mature works, framing it as exploratory, tentative, the product of a less experienced Hegel. Exciting practical implications of this claim will be investigated further in Chapter 8.

The analysis exposed Miller’s strategies for narrating a “return” to Hegel by subtracting the influence of the British Idealists on previous translations but also identified an additive reassertion of patriarchal authority through the use of a politically euphemised, non-democratic, elevated style, articulating a passive, doxic, misogynist position, opposed to the “heteronomous” politicisation and liberalisation of philosophy.

Against the theoretical and biographical background offered In Part One and Part Two respectively, the analysis of selected details from Miller’s retranslations provided in Chapter 7 substantiates the claim that the translated texts are loci for complex intersections of narratives. The translations are more than merely philosophical; they extend beyond the putative generic boundaries of a philosophical text to articulate additional narratives, engaging in the social dynamics surrounding the translation of Hegel and enacting additional performative roles. Miller’s translations and retranslations of Hegel’s mature system occupy a distinctive, restorative position in the dynamic social field of reception of Hegel’s philosophy during the 1960s and 1970s. They were framed strategically to resist social and political change and defend the purity and autonomy



of traditional Western philosophy. By contrast, however, Miller developed divergent strategies for the translation of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* which “fence” off Hegel’s first published work from the works of the mature system.

In the narrative relating Miller’s life experiences to the content of his translations, the analysis presented in Chapter 7 shows how Miller used subtle peritextual and textual reframing strategies to initiate, encourage and guide a select group of serious-minded readers more directly towards the philosophical truth of Hegel’s mature system than his predecessors Johnston and Struthers.

## Notes

1. In this introductory text on the *Science of Logic*, Houlgate reasserts Hegel’s emphasis on the need for clarity of thinking in a separate subsection entitled: “Preparing to Read Hegel’s *Logic*.”
2. In literature, the quest narrative is reminiscent of Bunyan’s *Pilgrim’s Progress* but, with reference to the presence of a guide, also possibly alludes intertextually to the tradition of Dante’s *Divine Comedy*.
3. I must acknowledge the source of this metaphor which I first heard at a conference on Hegel’s *Science of Logic* in Warwick University. Professor Anton Friedrich Koch elaborated on the idea of an “empty logical space” in the questions following his contribution.
4. Archaic, emotionally charged terms, such as “diremptions” and “divagations” are a characteristic of the elevated style used by Findlay in his own writing and in the peritextual introductions to Miller’s Hegel translations. Miller occasionally uses this vocabulary in the translations, adding an obscure and even occult feel with terms like “asunderness,” e.g. “At the highest stage of this *triumph* over asunderness” (Hegel and Miller 1971: 13–14). This is Miller’s translation of “Auf der höchsten Stufe dieser *Aufhebung* des Außeinander” (Hegel 1970e: 24). The quotation further exemplifies Miller’s creativity in the translation of *Aufhebung* (*triumph*) outside the context of the *Science of Logic*.
5. Regarding Johnston and Struthers’s use of the word “Himalayan,” Miller would probably have perceived this as an incongruous joke referring to a topical public narrative relating to the time of the translation and therefore as a distraction from Hegel. British mountaineers Mallory and Irvine were lost in a Himalayan expedition in 1924. The joke is that intrepid British readers of Hegel might also become lost in Hegel’s Himalayan language.
6. Details of the numerical analysis for J + S translation. Excluding words in sentence-initial position, 31 different words (types) had initial capitalisation. Occurrences of each type shown in brackets (tokens), with occurrences in Miller after the forward stroke: Absolute (5); Beginning (25); Being (40/1); Consciousness (2); Ego (3); God (3/3); Heaven (1); Idea (3/1); Intuition (1); Knowledge (1); Logic (6); Method (1); Monad (1); Nature (8); Not-being (5); Nothing (1); Nous (1); Object (1); One (1); Other (9); Phenomenology (2); Pure (9); Result (1); Science (18); Sensation (1); Something (1); Spirit (5); Subjectivity (1); Substance (1); Thought (3); Water. J + S = 31 types; 161 tokens; Miller 3 types; 5 tokens (shown after the slash).
7. The question of Hegel and language is discussed extensively in the cited reference with specific reference to the *Science of Logic*.

8. I had no access to the *Wissenschaft der Logik* text which Miller used but was kindly given the 1923 Lasson text which Miller used for some of the other translations.
9. In correspondence with the publishers, Findlay mentions this several times in passing.
10. The term “crib” is ambiguous here. Mure suggests plagiarism in the sense that Miller’s version is close to his predecessors, but together with “literal” also suggests that it is very close to Hegel’s German. For Mure, a good translation should be more than merely literal. For modern Hegel translators, such as Pinkard, being literal to Hegel’s meaning without adding anything more would be an ideal. Recent research in translation studies has developed an empirical approach to detecting plagiarism in literary texts (Al-Batineh 2019). This raises the question of the extent to which philosophical texts overlap with the literary genre. In general, philosophers have tended to underplay the creativity of translators. Distinction as a philosopher is taken to guarantee accuracy, authenticity, etc.
11. Mure was also an experienced translator. He had published a translation from Greek of Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics*.
12. The phrase “Bacchanalian revel of truth” quoted by Mure here is a direct translation from Hegel; the metaphorical image in the remainder of the quotation illustrates Mure’s inclination towards literary performance of an elevated, visceral style as part of his philosophising. Hegel’s metaphor for truth has been discussed by Kainz (1995).
13. For comparison, the following more explicit interpretation of “nach außen” is taken from the recent Giovanni translation: “This mistake, far from bringing clarity, produces instead an even more glaring and bewildering confusion; among the public at large, it has occasioned the crudest of misunderstandings” (Hegel and Giovanni 2010: 54).
14. Like Charles Williams, Miller was a “scholarship boy,” admitted to a grammar school from a working-class family. Lindop’s detailed account of Williams’ childhood at around the same time provides valuable insights into the kind of educational experience Miller must have shared.
15. The recent translation-studies article (Al-Batineh 2019) already mentioned references Baker’s discussion of “forensic” stylistics (Baker 2000) in the investigation of plagiarism in retranslations. The fact that plagiarism is seldom discussed with reference to philosophical translations suggests that similarities between texts are taken to corroborate the accuracy of the translation rather than pointing to a lack of creativity by the translator.
16. A recent conference “Translating Philosophy and Theory: Style, Rhetoric and Concepts” held at the University of Warwick (11 May 2019) specifically addressed this crucial distinction.
17. For a philosophical discussion of this point regarding the presence of a “we” at the start of the *Logic*, see especially Houlgate (2006: 276–280). The discussion focuses on interpretations by Stace, Schick and McTaggart. McTaggart was the driving force behind the Johnston and Struthers translation.
18. For the present context, the most relevant corpus is currently being developed by the Genealogies of Knowledge project, which has a special focus on political texts and includes translations of Hegel as well as many of his predecessors. The project can be accessed at: <https://genealogiesofknowledge.net>.
19. In this case, Miller almost certainly objected to the intrusion of “feeling” at the beginning of the *Logic*. For Miller, the binary distinction between emotion and reason, with emotion as the denigrated pole, was a familiar topic (Lettington 2019).

20. Advocates of logical positivism, mathematical philosophy, linguistic philosophy would all have made this claim, thereby adding to the temporal frame ambiguity in the Hegel translations.
21. As mentioned, E.V. Rieu agreed that his translations of the Gospels were aimed at the “man in the congregation” rather than the “man in the street” (Rieu 1955). The target readership for Miller’s translations was a similarly select group of serious-minded “thinkers.”
22. They add the word “us” in line 17 “Object before us”.
23. This context will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8.
24. This reference may also allude to the fact that Miller and/or Findlay must have decided to ignore their advisor’s suggestions about consistency and the provision of a “vocabulary.” See Figure 7.4.
25. According to Mary Lettington, Frances regretted having to give up work when she married. Arnold was uncomfortable about her taking up any kind of employment as a married woman, apart from helping him with the Hegel translations and doing most of the driving for the family. However, Frances was an active member of the church community of women who contributed to practical charity work (Lettington 2019).
26. See also the reference in Chapter 8 to a recent retranslation of the *Phenomenology* which criticises Miller for not having pursued this consistently (Hegel and Inwood 2018).
27. “. . . aus dem Kelche dieses Geisterreiches /schäumt ihm seine Unendlichkeit” (Hegel 1970a: 591). Note the absence of reverential capitalisation of the pronoun in Hegel’s German.
28. For comparison, the modern German edition reads: Hiermit ist schon der Begriff *des Geistes* für uns vorhanden. Was für das Bewußtsein weiter wird, ist die Erfahrung, was der Geist ist, diese absolute Substanz, welche in der vollkommenen Freiheit und Selbständigkeit ihres Gegensatzes, nämlich verschiedener für sich seiender Selbstbewußtseine, die Einheit derselben ist: *Ich*, das *Wir*, und *Wir*, das *Ich* ist. Notice Hegel’s economic use of emphasis with capitals and italics and Miller’s approximate reproduction of this, contrasting with Baillie’s verbosity.
29. Miller’s use of “*supersedes/supersession*” is discussed in detail in Chapter 8. While Hegelian philosophers have settled on *sublate* as a standard translation for *aufheben*, *sublate* occurs only rarely in Miller’s translation of the *Phenomenology*. One recently published article (Aldouri 2019) discusses “the unfolding of supersession in Hegel’s *Phenomenology*.” The discussion reinforces the importance of pursuing detailed analysis of the translation of philosophical texts. There is a significant difference between Hegel’s uses of *aufheben* and Miller’s uses of *supersede/supersession*. The present book provides details and discusses possible implications.
30. The data was collected from these chapters, excluding the Preface and Introduction which are considered to relate to Hegel’s entire planned system (Westphal 2009), rather than specifically to the *Phenomenology*.
31. This was the topic of an earlier publication (Charlston 2013).
32. Houlgate explains the relationship between the *Science of Logic* and the *Phenomenology* as follows: “The *Phenomenology* is essential reading, however, for those who are deeply attached to the ordinary view of the world as something that stands over against us and who want to know why they should be persuaded to give up that common-sense view and adopt the standpoint of ontological logic” (Houlgate 2005). There is archival evidence that Miller shared this view, and therefore possibly sought to articulate just this difference through the translation strategies analysed in this section. Miller’s strategy (e.g. especially his use of “ordinary language” phrasal verbs to translate

*aufheben*) was probably intended (somewhat paternalistically, because not explicitly) to guide the uninitiated, i.e. those attached to the ordinary view of the world, through the *Phenomenology* towards the *Science of Logic*. However, see also Miller's comment in the talk discussed in Chapter 9, in which he claims that Hegel had completed his philosophical development and discovered the "Concept" by the time he wrote the *Phenomenology*.

33. It is worth noting, by way of example, that John Rawls uses the term "set aside" in his later work in a context reminiscent of Miller's translation of *aufheben*. Rawls's use of "set aside" (Rawls 2000) was arguably "primed" by his reading of Miller's translation, which is referenced in this work.
34. By contrast with Pinkard's claim (1994: 16–19), the data presented here suggest that Miller's alleged inconsistency was deliberate and therefore deserves further scholarly attention.

## 8 Rethinking the Pre-Mature Hegel in Miller's *Phenomenology*

### Introduction

Chapter 8 suggests a rethinking of the translation strategies adopted in Miller's retranslation of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The discussion of Miller's strategic use of inconsistency in the translation of *aufheben* introduced in Chapter 7 is taken further, but Chapter 8 also considers Miller's surprising avoidance of the already familiar terms "master" and "slave" in the most famous passage in the book and his apparently unresponsive handling of a controversial passage about "womankind" in the *Antigone* story. The investigation continues the socio-narrative approach, suggesting that the circulation of relevant, new public narratives and disciplinary narratives in the decades leading up to the translation evoked a reactionary response from Miller and his associates. This was articulated through specifically adapted peritextual and textual reframing, which are highlighted in this chapter, and applies especially to the complex, dynamic narratives of postcolonial theory (Batchelor and Harding 2017; Fanon 2001; Said 2003) and feminist philosophy (Beauvoir 1953; Butler 2000; Irigaray 1985; Mills 1996) and the associated social and political activism (Debord 1994; Lonzi 1977), which were critical of aspects of Hegel's philosophy but also engaged constructively with Hegelian texts (Hutchings 2003: 1–30). Awareness of the surrounding narratives may have influenced gender-performative aspects of Miller's translation practice in the sense that he and his associates sought to give the translation the voice of an authoritative, elderly male (with fixed and recognisable characteristics). At the same time, they were forced to acknowledge that this pre-existing gender role had already become unsustainable – the "witnesses" for whom the retranslations were performed no longer shared the same values or aspirations (Parker and Sedgwick 1995a: 11); the interlocutory roles invited renegotiation and re-narration.<sup>1</sup> This suggestion introduces elements of instability and creativity into the dynamics of the Hegel translations and brings the discussion of Miller's work close to the concerns of writers on feminist translation studies, especially the focus on "transformance" in the work of Luise von Flotow (2011) and Carolyn Shread (2011, 2019).

Chapter 8 begins with a re-staging of Hegel's *Phenomenology* in the post-war and so-called Cold-War periods based on historical sources and recent research in philosophy. The chapter draws on an archive of correspondence relating to the fascinating publishing history of Miller's retranslation of the *Phenomenology*. This archive is held by Oxford University Press and contains letters and other documents<sup>2</sup> in which, amongst other matters, the publishers, editor, Delegates and advisors deal with an "insuperable" disagreement between Miller and his collaborator, Dr Peter Fuss (OUP 1973–1978). Their discussion touches on translational style, philosophical content, the desirability of footnotes, other editorial peritexts and the positioning of the new book in the rapidly growing UK and US markets. The archive also contains significant reviews of the translation (Harris 1979a; Harris 1979b). With this contextual background of intersecting narratives in mind, Chapter 8 focuses on various shifts relative to previous and subsequent translations of the master-slave passage and the *Antigone* story. Through retranslation, Miller reasserted his own hierarchically gendered interpretation of philosophy, religion and social relations in strategic resistance to contemporary, New Left appropriations of specific interpretations and responses to Hegel and changes in the distribution of power between men and women, between social classes, between older and younger generations, nationally and internationally. While previous generations of feminist philosophers and translation theorists might have condemned Miller's strategies based on a "pessimistic" (Flotow 2011) or deterministic understanding of gender performativity associated with the work of Judith Butler, the intersectionalist approach to feminist translation studies developed by Flotow and others is responsive to developments in feminist philosophy (Hutchings 2003; Parker and Sedgwick 1995a, 1995b; Shread 2019) and encourages a relativised, practice-orientated interpretation of the dynamics involved. One pertinent quotation from Flotow frames these dynamic developments as follows:

Contrary to Butler's pessimistic assessments of discourse as a restricted performative cage, but with her socio-activist motivations in mind, translation studies scholars who choose to view translation as a deliberate and intentional act carried out between discourses may well find aspects of performance theory useful. Translations allow various performances of a text; they foment differences in these performances – from one language to many others but also from one language to many versions of another; most importantly they take up "interlocutory space: – gaining more in this transformance than they "lose in translation," to counter that tedious old saying.

(Flotow 2011: 9)

This approach accordingly suggests a more positive response to what can be gained from Miller's translations and Findlay's editorial comments despite their unresponsiveness to the contemporary context. The

translations are re-interpreted in this light as a valuable historical resource for continuing engagement with and transformative re-readings of Hegel's philosophy in a new interlocutory space opened by the present analysis of Miller's work.

### Re-Staging Miller's *Phenomenology of Spirit*

Prior to the Cold-War period, the reception history of Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes* was divided between two schools often characterised by a binary, right-left division. As Robert Stern explains,

The Left Hegelians (such as Feuerbach, Marx and Engels) saw in Hegel a utopian vision of freedom, community, and the triumph of the human spirit, while the Right Hegelians saw in Hegel a theocratic defence of the Prussian state, support for the status quo of absolute monarchy, and a quietistic conservatism. Since then, thinkers from across the political spectrum have viewed Hegel as an ally, while he is also taken as an enemy by others on both the left and the right.

(Stern 2002: xi)

Pursuing the question of how Hegel became open to such divergent interpretations, Stern turns to "the nature of Hegel's writings themselves, and their notorious style." After dismissing accusations of stylistic ineptitude and obscurantism, he continues:

A more substantial stylistic difficulty is not with comprehension *per se*, but in properly locating Hegel's own position within the work. For, in the *Phenomenology* in particular, Hegel takes up an unusual and highly distinctive stance towards his audience: the authorial voice is muted; the discussion is left 'unsigned', so we are not told where we are going or what Hegel's final objectives are; other philosophers, texts and historical episodes are alluded to but not explicitly identified; and positions are advanced in a way that makes them appear final, but then turn out to be provisional in the light of criticisms that appear much later on. . . .

However, Hegel's elusiveness cannot be fully explained simply by matters of style and method, as these only really create problems for the uninitiated. A more substantial explanation can perhaps be given in terms of context; for how Hegel is categorised depends to an unusual degree on the background against which he is placed, and with whom he is juxtaposed.

(Stern 2002: xii–xiii)

As we shall see, this sense of elusiveness identified by Stern certainly also applies to the master-slave and Antigone passages which have been



subjected to multiple interpretations. Indeed the social dynamics of Hegel's elusive or obscure style are problematic not only to teachers of philosophy but also to translators, who are faced with the interpretive dilemma of whether to resolve ambiguities for their students/readers or leave them in place, allowing students/readers to experience for themselves the elusiveness the author seems to be communicating. It is interesting to note Stern's use of the word "uninitiated" in the quotation earlier which reinforces the sense discussed in Chapter 7 and elsewhere in this book that Hegelian philosophy continues to be problematic to all but a few, and that these few still regard themselves as "initiates," distinguished from the rest of the population precisely through their understanding of Hegel. This is no doubt a view shared by Miller and his associates in the 1970s. But Stern's more substantial point about context is especially relevant to the period preceding Miller's Hegel translations. In the post-WWII and Cold-War periods, radical social and political changes took place which related not only to the local context surrounding the translator and the translation but also more widely to the content of these passages from the *Phenomenology*. In a sense, Miller's retranslations of Hegel seem out of step with the "Cold-War transformation," but detailed analysis of the relevant passages suggests not only that Miller and his colleagues responded imaginatively, but negatively, to the challenges of retranslating this text at this time but also that the discernible traces of their strategic reframing may be significant for future interpretations, especially feminist-informed interpretations.

In a summary of the reception and influence of Hegel's *Phenomenology*, Houlgate (2013) considers the two most influential historical interpretations of Hegel's to be those of Marx and Kojève (who lectured and wrote in French). Although Marx and Kojève were not strictly translators of Hegel, their interpretive work exhibited the socio-narrative feature of selective appropriation, focussing on politically influential aspects of Hegel's philosophy. Houlgate explains the centrality of the master-slave passage in this reception history.

Marx's own understanding of the *Phenomenology* – which he saw as 'the true birthplace and secret of Hegel's philosophy' – would become the most important factor determining the future impact of Hegel's book. . . .

. . . The only interpretation of the *Phenomenology* whose influence is comparable to that of Marx, however, is the one given by Alexandre Kojève in his Paris lectures. These lectures, which were attended by, among others, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jacques Lacan, Emmanuel Levinas and Sartre, were held between 1933 and 1939 and published in 1947. Like Marx, Kojève shows no understanding of the phenomenological character of Hegel's text. In contrast to Marx, however, he focuses explicitly on the master-slave relation and, indeed, bases his whole interpretation of Hegel on it.

(Houlgate 2013:192–193)

Houlgate's point about the failure of Marx and Kojève to understand the phenomenological character of Hegel's book is a serious one. It relates to a fundamental distinction within Hegel's published works which, as already mentioned, has direct bearing on Miller's retranslations. From the point of view of Hegel's philosophical system, the discipline of phenomenology and the specific text of Hegel's *Phenomenology* stand outside the discipline of philosophy. In his talk on personal immortality referenced in the next chapter, Miller used the (originally Hegelian) metaphor of a ladder to explain this relationship: Hegel's *Phenomenology*, and by implication the discipline of phenomenology, leads up to the threshold of absolute knowing but not beyond it. The widespread interest in Hegel as a philosopher of social and political theory inspired by Marx and Kojève is haunted by this limitation. With reference to the Bourdieusian field of philosophy, their interpretations occupy a position close to the heteronomous pole (Bourdieu 1992: 105–106; Hanna 2016: 52–55; Pasmatzi 2012), because approaching Hegel's philosophy through the lens of phenomenology undermines the autonomy of a systematic philosophy grounded in logic and metaphysics.

On this account, philosophy becomes diluted with concerns more relevant to psychology, anthropology and especially social and political theory, but crucially for serious Hegelians, it is based on categories of thought which have not been derived systematically through Hegel's logic. For Hegelians, the differences between Hegel's mature, systematic philosophy and the various narratives articulated through his first, relatively immature, published work, the *Phenomenology*, outweigh the similarities. Miller's translation reframes the *Phenomenology* with reference to this disciplinary narrative of difference in maturity. In this sense, there is a significant intersection between disciplinary narratives distinguishing between phenomenology and philosophy and personal or ontological narratives relating, for example, to the "ages of man" narrative discussed in Chapter 6, according to which the immature is denigrated as naïve by comparison with the mature. Miller's exclusive translation strategy was to strengthen the fence between philosophy and phenomenology, reinforcing the autonomy of philosophy but thereby turning away from an expanding group of potential readers.

### *Kojève's Focus on the Master-Slave Narrative*

By the time of Miller's retranslation, Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and especially the famous master-slave narrative had already begun to play a part in wider public narratives often relating to Marx and Marxism, reinforcing or contesting the relationship between Hegel and Marx. Hegel's account of the master and slave Hegel and Miller 1977: 111–119) begins with a meeting between two apparently equal self-consciousnesses. Initially, they have no identity, only grammatical gender; their meeting is

abstracted from any spatial or temporal context. Each self-consciousness desires recognition from the other that the freedom of its self-determining will is more important to it even than its life. They believe they must risk their lives in a trial by death to prove their personal freedom and earn recognition from an equal. When one self-consciousness gives up the fight, the other claims victory. One is the master; the other is the slave. Finally, this asymmetric distribution of power leads to a paradoxical twist. Despite his victory (English translations reinforce their maleness at this point, switching from *it* to *he*), the master cannot receive the recognition he sought from an equal because the slave is not his equal. The master's freedom is empty; all he can do is "consume" or "destroy" the objects of his desire. By contrast, the slave, who must work in the material world to fulfil his master's desires, does achieve a kind of autonomy; he enjoys a more positive relationship with "things" and learns to express himself creatively through work. This unstable asymmetry is intriguing and still appeals to radical thinkers. As Neuhouser explains, the slave's position suggests "a new mode of relating to the world . . . as a practical rather than purely theoretical subject" (Neuhouser 2009: 37).

In France, debate over the relationship between Marx and Hegel was fraught with complexity but bursting with creative energy (Kelly 1992; Pinkard 2007; Roth 1988), and the discourse around Hegel, Marx and the *Phenomenology* dominated but also extended considerably beyond the disciplines of phenomenology, existentialism, Catholic theology. The following passage from the 1969 English translation of a compilation of Kojève's lectures illustrates the significance of the master-slave relation in this context. It is taken from the first chapter of the book, which begins with a short epigraph in which Marx acknowledges his indebtedness to Hegel. The quotation is in German: "Hegel . . . erfasst die Arbeit als das *Wesen*, als das sich bewährende Wesen des Menschen."<sup>3</sup>

[. . . Now, the Master who (involuntarily) engenders the desire of revolutionary negation is the Master of the Slave. Therefore, man can free himself from the given World that does not satisfy him only if this World, in its totality, belongs properly to a (real or "sublimated") Master. Now, as long as the Master lives, he himself is always enslaved by the World of which he is the Master. Since the Master transcends the given World only in and by the risk of his life, it is only his death that "realises" his freedom. As long as he lives, therefore, he never attains the freedom that would raise him above the given World. The Master can never detach himself from the World in which he lives, and if this World perishes, he perishes with it. Only the Slave can transcend the given World (which is subjugated by the Master) and not perish. Only the Slave can transform the World that forms him and fixes him in slavery and creates a World that he has formed in which he will be free. And the Slave achieves this only through forced

and terrified work carried out in the Master's service. To be sure, this work by itself does not free him. But in transforming the World by this work, the Slave transforms himself, too, and thus creates the new objective conditions that permit him to take up once more the liberating Fight for recognition that he refused in the beginning for fear of death. And thus in the long run, all slavish work realises not the Master's will, but the will – first unconscious – of the Slave, who – finally – succeeds where the Master – necessarily – fails. Therefore, it is indeed the originally dependent, serving, and slavish Consciousness that in the end realises and reveals the ideal of autonomous Self-Consciousness and is thus its “truth.”]

(Kojève 1969: 29–30)

The passage is interesting from multiple perspectives. Almost the entire chapter in which it occurs is placed between square brackets (repeated at the beginning of each paragraph and finally closed as shown earlier) as textual demarcations between Kojève's translation of parts of Hegel's text and Kojève's commentary on the translated text. The excerpt quoted above is part of Kojève's commentary but could easily be mistaken for Hegel's own account of the master-slave relation. Although the translator, James H. Nichols Jr., references J.B. Baillie's translation of the *Phenomenology of Mind* (Hegel and Baillie 1931) in his peritextual Translator's Note, stating that it will be useful to the reader, the relationship between Nichols' English translation of Kojève's French translation of Hegel is confusing, and the link with the Baillie translation tenuous. While Nichols explains that “Kojève's use of capitalisation has been preserved throughout,” this strategy was also applied to the Hegelian passages, thereby introducing a kind of allographic or translatorial emphasis similar to the effect Miller had objected to and removed in his retranslation of Hegel's *Science of Logic*, as explained in Chapter 7. In his translation of the complete text of Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Baillie had translated *Herrschaft und Knechtschaft*, the subtitle of this passage, as *Lordship and Bondage*, and the two characters are the “Master or Lord and . . . the Bondsman” (Hegel and Baillie 1931: 104–108). Baillie did not use the initial capitals consistently after their first occurrence. By contrast, Nichols consistently uses capitalised “Master” and “Slave” (possibly influenced by the French terms *Maître* and *Esclave* in Kojève's original). As a result of the integration of Kojève's commentary with the Hegel passages, readers are faced with the capitalised words *Master* and *Slave* repeated considerably more times than in Hegel's German (where initial capitals do not serve as emphasis because they are used for all nouns) and the Baillie translation, which does not use these words, creating a visual impression of almost constant emphasis and repetition, which is evident in the quotation earlier. As we shall see, Miller not only avoids capitalisation, he avoids these terms altogether in his retranslation of Baillie.

However, Kojève's commentary and the translation are politicised, revolutionary. The passage quoted uses emphasis strategically to reframe Hegel's ambiguous account of the master-slave relation as the concluding phase of a utopian progressive narrative of liberation told in such a manner that it will rouse, appeal and bring this particular interpretation of Hegel closer to the new, young generation of the interwar years (in the case of Kojève's lectures), and more significantly, to the young generation of the Cold-War years (in the case of Nichols' translation). However, one comment in the Editor's Introduction, written by Allan Bloom, makes explicit the underlying anti-Marxist commitments behind this project: "It is precisely Marx's failure to think through the meaning of his own historical thought that proves his philosophical inadequacy and compels us to turn to the profounder Hegel" (Bloom 1969: xi). This influential translation was published in the same year as Miller's *Science of Logic* – the year of Kojève's death and an important year of student demonstrations. Despite Kojève's claim that this is philosophy, his interpretation re-politicises Hegel's master-slave narrative with a modern, Western liberal political agenda based on a political ideology of mutual recognition. The editor targets the book against "progressivist intellectuals." He does not disguise its masculine gender bias: ". . . The dignity of man has been recognised and all men are understood to participate in it . . . Kojève gives an example of what it means to follow out the necessity of one's position *manfully and philosophically*" (ibid, italics added).

Moreover, by emphasising and reiterating the words "Slave" and "Slavery," Kojève's interpretation of Hegel's passage on the master-slave relationship reframes Hegel with reference to the Cold-War public narratives of the civil-rights movement and the disciplinary narratives of post-colonial theory, provoking a complex and critical response from those who saw the views expressed by Hegel and much Western philosophy as profoundly responsible for colonialism, imperialism and Eurocentrism. Frantz Fanon's 1961 book *The Wretched of the Earth* (Fanon 2001) belongs to this metanarrative context. It begins with a long Preface by Jean-Paul Sartre, situating it politically and philosophically as a canonical text of the New Left and endowing it with Sartre's accumulated institutional cultural capital. Given the present focus on Miller's work, Fanon's text could be classified according to Genette (1997) as a remote but highly relevant epitext (see Chapter 3) to Miller's retranslation of Hegel's *Phenomenology*. However, Genette's analysis does not preclude the inverse relationship. It is, in fact, Miller's apparent lack of response to the public narrative articulated by Fanon (but already circulating widely through media accessible to Miller) which most aptly characterises the present re-staging of the Hegel/Miller text as "performance." Although Fanon does not mention Hegel, his account intersects in many places with the content and vocabulary of the master-slave narrative

(especially in the English translation of Kojève's interpretation), raising questions about the relationship between Miller's retranslation and the contemporary context and "interlocutory space" into which it was placed through translation. For example, it would be appropriate to ask what evidence there is at the descriptive level that Miller's retranslation acknowledged the contemporary relevance of the master-slave passage and its resonance with wider public narratives relevant to potential readers at the time. There are also ethical implications to this question relating not only to Miller's personal and philosophical commitments but also to contemporary readers' and scholars' uses and interpretation of the translations.

One passage from Fanon's conclusion exemplifies the quasi-epitextual, or intertextual relationship between this work and Miller's retranslation of the Hegel text some 15 years later. Fanon's account shares the masculinist bias in language found in many of the sources from this period, complaining that "[t]he pretext of catching up must not be used to push man around, to tear him away from himself or from his privacy, to break and kill him. . . . No, we do not want to catch up with anyone" (Fanon 2001: 254). These words can be taken as Fanon's response to public narratives loosely associated with Hegel's dismissal of the non-European races as naïve, as discussed with reference to the *Philosophy of Mind* (see Chapter 3).<sup>4</sup> At the same time, however, it resonates positively with the aspects of liberalism articulated through Kojève's interpretation of Hegel's account. "It is a question of the Third World starting a new history of Man, history which will have regard to the sometimes prodigious theses which Europe has put forward, but which will also not forget Europe's crimes" (ibid). While Fanon targets the crimes of European colonialism and imperialism quite generally, his point here introduces a more nuanced response to the hierarchical, paternalistic assumptions scattered throughout Hegel's works and reproduced without comment in Miller's translations.<sup>5</sup> Mindful of the history of war crimes and genocide perpetrated by European colonisers against the colonised – the wretched of the earth – Fanon rejects the progressive metanarrative of European, Judeo-Christian civilisation with its goal of a Western Liberal Democracy modelled on Europe. He points to the symbolic and actual violence committed in the name of European Civilisation, to the possibility of learning from European history but also to the obscenity of slavishly imitating a nexus of cultures capable of such violence. "Humanity is waiting for something other from us than such an imitation, which would be almost an obscene caricature" (ibid). In other words, he presents an alternative revolutionary narrative which is distinct from but resonates with the revolutionary strand in Marx's and Kojève's interpretations of Hegel. The slave will succeed where the master has failed, but the relationship of critical engagement with Europe and by implication with Hegel will never be trouble free.

These considerations about the reception and influence of Hegel's *Phenomenology* on the social and political stage prior to Miller's retranslation intensify the significance of the questions underlying this chapter. Given the dynamic, politically charged reception history of the Hegel text, how did Miller and his associates respond? What signs are there in the peritexts and in the retranslation of the most significant passages that Miller, Findlay and the publishers saw the publication of this book as especially relevant to the contemporary scene, inspiring, dangerous, sensitive or compelling? To what extent might such signs of translatorial and/or editorial positioning in a historical translation be significant for contemporary readers interested in the transformative role played by translation and translators in the shaping and redistribution of ideas? To what extent can the signs of strategic reframing in the peritexts and text of the Miller translations be regarded as indicative of gender performativity in the sense discussed by Flotow with reference to Butler and Parker/Kosofsky Sedgwick (Butler 2004; Flotow 2011; Parker and Sedgwick 1995a)?

### Master-Slave or Lordship and Bondage?

By way of orientation, this subsection situates the master-slave narrative in the context of the *Phenomenology*. After the Preface and the Introduction, which relate more broadly to the philosophical system Hegel was planning prior to the publication of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in 1807 (Westphal 2009), the main body of Hegel's book is subdivided into six chapters of different lengths:

- Preface
- Introduction
- Consciousness
- Self-Consciousness
- Reason
- Spirit
- Religion and
- Absolute Knowing

Although there seems to be a progressive structure through these six chapters, moving from lower to higher forms of consciousness, the chapters are internally structured and characterised by a series of regressive narratives (Gergen 1997). Various "shapes of spirit" are attained sequentially but are shown to collapse through their own internal logic or dialectic (James 2007: 20f, 126–135; Stern 2002: 71–85). The master-slave relationship is investigated in the chapter, Self-Consciousness, following Hegel's demonstration of the inadequacy of the simple, empirical, subject-object conception of knowledge explored in the first chapter Consciousness. Now,



one special textual feature of the Miller retranslation was the addition of paragraph numbers, which do not occur in the German original (although Hegel did number the paragraphs in his later works) or in the Baillie translation. The paragraph numbers<sup>6</sup> correspond with the numbered sections of Findlay's *Analysis*, a long peritextual element at the back of the book.

The master-slave narrative occurs in a subsection of Self-Consciousness entitled: "A. Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage" (Hegel and Miller 1977: 111).<sup>7</sup> This subsection covers nine pages and comprises 18 paragraphs of different lengths (numbered 178 to 196 in Miller). As suggested by the semicolon in the German title, the master-slave narrative constitutes a separate subdivision towards the end of this subsection. In fact, the first occurrence of these key words is at the end of the 12th of the 18 paragraphs, that is two thirds of the way through the subsection in paragraph 189: "The former is the lord, the other is the bondsman." These terms are used throughout the passage and occur again in the next subsection (Hegel and Miller 1977: 119–120) in the transition to a subsection on stoicism but do not appear together anywhere else in the book. One aspect of this narrative which probably accounts for its popularity/notoriety is precisely that it can be read as a self-contained story, but by comparison with the whole book, it represents only a small episode.

However, the earlier paragraphs in the Self-Consciousness chapter (numbered 166 to 177) gradually prepare for the appearance of the lord and bondsman or master and slave, starting with an apparently abstract and impersonal discussion of consciousness becoming conscious of itself, of "the 'I,'" "being in itself" and "being for itself," then introducing the "other," "desire," "Life" and the "turning point" of two self-consciousnesses facing one another. This introduces the "Notion of *Spirit*" already referred to in Chapter 7. These paragraphs and the opening paragraphs of subsection A (178 to 189) all exhibit the kind of abstracted elusiveness described by Stern (2002: xii–xiii), in which the reader is not sure what to make of the narrative, the protagonists or the plot. In paragraph 186, the two self-consciousnesses are described as "submerged in the being [or immediacy] of *Life*," suggesting that the self-consciousnesses are now to be thought of as living individuals; in paragraph 187, "each seeks the death of the other." It is at this point that feminist activist Carla Lonzi must have objected that only men would interpret a face to face encounter with another apparently equal human being as a justification for a fight (Lonzi 1977). After the "trial by death," a power asymmetry is established between victor and vanquished which defines and structures the subsequent relationship between the two consciousnesses, and they are named in their familiar roles.

Hegel's structuring of this subsection into an introductory abstract or theoretical argument followed by a more vivid, accessible narrative with recognisable human characters or roles is a recurring feature in his writing

and probably reflects his teaching style. With reference to Hegel's teaching at grammar school level, Michael George and Andrew Vincent, the editors of Miller's retranslation of *Hegel's Philosophical Propaedeutic*, explain the structure of Hegel's lessons:

Hegel prepared his lessons utilising fairly short paragraphs for each section which he would read aloud and then explain greater length during the remaining period. The structure of each lesson was standard and required pupils to recapitulate, systematically, what had been learned from the previous week's lesson. Hegel encouraged questions and discussion of the topic, sometimes, it appears, spending the whole hour covering difficulties, of which no doubt there were many.  
(George and Vincent 1986: xiii–xiv)

In fact, a simplified version of the master-slave passage appears in the *Philosophical Propaedeutic* (Hegel and Miller 1986: 59–63). In the German version, Hegel included in brackets the words “(Geschichte Robinsons und Freitags)” (Hegel 1970g: 121, Werke 4) which appear in Miller's retranslation as “(History of Robinson and Friday)” (Hegel and Miller 1986: 62). The reference to Defoe's novel, which enjoyed cult status in German-speaking countries in the form of the *Robinsonade*<sup>8</sup> a popular fictional public narrative framing the wider contemporary metanarratives of colonialism and the abolition of slavery, suggests that Hegel's intention was to invite or provoke practical (ethical) discussion of the theoretical (logical, metaphysical and phenomenological) relationships investigated in his lectures based on his students' familiarity with literary texts, such as *Robinson Crusoe* (and Sophocles play *Antigone*). The *Zusätze/Additions*, for example, in the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, which were written by Hegel's students, were based on these extended discussions towards the end of Hegel's lectures.

Against this background, Miller's retranslations of the title (*Lordship and Bondage*), the names of the characters (*lord* and *bondsman*), his handling of the verb *aufheben* and other significant features in the master-slave narrative are now analysed and compared with other translations and a standard edition of the German original, with special reference to narrative reframing and Miller's elderly male cultural and gender performativity.

### **“Lordship and Bondage” at the Intersection of Narratives of Conflict**

Miller's decision to retain and therefore consolidate his predecessor's translation of Hegel's terms *Herrschaft und Knechtschaft* as *Lordship and Bondage* in the subtitle and his use of the terms *lord*, *Lord*, *bondsman*, *bondage* and *servitude* in the body of the text are surprising and

significant because the terms *mastery* and *slavery*, *master* and *slave* had already become established in the relevant secondary literature. In fact, Miller had already used and/or approved this translation (master and slave rather than lord and bondsman) in his retranslation of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* (Hegel and Miller 1971) and was to do so again in *Hegel's Philosophical Propaedeutic* (Hegel and Miller 1986). As already suggested, Hegel's intention in the different versions of this passage was to stimulate classroom discussion about power asymmetries in intersubjective relationships between two self-consciousnesses or self-conscious people. The master-slave narrative was supposed to be open to different, intersecting interpretations or points of entry, some more figurative or pictorial, others more abstract and metaphysical. Even a superficial genealogy of the narrative strands intersecting in and around Miller's retranslation of these terms shows how Miller's personal and philosophical commitments were performed through his translatorial choices.

Table 8.1 presents a genealogy of intersecting public narratives with which Miller was familiar and in which the terms occur in German, French and English, with comments suggesting Miller's reasoning. The table shows the approximate date and source of the narrative alongside a brief explanation of its relevance to Hegel's narrative and Miller's translational choices. Further details are indicated in the footnotes.

*Table 8.1* Genealogy of narratives relevant to Miller's decision to retain Lordship and Bondage, lord and bondsman instead of the more popular terms based on mastery and slavery.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Comments</i>
1520	Luther	Luther used the term <i>Knechtschaft</i> in his bible translation; he used both terms <i>Herrschaft</i> und <i>Knechtschaft</i> in a document about the freedom of a Christian person who is defined as both free and unfree. <sup>1</sup>
1604–1611	King James's Bible	The version of the bible which became known as the Authorised Version or King James Version used the term <i>bondage</i> in the same verse <sup>2</sup> as Luther's use of <i>Knechtschaft</i> (The Holy Bible 1604–1611: Exodus 20:2)
1780s	Kant	In Kant's <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i> (Kant 1929: 409–415), the third antinomy investigates the opposition between freedom and unfreedom, claiming that causality is both free and unfree, based on the logic of reason, as he understood it.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Comments</i>
1800s to 1830	Hegel	Hegel studied theology in a protestant seminary. He used the narrative of <i>Herr und Knecht</i> in his school teaching but with a reference to Robinson Crusoe in brackets (Hegel and Miller 1986: 62), in the <i>Phänomenologie des Geistes</i> (1807) and in the <i>Philosophie des Geistes</i> (1812/13). Hegel's use of this narrative thus combines intersecting Christian religious, social-political and phenomenological and logical strands.
1840s onwards	Feuerbach, Marx	Left-Hegelians emphasise the social and political dimension of Hegel's work. Marx's binary distinction between base and superstructure mirrors the asymmetric distribution of power between oppressed and oppressor, slave and master. This public narrative spreads beyond the boundaries of philosophy and academia into social and political activism and party politics.
1865 onwards	British Idealists	British Idealist philosophers begin systematic translation of Hegel into English. William Wallace uses the terms <i>master</i> and <i>slave</i> in Hegel's <i>Philosophy of Mind</i> (Hegel and Wallace 1894). But some British Idealists were selective in their appropriation of Hegel. <sup>3</sup>
1910	James Black Baillie	Baillie's is the first complete translation of <i>Phänomenologie des Geistes</i> (1910 revised in 1931). Baillie explicitly acknowledges his association with Dr Georg Lasson, protestant theologian and co-editor of <i>Hegels sämtliche Werke</i> (1905–1944). Lasson may have alerted Baillie to the Lutheran origins of Hegel's use of the terms <i>Herrschaft und Knechtschaft</i> , suggesting the appropriateness of <i>Lordship and Bondage/ lord and bondsman</i> with their biblical and feudal connotations in English.
1930s	Hyppolite, Kojève	Despite their familiarity with Baillie's English translation, influential French Hegelians use <i>maître</i> and <i>esclave</i> in French translations and commentaries on Hegel's <i>Phenomenology</i> . These works were read by French, European and non-European intellectuals, including existentialists, Marxists, Western Marxists, postcolonial and feminist thinkers, whose works are often translated into English with the terms <i>master</i> and <i>slave</i> as a prominent feature.

(Continued)

Table 8.1 (Continued)

Date	Source	Comments
1950–1989	NRSV Bible	The controversial New Revised Standard Version of the Bible was designed to modernise and remove gender bias. The word <i>bondage</i> was replaced by <i>slavery</i> (The Holy Bible 1950–1989: Exodus 20: 2). <sup>4</sup> Miller and many of his conservative associates in the Church of England Men’s Society resisted this and other changes.
1958	Findlay	Against the background of rapidly broadening interest in Hegel as in influence on Marx, New Left and Countercultural thinking, the Cold-War revival of Hegel prompted by Findlay’s <i>Hegel: A Re-examination</i> (1958) was predicated on a purification and de-politicisation of Hegel, emphasising the autonomy of philosophy, especially its independence from politics.
1969	Kojève/ Nichols	Despite Kojève’s liberal, anti-Marxist position, which is reinforced through Nichols’ influential translation of <i>Introduction to the Reading of Hegel</i> , Kojève’s powerful and selective interpretation of Hegel’s Master/Slave narrative is over-politicised from the perspective adopted by Findlay, Knox, Miller and Mure.
1977	Findlay, Miller	Miller’s choice of <i>Lordship and Bondage</i> supports the de-politicising, conservative emphasis of the Cold-War Hegel revival at the same time as reinforcing Miller’s commitment to the personal and religious dimensions of Hegel’s philosophy, the “God-man relationship.”

1 Luther’s text reads: Ein Christenmensch ist ein freier Herr über alle Dinge und niemandem untertan. Ein Christenmensch ist ein dienstbarer Knecht aller Dinge und jedermann untertan. [A Christian person is a free master of all things and subject to no one. A Christian person is a servile slave to all things and is subject to everyone (my translation)]. Source: [www.luther2017.de/de/martin-luther/texte-quellen/lutherschrift-von-der-freiheit-eines-christenmenschen](http://www.luther2017.de/de/martin-luther/texte-quellen/lutherschrift-von-der-freiheit-eines-christenmenschen).

2 KJV: “I am the LORD thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage.”

3 Details of the early translations are given in the Bibliography of *A Hegel Dictionary*. A full historical account of the British Idealists is given in *British Idealism: A History* (Inwood 2003; Mander 2011).

4 NRSV: I am the Lord your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of slavery.” The discussion of gender neutrality and specific lexical items like *bondage/slavery* was a topical public narrative in the social group within which Miller moved during the time of his Hegel translations.

Viewed against this genealogical backdrop, Miller's decision to retain Baillie's translation rather than opting for the increasingly popular *master* and *slave* constitutes a subtle form of reactionary or resistive activism through translation, a translatorial exploitation of the "interlocutory space" referred to by Flotow (Flotow 2011: 8–9). It was a conscious reframing strategy with reference to contemporary and historical technical (philosophical/theological) and popular (political) usage, designed to influence the reception of Hegel's philosophy in a specific manner. At the same time, Miller's translatorial choices exhibit an element of cultural and gender performativity. Through the translation, Miller acted out what he took to be his prerogative as an older male, his paternalistic right to guide and control younger, immature and possibly naïve readers based on the authority of his age, his mature and intimate understanding of Hegel's philosophy and his reliance on the canonical works of an established philosopher steeped in the Western philosophical, cultural and religious tradition. In this sense, Miller's personal narrative, that is, his certainty about the truth of his own experiences and where they had led him, discreetly permeate the text of the translation. A similar intersectional relationship between narratives in and around Miller's life and the content of the Hegelian texts occurs with Miller's translations of *aufheben* in the master-slave narrative.

### *Intertextual Comparison of Miller's Translations of Aufheben in the Master-Slave Narrative*

Table 8.2 shows Miller's retranslation of an excerpt taken from near the beginning of Hegel's 12-paragraph subsection which ends with the master-slave narrative; i.e. this is from the more theoretical part of the exposition before the characters have been introduced. For comparison, the Miller text (with editorially numbered paragraphs) is shown alongside the original Baillie translation.

Apart from the visually evident textual features relating to emphasis (capitalisation of Notion; agreement over capitalisation of Recognition; Miller's partial restoration of Hegel's emphasis through italicisation, as noted in Chapter 7),<sup>9</sup> the most prominent difference between the translations relates to Miller's disagreement with Baillie over the use of *sublate*/*sublation*/*cancel* as translations of *aufheben*. There are further disagreements over *essentially real* and *true being* (Baillie), both of which Miller translates as *essential being* and over *in a double sense* (Baillie: three times), which Miller translates as *ambiguous* (also three times) and a few other minor differences. The disagreement over *aufheben* is interesting in this context because Baillie uses *sublate* – the verb which Miller had used consistently throughout the *Science of Logic* – but, in this context, he evidently thought it inappropriate. This suggests that the context

Table 8.2 Baillie and Miller translations from the opening of the master-slave narrative (paragraphs 178–181).

<i>Baillie translation</i>	<i>Miller retranslation</i>
<p>... The detailed exposition of the notion of this spiritual unity in its duplication will bring before us the process of Recognition.</p> <p>Self-consciousness has before it another self-consciousness; it has come outside itself. This has a double significance. First it has lost its own self since it finds itself as an other being; secondly, it has thereby sublated that other, for it does not regard the other as essentially real, but sees its own self in the other.</p> <p>It must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation of that first double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning. First, it must set itself to sublimate the other independent being, in order thereby to become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it thereupon proceeds to sublimate its own self for this other is itself.</p> <p>This sublation in a double sense of its otherness in a double sense is at the same time a return in a double sense into itself. For, firstly, through sublation, it gets back itself, because it becomes one with itself again through the cancelling of its otherness; but secondly, it likewise gives otherness back again to the other self-consciousness for it was aware of being in the other, it cancels this its own being in the other and thus lets the other again go free.</p> <p>(Hegel and Baillie 1910/1931: 176/104)</p>	<p>... The detailed exposition of the Notion of this spiritual unity in its duplication will present us with the process of Recognition.</p> <p>179. Self-consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness; it has come out of itself. This has a twofold significance: first, it has lost itself, for it finds itself as an <i>other</i> being; secondly, in doing so it has superseded the other, for it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other sees its own self.</p> <p>180. It must supersede this otherness of itself. This is the supersession of the first ambiguity, and is therefore itself a second ambiguity. First, it must proceed to supersede the other independent being in order thereby to become certain of itself as the essential being; secondly, in so doing it proceeds to supersede its <i>own</i> self, for this other is itself.</p> <p>181. This ambiguous supersession of its ambiguous otherness is equally an ambiguous return <i>into itself</i>. For first, through the supersession, it receives back its own self, because, by superseding <i>its</i> otherness, it again becomes equal to itself; but secondly, the other self-consciousness equally gives it back again to itself, for it saw itself in the other, but supersedes this being of itself in the other and thus lets the other again go free.</p> <p>(Hegel and Miller 1977:111)</p>

and/or the wider staging of the *Phenomenology* itself made the use of *sublate* inappropriate.

While it would be possible to research and analyse the relationship between *sublate/sublation* and *supersede/supersession* (which Miller prefers in this context)<sup>10</sup> and to draw up a genealogy along the lines of that shown in Table 8.1 for lordship and bondage, this would go considerably beyond the scope of the present chapter. The etymology of



*sublate/sublation* is traced in detail in Inwood's *A Hegel Dictionary* (2003); its occurrence in translations of the *Phenomenology* has also been analysed (Charlston 2012; Charlston 2014; Charlston 2018) and these findings are summarised at the end of Chapter 7. However, regarding *supersede/supersession*, two points are significant.

The first relates to the ordinary usage of *supersede* and its bearing on the narrative features of temporality and causal emplotment (Baker 2006/2018: 50–61, 67–71). In normal English usage, *supersede* has both a temporal and/or sequential aspect and a normative aspect. When something is superseded, this takes place in a logical or temporal sequence. In Miller's letters to Barfield, discussed in Chapter 2, Miller mentions the distinction between "in species temporalis" and "in species aeternitatis" (Miller and Barfield 1968–1986: 130, 31 March 1973). Accordingly, pure logic is structural rather than historical, necessary rather than contingent and takes place *in species aeternitatis*, outside time;<sup>11</sup> by contrast, phenomenology is conditioned by time and contingency and takes place *in species temporalis*. Miller's choice of *supersede/supersession* in the *Phenomenology* may reflect his understanding of this relationship. He wanted to reserve *sublate* for the timeless "logical space" of Hegel's *Science of Logic*, further demarcating Hegel's earlier work from the mature system, as already discussed. Regarding the normative aspect, the ordinary-language implication of something being superseded is also that it is rendered obsolete. The new replaces with old with the implication that the old is now no longer as good or desirable as the new. These semantic features are confirmed by dictionary definition<sup>12</sup> and have strong ethical and political implications, especially relating to aspects of causality and teleology in historical progress and religious law.

The second significant point relates to the use of *supersession* in theological history, especially in the decades preceding Miller's translation of Hegel and especially regarding the religious metanarrative of supersessionism (Tapie 2014: 9–24; Novak 2019).<sup>13</sup> Supersessionism has recently been defined as follows:

Supersessionism describes the theological conviction that the Christian Church has superseded the Jewish people, assuming their role as God's covenanted people, Israel. At first glance, supersessionism seems to be a core Christian belief, making any fruitful dialogue between Jews and Christians impossible since it seems to entail the Christian replacement of the Jewish people as God's covenant partner. But on closer examination, there are two kinds of supersessionism: one "hard," and the other "soft." The former does indeed prevent dialogue. The latter, however, does not.

(Novak 2019)

This theological disciplinary narrative was topical at the time of Miller's translations in view of the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), which

marked a shift from hard to soft supersessionism and would have been relevant, for example, to the discussion groups held within the Church of England Men's Society of which Miller was a member. Miller's frequent use of the word *supersession* in the retranslation instead of *sublate* reframes the master-slave narrative with reference to a contemporary theological debate. This further contributes to the suggestion that Miller applied a strategy of de-politicising Hegel's philosophy and re-emphasising the religious aspects of his work. If Hegel intended the master-slave narrative as a stimulus for discussion, Miller's translation strategy could be regarded as re-focalising the discussion (through the retention of the biblical connotations of lordship and bondage) and widening the discussion to include and highlight religious history (especially through his use of the noun *supersession* which is extremely rare outside this theological context by comparison with the verb). This discussion would therefore shift the emphasis and relevance of Hegel's text towards power asymmetries between religions rather than between social and cultural groups, such as races, genders and/or classes, which defined the focus of the New Left. Christian soft supersessionism was tolerant towards claims that the Jewish religion had not been entirely qualitatively superseded by Christianity, but not towards Muslim claims that Islam had superseded both Judaism and Christianity (Novak 2019). The use of supersession therefore also has ethical and political implications relating to the history of religions, of which Miller may have been aware. Although Miller's retranslation generally attempts to de-politicise the master-slave narrative, social, cultural and political implicature is discreetly embedded in these narratives.

For further comparison, Table 8.3 shows Hegel's German text alongside a recent translation of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* by Pinkard (Hegel and Pinkard 2018). In fact, the Pinkard translation is published in a two-column, parallel text version similar to this table. The German text shown here is taken from the Suhrkamp edition (Hegel 1970a, Werke 3) and differs slightly from the text shown in the Pinkard retranslation.

Several points are immediately evident from the comparison offered in Table 8.3, such as Pinkard's footnote and the matching between Hegel's italicisation and the translation. It is also evident that Pinkard has used *sublate* consistently throughout this excerpt to translate *aufheben* (and in fact throughout the entire book) (Charlston 2012, 2014). Comparison between Hegel, Miller and Pinkard of the first phrase in paragraph 179, shows that Miller introduced an element of anthropomorphism by having one self-consciousness "faced by another" at a point in Hegel's exposition where they have not yet been given individual human attributes. Miller's translation anticipates this development in the narrative, slightly disrupting the temporality and prematurely individualising a Hegelian universal. Closer comparison between the four texts shows that Hegel's term *Wesen*, which was translated by Baillie as *essentially real* and *true being*, and by

Table 8.3 Hegel's original and Pinkard's retranslation corresponding to Table 8.2.

Hegel	Pinkard retranslation
<p>... Die Auseinanderlegung des Begriffs dieser geistigen Einheit in ihrer Verdopplung stellt uns die Bewegung des <i>Anerkennens</i> dar.</p> <p>Es ist für das Selbstbewußtsein ein anderes Selbstbewußtsein; es ist <i>außer sich</i> gekommen. Dies hat die gedoppelte Bedeutung, <i>erstlich</i>, es hat sich selbst verloren, denn es findet sich als ein <i>anderes</i> Wesen; <i>zweitens</i>, es hat damit das Andere aufgehoben, denn es sieht auch nicht das Andere als Wesen, sondern <i>sich selbst</i> im Andern.</p> <p>Es muß dies <i>sein Anderssein</i> aufheben; dies ist das Aufheben des ersten Doppelsinnes, und darum selbst ein zweiter Doppelsinn; <i>erstlich</i>, es muß darauf gehen, das <i>andere</i> selbstständige Wesen aufzuheben, um dadurch <i>seiner</i> als des Wesens gewiß zu werden; <i>zweitens</i> geht es hiermit darauf, <i>sich selbst</i> aufzuheben, denn dies Andere ist es selbst.</p> <p>Dies doppelsinnige Aufheben seines doppelsinnigen Andersseins ist ebenso eine doppelsinnige Rückkehr <i>in sich selbst</i>; denn <i>erstlich</i> erhält es durch das Aufheben sich selbst zurück; denn es wird sich wieder gleich durch das Aufheben <i>seines</i> Andersseins; <i>zweitens</i> aber gibt es das andere Selbstbewußtsein ihm wieder ebenso zurück, denn es war sich im Andern, es hebt dies <i>sein</i> im Andern auf, entläßt also das andere wieder frei.</p> <p>(Hegel 1970: 145–146)</p>	<p>... The elaboration of the concept of this spiritual unity in its doubling presents us with the movement of <i>recognition</i>.</p> <p>179. For self-consciousness, there is another self-consciousness; self-consciousness is <i>outside of itself</i>.<sup>*</sup> This has a twofold meaning. <i>First</i>, it has lost itself, for it is to be found as an <i>other</i> essence. <i>Second</i>, it has thereby sublated that other, for it also does not see the other as the essence but rather sees itself in the other.</p> <p>180. It must sublimate <i>its otherness</i>. This is the sublation of that first two-sided ambiguity and is for that reason itself a second two-sided ambiguity. <i>First</i>, it must set out to sublimate the <i>other</i> self-sufficient essence in order to become certain of <i>itself</i> as the essence by way of having sublated the other. <i>Second</i>, it thereby sets out to sublimate <i>itself</i>, for this other is itself.</p> <p>181. This double-edged sense of the act of sublating its double-edged sense of otherness is likewise a double-edged sense of a return <i>into itself</i>. This is so <i>in the first place</i> because it gets itself back by way of sublation, for it comes to be in parity with itself once again by way of the sublation of <i>its</i> otherness. However, <i>in the second place</i>, it likewise gives the other self-consciousness back to itself, since it existed for itself in the other, but it sublates <i>its</i> being in the other, and it thus sets the other free again.</p> <p>(Hegel and Pinkard 2018: 164–165)</p>

\* Pinkard's footnote: "es ist *außer sich* gekommen": the term "*außer sich*" usually means "to be beside oneself" (to be swept up in rage, or hilarity, etc.); but Hegel also clearly wants to play on the literal meaning of the term, so that he is also saying "It has come *outside of itself*," self-consciousness exists as an "external object" to itself. The sentence also has the overtones of saying that "self-consciousness has come to be *anxious* about itself."

Miller as *essential being*, has been translated by Pinkard as *essence*. This is also consistent throughout the book and corresponds to the translation of *Wesen* as a major section heading in the *Science of Logic* in both the Johnston and Struthers and the Miller versions.

Indeed, in the Translator’s Note to his version (Pinkard 2018) and in his major critical work on the *Phenomenology* (Pinkard 1994: 17–19), Pinkard criticises Miller’s general inconsistency and sets terminological consistency as a goal for his retranslation. Pinkard’s criticism raises the question of whether Miller’s inconsistency was in some sense accidental, the result of laziness or incompetence, or whether, as I argue here, Miller’s translation strategy included inconsistency selectively in given cases to reframe the narrative in response to his own philosophical commitments and the changing reception conditions at the time of the translation. For example, while Miller attempted to distinguish between the *Science of Logic* and the *Phenomenology* by reserving *sublate* for the context of logic and using a variety of different verbs to translate *aufheben* in the *Phenomenology* (see Table 7.6), Pinkard’s consistent use of *sublate* eliminates this distinction. Of course, it is easy to argue that *aufheben* should be translated consistently, but understanding Miller’s reasoning in his now historical retranslation opens a new interlocutory space, inviting imaginative re-reading of Hegel through Miller.

Tables 8.4 and 8.5 show an excerpt from a later passage in the master-slave narrative and further illustrate Miller’s creative use of terminological inconsistency, resisting the demand for consistency expressed, for

*Table 8.4* Baillie translation and Miller retranslation towards the end of the master-slave narrative (paragraph 194).

<i>Baillie translation</i>	<i>Miller retranslation</i>
<p>We have seen what bondage is only in relation to lordship. But it is a self-consciousness, and we have now to consider what it is, in this regard, in and for itself. In the first instance, the master is taken to be the essential reality for the state of bondage; hence, for it, the truth is the independent consciousness existing for itself, although this truth is not taken yet as inherent in bondage itself. Still, it does in fact contain within itself this truth of pure negativity and self-existence, because it has experienced this reality within it. For this consciousness was not in peril and fear for this element or that, nor for this or that moment of time, it was afraid for its entire being; it felt the fear of death, the sovereign master. It has been in that experience melted to its inmost soul, has trembled throughout its every fibre, and all that was fixed and steadfast has quaked within it . . .</p> <p>(Hegel and Baillie 1910/1931: 185/110)</p>	<p>194. We have seen what servitude is only in relation to lordship. But it is a self-consciousness, and we have now to consider what as such it is in and for itself. To begin with, servitude has the lord for its essential reality; hence the <i>truth</i> for it is the independent consciousness that is for itself. However, servitude is not yet aware that this truth is implicit in it. But it does in fact contain within itself this truth of pure negativity and being-for-self, for it has experienced this its own essential nature. For this consciousness has been fearful, not of this or that particular thing or just at odd moments, but its whole being has been seized with dread; for it has experienced the fear of death, the absolute Lord. In that experience it has been quite unmanned, has trembled in every fibre of its being, and everything solid and stable has been shaken to its foundations . . .</p> <p>(Hegel and Miller 1977: 117)</p>

Table 8.5 Hegel's original and Pinkard's retranslation corresponding to Table 8.4.

Hegel	Pinkard retranslation
<p>Wir sahen nur, was die Knechtschaft im Verhältnisse der Herrschaft ist. Aber sie ist Selbstbewußtsein, und was sie hiernach an und für sich selbst ist, ist nun zu betrachten. Zunächst ist für die Knechtschaft der Herr das Wesen; also das <i>selbständige für sich seiende Bewußtsein</i> ist ihr <i>die Wahrheit</i>, die jedoch <i>für sie</i> noch nicht <i>an ihr</i> ist. Allein sie hat diese Wahrheit der reinen Negativität und des <i>Fürsichseins in der Tat an ihr selbst</i>; denn sie hat dieses Wesen an ihr <i>erfahren</i>. Dies Bewußtsein hat nämlich nicht um dieses oder jenes, noch für diesen oder jenen Augenblick Angst gehabt, sondern um sein ganzes Wesen; den es hat die Furcht des Todes, des absoluten Herrn, empfunden. Es ist darin innerlich aufgelöst worden, hat durchaus in sich selbst erzittert, und alles Fixe hat in ihm gebebt . . .</p> <p>(Hegel 1970a: 152–153)</p>	<p>194. We only saw what servitude is in relation to mastery. However, servitude is self-consciousness, and thus what it is in and for itself is now up for examination. For servitude, the master is initially the essence. Therefore, in its eyes, the <i>truth</i> is the <i>self-sufficient consciousness existing for itself</i>, a truth which <i>for servitude</i> is nonetheless not yet <i>in servitude</i>. Yet servitude has this truth of pure negativity and of <i>being-for-itself in fact in servitude itself</i>, for servitude has <i>experienced</i> this essence in servitude. This consciousness was not driven with anxiety about just this or that matter, nor did it have anxiety about just this or that moment; rather, it had anxiety about its entire essence. It felt the fear of death, the absolute master. In that feeling, it had inwardly fallen into dissolution, trembled in its depths, and all that was fixed within it had been shaken loose . . .</p> <p>(Hegel and Pinkard 2018: 173–174)</p>

example, by his advisors and by his subsequent critics (Harris 1978). My suggestion is that Miller's attitude, expressed through his translatorial choices, is aptly described as translatorial *hexis* (Charlston 2012, 2013) and/or as an example of a specific, dynamically negotiated cultural and gender performativity (Butler 1988; Flotow 2011; Hutchings 2003; Parker and Sedgewick 1995a). The layout of the tables is as previously.

Although Miller translated *Knechtschaft* as *bondage* in the title to this subsection and uses the term *bondsman* for *Knecht*, he introduces the translation *servitude* in paragraph 194. The difference between these terms is significant based on a shift in narrative focalisation. Bondage is a form of oppression imposed on the passive bondsman by the active lord; by contrast, servitude implies an act of service performed (to some extent) voluntarily by the bondsman/servant. Miller's choice here articulates an important aspect in the dynamic relationship between master and slave/lord and bondsman, a change of perspective or focalisation (Bal 1997: 142–161). Over time and through discipline and work, the slave's relationship with the master and with himself (staying with the presupposition that these are male individuals) changes from bondage to servitude. But most importantly, as this paragraph explains, the slave gradually becomes conscious of the significance of his own experience of death. Disagreeing

with Baillie's "sovereign master," Miller consistently translates Hegel's *Herr* as *lord*, but this time capitalises it for added emphasis and to suggest that the absolute master is the Lord God. Christian readers brought up in the English tradition may notice Miller's subtle reinforcement of the Christian subtext in this same sentence with a well-known Christmas carol which contains the line "mighty *dread* had *seized* their troubled mind" through his choice and positioning of *dread* and *seized*.

It is significant that, despite his avoidance of "sex-specific pronouns" in this paragraph, Miller introduces a male-gendered metaphor: "it has been quite unmanned." Miller's overriding commitment to the gender-specific "God-man relationship" is once again subtly and performatively reiterated through the translation. The German text and the Pinkard translation, as shown in Table 8.5, illustrate the absence of male-gendered pronouns and metaphors as well as Miller's subtle religious reframing. Pinkard's minimising of gender and religious bias alongside his commitment to terminological consistency in the name of science<sup>14</sup> can also be regarded as aspects of a culture-specific, modern academic, gender-neutral performativity.

Miller's translation of the passage shown in Tables 8.4 and 8.5 should not be dismissed as inconsistent. It is not only more colourful than Pinkard's, it also reveals its historical situatedness in the wider narrative context of Miller's life. As such, it provides a valuable historical resource for future, transformative re-readings of Hegel through Miller.

Miller's retranslation of the last sentence of paragraph 194, which is not shown in Table 8.4, provides another example of his creativity in the translation of *aufheben*: "Through his service he rids himself of his attachment to natural existence in every single detail, and gets rid of it by working on it" (Hegel and Miller 1977: 117). The phrase *he rids himself* is a strongly emphatic translation of *er hebt . . . auf*, as shown with reference to the Pinkard translation of this sentence: "In his service, he sublates all the *individual* moments of his attachment to natural existence, and he works off his natural existence" (Hegel and Pinkard 2018: 174). For Miller, the bondsman's sublation of his attachment to natural existence is accordingly not a timeless logical process; it is a historically contingent, potentially violent *getting rid of* the bonds of slavery by escaping from natural drives and working towards self-improvement, cultural assimilation towards Western liberal, Christian, patriarchal values. This possibly suggests precisely the act of cultural "catching up" which Frantz Fanon repudiated. However, Miller's creativity with the translation of *aufheben* and emphasis in this specific context should not be generalised or taken too far. His translation strategy is informed by and transforms his interpretation of intersecting narratives which seemed relevant to him at this point in the translation and with reference to his own historical situatedness. Like Hegel's master-slave narrative in its original educational setting, Miller's retranslation has the advantage of provoking more questions than it answers.

By contrast with Miller's discreet and tentative translatorial strategies, Findlay's Analysis (Hegel and Miller 1977: 495–591) reinforces the suggestion of colonialist, imperialist bias more explicitly and robustly through the peritexts to Miller's translation. Findlay's analysis corresponding with paragraph 196, the concluding paragraph of the master-slave passage, is as follows:

Hegel suggests that a period of subjection to others is essential to the highest magisterial rationality. Not to have undergone such discipline results in a trivialisation of self-consciousness which never rises above petty finite interests. It would seem that the permissive bringing-up of children is implicitly condemned, and that 'imperialism' and 'colonialism' at certain stages of development are given justification.  
(Findlay 1977: 523)

There is a sense here that Findlay is exploiting the peritextual "interlocutory space" to articulate a narrative of "magisterial" resistance to everything which goes by the name of the "permissive" society. This too constitutes another familiar trope of elderly male cultural and gender performativity, although not the same as that performed by Miller. The Hegel of Miller's *Phenomenology* was thus co-opted in support of a specific interpretation of the role of maturity.

Nevertheless, Miller's wider strategy of fencing off Hegel's *Phenomenology* from his later works by generally avoiding the use of *sublate* as a translation for *aufheben* and his introduction of 44 near synonyms (as illustrated in Table 7.6), achieves the interesting effect of softening the translation by contrast with greater consistency offered by Pinkard. Miller explicitly wanted to avoid "rigid consistency" which he associated with "mere Understanding" and "ordinary consciousness." What he offers instead was possibly also intended to mimic a younger, pre-mature Hegel who had not yet settled on a precise philosophical meaning for *aufheben*. The various near synonyms are pseudo-pedagogical approximations, suggestions or attempts at capturing the full sense of *sublation*, which will be explained fully only in the *Science of Logic*. They enact the condescending performativity of a seasoned teacher, adept at expressing complex thoughts in simple language accessible to the "interested layman." But Miller's creative readiness to step into the minds of less experienced thinkers in his retranslation of Hegel's *Phenomenology* suggests a significant development in his understanding and performance of the hermeneutic potential of translation. Miller seems to have ignored advice (see Figure 7.4) about the translation of *aufheben* and introduced his own imaginative characterisation of Hegel. It is this creative translation strategy above all which makes the retranslation itself worthy of reinterpretation, rethinking and re-staging with reference to the now historical translator, Arnold Miller.



### **Antigone: Retranslation and the Renegotiation of Gender Identity Roles**

The Antigone excerpts discussed in this subsection are taken from the chapter of the *Phenomenology* entitled Spirit. After a short theoretical introduction, Hegel elaborates three sub-chapters:

- A. The True Spirit. The Ethical Order;
- B. Self-alienated Spirit. Culture; and
- C. Spirit That is Certain of Itself. Morality.

The first of these sub-chapters is further subdivided into three subsections:

- a. The Ethical World. Human and Divine Law: Man and Woman;
- b. Ethical Action. Human and Divine Knowledge. Guilt and Destiny; and
- c. Legal Status.

In a similarly “elusive” manner to the master-slave narrative, Hegel’s discussion begins abstractly, referring to man and woman, but without mentioning Sophocles, Antigone or the role her story is supposed to play.<sup>15</sup> In the first subsection (Hegel and Miller 1977: 267–278), Hegel attributes human law to man and divine law to woman, reinforcing a traditional binary division relating to (legislation of) the relationships between men and women and the roles women play in social and political life, especially in the Family, which Miller capitalises.

The plot of Sophocles’ *Antigone* begins with Eteocles and Polyneices, the two sons of Oedipus, who are fighting for the kingship of Thebes. Both men die in the battle. Their successor, Creon, decides that Eteocles will be buried, but, because he was leading a foreign army, Polyneices will be left on the battle without a proper burial (human law). Antigone, his sister, is outraged that a member of her family should be treated in this way (divine law) and buries him anyway. Antigone is caught burying Polyneices and is condemned to death for her disobedience (human law). Her fiancé, Creon’s son, Haemon, learns about this and tries to convince Creon to change his mind. After a long discussion introducing the seer Tiresias, he finally persuades Creon that the gods require the burial of Polyneices (divine law). By then it is too late because Antigone has hanged herself. Haemon kills himself when he finds her, and Creon’s wife kills herself when she learns about her son (Sophocles 1982).

Hegel assumes that his readers will be familiar with the Antigone story, but he does not specifically announce that this subsection is an interpretation of Sophocles’ play. Hegel’s discussion of the Antigone story became increasingly controversial during the development of feminist philosophies and activism because Hegel seems to be using the Antigone story as a basis

for generalisations about women or womankind and he seems to take the side of Creon and human law, thereby adopting a misogynist position.<sup>16</sup> This interpretation is speculative because Hegel's "elusive" or "euphemised" text does not articulate a clear position. However, as explained in Chapter 2, Hegel has been interpreted as speaking from a narrow misogynist perspective which does not acknowledge either the diversities between women, the dynamics of what it might be to be or become a woman or the individually enacted "performative" roles through which people explore their developing identities. English translations of this passage may have contributed to such interpretations by resolving the inherent ambiguities of Hegel's account. The excerpt analysed in detail here, which has been the particular focus of feminist critiques of Hegel (Hutchings 2003: 94–102), is taken from the second subsection on "ethical action" and explores further aspects of the relationship between the human and divine laws and between men and women in ancient Greek society.

In the passage quoted in Table 8.6, Hegel presents a patriarchal argument for confining women's role or sphere of ethical action to the family, thereby excluding women from involvement in political life. Because of

Table 8.6 Excerpt from Miller's retranslation of Hegel's controversial discussion of *Antigone*, human and divine law, ethical action, guilt and destiny.

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*Miller retranslation*

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... Human law in its universal existence is the community, in its activity in general is the manhood of the community, in its real and effective activity is the government. It *is, moves and maintains* itself by consuming and absorbing into itself the separatism of the Penates, or the separation into independent families presided over by womankind, and by keeping them dissolved in the fluid continuity of its own nature. But the Family is, at the same time, in general its element, the individual consciousness the basis of its general activity. Since the community only gets an existence through its interference with the happiness of the Family, and by dissolving [individual] self-consciousness into the universal, it creates for itself in what it suppresses and what is at the same time essential to it an internal enemy – womankind in general. Womankind – the everlasting irony [in the life] of the community – changes by intrigue the universal end of the government into a private end, transforms its universal activity into a work of some particular individual, and perverts the universal property of the state into a possession and ornament for the Family. Woman in this way turns to ridicule the earnest wisdom of maturing age which, indifferent to purely private pleasures and enjoyments as well as to playing an active part, only thinks of and cares for the universal. She makes this wisdom an object of derision for raw and irresponsible youth and unworthy of their enthusiasm. In general, she maintains that it is the power of youth that really counts: the worth of the son lies in his being the lord and master of the mother who bore him, that of the brother as being one in whom the sister finds man on a level of equality, that of the youth as being one through whom the daughter, freed from her dependence [on the family] obtains the enjoyment and dignity of wifedom . . .

(Hegel and Miller 1977: 287–288; Hutchings 2003: 99)

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the elusiveness of Hegel's writing, this position can be attributed either to Hegel, in other words as an expression of his own political stance about women, or exclusively to the ancient Greek patriarchs in Sophocles' play. Hegel's elusiveness has provoked heated discussion. Regardless of any claims about Hegel's philosophical intentions, the patriarchal position articulated in the excerpt corresponds approximately with the passively misogynist, actively masculinist views articulated by the "outwardly conventional," elderly Miller and corroborated in conversations and correspondence with Mary Lettington, as discussed in Chapter 6 (Lettington 2019). Although this controversial passage does not represent Hegel's formal, philosophical statement on the role of women in society and the state, which is to be found in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (Hegel and Houlgate 2008: 162–180; Houlgate 2013: 149), the excerpt is relevant to the discussion of Miller's translations because it has been and can be construed not only as evidence of Hegel's misogyny but also of the complicity of a male translator in circulating and perpetuating misogynist narratives. Miller and many cultural conservatives of his generation felt their own patriarchal cultural values challenged by a dangerously dynamic ideology of permissiveness and spiritual decline which they associated with an undermining of civilisation by "womankind" and tried to oppose.

Underlining and shading have been added to the text in Table 8.6 to draw attention to points relevant to the subsequent discussion.

Table 8.6 shows an excerpt from Miller's retranslation containing the controversial passage. The two highlighted sentences are discussed in detail in *Hegel and Feminist Philosophy* (Hutchings 2003), citing the Miller translation but without specific comment on the fact that this is a retranslation. As already mentioned (Chapter 2), Hutchings uses this passage as a basis for contrasting three critical interpretations of Hegel's *Antigone* passage by Luce Irigaray, Patricia Mills and Judith Butler (Butler 2000; Irigaray 1985; Mills 1996). While Hegel's position has been described as "chauvinistic and derogatory to women" (Hegel and Shannon 2001: 28), limited attention has been given to understanding the role of Miller's translation in perpetuating and reframing what has been perceived as a misogynist narrative in which "womankind" is presented as an abstract universal,<sup>17</sup> with the implication that, regardless of differences between women, all women are members of this class or set by definition rather than with reference to their actions or preferences. "Womankind" is associated with "intrigue," described as "an internal enemy" of the community and the government which "perverts the universal property of the state into a possession and ornament of the Family." The passage also makes claims about the indifference of elderly men to "private pleasures" and to "playing an active part," suggesting that their suitability for government of the community rests on this indifference as well as on their thinking and caring only "for the universal." The language of the

retranslation does not shelter Hegel from such criticisms; on the contrary, it celebrates the virtues of “manhood” in the wider community, in government and in the “Family.” Although the family is presided over by “womankind” (and capitalised as “Family” in the translation to emphasise its importance as a traditional institution), the young man is described as “lord and master” of his mother, and the daughter’s only escape from dependence on the family is in the “enjoyment and dignity of wifehood.”

Comparison with the German text (shown in Table 8.7) illustrates Miller’s now familiar strategy of using certain textual features, such as the italicised words in the second line in Table 8.6 to restore Hegel’s original emphasis by contrast with Baillie’s Victorian/Edwardian translation. Miller’s square brackets indicate words he has added, further reinforcing the impression that this is an accurate, faithful and honest translation. However, even in this short excerpt, the capitalisation of “Family” is a translatorial addition which, in view of Miller’s comment in his Translator’s Foreword, suggests a special Hegelian usage without explaining exactly what is special about it. Shading and underlining corresponding with Table 8.6 have been added in Table 8.7 for orientation. While *Männlichkeit* corresponds with *manhood* and *Weiblichkeit* with *womankind*, the comparison shows that

Table 8.7 Excerpt from Hegel’s German text of the controversial discussion of *Antigone*, human and divine law, ethical action, guilt and destiny.

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*Hegel text*

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... Das menschliche Gesetz also in seinem allgemeinen Dasein, das Gemeinwesen, in seiner Betätigung überhaupt die Männlichkeit, in seiner wirklichen Betätigung die Regierung, *ist, bewegt und erhält* sich dadurch, daß es die Absonderung der Penaten oder die selbständige Vereinzelung in Familien, welchen die Weiblichkeit vorsteht, in sich aufzehrt und sie in der Kontinuität seiner Flüssigkeit aufgelöst erhält. Die Familie ist aber zugleich überhaupt sein Element, das einzelne Bewußtsein allgemeiner betätigender Grund. Indem das Gemeinwesen sich nur durch die Störung der Familienglückseligkeit und die Auflösung des Selbstbewußtseins in das allgemeine sein Bestehen gibt, erzeugt es sich an dem, was es unterdrückt und was ihm zugleich wesentlich ist, an der Weiblichkeit überhaupt seinen inneren Feind. Diese – die ewige Ironie des Gemeinwesens – verändert durch die Intrige den allgemeinen Zweck der Regierung in einen Privatzweck, verwandelt ihre allgemeine Tätigkeit in ein Werk dieses bestimmten Individuums und verkehrt das allgemeine Eigentum des Staats zu einem Besitz und Putz der Familie. Sie macht hierdurch die ernsthafte Weisheit des reifen Alters, das, der Einzelheit – der Lust und dem Genusse sowie der wirklichen Tätigkeit – abgestorben, nur das Allgemeine denkt und besorgt, zum Spotte für den Mutwillen der unreifen Jugend und zur Verachtung für ihren Enthusiasmus, erhebt überhaupt die Kraft der Jugend zum Geltenden, – des Sohnes an dem die Mutter ihren Herrn geboren, des Bruders, an dem die Schwester den Mann als ihresgleichen hat, des Jünglings, durch den die Tochter, ihrer Unselbständigkeit entnommen, den Genuß und die Würde der Frauenschaft erlangt. –

(Hegel 1970a: 352–353)

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*Weiblichkeit* occurs only once while *womankind* occurs twice and *woman* once (in a prominent, sentence-initial position). While Hegel uses “sie” [she] once (capitalised because it is at the beginning of the sentence), this grammatically feminine pronoun refers back to *Weiblichkeit*, an abstract noun, rather than to a particular woman or to woman used as a universal. The pronoun could therefore arguably be translated as “it” rather than “she,” which adds a personal/anthropomorphising dimension to the abstract category. In more recent retranslations discussed in Table 8.8, this individualising and anthropomorphising connotation has been removed. The occurrence of different words in the text which seem to refer to the

Table 8.8 Corresponding excerpt from the Baillie and Hyppolite translations of Hegel’s discussion of *Antigone*, human and divine law, ethical action, guilt and destiny.

Baillie translation	Hyppolite translation
<p><u>Womankind</u> – the everlasting irony in the life of the community – changes by intrigue the universal purpose of government into a private end, transforms its universal activity into a work of this or that specific individual, and <u>perverts</u> the universal property of the state into a possession and ornament for the family. <u>Woman</u> in this way turns to ridicule the grave wisdom of maturity which, being dead to all particular aims, to private pleasure, personal satisfaction and actual activity as well, thinks of, and is concerned for, merely what is universal; <u>she</u> makes this wisdom the laughing-stock of raw and wanton youth, an object of derision and scorn, unworthy of their enthusiasm. <u>She</u> asserts that it is everywhere the force of youth that really counts; <u>she</u> upholds this as of primary significance; extols a son as one who is the lord and master of the mother who has borne him; a brother as one in whom the sister finds man on a level with herself; a youth as one through whom the daughter, freed from her dependence (on the family unity), <u>acquires</u> the satisfaction and the dignity of <u>wifehood</u>.</p> <p>(Hegel and Baillie 1910/1931: 474/276)</p>	<p><u>Cette féminité</u> – l’éternelle ironie de la communauté – altère par l’intrigue le but universel du gouvernement en un but privé, transforme son activité universelle en une œuvre de tel individu déterminé, et <u>pervertit</u> la propriété universelle de l’État en une possession et une parure de famille. Ainsi de la sagesse grave de la maturité qui, morte à la singularité – au plaisir et à la jouissance aussi bien qu’à l’activité effective – ne pense qu’à l’universel et ne se soucie que de lui, <u>elle</u> fait un objet de raillerie pour la pétulance d’une jeunesse sans maturité, et un objet de mépris pour son enthousiasme. <u>Elle</u> fait valoir en général la force de la jeunesse, celle du fils dans lequel la mère a engendré son maître, du frère dans lequel la sœur trouve l’homme comme son égal, du jeune homme grâce auquel la fille, soustraite à sa dépendance, <u>obtient</u> le plaisir et la dignité de <u>l’épouse</u>.</p> <p>(Hegel and Hyppolite 1939/1941: 41–42)</p>

same entity or event in the fabula layer (see Chapter 2) is a significant narrative feature relating to the way the story is retold or re-narrated by Miller. A difference in nuance between *womankind* and *woman*, which is not a feature of the German text at all, is suggested in the translation and prompts further investigation and discussion.

This distinction is at the heart of the question posed by Hutchings regarding the relevance of her quotation of the two sentences shaded in Tables 8.6 and 8.7 to feminist critiques of Hegel's interpretation of the Antigone story: "How is it that the examination of Antigone's specific crime is able to transmute into a generalised transhistorical claim about the role of woman in relation to the community?" (Hutchings 2003: 99). My suggestion is that, in this case, translation contributes subtly to the internal structuring of the universal concept of *womankind/woman* as perceived by readers, that is, to the fabula layer of the narrative. While Baillie and Miller probably sought to consolidate and objectify *womankind* as a unitary threat to both the ancient Greek and Roman civilisation and to their own respective phases of British imperial culture, the internal structure of the concept is and always has been more dynamic and less determinate than their conceptualisation and rhetoric suggests. Miller's commitment to avoiding the rigidity of "mere Understanding" is in fact more compatible with a dynamic understanding of *womankind*. In other words, the translation of *Weiblichkeit* as both *womankind* and *woman* can be read as suggesting either that *womankind* and *woman* refer to an identical category and are therefore synonyms, or that the use of a different word in the text suggests the existence (in the fabula of the narrative) of multiple or overlapping categories, still to be negotiated and requiring mutual recognition. In view of the wider narrative context surrounding his life (which included his friendship with Nellie Shaw, familiarity with Jung's psychology and his relationship with the women in his own family), Miller's translation invites the latter interpretation (allowing for diversity among women), even if his more explicit commitments around the time of the translation seem more inclined towards the former (unitary concept of *womankind*).

At the level of sentence structure, the most prominent feature in the German text shown in Table 8.7 is the long sentence (87 words) extending from the beginning of the shaded area to the end of the quotation. As we shall see in the next comparison, it was originally Baillie who broke this sentence up, repeating "Womankind" at the beginning of the shaded area, where Hegel has "Diese" [The latter . . .]. Baillie also added "Woman" and "she," using semicolons to separate the long sentence into individual clauses. Miller reproduced Baillie's structuring, using full stops instead of semicolons and removing some of Baillie's two-for-one translations, as can be seen with reference to the left column of Table 8.8. Overall, Miller's translation of Hegel's 87-word sentence comprises three sentences (37 words; 18 words; and 76 words = 131 words). At a quasi-forensic level of analysis (Al-Batineh 2019; Baker 2000), Miller's small-scale

interventions, such as the changes in punctuation, serve as evidence that he had read Baillie's translation carefully and approved the wording as an accurate rendition of Hegel's intentions, although, of course, he may also have realised that Baillie's wording would be received differently by readers in the 1970s and beyond. The German words *verkehrt* and *Frauenschaft* are also underlined in Table 8.8. While Baillie and Miller agreed on the translation *perverts*<sup>18</sup> and *wifehood* respectively, more recent translators have avoided these lexical items.

In the left column, Table 8.8 shows Baillie's original translation from the shaded area to the end of the quotation given in Tables 8.6 and 8.7. The right column shows Hyppolite's French translation of the same passage.

The similarities between Baillie's and Miller's versions of this passage are striking and, in view of the discussion of the master-slave narrative in the last subsection, suggest an analogous translation strategy of active resistance to change and solidarity with the previous, patriarchal generation of translators as a considered response to the dynamic social and political context, in this case, specifically regarding the changing role of women. As with the example of the master-slave narrative, Miller's retranslation restores Hegel's emphasis, which Baillie had removed, but Miller additionally capitalised Family, thereby subtly reinforcing the link between women and the family. Miller retains Baillie's restructuring of the long sentence using full stops instead of semicolons; and reduces the overall wordcount by trimming some of Baillie's two-word translations, such as *derision and scorn*, which becomes *derision*, but not *lord and master*, which Miller decided to retain. By way of numerical comparison, Baillie's version runs to 137 words (39 words to semicolon; 21 to full stop; 77 to full stop = 137); Miller's version is therefore only slightly shorter overall. Despite their restructuring, neither translation significantly increases the readability of this passage in terms of sentence length. As shown in Table 8.8, the contrast in length by comparison with the somewhat shorter French translation is also visually striking.

In combination with his lexical choices in this passage, Baillie's restructuring intensifies the rhetoric of Hegel's re-narration of the Antigone story, much as a prosecution lawyer might narrate the events of a case in a manner designed to convince the jury of the guilt of the accused. Baillie may have been prompted by Hegel's subtitle "Guilt and Destiny" to place "womankind" or "woman" on trial here alongside Antigone. In fact, two narrative strands intersect in this argument: woman/Antigone is accused of undermining the authority of a patriarchal government; and woman/Antigone is accused of favouring youth and energy or "force" over age, maturity and wisdom. In both respects, the accusatory tone is focussed in Baillie's translation through his use of emotionally charged vocabulary and phraseology: *perverts, laughing-stock, raw and wanton youth, the grave wisdom of maturity*. Although these translations correspond approximately with the German, they augment the intensity of



Hegel's rhetoric through imagery and prosodic features, which Baillie combines with the mastery of a barrister in a courtroom. This effect is especially increased by the rhetorical device of repetition: *womankind*, *womankind*, *woman*, *she* and *she* all point an accusing finger at the guilty party. A similarly powerful effect is achieved by the way Baillie lists the family members whom woman extols: a son, a brother, a youth. Miller's non-interventionist retranslation of this passage suggests that, despite his familiarity with early feminist views through his friendship with Nellie Shaw and her books, he was persuaded by Baillie's rhetoric. He accepted the restructuring and much of the vocabulary but, once again, toned down or euphemised (Bourdieu 1991: 83; Charlston 2012: 56)<sup>19</sup> the intensity, at the same time, protecting Hegel from criticism but also allowing space for more nuanced, retrospective interpretations.

Hyppolite acknowledged that he used the Baillie translation as a resource when working on his French translation of Hegel's *Phénoménologie de l'Esprit* (Hegel and Hyppolite 1939: vii),<sup>20</sup> an excerpt of which is also shown in Table 8.8. Although he presumably adopted the lexical component of *pervertit* from Baillie, Hyppolite's version is generally more concise. His choice of *féminité* as a translation of *Weiblichkeit* allowed him to avoid the personalisation and individualisation associated with the shift from *womankind* to *woman*, so that when Hyppolite uses the pronoun *elle*, it can be taken as merely grammatically feminine, referring back to the abstract noun rather than to particular women or a specific individual. Hyppolite also introduced his own creative restructuring of the long sentence by beginning hypotactically with a dependent clause (starting with *Ainsi de*, the dependent clause is shaded in Table 8.8). This also has the effect of toning down the rhetorical and potentially chauvinistic intensity introduced by Baillie.

However, the significance of this comparison for our understanding of Miller's translation strategies, their embedding within the surrounding narrative context and their potential transformative impact on subsequent interpretations relates to the way the various translations subtly influence the level of universality or generality at which Hegel's account is read. For pedagogical reasons, Hegel presumably intended a certain degree of ambiguity about the extent to which the narratives relating to the master-slave relationship and the Antigone story were to be understood as applicable universally, or only in particular or individual cases, such as Robinson Crusoe's island or the ancient Greek setting of Antigone. I imagine the classroom discussion of these narratives and their philosophical significance would have repeatedly touched on this question, especially since the terms "universal," "particular" and "individual" already occur frequently in both narratives. The key question, already mentioned in the quotation from Hutchings (2003: 99) is whether it is or ever was philosophically appropriate or politically correct to extrapolate from the Antigone story, e.g. to accept interpretations according to which Antigone's guilt is shared by all

women or some women or is explicable based on some attribute shared by women, because the underlying relationship between men and women, human and divine law applies universally for all time or, conversely, applies only specifically to the given, ancient Greek context. None of the translations is neutral in this respect. The suggestion that the Baillie and Miller versions with their relatively exaggerated misogynist rhetoric were or had become philosophically inappropriate and politically incorrect during the twentieth century is substantiated by reference to the following two retranslations of the same passage, which significantly revised precisely this aspect.

In this context, Hutchings' re-focalisation of Hegel's view of women is worth bearing in mind: "A Hegelian account of knowledge permits the claim that it makes sense to say that Hegel is more wrong about women now than he was when he made his claims, because his partial grasp of the position of women has become less and less sustained by spirit and the forms of its self-understanding in science and philosophy. . . . This is not a question of finding excuses for Hegel; rather, it is an attempt to understand the conditions for the production of truth as neither fixed nor arbitrary, but a matter of the complex potential of self-changing, self-interpreting being" (ibid: 109).

In the mid-1980s, some years after the publication of Miller's retranslation but also several years before Miller's death in 1991, a group of Hegel scholars who were critical of Miller's work began to meet at Trinity College at the University of Toronto to work on a new translation of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Approximately a decade after Miller's death and despite the considerable difficulties of coordinating such a group of philosophers, The Hegel Translation Group eventually published one chapter of the planned book entitled *Spirit: Chapter Six of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (Hegel and Shannon 2001). The Group's published translation product can be classified as a "thick translation" in that it comprises a scholarly introduction with full academic referencing and detailed footnotes. To some extent, the group translation is defined by its members' commitment to distinguishing their work from that of its predecessors, Baillie and Miller. The opening of the Introduction to the Translation, written by editor Daniel Shannon provides a good example of the phenomenon of "ageing" described by Sameh Hanna with reference to his Bourdieusian approach to translation studies (Hanna 2016: 62–63, 128–139). Shannon describes the aims of the group as follows:

This translation would employ the precise conceptual terminology that corresponds to Hegel's systematic categories. This decision was instigated by HS Harris, who argued that both Baillie's and AV Miller's translations of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* were defective in a number of areas.

(Hegel and Shannon 2001: vii)

To summarise the details of their criticisms, Baillie is said to lack precision, leaving the reader with a wordy and unwieldy text; Miller's work is

described as more elegant and useful, but “uses a variety of English expressions to render one German term without ever indicating to the reader that he is doing so.” He is also accused of misnumbering the paragraphs and dropping a word or phrase from the German. These criticisms of Miller’s translation, some of which Shannon explains in greater detail, were probably also instigated by H.S. Harris, who was consulted in connection with the Miller retranslation and, at one stage of the publication process, was to have provided footnotes (OUP 1973–1978). Although Miller mentions Harris in his Translator’s Foreword and was personally acquainted with Harris, Miller’s retranslation did not include any footnotes by Harris. Findlay’s paragraph-by-paragraph Analysis, which can be read almost like a synopsis at the end of the book, was eventually used instead of detailed footnotes.<sup>21</sup>

However, there is another sense in which the translation by The Hegel Translation Group distinguishes itself from its predecessors, further contributing to the phenomenon of ageing mentioned in the last paragraph. In harmony with its modern scholarly aspirations, the Group’s translation is more responsive and open to the wider socio-narrative context surrounding the translation, especially to the genealogy of relevant scholarship in the almost two intervening centuries between the publication of Hegel’s *Phänomenologie des Geistes* and the decade or so preceding the publication of the Group’s translation. In one case, for example, Shannon explains the Group’s use of a term associated with Heidegger and Sartre to translate an elusive Hegelian expression:

To illustrate the problem with Miller’s translation, we can consider just one instance where he obscures Hegel’s meaning by using too great a variety of English terms. The German expression *Sache selbst*, which is an important category in Hegel’s definition of Reason, is rendered by Miller as “subject matter,” “heart of the matter,” and “the thing itself,” among others. While the German can mean any one of these when used conventionally, Hegel almost always intends it to designate the “facticity of individual consciousness;” \* that is, the condition where consciousness identifies itself through its prudential self-interests and its reflection on worldly values. This term implies, for Hegel at least, a deception that spoils the “true character” of the Self and commits it to personal and moral error. This concept is the key for understanding the dialectic of Spirit, since Spirit’s journey in the World is to discover how to overcome the deception latent in the *Sache selbst*. Thus for any accurate translation of Hegel’s text it is essential to use as consistently as possible one term for this category, and I have used “facticity itself” accordingly.

(Hegel and Shannon 2001: viii)

“Facticity itself” is not an expression likely to create an “equivalent effect”<sup>22</sup> on modern readers by comparison with the effect Hegel’s expression *die Sache selbst* had on his nineteenth century readers. It reframes

Hegel's German Idealist philosophy with reference to modern, continental philosophy, as Shannon's footnote relating to the asterisk in the earlier quotation explains:

Footnote \*: Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre were the first to use this term, "facticity" (Faktizität, facticité), to indicate both the factual condition of consciousness and the malediction of inauthenticity (for Heidegger) or "bad faith" (for Sartre).

(ibid)

However, more important for the present focus on Miller's retranslation of the controversial paragraph on Antigone, ethical action and guilt, is The Hegel Translation Group's erudite but euphemising response to the now inescapable relevance of feminist and feminist-informed interpretations and criticisms of Hegel, such as the articles by Mills, Irigary and Butler investigated by Hutchings. Table 8.9 shows the Hegel Translation Group version

Table 8.9 Corresponding excerpt from retranslations of Hegel's discussion of *Antigone* by the Hegel Translation Group and by Terry Pinkard.

Hegel Translation Group	Pinkard
<p><i>This [female] principle</i> – the eternal irony of the community – changes the universal of the government into a private purpose through intrigue, transforms the universal activity of government into the work of some definite individual, and <i>inverts</i> the universal property of the state into the possession and adornment of a family.* In this way, the earnest wisdom of ripe old age, which, being dead to singularity – to pleasures and enjoyments, as well as to any active role – thinks and cares only for the universal, is made <i>by the female principle</i> into a laughingstock for the mischievous immaturity of youth, an object of contempt for their enthusiasm.** <i>The female principle</i> in general raises the strength of youth to what has value: that of the son, the master of the mother who bore him; that of the brother, in whom the sister has a man who is her equal; that of the young man, through whom the daughter loses her dependence and <i>achieves</i> the enjoyment and dignity of <i>wifehood</i>.</p> <p>(Hegel and Shannon 2001: 28–29)</p>	<p>By intrigue, <i>the feminine</i> – the polity's eternal irony – changes the government's universal purpose into a private purpose, transforms its universal activity into this determinate individual's work, and it <i>inverts</i> the state's universal property into the family's possession and ornament. In this way, <i>the feminine</i> turns to ridicule the solemn wisdom of maturity, which, being dead to individuality – dead to pleasure and enjoyment as well as to actual activity – only thinks of and is concerned for the universal. <i>The feminine</i> turns this mature wisdom into an object of ridicule for immature, high-spirited youths and into an object of contempt for those youths' enthusiasm. As such, <i>she</i> elevates the force of youth into the status of what is validly in force – <i>she</i> elevates the force of the son, born to his mother as her master, and what counts is the force of the brother as one in whom the sister finds a man as an equal with herself, the man through whom the daughter, freed from her own non-self-sufficiency, <i>achieves</i> the enjoyment and the dignity of <i>womanhood</i>.</p> <p>(Hegel and Pinkard 2018: 428–429)</p>

(2001) of the excerpt under discussion alongside Pinkard's version (2018). Both retranslations actively distinguish themselves from Baillie's and Miller's handling of Hegel's discussion of *Weiblichkeit* in this paragraph.<sup>23</sup>

The italicization in Table 8.9 has been added to highlight terms central to the present discussion. The asterisks in the left column refer to Shannon's footnotes, in which he partially explains but also obscures the translation strategy adopted here, as the following examples show:

Footnote \*: Hegel's remark appears to be highly chauvinistic and even derogatory towards the "female principle," but we must remember that he is expressing the situation of the Greek (and later Roman) political life. Even in the Greek plays that are "pro" female, it is quite clear that it is the women who counsel war, seek revenge, and push their husbands to action. . . . So it is not that Hegel is being overtly chauvinistic with these remarks he is indicating an ethical character belonging to womankind as recorded in the ancient world. This conception shows *female facticity*, which itself shows us the nature of guilt.

(Hegel and Shannon 2001: 28)

It is evident from Table 8.9 that the Hegel Translation Group disagreed with the Baillie/Miller translation – with *womankind*, *woman* and *she* – and that they have substituted the term *female principle*, adding square brackets around *female* without explanation (but presumably in response to the fact that Hegel did not repeat the word *Weiblichkeit* at this point. Hegel's "Diese" (see Table 8.7) refers back to *Weiblichkeit* but the translation suggests that it is the abstract, universal female principle rather than its instantiations in actual, particularised or individualised women which is the focus of interest here. Indeed, the footnote suggests, further, that this is a historically situated female principle and must be thought of in the context of the ancient world. Despite the removal of the word *womankind* from the text of the translation, this word is used in the footnote. The cross-reference to *womankind* would therefore be understood by scholars familiar with Miller and Baillie but not by readers unfamiliar with the older translations. While this footnote and the next footnote, which also references the ancient Greek background, apply considerable subtlety and scholarship in the attempt to deflect readers from concluding that Hegel's philosophy is "chauvinistic and derogatory" towards women, the final statement of the second footnote is unlikely to convince the feminist critics discussed by Hutchings:

Footnote \*\*: Hegel is attempting to show us how our social self emerges from the natural self, and in this context passion and appetite are stronger, more vital powers than rationality. That reason is "superior" to these other powers occurs only through the suppression of the female principle.

(Hegel and Shannon 2001: 29)

To the more recent generation of intellectuals and activists whose education has included postcolonial and feminist thought, the association of women and/or the female principle with passion and appetite and men and/or the male principle with rationality or reason, and the anachronistic suggestion that reason, rationality and therefore men might be “superior” outweighs such attempts at subtlety, scholarship and hegemonically elevated style. However, tactfully it is done, restating this case in a footnote to a retranslation is a performative act which prompts an activist response. Contemporary witnesses will no longer remain silent.

As we have already seen, Pinkard’s 2018 retranslation of Hegel’s *Phenomenology* is characterised by its commitment to terminological consistency. While adopting some of the reframing strategies introduced by his predecessors, such as the replacement of *perverts* with *inverts*, and improving on others, such as his repeated use of *the feminine* and his avoidance of the terms *womankind*, *woman* and *wifehood*, Pinkard also prudently, and somewhat more confidently than the Hegel Translation Group, avoids detailed peritextual engagement with accusations against Hegel’s putative misogyny. By contrast with these critical responses to Miller’s work, the present analysis suggests that Miller’s attempts to avoid “rigid consistency” were part of a broader de-politicising strategy attributable to Miller’s historical situatedness, which was out of touch with contemporary social and political developments but nevertheless has positive implications as a prompt for feminist activist rethinkings of Hegel along the lines suggested by Hutchings (2003).

## Summary and Conclusions

Chapter 8 restaged the politically controversial *Phenomenology of Spirit* with reference to relevant contemporary narratives, including those identified in Miller’s story. A comparison with previous and subsequent translations, identified strategic details in Miller’s retranslation of the famous master-slave narrative designed to resist politicised responses to this text, e.g. by Alexandre Kojève, Carla Lonzi and Simone de Beauvoir. Miller’s intransigent, passively misogynist framing of “womankind” in the Antigone story contrasts with his strategically inconsistent translations of *aufheben*/*sublate* throughout the *Phenomenology*, further demonstrating the potential of translation to reconstruct a less-than-certain interlocutory space around the pre-mature Hegel. Miller’s intention was presumably to weaken or soften the focus of the *Phenomenology* by contrast with the mature and rigorous *Science of Logic*. But his retranslation strategies in the *Phenomenology* also demonstrated the creative potential of translation to broaden and renegotiate the conceptual and socio-narrative space, especially around politically significant concepts. Viewed through the lens of Flotow’s intersectional reinterpretation of gender performativity (2011), Miller’s masculinist performativity in this text enacts a differently

situated, less fixed, remembered, age-specific identity role than in his other translations.

Strategies adopted by Miller in the excerpts analysed effectively obscured liberal elements in Hegel's political philosophy. Feminist responses to Hegel's philosophy (Butler 2004; Hutchings 2003) and aspects of feminist translation studies (Flotow 2011; Flotow 2014; Shread 2019) suggest the possibility of "undoing" some of Miller's defensive work to release an inherent potential for transformative, postcolonial and feminist rethinking of Hegel. In particular, Miller's more tentative, exploratory approach to translating *aufheben* with multiple approximate synonyms is juxtaposed with his seemingly unresponsive retention of Baillie's translations *bondage* and *womankind*. One imaginative response to Miller's strategy would be to transfer the tentative, exploratory approach of generating multiple near synonyms to the translation of concepts like *slavery* and *woman*. Miller recognised the need for greater flexibility in the translation and conceptualisation of *aufheben* and demonstrated surprising creativity. Similar creativity and sensitivity in the re-conceptualisation of man, woman, freedom, slavery, oppression, dependency, family, nation, state and many other politically relevant, contested concepts is required in response to contemporary social and cultural changes which were unimaginable to Miller.

In his retranslation of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Miller began to do things differently with Hegel's words and with his own. The combination of creative re-remembering (Flotow 2011a: 142) of the pre-mature Hegel, on the one hand, with intransigent adherence to specific conceptualisations, such as the biblical characterisation of *Lordship* and *Bondage* and the looming Other of a politicised *Womankind*, on the other, destabilises the translation, opening it up as a new interlocutory space for rethinking and renegotiation in light of the radically different social dynamics and gender identities of the contemporary world.

## Notes

1. For many years, Miller was a member of the Church of England Men's Society which placed special emphasis on the role and special responsibilities of fathers in the church community and in the family. Faced with rapidly progressing social changes including the role of women in society and in the church, the CEMS was abandoned in 1985. Explanations for their decision were published in a document entitled "A Time to be Born and a Time to Die." The title of Chapter 9 alludes to this document and the associated sense of reluctant valediction.
2. The letters between various participants in the translation and publishing processes are arranged in chronological order between 1973 and 1978 with notes added in the 1980s.
3. This was translated by Nichols as follows: "Hegel . . . posits work as the essence, the self-verifying essence, of man" (Kojève 2007: 26).
4. The tensions between the logocentricity of Western philosophy and postcolonial responses to this has recently been analysed with specific reference to the translation of philosophical texts (Zhang 2019).



5. This applies especially to certain passages in the *Zusätze* to Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* referring e.g. to the bone structure and uninterested *naïveté* of non-European races, such as "negroes" (Hegel and Miller 1971: 42). Findlay's attempt to euphemise or whitewash such passages as "prejudices" of the time was discussed in Chapter 3. Once again, the ethical standards demanded of translators of philosophy have been raised during recent history, especially in view of developments in feminist translation theory.
6. Pinkard has pointed out that there are inconsistencies in the numbering system applied by Miller which he has corrected to correspond more closely with Hegel's in his own two-column parallel-text translation (Hegel and Pinkard 2018).
7. The German titles are: A. Selbständigkeit und Unselbständigkeit des Selbstbewußtseins; Herrschaft und Knechtschaft (Hegel 1970a: 145).
8. For further information about Robinson and Robinsonades, see e.g. *Mapping Men and Adventure* (Phillips 1997).
9. In the Note on the Translation and Commentary to his recent retranslation of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (Hegel and Inwood 2018: xxi–xxii), Michael Inwood mentions the partial loss of Hegel's punctuation and emphasis in Miller's translation. However, the present analysis, especially in Chapter 7, that Miller restored a great deal of Hegel's emphasis by comparison with his predecessor translators but "toned down" the overall impression. Miller also strategically modified Hegel's punctuation, possibly to improve readability. But as shown in this chapter, Miller's interventions regarding punctuation provide quasi-forensic evidence that he had carefully considered the content of passages even when they are almost identical to the earlier translation.
10. See Table 7.6 for a numerical analysis of Miller's translations of *aufheben* in the *Phenomenology*, including his preference for *supersedes/supersession*.
11. In the cited letter, Miller notes that occult science had not "grasped the scheme of creation sub specie aeternitatis"; only Hegelian logic had achieved this.
12. See for example the OED 2nd Edition entry for *supersession*: [www.oed.com/oed2/00242795](http://www.oed.com/oed2/00242795).
13. The discussion is referenced at: [www.firstthings.com/article/2019/02/supersessionism-hard-and-soft](http://www.firstthings.com/article/2019/02/supersessionism-hard-and-soft).
14. Pinkard explains in his translator's note that he wishes to use terminology consistently to highlight the scientific nature of philosophy.
15. In Hegel's text, Antigone and Sophocles are mentioned once at the end of the chapter on Reason (Hegel and Miller 1977: 261) and only once more in the whole book (Hegel and Miller 1977: 284). Sophocles is also mentioned in (editorial) footnotes in each case.
16. It is probably this understanding of Hegel which outraged C.S. Lewis, as referenced in his reply to Miller's letter discussed in Chapter 2.
17. A detailed explanation of Hegel's "concrete universal" was given by Stern (2009), who also recently spoke at a seminar in Durham: "Conversations on the Concrete Universal," 17 May 2019. Stern distinguished the abstract from the concrete universal in Hegelian philosophy with reference to different types of judgement. According to the judgement of the concept, an individual is judged normatively "based on how well it exemplifies the kind to which it belongs: 'This house, lacking a roof, is bad'." Thinking of woman or womankind as an abstract universal accordingly lacks this normative dimension. To be consistent with himself and his frequent references, Miller should have regarded an abstract conceptualisation of womankind as an example of "mere Understanding." The higher, reason-governed conceptualisation would be based on the normativity suggested by the concrete universal. Woman is not a fixed category but more like a work in constant progress.

Each individual achieves her own dynamic realisation or actualisation of what it is to be or become a woman. While male philosophers had long pondered the realisation of their own selves, they tended to categorise women abstractly and thereby denigrate women by contrast with themselves. Pursued in this manner, Hegelian philosophy could encourage further exploration of this aspect of metaphysics contributing to a re-reading of certain aspects of Hegel's writing, especially about women.

18. It is interesting regarding the reception of the translations, that the term "perverts," which seems to derive from the English and French Hegel translations, plays a prominent role in Butler's discussion of Antigone (Butler 2000).
19. Bourdieu uses the term "euphemisation" to describe how the political origins and embeddedness of cultural products is concealed through "exportation." In other words, translation often serves to de-politicise otherwise politically relevant texts.
20. Hyppolite also mentions that he referred to Enrico de Negri's 1943 Italian translation, which must have been in preparation at around the same time as Volume II of Hyppolite's work. These references reinforce narratives linking the reception of Hegel's work with aspects of Italian Fascism and the work of Gentile and Croce (Charlston 2012).
21. Harris wrote two reviews (Harris 1979a, 1979b) on Miller's translation; after publication, he circulated critical notes among the circle of Hegel experts (Harris 1978) and contributed to the Hegel Translation Group which eventually published *Spirit: Chapter Six of the Phenomenology* (Hegel and Shannon 2001).
22. See Chapter 2 for details of E.V. Rieu's theory of translation and its probable influence on Miller.
23. In this context, Frederick Beiser's distinction between "antiquarian" and "anachronistic" approaches to Hegel in twentieth century reception history also seems relevant to the translations (Beiser 2008: 7). I repeat this footnote in Chapters 2 and 9. Translators can exhibit greater or lesser concern for the antiquarian/historical accuracy of their work (although it is delusory to think anyone can know with certainty "what Hegel meant"); or they can show an anachronistic/ethically responsible concern for the impact of the translation on contemporary readers. In the examples cited, Miller and the Hegel Translation Group were negotiating this interlocutory space. See also the invitation in Chapter 9, especially if you would like to participate in this translatorial renegotiation and rethinking.

## 9 A Time to Be Born and a Time to Die

### An Invitation

A conference paper delivered by Miller in 1978 provides a natural conclusion to this book. In the paper, Miller explained his views on Hegel's belief in personal immortality and the "God-man relationship." Miller's talk must have surprised his philosophical audience, but in view of the socio-narrative analysis pursued throughout this book, it can be seen to exemplify yet another enactment of the uniquely gendered, age-specific identity role discerned in the Hegel translations and intersecting with narratives of Miller's life. This book concludes that Miller's translations of Hegel allowed him to accumulate the symbolic capital required for unprecedented social and cultural mobility and offered a space and a time for exploration and performance of complex ontological narratives of self-absorption in and through the Hegelian texts he translated. For Miller, Hegel's philosophy allowed (self-)selected human minds to approach and approximate the immortality and infinitude of God's mind through the strenuous, intellectual effort of reading and translating Hegel.

But understanding the situatedness of the translator, Arnold Miller, and his embeddedness among specific narratives circulating within the social space around him provides a potential basis for "undoing" some of this interpretive content in the translations to allow a rethinking of practical implications of Hegel's philosophy, for example, as suggested by Hutchings (2003) supplemented with Flotow's response to Butler's developing ideas about gender performativity (Flotow 2011; Parker and Sedgwick 1995a, 1995b). The certainty and truth which Hegel's philosophy offered Miller and his associates was based on an understanding of philosophical purity which effectively excluded from consideration many of the social and political implications of Hegel's philosophy which now seem most urgently in need of the clear-headed and rigorous analysis promised by philosophy, in particular, the social dynamics relating to culture, ethnicity and gender. In retrospect, Miller's hopes for Hegelian philosophy seem pre-mature. Rather than the distant promise of rational self-determination, personal immortality, logical certainty and oneness with God aspired to by Miller, it might be more reasonable to hope that philosophical truths can be apprehended gradually in inclusive, practical

contexts, renegotiated and re-narrated by each generation, each self-supporting group of people as well as every individual.

Arnold Miller gave his paper, entitled "Absolute Knowing and the Destiny of the Individual" (Miller 1983a), at the final session of the Fifth Biennial Meeting of the Hegel Society of America, Pennsylvania State University on 14 October 1978.<sup>1</sup> His audience would have comprised Hegel experts, readers and critics of his recent translation of Hegel's *Phenomenology* (Hegel and Miller 1977). Like many examples of public and disciplinary narrative discussed in this book, the text of his talk contains signs of strategic framing with this specific, expert audience in mind, the witnesses to Miller's performance. But Miller did not pander to his audience. In fact, by dissociating himself from what was becoming the conventional, politicised view of Hegel in the 1970s, by focussing selectively on religion, immortality, reincarnation and the "God-man relationship," he may have deliberately disappointed some listeners/readers precisely by not giving them what they were hoping for. He explains, "When Hegel wrote the *Phenomenology*, he had already completed his philosophical development, he had already discovered the Concept" (ibid). But for Miller, the *Phenomenology* was not the heart of Hegel's philosophy; it was a "ladder to bridge the gap between the standpoint of the ordinary consciousness and that of Absolute Knowing"; it remained, in a sense, pre-mature, a stage on the road towards the *Science of Logic*. And Miller used this paper to reiterate the point mentioned in the letters to Barfield that those who rely on the *Phenomenology* as a way into Hegel's philosophy are likely to set off on the wrong track. In the talk, Miller comments that, in general, Hegel "knew that his students did not fully understand him. . . . Yet he was not deliberately obscure. In the lengthy introductions and copious notes which accompany his works he took immense pains to help his students come to grips with the subject-matter in hand. But at times he seems to have been pessimistic about finding a public prepared to take on the strenuous effort demanded by the Concept . . ." (ibid).

The social dynamics in and around Miller's talk are fascinating and prompt a return to the questions posed in Chapter 1. What can a case study on Miller's translations of Hegel tell us about the relationship between the context of a translator's life and the content of the books s/he translated, and how might such insights inform and transform our reading of the translated texts?

For Miller, discovery of the "Concept" was the endpoint of a progressive narrative, a journey which Hegel had already completed by 1807 when he published the *Phenomenology*. Miller implies that he too had made this journey. The problem still facing Hegel in 1807 was to formulate his findings appropriately and to find a public prepared to listen to the solution he had found. Miller was in no doubt that Hegel had discovered the truth, freedom and immortality, and formulated these ideals fully in the *Science of Logic*. "Freedom and immortality are key

words in Hegel's philosophy, but if personal immortality is a myth, if the individuality as being-for-self is extinguished at death, then all talk of freedom and the absolute worth of the individual is a mockery" (ibid). Hegel's temporary pessimism relates to the difficulty of sharing his conceptions of freedom, truth and immortality with other people. It is a difficulty which characterises the translation of philosophy. Yet overall, Miller's commitment to Hegel is based on more optimistic beliefs that the difficulties faced by Hegel and his translators can be overcome through strenuous effort, that people can be found who are prepared to make this effort and that those who have already discovered the Concept can help others, their students, to make the effort required. These three principles suggest tentative answers to the research questions. Miller's translations and retranslations were a demonstration and a performance of his own strenuous effort, firstly, to come to grips with Hegel's philosophy but secondly, to help his potential readers to make the effort required of them if they are eventually to discover the Concept or to reach "the standpoint of Absolute Knowing."

Despite the apparently liberal, Christian/ethical idea of "making an effort" to help others to progress towards Absolute Knowing, freedom and immortality, Miller's interpretation of Hegel is individualistic, exclusive and elitist. He introduces the central focus of his talk as follows: "Now the Oriental idea of metempsychosis was, of course, rejected by Hegel, but the paragraph [the last paragraph of the *Phenomenology* quoted in Miller's talk] undoubtedly describes a process of reincarnation. However, it is not clear what spirit it is that reincarnates" (ibid). Miller concludes that what Hegel has in mind is the reincarnation of individual spirits, "each and every individual." This might sound democratic, but it is evident from the context that only very few individuals can reach "the standpoint of Absolute Knowing." Furthermore, Miller repeats the gender restriction on individuality already mentioned several times in this book. He writes of "the process in which the individual achieves *his* spiritual self-realisation." In general, Miller's comments suggest a rejection of the oriental, the irrational and the synoptic, but Miller does not reject the idea of an esoteric brotherhood of philosophers who have completed the journey and now look back from the position of having "discovered the Concept."

Many of Miller's translational strategies can be understood against this background, especially, for example, the elevated style, the retention of religious language in favour of more modernising, secularised or politicised vocabulary discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. The translations are not designed to make access to Hegel and his truths easy or democratic; they are designed to encourage the serious-minded, those committed to spirituality and the God-man relationship, to increase their efforts. But they inevitably also discourage others, who "faintheartedly flee" from the "immensity of the demand made on the human spirit" (ibid).

For Miller as a translator, it was unacceptable to diminish the immensity of the spiritual demand articulated through Hegel's works. This explains his aversion to social and political philosophy and interpretations of Hegel which minimise the religious and spiritual dimension. These are the contingent and distracting "molehills" of everyday life in opposition to the necessary "mountains" of pure thought. The translatorial and editorial reframing strategies identified in the peritextual and textual elements discussed in Chapter 3, especially those designed to "fence" off the *Phenomenology* from the *Science of Logic* and the *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences*, articulate this binary, hierarchical division, which is, of course, denigrating by implication to all those who fall short of the immense demands.

The competitive, performative implications of Miller's stance are also evident from this analysis. Like the theosophical, anthroposophical and other esoteric approaches referenced in Chapter 5 in connection with Sedlák, Miller's conception of Hegelian spiritual progress was primarily concerned with the ascent of a (male) individual to higher levels of spirituality, through strenuous intellectual concentration. Those who are unable to achieve this feat are left behind and remain naïve like the "primitive" civilisations discussed in the *Philosophy of Mind*. They have little chance of "catching up." The binary and the hierarchical structuring here augment the performative prowess and distinction of those who move beyond "ordinary consciousness."

Nevertheless, despite misgivings about ideological assumptions articulated through Miller's Cold-War retranslations of Hegel, his effort-intensive strategy of providing more than 40 translations for Hegel's term *aufheben* in the *Phenomenology* introduced a creative, imaginative and potentially transformative dimension to his work. As discussed in Chapter 7, Miller seems to have adopted this strategy in defiance of his advisors and critics and by way of unexplained divergence from his approach in the *Science of Logic*. Although Miller has been criticised for inconsistency in this and other respects, it is more likely that he was making a "strenuous effort" to help "uninitiated" readers towards an understanding of a concept which is explained more fully in the *Science of Logic*. If this was the case, Miller's strategy can be thought of as innovative and optimistic. It points towards an understanding of translation as performative in an exploratory sense – as discussed in Chapters 2 and 8 with reference to Flotow (2011) – and transformative. While Flotow suggests that the pessimism of Butler's performative "cage" can be overcome with a more imaginative, creative approach to gender roles, which must be constantly formed and negotiated, a similar dynamic of "undoing" the rigidity of the cage is applicable to Miller's Hegel. Indeed, Miller's strategy with *aufheben* in the *Phenomenology* suggests precisely this.

As the biographical Chapters 4, 5 and 6 showed, Miller's life was transformed several times: by war, by meeting diverse people (especially Francis

Sedlák) and, spectacularly, by reading and translating Hegel. Although he was undeniably drawn towards Hegel's philosophy because of the certainty it promised him after the traumatic uncertainties of his early life, Miller's creativity in the translation of *aufheben* invites a commensurately imaginative response from his readers. For Miller, rigid terminological consistency was useful in some contexts but not in others. In the *Phenomenology*, he was prepared to experiment, and, although he was not prepared to share the exploratory nature of his translation with his readers – he did not explain what he was doing – his strategy was open to inspection. In his notes (Miller n.d.), he sometimes used a favourite expression, “translators live in glass houses.” For Miller's generation, the “glasshouse” was the army slang term for “military prison”; as well as the focus of a proverb: “people who live in glass houses should beware of stones”; and, of course, an alternative term for “greenhouse” where plants are grown. The approach to his translations adopted in this book has provided privileged glimpses inside the glass house, especially showing up Miller's deliberate inclusion of a (presumably) pedagogical, transformative, destabilising element. Miller's first move in this direction suggests the possibility of further transformative encroachments into the conceptual stability usually associated with Hegel's speculative philosophy.

Miller's turn towards outward conventionality in the 1930s gave him respectability and a stable framework within which he could perform successfully as a civil servant, a husband, a father and, in later life, as a published translator of Hegel. Aspects of the various roles he adopted were ready-made; like the retranslations, they simply needed to be adapted, revised and re-enacted. In this sense, Miller's performativity could be thought of as “caged” by convention (Butler 1988; Flotow 2011). However, Miller's ostensibly “inconsistent” translations of *aufheben* in the *Phenomenology* demonstrate that, despite convention, an “interlocutory space” still existed between the bars of the cage, a translational space for creative performativity and renegotiation of apparently rigid roles. It is Miller's virtuosic exploration of this space in the *Phenomenology* translation, his imaginative use of 44 near synonyms for Hegel's elusively transformative term *aufheben/sublate*, which ultimately render the work of Miller's later years optimistic. The challenge still facing translators and readers of Hegel is to respond creatively to the interlocutory spaces identifiable in his work. To keep on translating concepts like *womankind*, whose phenomenological referents have already changed beyond recognition by comparison with their Sophoclean and/or Hegelian senses.

This brings us to a final quotation about “untranslatability” which is already familiar in translation studies but deserves to be repeated as a pendant to Miller's retranslations of Hegel. Miller's approach to *aufheben* in the *Phenomenology*, eloquently demonstrates the need to “stay with the trouble” (Haraway 2016), to keep on translating difficult works and difficult concepts, despite their sometimes undemocratic inaccessibility,



as an aspiration and a performance towards broader understanding and engagement with the intersecting narratives which form and transform the social space in which we live.

To speak of untranslatables in no way implies that the terms in question, or the expressions, the syntactical or grammatical turns, are not and cannot be translated: the untranslatable is rather what one keeps on (not) translating [*l'intraduisible, c'est plutôt ce qu'on ne cesse pas de (ne pas) traduire*]. But this indicates that their translation, into one language or another, creates a problem, to the extent of sometimes generating a neologism or imposing a new meaning on an old word.

(Cassin 2014: xvii)

### **Beyond the Conclusion: An Invitation to [avmiller.co.uk](http://avmiller.co.uk)**

As a concluding gesture, Mary Lettington and I would like to invite readers to respond imaginatively and creatively to the opportunity of transforming Miller's seemingly unresponsive and outdated handling of "womankind" in the quotation from the *Antigone* passage discussed in Chapter 8. Miller kept the same wording as his predecessor, Sir James Black Baillie, "Womankind – the everlasting irony [in the life] of the community – changes by intrigue the universal end of the government into a private end, transforms its universal activity into a work of some particular individual, and perverts the universal property of the state into a possession ornament for the Family." More than a decade later, Miller's critics and successors in the Hegel Translation Group tried to improve on his translation with "This [female] principle – the eternal irony of the community – changes the universal of the government into a private purpose through intrigue, transforms the universal activity of government into the work of some definite individual, and inverts the universal property of the state into the possession and adornment of a family," how would you continue the transformation of this idea through translation? This performative question/invitation is intended to evoke an unlimited range of responses anywhere in the sentence. While some will feel their response must correspond with what they see as Hegel's intentions as expressed in German, otherwise it would not be a translation, others will see this as an opportunity to diverge from Hegel to say something they believe more appropriate to contemporary circumstances. Even those who wish to stay close to Hegel will probably be inclined to add information, either in the text or in a footnote, for example, to the effect that Hegel meant "women in ancient Greek, patriarchal societies but not modern women."<sup>2</sup> Even with this one clause, responses need not be restricted to the single word *Weiblichkeit/womankind*. Some readers might want to leave "womankind" but transform "perverts" into something quite different, such as "frustrates," "enriches" or even "transforms."

We have set up a special A.V. Miller website and blog for your responses to this question and/or to the book in general at: <https://avmiller.co.uk>. The website contains further information about Miller's life and work. The initial invitation to respond to Miller's translation of the *Antigone* passage can, of course, be extended to include other passages which readers of this book and/or users of the website are motivated to engage with and transform.

There is a performative element to this suggestion because even making a small modification to a canonical philosophical text requires a certain degree of circumspection and commitment. Although you may submit anonymous suggestions and are not therefore in the same kind of glass house, vulnerable to external, retrospective scrutiny, as Miller was, you will be aware that many others, the witnesses to your translatorial performance, may be reading your response. In this sense, perhaps Miller's translations of Hegel can indeed continue their transformative work beyond the Cold War and even beyond an individual lifetime.

For me, Miller's extended metaphor about translators living in glass houses invites primarily an optimistic interpretation. I have come to think about Miller's translations of Hegel rather in the way that Nellie Shaw looked back on the Whiteway experiment. She wrote, "I cannot bear the thought that the splendid attempt to create a little Utopia in the midst of a capitalistic world should fade into oblivion, or that the self-sacrifice, courage and devotion to high ideals should be forgotten." Shaw's words apply poignantly to Miller's historically situated Cold-War retranslations of Hegel. The utopian vision of Hegelianism to which he aspired may never be achieved but his strenuous intellectual and spiritual efforts should not be wasted; may they continue to make a difference. The detailed analysis provided through socio-narrative theory, Bourdieusian sociology and feminist translation studies has indeed allowed privileged access and promoted a deeper, contextualised comprehension of Miller's work. But through the lens of translation studies, the glasshouse of Hegelian translation continues to offer democratically expanding spaces and times in which words, concepts, ideas, ideologies and even pure thoughts continue to grow and to be transformed.

## Notes

1. The CD with Miller's account of his experiences in WWI, (discussed at the start of Chapter 6) contains an audio recording of Miller rehearsing this talk.
2. In this context, Frederick Beiser's distinction between "antiquarian" and "anachronistic" approaches to Hegel in twentieth century reception history seems relevant to the translations (Beiser 2008: 7). I repeat this footnote from Chapters 2 and 8. Translators can exhibit greater or lesser concern for the antiquarian/historical accuracy of their work (although it is delusory to think anyone can know with certainty "what Hegel meant"), or they can show an anachronistic/ethically responsible concern for the impact of the translation on contemporary readers. Miller and the Hegel Translation Group were negotiating this philosophically significant space.

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